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THIRD BOOK 
CONSTITUTION  OF THE  STATE 
VOL. I1 FORMS  OF  CONSTITUTION 
WE  have  in  this  chapter  to  investigate  the 
various  forms which the constitution of  a  State 
may  assume.  We  must,  in  the  first  instance, 
eliminate that false theory of  the powers of  the 
State which  has long  exercised a confusing  in- 
fluence on the science of  government. 
Aristotle  says that in  every State there is a 
triple source of  authority : TA  ~ov~~v6~~vov  mpZ  TGV 
KOLV~~,  TA  mpl T~F  APX&,  and  TA  611ca~ov. 
This scheme, called the "  triaspolitica " of  the 
Stagirite, was elaborated in the course of  succeed- 
ing  centuries,  and  has  been  more  particularly 
adopted and distorted by modern political philo- 
sophers.  After  the  Revolution  of  1688  Locke 
evolved the doctrine  of  the division  of  powers. 
Following in Locke's  footsteps, Montesquieu dis- 
tinguished three separate authorities in the State 
-the  legislative, the judicial,  and a third called 
by Locke the federative. 
Montesquieu describes it as that power which 
deals with  matters inseparable from the law  of 
nations : immediately afterwards he  calls it out- 
right the executive authority.  Now  the essence 
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of  liberty is said to consist in the separation of 
these  three  authorities,  which  must  never  be 
united in a single grasp.  This ideal was realized 
for  Montesquieu  in  the  England  of  his  day, 
which  in  his  eyes  "reflected  freedom  as in  a 
mirror."  Rarely  has  a  more  stupendous  error 
been  enunciated; beyond  all  question it is  pre- 
cisely in England that this division  was  not to 
be  found.  It  is  indeed  true  that  the  judicial 
authority  was  in  that  country  comparatively 
independent, and this caused Montesquieu's mis- 
take.  He was a scion of the old French noblesse 
de  robe,  or  hereditary  magistracy,  which  was 
able  to display  a  certain  stubbornness  towards 
the Crown just  because it was hereditary.  Ani- 
mated  by  this  spirit,  Montesquieu  lays  special 
stress  upon  the fact that the regular  course of 
justice  in  England  could  not,  as in  France, be 
arbitrarily  disturbed  by  means  of  lettres  de 
cachet.  The power  of  the Crown had, however, 
faded to a shadow : the House of  Commons both 
made the laws and controlled  the policy  of  the 
nation  so  completely  that  whoever  had  its 
confidence  necessarily  became  the  inspirer  of 
England's foreign policy.  In England, therefore, 
the exact contrary of  this much-prized  division 
was discernible ; and if  we  contemplate modern 
constitutional monarchies we perceive that, wher- 
ever  the  Kingship  is  vigorous,  as  in  Prussia, 
there  also  the division  of  authority  is  lacking. 
All authority in the state is centred in the King. 
Without his assent no law is valid ; in his name 
justice  is  administered ; his  instructions  direct 
foreign  policy  and  internal  government.  And 
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yet  how  capricious  is  this  division.  How  is  it  . 
possible  to speak  of  a  purely  executive  office ? 
Every  administration  not  only  executes  but 
co-operates in the further development of  legisla- 
tion.  As  this fact came to be  more  and more 
realized a variety of  further pouvoirs were evolved, 
primarily  by  French thinkers :  a pouuoir  klectif 
alleged  to  be  inherent  with  the  electorate,  a 
pouvoir rnoddrateur with which Benjamin Constant 
endows the King for the purpose  of  reconciling 
the  Chambers,  etc.  All  this  is  merely  the idle 
sport of  ingenuity.  This whole  doctrine  of  the 
three authorities in the State and their division 
is  the  toy  of  theory  and  playful  fancy.  The 
essence of  the State is its unity, and that State is 
the best  organized in which these three powers 
are  united  in  one  supreme  and  independent 
hand. 
Thus  this  separation  is  equally  untenable 
both  in  theory  and  in  practice.  Far  more 
satisfactory  than  this  ancient  doctrine  is  that 
which  divides power  into the constitutional and 
administrative  categories.  By  constitution  we 
understand the totality of  institutions by which 
the unified will  of  the State is consolidated  and 
expressed ; the juridical  character  of  the State, 
the  division  of  classes,  distribution  of  offices, 
and appointments, etc.  Administration,  on  the 
other  hand, is  the  aggregate of  institutions by 
means  of  which  the will  of  the State thus em- 
bodied manifests itself in the diverse relations of 
life.  At  first  sight  this  is  a  purely  theoretical 
distinction.  As  in  the  realm  of  thought  in 
general, so here too we  have to deal with elastic 6  FORMS OF CONSTITUTION  ARISTOTLE AND MONTESQUIEU  7 
conceptions.  Many departments of  State belong 
to its constitutional as well  as to its administra- 
tive  side.  Whether  the State is  supported  by 
universal military service, or a  mercenary  army, 
or a feudal army, is a constitutional question of 
the first rank, for upon its solution depends the 
character  of  the  State, whereas  the  particular 
technical  questions of  the military  organization 
are administrative matters.  Again, in finance a 
sharp  division  would  be  found  impossible.  Is 
there a general liability to taxation ?  Are taxes 
imposed  by the sole  authority of  the  State, or 
in virtue of  the taxpayer's vote ?  Is any person 
exempt  from  taxation ?  These  are all  weighty 
constitutional  questions.  The  classifying  of  a 
tax as direct  or  indirect,  however,  falls  within 
the  range  of  administration.  The  essence  of 
each  separate  institution  must  be  sought :  by 
this  process  it will  become  apparent  that the 
country's  army  and  finance  belong  to the  ad- 
ministrative half of  the State. 
If  we  take  a  rapid  survey  of  the  diflerent 
forms  of  constitution,  the  decisive  point  to 
determine is where the sovereignty resides, and 
in  whom  is  the  supreme  and  final  authority 
vested ?  To  this  question  also  Aristotle  has 
supplied  an answer  which  has  been  adhered  to 
through successive centuries.  His simple teach- 
ing is  that authority may  rest  either  with  one 
or several or many, and according to this distinc- 
tion he builds up the difference between monarchy, 
oligarchy, and democracy.  Instead of  democracy 
he  uses  the  word  aoX~r~ia.  These  three  ideal 
forms of  government (6p90l  .rp6rror),  each of  which 
aims  at the  common  good, may  however  de- 
generate, if  the welfare of  all be  not  sought and 
if  power  be selfishly exercised in the interests of 
those who  wield  it.  When  the summa uoluntas 
regis is directly described as such ;  when it becomes 
absolute, then a tyranny or despotism has arisen. 
If  the aristocracy governs in the interests of  its 
separate aspirations, so that the rule of  the best 
is  transformed into the domination of  a  clique, 
an oligarchy has been  established.  If  the sove- 
reign  people  rules  only  in  order  to  procure 
transient advantages  for  itself,  then  democracy 
becomes corrupted into an '' ochlocracy."  This 
word  was  not  introduced  until  a  later  date : 
Aristotle himself describes the degeneration of his 
rroX~~ata  as "  8rlporcparla.  7, 
This  triple  arrangement  of  Aristotle7s was 
further elaborated in the course of  centuries.  To 
later generations it appeared superficial to distin- 
guish between  the forms of  government only by 
the  number  of  those  who  held  power.  In the 
search for principles Aristotle came to  be amplified 
by  Montesquieu.  But Montesquieu's  comments 
on  the  methods  of  differentiation  between  the 
three  forms  of  constitution  are,  after  all, only 
brilliant  aphorisms  which  do  not  go  below  the 
surface  nor  penetrate  to  the  core  of  the 
subject.  He  lays  down  that  the  principle 
of  monarchy  is  honour,  that  of  aristocracy  is 
moderation, and of democracy, virtue.  But why 
should  honour  be  the  governing  principle  of 
monarchy  only ?  It  might  more  accurately  be 
asserted to be  part of  the essence of  aristocracy 
which  must  cling  to certain positive  notions of FORMS  OF CONSTITUTION  ARISTOTLE'S  ARGUMENT  9 
chivalry and honour.  Similarly it is inexplicable 
why  moderation  should  be  the  distinguishing 
mark of  aristocracy ; this could be  said with far 
more truth of  democracy, which must perish if  it 
is not  handled  with  cautious  perspicacity.  In 
short, at the risk of  irreverence we  must openly 
declare that no satisfactory result can be obtained 
by  attempting  to define  the nature  of  a  given 
form  of  government.  If  we  search  for  the 
fundamental  principle  underlying  these  forms, 
we  must approach  the task in a  political  spirit. 
We  shall  here  describe  as  the  principle  of  a 
constitution  that  political  idea,  through  the 
realization  of  which it has been  created.  If  we 
consider monarchy in this spirit we  shall perceive 
that its nature is unity.  Monarchy arises when 
this  idea  emerges  in  tangible  political  form. 
When it is overstrained, that is to say when the 
ruler  sets his  individual  will  above that of  the 
State,  tyranny  has  supplanted  monarchy.  In 
the same way the basis of  aristocracy is division 
into  classes.  The  existence  of  different  estates 
with  different  rights is assumed, and herein  lies 
the nature of  pure aristocracy.  If the aristocratic 
conception  remains  vigorous and is carried  into 
practice with skill it may conduce to the stability 
of  the State : if  it is carried too far, and the gulf 
between the classes becomes too wide, aristocracy 
degenerates  and  founders.  The  principle  of 
democracy is equality.  The ideals and illusions 
of  democracy alike depend  on the notion of  the 
equality of  all that bears human form.  Nothing, 
however, is achieved  by this  ancient  trinitarian 
division derived from Aristotle.  It brings home 
to us  once more that his outlook on the universe 
was a narrow  one and is no longer adequate for 
the study of  the multifarious aspects  of  modern 
political  life.  One  form  of  constitution  of  im- 
mense  power  which  has  determined the history 
of  several  continents through many  centuries  is 
absent from his  schedule-Theocracy.  Aristotle 
in  his  Hellenic  pride  of  race  disregarded  its 
existence.  To  him  the  Persian  monarchy  as 
displayed  before  him  in  Europe  was  a  mere 
corruption  of  Kingship.  This  was  a  radical 
error.  With  the  double  exception  of  Phoenicia 
and Carthage all Asiatic and North African states 
had a constitutional form, peculiar to themselves, 
alien to the free, open, and secular spirit of  the 
West.  Oriental  states  as  distinguished  from 
European  can  only  be  understood  if  it  be 
remembered that in the East the revealed word 
is  at  the  same  time  law  and  doctrine.  We 
therefore  must  place  theocracy,  which  for  cen- 
turies  has  dominated  Asiatic  nations  and many 
aboriginal  states  of  Africa  and  America,  in  a 
category  quite distinct from those already men- 
tioned. 
If,  however,  we  examine these  a  little more 
closely it would  appear that the great Stagirite 
is  guilty even  of  a  logical  mistake.  Are, then, 
the three categories-monarchy,  aristocracy, and 
democracy-really  co-ordinated ?  After  all,  it 
is  clear  that two  of  them  are subordinate  to a 
third  and  wider  notion.  Monarchy  stands  out 
in  sharp  contrast  to democracy  as  well  as  to 
aristocracy, but these two latter have something 
in common and are comprehended in the jointly 10  FORMS OF CONSTITUTION  THREE TYPES  11 
applicable  term  of  Republic.  This  distinction 
is not like one drawn by  Aristotle-an  external 
one ; it is not based on the number only of  the 
ruling  class.  Consider  England  in  the  days  of 
the  Commonwealth.  Oliver  Cromwell  was  the 
greatest and most powerful master she has ever 
had, and yet under his rule she was undoubtedly 
a republic. 
The nature of  monarchy is not summed up in 
the single fact that authority is concentrated  in 
one person.  Contrasted with & republic, authority 
rests  on  personal,  not  on  delegated  right.  In 
the course  of  history  this  or  that  dynasty  has 
risen  to power  and ruled  by  right  of  conquest. 
In true  monarchy  the  monarch  being  actually 
sovereign  can  never  subject  his  authority  to 
any other, while in a republic power is delegated. 
It  is  delegated  either  by  popular  assemblies or 
aristocratic  bodies,  and  the chief  magistrate  is 
then both ruler and subject.  The true distinction 
between  the  monarchical  and  the  republican 
form lies not in the fact that the former is ruled 
by a  sole individual, but that in a republic  the 
chief  magistrate  is both  ruler  and subject  with 
no self-derived power. 
Aristotle knew few  monarchies, and those not 
of the most exemplary kind, while we have a very 
ample experience.  It may in fact be said that Aris- 
totle and Hellenes in general misunderstood mon- 
archy.  They start with the notion that monarchy 
consists in the rule of  a single individual : then, 
naturally inquiring how  one man  can  be  placed 
so far above his fellows, they arrive at the conclu- 
sion  that since only a  semi-divine being can be 
superior  to all other  men,  a  republic  is a  more 
reasonable  form  of  government.  This  is  Aris- 
totle's  view.  It  is  simply a  fundamental error. 
Why,  we  should  be  no  better  than  Byzantine 
flatterers  were  we  to say that our royal family 
is superior to all other families in this country. 
Neither  personal  excellence nor mental capacity 
lies  at the root  of  the position  of  the house  of 
Hohenzollern,  but  their  distinguishing  mark  is 
that they are our Kings and stand on their own 
right and exercise a power which is undisputed. 
Thus we  discern three main types of  constitu- 
tional  form-Theocracies,  Monarchies,  and  Re- 
publics.  A glance over any considerable period 
or area will prove that this division of  the subject 
is  full  of  promise.  Classical  antiquity  was  re- 
publican  in  spirit,  modern  times  have  been 
monarchical.  Theocracy  has  flourished  chiefly 
in Asia ; in Europe this type was only represented 
by  the  Papal  States,  which  are  an  anomaly 
amongst  us.  It  will  further  be  perceived  that 
in  recent  times  the  daughter  states of  Europe 
have  uniformly  become republics for the reason 
that  their  political  tradition  has  been  broken. 
Modern  America  is  in  all  essentials  republican. 
We  see,  then,  whole  periods  of  history,  nay 
whole  continents ranging  themselves  in  accord- 
ance with these categories ; the division, therefore, 
must  be  f imdamental  and  essential.  Unfortu- 
nately most of  our constitutional text-books treat 
very  casually  of  theocracies :  they  must  be 
more  deeply  studied  as  an  expression  of  the 
contrast between Western and Oriental genius. 
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divisions we find that monarchy, by sharing some 
characteristics  of  the other two  forms, takes  a 
position between them.  In common with  theo- 
cracy  its  power  is  not  derived  but  original. 
Theocracy rests  its claim  on an  immediate and 
divine  commission.  Similarly,  while  discarding 
the  mystical  claim,  monarchy  appeals  to  the 
hereditary  and  historical  right  of  a  dynasty, 
which, once established,  admits  of  no question. 
Thus these two types are placed in opposition to 
the Republic.  From another point of  view theo- 
cracy  is  at variance  with  the  republican  and 
monarchical form.  The pious  formula "  By the 
grace  of  God " in  no  wise  implies  that  the 
monarchy is the direct mouthpiece  of  God's  will. 
It  bears  no mystico-theocratic  meaning,  but  is 
intended  only  to convey  that the authority  of 
the  monarch  stands  above  all  earthly  power. 
Monarchies and republics alike embody the secular 
conception of  the State. 
Clearly  it  is  impossible  to  formulate  any 
ethical  classification  of  these  three  types  of 
government.  No  more  can  be  said  than  that 
theocracy belongs to a period when men's  minds 
were  enslaved  by  authority.  A  people  cannot 
become  free  and  enlightened  until  the inspired 
word is not held to confer at the same time the 
right of  compulsion.  Theocracy can only flourish 
in the dreary chaos  which  such  a  belief  brings 
into religious and political  ideas, and therefore it 
may fairly be described as the most immature of all 
forms of  government.  This appears clearly when 
it attempts to assert itself amongst a free people : 
the grotesque nature of  its claims is then obvious. 
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Of  this 'the history  of  the Papacy  is  sufficient 
proof.  We  must,  however,  guard  against 
attempting to establish  an order  of  precedence 
based  on  merit  as  between  monarchical  and 
republican  forms  of  government.  To  set  out 
in  search  of  a  good  constitutional  form  is 
from  a  scientific  point  of  view  a  confusion  of 
thought.  The historian must be content merely 
to inquire  what  form  is  most  appropriate to a 
given people at a given period.  He will accord- 
ingly  acknowledge  a  republic  to  be  ethically 
justifiable  where  it satisfies the ethical  require- 
ments  of  a  nation.  Historians  cannot  without 
presumption  say more, even of  the best constitu- 
tions,  than  that, since  the  State  is  primarily 
power, that State which gathers authority most 
completely into the hand of one and there leaves 
it most independent,  approaches most nearly to 
the ideal.  On the other hand, one may say of the 
Church with equal force that her ideal is republi- 
can.  Her power  is rooted  in the conscience of 
the  faithful;  therefore  a  republican  constitu- 
tion, which  in some way  or'other leaves to the 
individual  conscience  a  certain  scope,  while 
remaining itself the living voice of  faith, conforms 
more  closely than any other to the ecclesiastical 
ideal;  whereas the Church, which is based on a 
monarchical pattern, deviates furthest from it. 
All  this can be  laid down in abstracto,  but a 
little reflection  shows  that the weal  of  nations 
rests  but slightly on their  form  of  constitution. 
It  must  be  left  to  journalists  to  glorify  the 
freedom  of  modern  France.l  Let  us  turn  our 
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thoughts  to  1848.  In  that  year  Piedmont 
enacted  a  statute  which  was  almost  literally 
copied from  Louis  Philippe's  charter  of  1830 ; 
and which  is still the constitution of  Italy.  At 
the moment  when  the constitution founded  on 
this  charter  perished  ingloriously  in  France,  it 
was adopted in Piedmont, and in spite of  faults, 
has  proved  itself  capable  of  survival  in  Italy. 
In the  same  way  our  Prussian  constitution  is 
known  to have  been  modelled  by the Rhenish 
Westphalian  clerical  lawyers  on  that  of  the 
neutral  state  of  Belgium,  and  in  spite  of  this 
stupendous  mistake  it  has  been  developed  in 
such a way that we  flourish under it. 
More  than  any  other  form  of  government 
monarchy  has  the  faculty  of  rejuvenating  and 
perfecting itself by assimilating borrowed institu- 
tions : in a word monarchy is the constitutional 
Proteus.  This importation of  foreign institutions 
is indeed also possible in a theocracy.  There are 
theocratic monarchies as well as theocratic aristo- 
cracies, and in Israel we  have even an illustrious 
example of  a theocratic democracy.  Nevertheless 
the  nature  of  theocracy  is  to remain  fettered 
owing to its limited capacity for adopting repre- 
sentative  institutions.  A  latent  monarchical 
power is also sometimes to be found in republics. 
Thus  Carthage  has  its  family  of  hereditary 
strategists,  the  Barcidi,  a  line  of  heroes 
sustained  by  democratic  forces.  There  is  a 
certain conflict  between  this peculiar institution 
and the nature  of  a  mercantile  oligarchy,  and 
yet Carthage  never  ceased to be  an oligarchical 
republic.  Hannibal  was  taught  by  his  own 
tragic experience how curmudgeon was the spirit 
of  that  oligarchy  which  he  called  his  native 
country.  Exactly  the  same  holds  good  of  a 
monarchical  office  of  modern  times  curiously 
akin to that held by the Barcas.  Their modern 
counterpart is the House of  Orange, in which the 
supreme military command was practically heredi- 
tary.  Its  career  was  part  and  parcel  of  the 
national  life,  and,  supported  as it was  by  the 
warlike spirit of the people, it was able to confront 
the aspirations of  the great mercantile  families. 
So  long as the Stadtholdenhip did  not actually 
become hereditary, Holland remained  a republic, 
the  power  of  Orange  notwithstanding.  And 
here  again  we  see  how  little the  constitutional 
form of  a State affects the greatness of  a people. 
When in Holland that happened which had been 
foreshadowed for three hundred years,  when  at 
last  the  family  of  Orange  achieved  the  royal 
crown, what was the result ?  The constitutional 
arrangements  of  the  modern  kingdom  of  the 
Netherlands  are  more  logical,  lucid,  and  con- 
sistent  than  those  of  the  Republic,  yet  who 
would place modern Holland on a level with the 
old glorious Republic ? 
The  natural  faculty  of  all  States to perfect 
themselves  by  importing  from  others  particular 
institutions is therefore considerable, but it is a 
dangerous  error  to  correct  by  means  of  what 
Leibnitz calls "  a  mixture " the inevitable one- 
sidedness of  all human endeavour.  The defects 
inseparable  from  the main  constitutional types 
cannot be  pruned  away by constructing a  type 
of  State which is necessarily hybrid.  This false 16  FORMS  OF CONSTITUTION  AIMS  AND  IDEALS 
method has played  a disastrous r6le in times of 
political  perplexity.  Tacitus  mentions  a  con- 
stitution thus concocted from aristocratic, demo- 
cratic, and monarchic elements, but adds that it 
can  be  more  easily  invented  than  practised. 
All  the  same  there  have  been  men  who  have 
churned together what seemed best  in a variety 
of  institutions,  and  imagined  they  could  give 
vital  force  to what  they  put  down  on  paper. 
This  Ciceronian  way  of  proceeding  is  mistaken 
if  for no other reason, because the most  diverse 
States  are  themselves  composite.  Rome,  the 
most  logical  aristocracy  in  the world,  is  called 
by Polybius and Cicero a mixed  State.  If  it is 
conceived to be  the duty of  a  great  people  to 
provide the pattern Constitution for an academy 
of  professors,  the  old  Holy  Roman  Empire 
would  have  been  the  most  perfect  of  States. 
In my  youth  this  was  the  generally  accepted 
view.  It  is  another  symptom  of  the notorious 
muddle-headed German  cosmopolitanism which, 
when  apparently  extinct,  is  always  reviving. 
All  States  closely  examined  reveal  distinctly 
where  their  true  centre  of  gravity  lies,  and 
whether they are genuine monarchies or genuine 
republics.  A  mixed  State belonging to neither 
kind does not exist. 
Within the circle of  these forms sf  constitution 
a further contrast may be perceived, and consists 
in  the  fact  that  monarchies  and  aristocratic 
republics  pursue  a  definite  and  attainable  end, 
while theocracies and democratic republics strive 
after  an  unrealizable  ideal.  The  two  former 
take their stand on certain actual circumstances 
of reality, such as on the rule of a single individual 
supported by some section or other of  the people, 
or  by  a  whole  nation  determined  to recognize 
a  particular  dynasty  as  its own.  Such  rule  is 
not only possible, but a patent fact, just  as the 
rule of  a plurality is both possible and legitimate. 
On  the other hand it is  impossible, quite apart 
from  our  Christian  beliefs,  to  admit  that  the 
Almighty  intervenes directly in  affairs of  State. 
The  experience  of  centuries  has  taught  weak 
mortals  that there is no  direct  means  of  ascer- 
taining the divine will.  Sooner or later theocracy 
runs mad and overstrains its own doctrine.  The 
mystical  edifice becomes  top-heavy, whether  by 
oracular pronouncements or supposed inspiration 
of  the Holy Ghost, or whatever other lies priests 
may  coin.  A  theocratic  government  must  by 
exaggerating its own fundamental idea infallibly 
aim  at  realizing  what  is  beyond  realization. 
The same fact, unwelcome as it is in a democratic 
age, holds good of  democracy, for the very notion 
of  democracy  contains  a  contradictio  in adjecto. 
All governing implies the existence of the governed, 
but if  all are to rule, who is to be ruled ?  Pure 
democracy logically carried out makes for a goal 
as inconceivable as the goal of  theocracy.  Both 
have  in  common  the  abnormal  tendency  to 
compel  an  unattainable  result.  This  may  be 
seen in all radical democracies.  All  inequalities 
between individuals are to be  violently  levelled, 
so  much  so  that a  point  is  reached  at which 
even  sex  distinctions  are  to  be  abrogated  by 
enactment.  For  the  sake  of  conforming  to a 
principle  every  possible  difference  between 
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human  beings  is  to  be  bludgeoned  out  of 
existence. 
The  sorts  of  constitutions  we  have  hitherto 
examined  are not the only  ones into which the 
subject  might  theoretically  be  divided.  So  far 
we  have dealt only with such divisions as apply 
to  uniform  States.  Yet  another  distinction 
emerges  when  we  consider  the  composition  of 
States.  It then appears we  may have either the 
absolutely uniform  State, or  one which may  be 
united with others.  The latter is a complicated 
condition of  things,  since the nature of  a  State 
is unity and the various forms of  union  may be 
highly  complex.  There  are fundamental unions 
such  as  Castile and Aragon,  or  States may  be 
united in a  purely  external way,  merely by the 
person  of  the sovereign.  In this case the Allies 
recognize in common nothing but the sovereign 
and the enemy.  So runs the accepted definition. 
But there are unions  where  even the enemy  is 
not  held  in  common.  This  might  be  said  of 
the union  between  England and Hanover.  The 
instance of  Sweden and Norway  shows that the 
personal union may also take a closer form, and 
it is  hard  to say whether  this is  not  after  all 
a fundamental union,  since these two  countries 
cannot legally separate and must have an identical 
foreign policy.  Constitutionally Finland is united 
to Russia only by a personal tie, but owing to the 
brutality of  Russian  methods,  the reality  of  the 
tie is  different.  And  this relationship  becomes 
still more momentous  when  a  number  of  States 
constitute  themselves  into  a  federation.  A 
variety of  States may form  themselves  into an 
association which is subordinate to its component 
parts ; or again, sovereign States may resign their 
sovereign powers to a superior central authority, 
retaining  only  a  portion  of  their  prerogatives. 
The  Swiss  cantons  and  the  United  States  of 
America may be cited as examples. 
Lastly,  we  shall here  concern  ourselves with 
that most striking of  all evolutions-a  monarchy 
under federal forms which is our own Empire. 
There are still other conceivable categories  of 
States.  One may proceed by the historical method 
and enumerate the vast theocratic monarchies of 
the East, the popular democracies of  the Ancients, 
and the well-defined units which constitute modern 
States, but no system of  constitutional history can 
be evolved by this method, which is suitable only 
to  political  history.  Further, it is  possible  to 
differentiate States according to  the ideal for which 
they strive.  This arrangement  was  adopted by 
Leo in his treatise on the physiology of  the State, 
in  which  he  discriminates  between  sacerdotal 
States,  military  States,  mercantile  States,  etc. 
This again is only the idle play of  ingenuity, for 
it  is  precisely  the  characteristic  of  Christian 
nations  not  to identify  their  existence  with  a 
single purpose to the same degree as the nations 
of  antiquity.  An  inexorable  one-sidedness is  a 
distinguishing mark of classical mentality.  Hence 
Greek  poets  weary  the  modern  reader  by  in- 
cessantly repeating the ao+po~dv~.  Carthage was 
undoubtedly  the  mercantile  State  /cary  E'Eo~.liv  ; 
not  so  the  Netherlands,  whose  heroic  history 
flourished side by  side with  a  brilliant,  artistic, 
and  scientific  expansion.  Indeed,  though  con- FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 
temporary  England  is  solely  swayed  by  the 
interests  of  her  commercial policy,  it would  be 
doing her  a  grave injustice to suppose that her 
rich intellectual life is entirely overshadowed by 
the spectre of  commercialism.  Sparta was with- 
out  doubt  a  warrior  State,  but  what  State in 
modern  times  can  be  so  described  without 
reserve ?  Ignorant and hostile critics have often 
stigmatized Prussia with the epithet of  militarism, 
and yet it is obvious that this conception entirely 
fails to take the measure of  our national life. 
We  will  discard  all  these  classifications  in 
favour of  an arrangement by  which  our subject 
is  divided  into  Theocracies,  Monarchies,  Re- 
publics.  The next three sect;ons will  be devoted 
to the closer  examination  of  these  three forms 
of  government. 
XIV 
THEOCRACY 
EVERY  theocracy depends upon the intermingling 
of  spiritual  and  temporal  authority.  In  this 
form  of  government spiritual laws are also ipso 
facto  secular ones, and under it, divine revelation 
and the ordinances of  the temporal State become 
commensurate terms.  Hence theocracies  are as 
a rule found where existence is viewed only from 
an ecclesiastical angle.  It is one of  the glories of 
the Arian race to have broken the bonds of  this 
most terrible of  all dominations.  For us divine 
truth  consists  in  the  good  tidings  which  make 
their  appeal to the heart  but  do  not  strive to 
impose  themselves  by  force  as  do  the laws  of 
men.  To the Oriental, on the other hand, divine 
truth  is  a  command  resulting  in  that  dismal 
slough  of  stagnation  which  characterizes  the 
interior life of  the East, and which  contrasts so 
markedly  with  the  Western  predisposition  to 
limpidity and liberty of  thought. 
It  is  very  important  not  to  disregard  this 
essential  difference,  which  I  have  not  found 
adequately  stated  in  any  political  text-book. 
It constantly happens that Oriental monarchies 
are  spoken  of  as  degenerate  temporal  States ; 
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in fact they are something essentially  different, 
namely,  theocracies,  whose  potentates  rule  in 
virtue  of  a  spiritual  right  which  they  neither 
can  nor  may  abrogate.  In all  other  respects, 
however, their  power,  because  derived  immedi- 
ately  from  God,  is  without  limitations.  The 
conception  formed  of  the  Godhead  is  quite 
immaterial to the nature of  a theocracy.  Among 
the subjects of  the Sultan a certain Kurdish tribe, 
the Jezidi, worship Satan.  Through a variety of 
extraorginary interpretations of  the old  Persian 
dualistic  creed, they  have  preserved  only  the 
veneration  of  Ahriman,  and their  sheikh  reigns 
in  the  name  of  this  secret  diabolical  power ; 
consequently they are the most profligate of  men. 
Nevertheless,  regarded  in  a  political  light  they 
constitute a theocracy, that is to say, a Govern- 
ment  invested with  supernatural  authority  and 
protected from all secular control. 
It  is  a  presumption  on  the part  of  modern 
society to forbid the State to interfere with the 
liberty  of  conscience.  In our view  the State is 
fully  entitled  to do  so,  although  it  would  be 
madness  to attempt  it amongst  us ; it  would 
meet  with  such  resistance  that it would  have 
to  acknowledge  its  own  impotence.  In  the 
East the State has been able to rest for centuries 
upon  the influence  it exercises upon  the minds 
of  men, because there is nowhere the trace of  a 
desire to assert individuality by means of  rational 
thought.  Theorists  are  generally  of  opinion 
that  all  men  act  in  accordance  with  the 
dictates  of  reason.  No  such  thing  occurs  to 
them ; millions act according  to the dictates of 
obscure  instincts,  and feel  perfectly  content  in 
consequence.  In  such  a  soil  theocracy  is  a 
foregone conclusion and sure of  a long life.  Let 
us  transport  ourselves in thought  to the realm 
of  Eastern  imagery  which  says,  "A thousand 
years  in Thy sight are but as yesterday."  This 
can be said not only of  Jehovah, but of  the whole 
Oriental  outlook  upon  life.  Any  one  who  has 
been in the East knows that the scene of  Rebecca 
at  the  well  is  there  constantly  reproduced. 
Wherever the life  and thought  of  the people  is 
moulded in this form, theocracy may be considered 
a  native  growth  and the securest  guarantee  of 
order.  These people require to be  checked and 
guided by something that can be called a divine 
revelation, and are entirely lacking in the critical 
bent  and  impetus  towards  action.  The  Turks 
are an example : ask any one of  them as he sits 
cross-legged and smoking his  chiboukh  what he 
is really about, he will reply, "  Thou seest, I sit." 
And yet we  find amongst the nations of  the East 
a  marvellous  wealth  of  the imaginative faculty, 
to which their immortal poems  bear  witness no 
less than does the perfection of  their artistic taste. 
The exquisite patterns of  the textiles of Kashmir 
have never  been  surpassed by us in spite of  all 
our discoveries in aniline dyes. 
The  Oriental  tendency  to live  in  a  world 
of  dreams  while  craving  for  an  authoritative 
creed,  makes  the  further  development  and 
immense  duration  of  theocracies  a  certainty. 
When  a  people  is once imbued with this stifling 
faith  and  stagnant  outlook  upon  life  it  is 
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which can count upon an authority and duration 
unrivalled  in  secular  States.  The  sacerdotal 
States of  Asia  endure  for  hundreds  and  even 
thousands  of  years.  If  a  people feels this form 
of  rule  to  be  beneficent  no  objection  can  be 
raised.  It remains the duty of  the historian to 
study such  a phenomenon,  even if  he  can only 
regard  it  as  an  abnormal  aspect  of  human 
existence. 
The loftier  a creed is, and the more ready to 
foster  a  spirit  of  inquiry, the  less  readily  will 
it lend  its support to a  theocratic  constitution. 
It  is  characteristic  of  the  Christian  view  of 
liberty to rebel  against rigidity  in the relations 
between  the'  subject  and  the  State,  and  any 
attempt to establish  the  direct  intervention of 
divine will  in this world's affairs is a patent lie to 
thinking  minds.  Lucid  political  thought leads 
"  straight to the severance between temporal and 
spiritual powers which is fatal to theocracy.  The 
Papacy is the most elaborate but also the most im- 
moral of all theocracies, because it subjects peoples 
destined to liberty to a  yoke incompatible  with 
the  freedom  of  the  spirit.  We  may  feel  that 
Oriental theocracies satisfy the ethical standards 
of  the nations over which they rule, but we cannot 
extend the same generous latitude to the Papacy, 
which  continually  makes  war  upon  the secular 
aspirations of  a  world more tolerant than itself. 
A  theocracy  must  aim  at repressing  the  spirit 
of  free  inquiry;  it cannot  do  otherwise.  Lip 
service  at the  very  least  must  be  paid  to the 
revelation  upon  which  the edifice  of  the State 
is founded.  It is no easy matter to set limits to 
such coercion whose rigour will always be modified 
by  circumstances.  Free  inquiry  into  certain 
branches  of  science  may  indeed  be  permitted, 
the  results  of  unhampered  research 
strictly  speaking,  be  found  to  conflict 
with revealed truth.  The Roman See has always 
been  very  liberal  towards  mathematics  and 
astronomy,  but  will  assuredly  never  loosen  the 
fetters with which it seeks to bind those branches 
of science whose free development would endanger 
the  theocracy.  In  the  front  rank  of  these 
scientific  enemies  stands  history  in  its  widest 
sense, towards which the theocracy must proceed 
with far greater caution than is necessary in its 
attitude to natural science. 
Similarly the gulf  which  separates the ruled 
from  the  rulers  must  be  immeasurable  in  a 
theocracy  whose  head,  as  we  have  shown,  of 
necessity  claims  a  sacrosanct  character.  As  a 
rule theocracy tends to adopt aristocratic forms : 
in  it  the  priestly  caste  will  monopolize  the 
Government.  It  is  true  that  in  Indian  mon- 
archies the King belonged to the military caste, 
but he was bound by the counsels of  the Brahmins 
who  were  the  virtual  rulers  of  the  country. 
Among the Israelites, although in modified forms, 
we  find  an  influential  hereditary  priesthood. 
No  less  than  these  the  Catholic  Church  has 
sought  by  means  of  ingenious  and  plausible 
contrivances,  such as the celibacy of  the clergy, 
to turn her priesthood into a caste which isolates 
it in the middle of  civil society. 
The aim of  creating as profound  a  severance 
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promoted  by  the  mystical  rite  of  ordination, 
which sets its irrevocable seal upon the candidate. 
A  further consequence  of  the theocratic  system 
is  to exclude  more  effectually  than  under  any 
other a  vigorous participation  of  the people  in 
the  Government.  A  constitutional  Pope  and 
a constitutional Sultan are alike anomalies.  In 
the  early  years  of  Pius  IX.  a  certain  benign 
disposition  to reform  was  not  lacking,  but  was 
cherished  in  vain.  A  Cardinal  would  cease  to 
be a true Prince of  the Church were he bound by 
lay advice. 
The Teutonic knights were forbidden by  the 
statutes of  their  order  to consort  with  laymen. 
Nevertheless  Henry  of  Plauen  attempted  to 
bridge  the  cleft  between  the  celibate  knights 
and  the  Prussians  by  means  of  a  provincial 
constitution, but since the final decision of  every 
question rested  with the knights as representing 
the ecclesiastical power, the ultimate alternative 
to destruction was complete secularization. 
It  is  contrary to the nature  of  theocracy  to 
change and grow with the times, because it rests 
upon the immutable rock  of  revelation.  When- 
ever  a  free  and  secular  spirit,  an  active and 
critical reason, manifests itself amongst a people 
governed  by  a  theocracy,  that theocracy  must 
choose between annihilation and radical change. 
Only  a  people  destined  to  dream  away  its 
allotted course in perpetual drowsiness will  per- 
manently endure a theocracy.  Amongst nations 
capable  of  progress,  on  the  other  hand,  an 
original, indigenous form of  government suited to 
primitive  times  can often  be  maintained  under 
more  enlightened  conditions  only  by  falsehood 
and deceit.  The whole world rings with priestly 
fraud and  cunning  from the time  of  Hafis and 
the  Roman  augurs  down  to our  own  day.  In 
order to  keep alive the dwindling faith in revela- 
tion they  snatch at oracles and miracles, never 
yet disdained by theocracy, and a State originally 
pious becomes a travesty of  holy things. 
Of  all the ancient theocracies of  the East the 
most notable is the majestic sacerdotal empire of 
the Brahmins, in which as a rule we  find a king, 
belonging by birth to the military caste, entirely 
subject to Brahminical law and guided in matters 
of  conscience by a priestly Council.  We are here 
confronted with a  priesthood  craftily employing 
the  secular  arm  solely  in  support  of  its  own 
domination.  Constitutional  order  and  religious 
concepts are here very closely intertwined. 
The  whole  nation  is  divided  into  sharply- 
defined  castes,  and  any  infringement  of  this 
division is severely punished  in the delinquent's 
after life ; for  here  flourishes the theory  of  the 
migration of  souls, that most ghastly fancy ever 
devised by the human brain in its most frenzied 
ravings, being an eternal circle which, as a  rule, 
only leads the wanderer from bad to worse.  A 
people  possessed  of  such beliefs is checked once 
for all  in  its free  development.  Nor  can  it be 
denied  that  amongst  the  mixed  races  of  the 
Indian peninsula  stagnation soon  set in ; there- 
fore the advent of Buddha and the spread of  his 
doctrine  of  man's  real  mortality  proclaimed  a 
genuine  liberation  of  the spiritual life.  As  the 
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us free, so Buddha's teaching of the real destruc- 
tion of the flesh may be said to have enlarged and 
illumined  the warped  vision  of  the East.  This 
suffices to show  what  intellectual  slavery  over- 
takes men who allow themselves to be governed 
by a theocracy. 
All powerful Oriental States, with the exception 
of the mercantile communities of  Phoenicia, were 
theocracies.  Appellations  are  immaterial,  and 
Pharaoh  may  be  truly  called  both  King  and 
Pontiff,  although  a  high - priest  stands  at his 
right  hand.  In Egypt  we  find  the fetters of 
theocracy  so  closely  linked  as to have annihil- 
ated  amongst  the  people  the very notion  of  a 
secular  ruler.  Alexander knew  very  well  what 
he  was  abovt  when  he  represented  himself 
as Ammon,  that horned  divinity of  the  desert. 
And  Bonaparte  too,  when  in  Egypt,  fully 
appreciated  the  popular  value  of  the  saying, 
"  A thousand years are as a  day."  The legend 
of  Iscander  or  Alexander,  the  great  Frankish 
Sultan  who  should  return  after  a  thousand 
years,  was  still  alive  among  the people,  and 
Napoleon  on  landing  in  Egypt  was  able  to 
represent  his  arrival  as the return  of  Iscander. 
Thus  such  nations  require  to  be  ruled.  No 
people has seized upon the idea of  a life to come 
with  so  much  energy  as the Egyptians.  They 
were  so  absorbed  by  the  glamour  of  a  world 
beyond, that the tombs of  their  dead kings far 
surpass in splendour the palaces  of  their  living 
successors.  Faith in immortality was  the secret 
spring  of  Egyptian  history;  all  minds  were 
dominated  by  the  thought  of  the  stupendous 
Day  of  Judgment.  When  such  is  the  mental 
of  a  people, an exclusively priestly rule 
is  inevitable.  In  Ethiopia,  on  the  southern 
frontier  of  Egypt,  a  purely  theocratic  State, 
Meroe,  long  maintained  itself.  There  govern- 
ment  was  under the immediate direction  of  the 
high-priest. 
Likewise  in  Tibet, at a  later date, Buddhism 
evolved the pure theocracy  of  the Dalai  Lama, 
which,  in  its  external  form,  so  resembles  the 
Papacy  that  the  Jesuit  missionaries  who  first 
visited  that country in the seventeenth century 
described  it  in  their  reports  as  a  diabolical 
imitation.  There they found the same vestments 
and  mitres,  the  same  thuribles  and  clouds  of 
incense;  they  beheld  the  Pontiff  of  the  East, 
the thrice-crowned  priests  in  snow-white robes. 
They were as yet unaware that most of  the ritual 
ceremonies of  the Romish Church are of  Oriental 
origin. 
The Hebrew theocracy is in its way the most 
peculiar  of  any,  and for  two  reasons.  For  we 
find  a  religion  superior  to all its rivals  through 
its uncompromising monotheism, and yet without 
belief  in  immortality.  It is  natural to suppose 
that  some  doctrine  of  a  future  life  would  be 
indispensable to a  theocracy,  since it gives the 
priest  power  to curse  even  the departed.  But 
the history  of  Israel shows the fact to be quite 
different, for it teaches  us that a  definite belief 
in the immortality of the soul developed only at 
a late period, and the promise of  earthly happiness 
contained  in  the  saying "  that it may  be  well 
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land"  sufficed  to  maintain  the  power  of  the 
hierarchy.  There is no parallel to this in history, 
and  it  is  also  exceptional  to  find  democratic 
ideas of  equality in conjunction with theocracy. 
This small people, fascinated by the idea of  being 
the Chosen out of the multitude of  the uncircum- 
cised,  regards  itself  as a  nation  of  aristocrats ; 
within  its ranks,  however,  a  strong democratic 
spirit prevails,  and it is only  outside them that 
inequality  may  be  sought.  The  only  privilege 
tolerated  within  this  dead  level  of  democracy 
was  the right  reserved  to the tribe  of  Levi  of 
exercising the sacerdotal office.  When the elders 
of  the people  become  estranged from the Lord 
God  of  Sabaoth, then demagogues and prophets 
arise  to inspire  the  people  with  fresh  zeal  in 
the  fulfilment  of  their  national  destiny.  The 
prophets are only intelligible to political thought 
when considered as demagogues.  Another char- 
acteristic sign of  the spirit of  Israel is solicitude 
for the poor and humble, as shown, for example, 
by  the  institution  of  the  Sabbath.  It  is  of 
course true that the actual conditions of  life in 
ancient  Palestine  greatly  diverged  from  the 
letter of  the law contained in the sacred books. 
For  does  not  the  promised  land  belong  to the 
Lord  God  of  Sabaoth who  will  redistribute his 
own at  the appointed intervals ?  These legal con- 
ceptions never died out, but it must be admitted 
that their  practical  execution  at the septennial 
Jubilee left much to be desired. 
Of  all  Eastern  theocracies  none  appeals  as 
forcibly to us as the Jewish, but it lacked expan- 
sive  force ;  the  Israelites  have  never  excelled 
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in foreign policy.  Such diminutive States must 
indeed be  of  small value if  the State be  rightly 
defined  as  power.  From  time  to  time  the 
Israelites undertook  wars  of  conquest,  but with 
moderate  success.  As  surely  as  patriotism  is 
the  foundation of  all political  greatness, so  too 
a  people  without  a  mother - country  will  be 
deprived of  true political genius, essential elements 
of which are valour and love of  hearth and home. 
The bent of  the modern Jewish mind is directly 
antagonistic  to genuine political  talent, and it is 
therefore  nothing  short  of  an  outrage  that 
Jewish  influence  should  predominate  to-day in 
our political press. 
Of  all the theocratically governed  nations  of 
the  East  the  most  secular - minded  were  the 
Persians, and it is exactly amongst them that we 
find  institutions  really  capable  of  developing. 
No  doubt they too regarded their king as a semi- 
divinity,  immeasurably  exalted  above  all  his 
subjects ; but he was not invariably surrounded 
by  the  priestly  caste :  the  instruments  of  his 
royal will  were warriors, and the organization of 
the  State  was  so  firmly  knit  together,  that 
generally its protectorate over the small Hellenic 
States offered  no  menace to its integrity.  The 
government  of  Asia  Minor  by  Persian  satraps 
may  be  adduced  as  the  earliest  example  of 
regular  and  methodical  administration.  To  a 
certain  extent,  then,  the  Pambasileus  was  a 
temporal  ruler,  but  that the theocratic  concep- 
tion was  not extinct we  in the West  have good 
reason to remember even to-day. 
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Persia, as we  know,  came into contact with  the 
Roman  Empire.  Diocletian  removed  the  seat 
of  government  to Byzantium  and adopted  the 
etiquette of  the Persian  Court,  which  has  been 
gradually  transmitted  from  Byzantium  to the 
West ; and it is  only  honest  to admit that it 
does  no  credit  to the  boasted  freedom  of  our 
Western  atmosphere that we  should  still retain 
the  theocratic formulae  and  ceremonies of  the 
East.  The  exaggerated  veneration  due  to  a 
theocratic  origin  which  we  still  pay  to  the 
majesty  of  the Sovereign  is  a  deep  stain upon 
our monarchy.  Our courts have adopted forms 
and customs  of  social intercourse  which  do not 
bear the stamp of  a free Arian, but rather recall 
the dreary monotony of  Oriental slavery. 
We  may  gauge  the  strength  of  Oriental 
theocracy even at the present  day by examining 
the  construction  of  a  State whose  institutions, 
while  rooted  in  sheer  rationalism,  yet  retain  a 
theocratic outline.  I refer to China.  Few races 
have  had  less  religious  conviction  than  the 
Chinese.  They are imbued with a dispassionate 
and prosaic spirit of  inquiry ; lack of  tenderness 
and  of  imagination  is  a  fundamental  mark  of 
this  people,  who  are  entirely  absorbed  by  the 
sordid  calculations  of  commercial life.  And  yet 
they are held together in the tight grip of  certain 
superstitious  ideas.  Hundreds  of  millions  of 
men  regard  themselves  as a  single  family,  the 
elect  of  God, ruled  over by the Son of  Heaven. 
The sanctity of  the native soil is an idea no less 
firmly rooted than these in the national conscience. 
No Chinaman may be buried beyond the pale of 
his  if  a  dire  destiny  is to be  averted 
from his  kindred.  Such a  superstitious  system 
of  thought  is  essential  to the theocracy :  that 
it  in China and that the power of  the "  Son 
of  Heaven " is  quite  different  from  that of  an 
ordinary monarch cannot escape the glance of  a 
vigilant observer. 
The  colossal  difficulty  without  which  no 
theocracy  can  be  transformed  is  illustrated  for 
us by the recent  history  of  Japan.  Even down 
to our  own  time  a  government  combining the 
dual character of spiritual and temporal authority 
flourished  amongst  this  most  chivalrous  race, 
more closely allied to us Europeans than any other 
Far Eastern nation ; Mikado and Tykom were to 
one another as Emperor and Pope.  When about 
the middle of  the nineteenth century their ports 
were thrown open to North American as well  as 
to other traders, the great upheaval began ; the 
truth  of  the  saying  Sint  ut  sunt  aut  non  sint 
was  made plain.  It was  not now a  question  of 
reform but of  revolution  in its most aggravated 
sense.  Everything  is  changed  down  to  the 
minutest  details  of  life :  the  official  language, 
dress,  the calendar,  the  division  of  time.  The 
hierarchy is transformed and enters upon a  new 
phase. 
The two most important theocracies for us at 
the present  day are  the  Ottoman  Empire  and 
the  Papacy.  The  former  presents  a  curious 
combination of  theocratic ideas and the military 
institutions  of  feudal  monarchy.  According  to 
constitutional theory the Sultan, in whose  veins 
flows the sacred blood of  Osman, is the legitimate 
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successor  of  the  prophet;  no  Mussulman  can 
entertain  the  notion  that  any  race  but  the 
Osmanli could  reign  over  him.  Even Mehemet 
Ali  did  not  aim  at dethroning the  Sultan, but 
only at a Mayoralty of  the Palace.  Belief in the 
special  sanctity  of  the  blood  of  Osman  is  un- 
doubtedly a strong bulwark  of  the State. 
As  the Lord's  Anointed  the Sultan may pro- 
mulgate spiritual laws, which, however, may not 
conflict with the text of  the Koran or its orthodox 
interpretation.  In that  abominable  book  bald 
judicial  dicta  are  huddled  together  pel1 - me11 
with  moral  precepts,  and  in  this  medley  the 
Oriental  finds  the  complete  subjection  which 
he  requires.  Ablutions  and temperance  are re- 
ligious laws, and any morality except one imposed 
from  without  is  unintelligible  to the  Moham- 
medan.  When  a  true  Mussulman  is  converted 
to Christianity without thorough preparation, he 
ceases to wash and begins to drink. 
The Sultan then is also bound  by the Koran; 
he  has  in  his  train  the  Sheikh - U1- Islam,  a 
kind  of  confidential Pope, who may on  occasion 
be  consulted.  Doubtless  he  calls  himself  "  the 
humblest  and  most  miserable  of  slaves,"  just 
as  the Pope  of  Rome  styles  himself  "  servum 
servorum  Dei,"  but  in  critical  cases  he  utters 
the  decisive  word.  When  the Sultan  appears 
to be  in  danger  of  infringing  the  sacred  law, 
the  Sheikh - ul-  Islam  may  be  appealed to, and 
it  is  notorious  that  his  decision  has  often 
turned the scale in the choice between peace and 
war.  In ordinary  practice  it  is  assumed  that 
the  Sultan  neither  can  nor  will  exceed  the 
strict  letter  of  the  law.  This  theocratic  ruler 
is  invested  in  the name  of  the  one  true  God 
and of  His prophet with the proprietorship of  all 
conquered  territory.  It  is  he  who  distributes 
the  scimitars  and  the  horse - tail  standard ; a 
small fief,  or  Timar,  must  provide  a  horseman, 
a larger one, or  Sanjak, a whole company.  This 
bellicose  feudal  monarchy  is  encamped  in  the 
midst  of  a  multitude  whose  abject  condition 
baffles description.  Conversion of  the conquered 
is  not  the  primary  motive  of  Islam :  if  it is 
attained it is welcome;  if  not, conquest  suffices 
provisionally.  In its view the universe is divided 
into the realms  of  Islam  and of  war : the one 
predestined to victory, the other to subjugation. 
Humanitarian  considerations  are  here  irrele- 
vant, the fact cannot be too much emphasized that 
they emanate from a purely Christian standpoint. 
The Oriental's  exclusiveness and brutal hostility 
to strangers is irreconcilable with the notion  of 
human  brotherhood  which  is  dependent  upon 
the  belief  that  all  men  are  God's  children.  A 
Mohammedan cannot span the gulf  which severs 
the  believer  from  the  infidel ;  to him  all  un- 
believers are, in the words of  the Koran, "  swine 
with the same bristles, dogs with the same tails." 
In its political aspect the history of  the Sultan- 
ate is particularly instructive, because it reduced 
tyranny and enslavement to a  fine art, admired 
even  by Machiavelli.  Undoubtedly many of  the 
traditional tricks  of  political  management  were 
handed  down  to the Turks  by their  Byzantine 
predecessors.  They organized the whole Empire 
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how  to subjugate the Giaour  and to rule  over 
the  races  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  by  pitting 
them  against  each  other.  Their  first  care  was 
to rob the Christian population of  the flower of  its 
youth.  The strongest and handsomest Christian 
boys were annually carried off  to Constantinople, 
and after being forcibly  converted and castrated 
were turned into Janissaries by a careful military 
training.  A  host  such  as the Janissaries  over- 
flowing  with  the  fanaticism  of  the soldier and 
the  zealot,  is  undeniably  a  powerful  instru- 
ment  of  government,  and  for  a  considerable 
time they were in fact the best  soldiers.  They 
were the Sultan's standing army at a time when 
no  other  European  sovereign  had  such  a  force 
at his command. 
The Giaour, on the other hand, was forbidden 
to bear arms or even to mount a horse, because 
it was a fundamental principle to prevent military 
talent from developing in him,  and even  at the 
present  day,  in  spite  of  all  the  honeyed  talk 
about  equality  between  Christian  and  Mussul- 
man,  no  Christian  serves in the Turkish  army. 
The  circumstance  that  the  Turkish  army  is 
Mohammedan  to  a  man  exposes  the  patent 
falsehoods  spread  by  the  Turkish  Government 
on this subject.  The fact is that all the Prussian 
majors we  send to Turkey are employed simply 
as drill sergeants, and are without real influence, 
for they too are "  swine " and "  dogs."  In old 
times Christian troops were no doubt summoned 
in order to protect the baggage train of  the armies, 
and  still  more  to  be  flung  in  heaps  into  the 
trenches  round  besieged  Christian  fortresses,  a 
living  bridge  of  unbelievers  for  the  storming 
Moslem  host.  In this way and in no  other does 
the  Turk  understand  the military duties  of  his 
Christian  brother,  for  his  domination  depends 
upon the suppression of  other nationalities by the 
followers of  Mohammed, and even more upon the 
dogma common to all theocracies that God's laws 
are unchanging.  "  Change is innovation and in- 
novation  the  path  to Hell,"  is  written  in  the 
Koran.  All  these facts are not changed because 
tlie Sultan's  weakness and the tutelage assumed 
over  him  by  European  diplomacy  enable  them 
to be hushed up. 
It  is  to be  hoped  that the future  will  wipe 
out  the scandal  of  having  such  a  government 
on  European soil.  What, after all, has  Turkish 
rule achieved during these three hundred years ? 
Nothing but destruction.  Like an avalanche of 
rubbish  they  poured  over  the  Western  world, 
annihilating all they  encountered.  And  yet  no 
trace  of  their  hundred and fifty years of rule in 
Hungary  remains, except some  ruined  Christian 
churches and the hot baths of  Buda.  We know 
that theocracy is by  definition  incapable  of  de- 
velopment beyond a certain point.  How resplen- 
dent  was  civilization  under  the  Ommayades  in 
Spain,  at Cordova  and Granada, and  yet  at a 
given  moment  it  became  rigid  and was  com- 
pelled  to  yield  to  the  comparatively  rude 
Christian races of  the North,  in  whom  lay  the 
germ  of  expansion  peculiar  to their faith.  The 
Turks  have never developed at all, and in virtue 
of  their  innate lazy-mindedness have always re- 
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we  cannot  but  admire.  It  is  the  misfortune 
of  a  people  who  sees its destiny in the achieve- 
ments of  a  band  of  mounted  brigands  to have 
been  brought  within  the orbit  of  Western  en- 
lightenment.  What are the celebrated  mosques 
but imitations of  the Hagia Sophia ?  That Chris- 
tian  temple  has  simply  been  copied  by  the 
Turks.  They are experts at  embroidering slippers 
and covering faqades of  palaces  with  a  kind  of 
marble  lace-work, and they are past masters  in 
the decoration of  festal apartments such as the 
great halls where the harem bathes.  True archi- 
tecture they  have  none.  It is  astonishing  with 
what ingenious perversity they have transformed 
St. Sophia, that exquisite building, the perfection 
of  whose dimensions seems to re-echo the rhythm 
of  ideal proportion.  On entering, what a sight ! 
As Mecca lies in a south-south-easterly direction, 
all the prayer niches have been shifted sideways 
from the centre.  All church furniture, all carpets 
are askew and turned towards this corner :  it seems 
exactly  as  if  a  party  of  drunkards  had  given 
everything a  twist.  That is  the way  Orientals 
bungle when they meddle with Christian concerns. 
It  was  inevitable  that  the  hollowness  of 
Mohammedan rule, content with simple obedience, 
should  in the course  of  time  avenge itself,  and 
we  are  to-  day  witnessing  its  gradual  decay. 
The first warning has been given by the physical 
and mental decline of  the dynasty.  The Moslem 
is forced to make peace, and even a humiliating 
peace, with the infidel.  The nineteenth century 
saw the dawn of  an aspiration towards Christian 
ideals  of  civilization.  We  have  here  another 
illustration of  the truth that when at last Theo- 
cracy is roused from its long slcep to the necessity 
of  change,  reform  is  always  found  impossible. 
The  alternatives  of  revolution,  secularization, 
and conquest alone remain.  We Europeans have 
learnt  this  lesson  from  the fate of  the  Sultan. 
Since  Russia  is  the  natural  enemy  of  Western 
Europe, and the Sultan has come to regard  the 
Czar as his most dangerous foe, it often happens 
that the Sultan is made to figure as the repre- 
sentative of  Liberalism.  There was once a time 
many  centuries  back  when  the Turkish  Empire 
could  with  some  justice  have  been  considered 
democratic.  For  a  nobility  is  unknown  in  the 
Empire : before the Caliph  all are equal ; it is 
only  collectively  that  the  mass  of  the  faithful 
form  an  aristocracy  as  distinct  from  the  sub- 
jugated  droves of  the Giaour, so simple are the 
class  distinctions  of  the  Ottomans.  When  in 
the  great  days  of  Islam  they  went  forth  to 
conquer and convert, it was certainly an allevia- 
tion for the vanquished when they adopted the 
Mohammedan religion.  For it must be  remem- 
bered  that every  convert from Christianity was 
released  from  feudal obligations.  Hence  in  the 
sixteenth  century  the  Turks  were  constantly 
received  by  the  population  along  the  Danube 
with  emotions similar to those with which at a 
later period the Sans-culottes were greeted along 
the  Rhine.  Thus it is  clear  that the Turkish 
Empire  at its  zenith  appeared  as  a  liberating 
Power  in  contrast  to  the  feudal  rigidity  of 
Christian States.  But there is no thraldom more 
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subjection to a feudal overlord is more tolerable 
than  the  collective subordination  to  which  the 
Mussulman condemns the Christian herd. 
Our  century  has  seen  a  serious  attempt to 
infuse  European  principles  into  the  theocratic 
fabric of  this Oriental  State.  A sober historical 
survey  must  recognize,  however,  that  such  re- 
forms are merely  so many  steps on the road to 
further decay.  Since Turkey has turned Liberal, 
as  newspaper  politicians  understand  that term, 
she  has  lost  province  after  province.  The  de- 
struction of  the Janissaries, that decisive stroke 
by which  reform was initiated, has proved itself 
a  portent.  Doubtless  these  kidnapped  and 
converted Christian youths,  who knew no home 
but the camp fire,  became in time a  fierce  and 
dangerous  Pretorian  guard.  Their  forcible  im- 
pressment  was  carried  out with  a  refinement  of 
cruelty well  calculated  to rob the Giaour of  his 
best  strength.  Nevertheless,  as  things  stood, 
the system, even with  all its attendant horrors, 
was  consistent.  After  the  massacre  of  the 
Janissaries under the formidable Sultan Mahmud 
II., the ever illusory attempt to introduce Euro- 
pean conditions of  life was made.  The capitation 
tax was abolished on paper, and the maxim laid 
down  likewise  on  paper  that Christians  should 
serve in the army.  The Sultan, however, saved 
the  last  vestige  of  a  reputation  for  political 
insight by not committing the blunder of enforcing 
this decree. 
Still more ridiculous was the plan of  establish- 
ing the constitutional ideas  of  Western  Europe 
on a firm footing in Turkey, for their indispensable 
which was a sense of  nationality, was 
lacking.  The  population  consists  not  only  of 
~~manlis,  but of  a hotch-potch of  Mohammedans 
and Europeans of all sorts.  Turkey is incorrigible, 
and will remain so in spite of  all her fair promises. 
TO  feel convinced of  this, one has only to know 
the  habitual  Turkish  methods  of  transacting 
State business, and to  recall,  for  example,  the 
grotesque  conditions  under  which  the  Hat-i- 
Sheruf  of  Gulhane  was  promulgated  in  1839. 
When the Grand Signior appeared and all present 
fell  flat  on  their  bellies,  the  court  astrologer 
stepped forth and proceeded to examine with his 
astrolabium  whether  the  auspicious  hour  had 
come.  As  Allah  graciously  spoke  the  words, 
"  It is time,"  the reading of  the edict of  liberty 
took place.  A State capable of  such proceedings 
will  never  change,  but  since  some  of  the  old 
martial spirit survives, and is renewed by drafts 
of  seasoned troops from  Asia, Turkey will  in all 
probability  remain  in  Europe  until  driven  out 
by  force.  This  view  was  expressed  fifty  years 
ago  by  Moltke,  then  a  captain  in  the  Turkish 
service.  To  us  it  appears  that  this  entirely 
alien  order  of  things  cannot  be  reformed.  The 
famous  dogs  of  Constantinople  are  the  best 
simile  that can  be  found  of  a  people  mentally 
inert,  but grown  expert in the art of  governing 
by  centuries  of  experience.  Those  mild  but 
sturdy animals sleep during the day, but at night 
perform spontaneously the functions of scavengers. 
If, however, it is attempted to tame one of  them, 
he  dies  of  a  broken  heart  for  love  of  his  lost 
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in  the desert  he  was  in  his  element.  That  he 
has  drifted  into  the  toils  of  civilization  is  a 
tragedy that can only end in his annihilation. 
The  Papacy  towers  above  the  theocratic 
institutions  of  the  West  by  the  grandeur  of  a 
development  peculiar  to  itself.  In  the  early 
centuries  of  the  Church,  a  highly  centralized 
power  was  beneficent  and necessary in resisting 
the crude encroachments of  Arianism.  Her for- 
mulae  and  doctrines  have  preserved  for  us  the 
glowing  ideals  of  a  past  age.  The  historic 
development  of  the Papacy typifies  the growth 
of  Christian  theocracy  and  clearly  shows  how 
incompatible are its intellectual  restrictions with 
the essential spirit of  Christianity.  It is distress- 
ing that the greatest oracle of  Christian thought 
during the Middle Ages, St. Augustine, should have 
employed his  genius to establish  upon  a  logical 
basis  the anti-Christian  doctrine  of  the  Civitas 
Dei : that the Kingdom which is not of  this world 
is also the most glorious in the world.  Among 
the  liberty-loving  peoples  of  the  West  whose 
march is towards enlightenment, such claims must 
in  the  long  run  provoke  universal  opposition. 
To secure victory  the Church was  compelled to 
forge an imposing panoply  of  spiritual weapons. 
The truth that Theocracy like Democracy pursues 
an unattainable  ideal  and  is  conscious  of  this 
fact, emerges with particular clearness from the 
annals of  the Popes.  From simple Bishops they 
rose  little  by  little  to  be  rulers  of  a  Church 
claiming  universal  domination.  And  since  the 
secession of  the Teutonic nations, the encroach- 
ments  of  the  Papacy  have  been  so  successful 
as to make it possible for its crowning achieve- 
ment,  the doctrine of  Papal Infallibility, to find 
acceptance in our own time.  A Church of  which 
one of  her own ablest protagonists could say that 
her  temporal  authority  was  as  obvious  as  the 
State  of  Venice  must  inevitably  aim  at theo- 
cratic absolutism.  Her spirit is that of  authority 
without condition or compromise, and she makes 
the  word  synonymous  with  Papacy.  If  it 
be  assumed  that  all  authority  on  earth  is 
from  God,  and  that  God  is  represented  by  a 
man, that man must have supreme power.  The 
logical  interdependence  of  these postulates is so 
compelling  that  there  is  no  choice  between 
complete surrender to them and their collective 
rejection  as  heretical  and  tending  to idolatry. 
Any  attempt to find  a  middle  course would  be 
derisive ; the failure of  the "  German Catholics " 
and of  the "  Old  Catholics " would always recur 
and should  serve as a  warning.  It is  the glory 
of the Roman system to admit of only one answer : 
Yes or No.  All is sacrificed to external symmetry, 
and  the  Ultramontane  party  is  therefore  not 
ecclesiastical  but  essentially  political  in  aim ; 
its  only  object  is  to  rule.  One  may  be  an 
excellent  clerical  while  rejecting  all  religious 
belief.  One of the best known leaders of  the Ultra- 
montanes in Baden coolly said to me, an avowed 
antagonist  not  accustomed to the confidences of 
opponents, "  For my  own  part I have no need 
of religious faith, but a final authority is necessary 
in  this world, and the Pope  is  the only possible 
one." 
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universal adaptability we  must acknowledge her 
unrivalled  skill  in  the art of  ruling  men.  The 
features characteristic of  theocracy become more 
and  more  pronounced.  The  enforced  celibacy 
of the clergy goes hand in hand with Hildebrand's 
victories  over  the  Emperor.  The  Byzantine 
bureaucracy formed the model for the admirable 
classification of the hierarchy,  the apex of  which 
was the College of  Cardinals by which the Pope 
must  be  elected.  In the  days  of  Henry  111. 
Popes  were  still  made  and  unmade  by  the 
Emperor;  within  a  short  space  of  his  death 
these conditions were reversed  and the Imperial 
influence  upon  the Papal  elections was  entirely 
eliminated. 
Concurrently  with  these  events  a  dogmatic 
system was elaborated in the interests of  priestly 
domination.  By  the  most  important  amongst 
its  tenets,  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation, 
which  established  the  power  of  the  priest  to 
create God,  and his  exclusive right to the cup, 
the gulf  between  priest  and  people,  between  a 
commanding and teaching Church and a hearken- 
ing and obedient flock, was so magnified that it 
could  never  again  be  spanned.  Gregory  VII. 
succeeded in freeing the choice  of  bishops from 
all trace of  secular control.  Celibacy and sacer- 
dotal ordination formed,  as it were, an impene- 
trable  barrier  around  the  priesthood,  which 
happened to be the only  professional class  at a 
time when all other professions were hereditary, 
and therefore the ascendancy of  the clergy was 
immense.  The  Church  alone  offered  a  career 
to every  kind  of  ability ; Gregory VII.  himself 
sprang  from  the  humblest  class  of  the  people. 
The feast of  Corpus Christi, the greatest solemnity 
in the Roman Church, is not celebrated in honour 
of  the Saviour but of  a miracle to the Host.  It 
is the festival of the self-glorification of  the clergy, 
and  displays to full view  the prostration of  the 
laity before the ministers of  the Church Militant. 
In Spain  the Romish  system  is seen in  its full 
luxuriance.  Unlike the light-hearted Italian, the 
hard  and  morose  Spaniard  is  a  fanatic.  In 
Spanish  churches  the clergy, seated  in  gorgeous 
stalls, occupy the entire nave,  and from time to 
time  a  hoarse  croak  emerges from  their  midst. 
The  laity is  relegated  to the side aisles, whence 
the altar is barely visible. 
The  interests  of  true  monarchy  were  more 
and  more  counteracted  by  the  ever - increasing 
expansion of  a  hierarchy  which  did not  scruple 
to use faith as the vehicle of  its own power.  The 
issue  could  not  be  doubtful : since the Church's 
claim  is  based  on  Apostolic  descent  from  St. 
Peter,  it follows  irresistibly  that  his  legitimate 
representative  must  be  the  sole  repository  of 
spiritual  power.  This  conclusion  was  finally 
proclaimed by Pius IX., and will in all probability 
be  long maintained.  As  yet the Catholic world 
reveals no symptom of  revolt against the Pope's 
infallibility. 
This universal Church, in her  attempt to set 
up a world-wide spiritual dominion, has sacrificed 
much of  the true Christian spirit.  On  the other 
hand, the temporal  States of  the Church  which 
formed  the  mundane  basis  of  her  power  were 
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misery  of  their condition.  The first  beginnings 
of  the temporal  sovereignty  of  the Pope, which 
endured only 650 years, were in a political sense 
as  promising  as  its  consequences  have  been 
disastrous.  It  is  an historical  fact  that in  the 
early  part  of  the Middle  Ages  the Bishops  of 
Rome  were  the  Emperor's  subjects.  Subse- 
quently they obtained possession of  considerable 
tracts,  but  were  unable  to  erect  them  into 
anything  that could  be  called  an  independent 
State.  Otho  IV.  was  the  first  Emperor  who 
recognized a territorial sovereignty vested in the 
Bishop  of  Rome,  but the donation  of  Neuss  is 
only  one  of  the  many  political  crimes  which 
lie to the.charge of  this Guelph Emperor. 
For a  long period the Pontifical  Government 
had  immense  advantages  over  its  temporal 
colleagues.  Since the only haven of  culture was 
the  Church,  she  naturally  controlled  nearly  all 
the intellectual forces of  the time.  The Court of 
Rome  was  the  first  to  maintain  permanent 
embassies, and the Pope was therefore in posses- 
sion  of  incomparably  more  ample  political  in- 
formation  than  any  temporal  sovereign  could 
dispose  of.  Moreover, while  the rest of  Europe 
still made payments in kind,  Peter's  Pence  and 
the Annates flooded Rome with coin.  A money 
currency is an immense instrument of  power over 
those  who  know only the primitive practice  of 
barter  and  exchange.  The  Byzantine  Empire, 
deprived  of  vigour  and  genius, yet maintained 
itself  solely  by  the  finished  technique  of  its 
administration and the excellence of  its financial 
system.  Its well-paid officials long kept at bay 
the  onslaughts  of  youthful  nations.  A  similar 
process  may  be  observed  in  the  Papal  States. 
The Emperor Frederick 11. adopted the admirable 
methods of  the Moors ; the Popes 
in their turn learnt from him, with the result that 
their Government became the most highly organ- 
ized in Europe.  Even during the exile at  Avignon 
the  traditional  maxims  were  not  abandoned, 
but, on  the contrary, embodied in the so-called 
Aegidian  Constitutions which  were drawn up by 
Cardinal  Albornoz  as the  permanent  basis  for 
the guidance of  the internal administration and 
police.  In 1356 these  regulations  might  justly 
be  called  a  masterpiece  of  wisdom.  Unfortu- 
nately they were adhered to without intermission 
until  the  French  Revolution,  more  than  four 
hundred years later, when stereotyped reason had 
long since degenerated into absurdity. 
Even  the  spiritual  advantages  of  the Papal 
regime became attenuated with the lapse of  time. 
A  new  superior  secular  learning  rose  into  im- 
portance  and  everywhere  displaced  the  old 
ecclesiastical type of  scholarship.  The increasing 
use  of  money  relatively  diminished  one  of  the 
Pope's  advantages;  and  when  from  the  days 
of  Martin  Luther  onwards  Peter's  Pence  grew 
less  abundant,  a  main  support  of  the  political 
structure of  the Papacy began  to crumble.  As 
a result of  the financial disorder the armies of  the 
Holy  See  became  notoriously  the worst  in  the 
Western world.  A remedy was  sought  in Swiss 
levies,  which,  however,  failed  to maintain  the 
krmer strength  of  the  Pontifical  State.  Since 
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apace, but although the general conditions were 
at  length  condemned  as  intolerable  by  the 
liberated judgment of  a more enlightened age, no 
means of  reconciling the warring principles were 
at hand.  As  recently  as 1815 even  Metternich 
saw the need of attempting serious reforms in the 
Papal  Government.  After  the  Italian  disturb- 
ances  of  1831  a  conference  of  the five  Powers 
was  held  at Rome,  at which  modest  but  im- 
practicable  proposals for  reform  were  made  by 
Bunsen on  behalf  of  Prussia.l  Since the tradi- 
tional gulf  dividing  priest and layman, which is 
so indispensable to theocratic predominance, was 
carefully maintained as between the ecclesiastical 
and secular  delegates to the newly-devised pro- 
vincial  assemblies,  these  bodies  never  attained 
the unity requisite  for  success.  The priesthood 
as usual proved itself incorrigible. 
If  the  Papal  Government  can  be  said  to 
have  deserved  credit  in  the  early  days  of  its 
existence for its administrative achievements  it 
was from the first the source of  untold political 
misfortunes for Italy.  All  Italian patriots, from 
Dante onwards, have been the sworn adversaries 
of  the  Holy  See.  No  doubt  the  Papacy  was 
reckoned  as  a  "  gloria  italiana,"  and  as  such 
soothed the national pride,  though  at the same 
time  it  hampered  national  unification.  Come 
what might, no Pope could identify himself  with 
purely national ideals.  From time to time there 
arose  a  great  Pope  who  was  also  an  Italian 
patriot ; such  was  Alexander  III.,  perhaps  the 
greatest of  all Pontiffs, the redoubtable opponent 
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of  the Hohenstaufen ; and Julius II., surnamed 
the Terrible, who subdued Bologna and there set 
up his own statue by Michel Angelo as an emblem 
of his despotism.  These Popes never completely 
attained  their  ends,  but  their  history  shows 
that  Papal  policy  can  only  be  identified with 
national aims within certain definite limits. 
From  the first the Roman  Pontiffs  played  a 
double game,  originally between  the Goths  and 
Byzantium, then between Lombards and Franks. 
The  goal  was  always the same,  the division  of 
Italy.  This  territorial  policy  was  effectively 
promoted  by  the  existence  of  problems  which 
divided the peninsula in half.  As  long as upper 
and  lower  Italy  obeyed  different  masters  the 
Popes  inevitably  leant  alternately  towards  the 
Normans  and  towards  the  German  Emperors. 
When  the unity  of  Italy seemed to be  in  sight 
through  the reversion  of  southern  Italy to  the 
Hohenstaufen,  the  Papacy  became  the  implac- 
able opponent of  the Empire.  Later, the policy 
of  vacillation  was  still  continued,  and  even 
during  the  Reformation  the  Curia  could  not 
be  induced  to  side  whole-heartedly  with  him 
who  could have stemmed the tide of  revolt.  In 
this connection there is nothing more instructive 
than  the controversies  between  Charles  V.  and 
that  consummate  Medician  schemer,  Clement 
VII.  No sooner did Charles prepare to suppress 
the Reformation than the Pope began to fear a 
future predominance of  the Empire, and true to 
his  tacking policy  opened negotiations with  the 
French  and  even  with  the  Porte.  It  is  well 
known  that when  Gustavus Adolphus landed in 
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Germany  at the  opening  of  the  Thirty Years' 
War  his  intervention  was  welcomed  with  joy 
by the Pope, because he feared that Wallenstein, 
if  victorious, might march upon Rome. 
Such tactics have from all time characterized 
Papal diplomacy, and have at last brought about 
the shipwreck of  the temporal power.  Towards 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  group 
of  high-minded  enthusiasts,  the  so-called  Neo- 
Guelphs,  arose  in  Italy,  and for  a  brief  period 
transformed  men's  views  of  the  political  r61e 
which  they  believed  that the Papacy  might  be 
made to play at the head of  the national move- 
ment,  much  as the "  Greater  Germany " party 
believed  that  Austria  would  be  the  means  of 
German unity.  As  Pius IX. at first appeared to 
be  a  moderate  man,  nationalist  dreams  were 
imputed to him,  which,  in  fact, no  Pope  could 
ever indulge in.  It was imagined that the party 
of  unity could found a confederation over which 
the  Pope  would  preside.  Such  was  the  pro- 
gramme  when  the war  of  1848 broke  out.  On 
April 29, 1848, the Pope pronounced the decisive 
Allocution, in which he abandoned the nationalist 
cause  on  the  ground  that  he  could  not  fight 
against  a  Catholic  Power  like  Austria.  The 
Church's  cosmopolitanism  was  thus irrevocably 
proclaimed, and a blow dealt at her prestige from 
which she has never recovered.  At last the chair 
of  St. Peter had to be  protected by French and 
Spanish  garrisons.  Nothing  brings  home  more 
clearly how blessed a deed despoiling the Church 
may  be  than a  comparison between  the vulgar 
monument raised by Pius IX. in memory of  the 
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mercenaries who fell at Montana and the follow- 
ing noble words inscribed upon it by the Italian 
Government in commemoration of  1870 : "  We, 
who  rejoice  in the blessings of  liberty,  preserve 
this  melancholy  memorial  of  the  Theocracy  in 
order that our fellow-citizens may recognize the 
value of  freedom and unity." 
Since  that  time  the  Pope  is  placed  in  an 
entirely abnormal position, inasmuch  as he  still 
receives the recognition due to him as a sovereign, 
although  he has been  deprived  of  the territorial 
independence  which  in  all  other  cases  is  the 
indispensable adjunct of  sovereignty.  Let it be 
supposed  that  an  insoluble  difficulty  arises 
between  the  Papacy  and  another  State.  In 
former times Oliver Cromwell could despatch war- 
ships  and reduce  the Pope  to submission by  a 
demonstration on the coast.  At the present day 
the  Italian  Government  repudiates  all  responsi- 
bility for the political acts of  the Holy See, but 
in fact protects an irresponsible Pontiff from any 
kind of  reprisals.  Coercive measures are power- 
less  against  him  unless  Italian  neutrality  is 
violated.  In short, he is  protected  by a secular 
State which  will  recognize  no  responsibility  for 
his  acts.  Here again the peculiar circumstances 
of the Curia are visible : two ways of  improving 
its  unsatisfactory  position  are  open to  it.  It 
might  follow the  advice of  the Jesuit Ventura, 
and  silently  become  reconciled  to the kingdom 
of Italy, a course which would  offer great future 
advantages.  As  the clergy, to which the bulk of 
the  people  is  much  attached, is  more  patriotic 
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if  the Pope withdrew his prohibition and allowed 
the faithful to vote, a strong Papal party would 
soon  arise.  Another  probable  consequence 
would  be  that  first  of  all  the  ladies,  then  the 
gentlemen  of  the  Court  would  come  under 
Vatican  influence.  For  many  generations  the 
Princes  of  Savoy, after  a  stormy  youth, have 
turned penitent in their old age, and this practice 
might  quite conceivably lead to the virtual but 
indirect  control  by  the Pope  of  Italian  affairs. 
This effect  cannot be counted on, for every Italian 
has such a capacity for enjoying the pleasures of 
this world that it is scarcely possible to imagine 
him  priest-ridden.  The  other  alternative  open 
to the Pope, and in fact adopted by him, was to 
play the part of  a prisoner ;  a real farce, for no one 
prevents  Christ's  Vicar  from  going  where  he 
pleases.  Great material discomfort has been the 
inevitable  consequence, and being too  obstinate 
to accept the civil list offered him by the Italian 
Government he is compelled to drain the resources 
of  the faithful all over the world. 
On close scrutiny this system shows signs of  a 
certain consistency, for if  the first alternative had 
been followed the Papacy would no doubt have 
been untrue to its inmost spirit.  The Pope could 
not make himself master of  Italy without barter- 
ing a cosmopolitan for a purely national mission. 
Hence even a mild and gentle Pope like Leo XIII. 
is  completely  inaccessible  to any  reconciliation 
with  the  Italian  Government,  and  constantly 
renews  his  protests  against  it.  The  Church  of 
Rome  is  determined  to remain  the world-wide 
Church, and therefore can never make any peace 
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with  the  sacrilegious  robbers  who  have  fortu- 
nately made their nest in Rome. 
Amongst  the  minor  Theocracies  of  Europe 
the  Teutonic  Order  is  the  only  one  which  can 
boast a creditable history.'  From the very first 
its  military  constitution  preserved  it from  the 
priestly influences which oppressed other ecclesi- 
astical  states,  and  a  wealth  of  talent  enriched 
its  most  flourishing period.  It disposed of  the 
intellectual attainments of  the clergy, but was not 
in conflict with them.  The Bishops were members 
of  the Order, and hostility  between Church and 
State  was  therefore  an  impossibility.  Rome 
taught  the  Teutonic  Order  the  value  of  per- 
manent  ambassadors  and  systematic  finance. 
By means of exemplary thrift it amassed immense 
reserves of  ready money at a time when its neigh- 
bours  were  in  want.  It  irresistibly  attracted 
all  the  spirited  and  ambitious  youths  of  noble 
birth  in Germany, and at the outset its statutes 
were  so  liberal  that  no  test  of  pedigree  was 
required  for  admission  to its  ranks.  Members 
of the principal mercantile families of  Hamburg, 
Liibeck, and Bremen were received without diffi- 
culty,  efficiency  was  the  only  standard.  The 
restraining  test  of  quarterings was  not  applied 
until  the  decline  set  in.  A  contributing  cause 
of  prosperity  was  the expansive  impulse  innate 
in the German people to whom at that time the 
regions  beyond  the  Eastern  frontier  were  like 
America to-day, the land of  Promise. 
Thus  for  a  short  time the Order  had  at its 
Command  the  most  vigorous  elements  of  the 
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nation.  Already by the middle of  the fourteenth 
century it had consolidated its power in Prussia, 
and established its control over one hundred miles 
of  Baltic coast.  Decay was no less rapid.  The 
defeat  of  Tannenberg  cost  the  Order  all  the 
glamour of  invincibility which was half its power. 
Unlike secular States, such as the later kingdom 
of  Prussia, the Teutonic Order lacked the internal 
recuperative  forces  necessary  for  its  salvation 
as  a  State.  It  was  theocratic  in  constitution, 
and therefore irreconcilably at variance with the 
spirit  of  the  people  over  which  it ruled.  The 
laity, the native  Pmssian  nobility,  the dwellers 
in the towns all felt increasing resentment towards 
the  foreign  masters  whose  celibate  condition 
precluded  genuine attachment to the  soil ; the 
break-up of  the State was hastened by appalling 
acts of  treason.  All attempts at reform after the 
great defeat, all attempts to enlist the lay elements 
of  the  community  in  support  of  the  State  as 
constituted by the Order, were doomed to failure 
when  brought  into  contact  with  its  Statutes. 
No remedy was conceivable except the revolution 
actually carried  out by  the last  Grand  Master, 
who,  in  1525,  transformed  the  ecclesiastical 
State  into  a  secular  principality,  and  to  our 
perpetual benefit built a pillar for the foundation 
of  the Prussian monarchy. 
Compared  with  this  military  theocracy  the 
paltry spiritual principalities of  Germany, subject 
to  the  Roman  obedience,  assume  a  well-nigh 
ludicrous  aspect.  The  infusion  of  Christian 
notions  of  almsgiving  into  the  domain  of  law 
had  terrible  consequences.  When  the  French 
occupied Cologne one-fourth of its 40,000 inhabit- 
ants  were  registered  beggars.  The  well-known 
saying, "  It is  good  to live  under  the  crozier," 
had  no other  meaning than that under  its sway 
the mean man need  do little or no work, for his 
wants would be attended to in any case. 
The  rise  of  these  ecclesiastical  States  dates 
from the days of  the  Othos,  who  made  use  of 
the  bishops  in  resisting  their  lay  vassals.  The 
bishops thus grew in power, and finally succeeded 
in  acquiring territorial  rights.  It  is  worthy  of 
note that these petty sovereigns were obliged to 
tolerate  the existence of  representative  Estates. 
Almost everywhere we find a provincial assembly, 
whose  assent  and approval seems to have  been 
sought by the prince.  This was no doubt largely 
due  to the  fact  that bishoprics  were  generally 
filled  by  the nobility,  more  especially after the 
Reformation.  For  centuries Cologne  and  other 
Westphalian  Sees  were  occupied  by  Bavarian 
princes.  Bishops like these of  illustrious German 
blood  could  not  become  totally  estranged from 
the nation.  Although the old aristocratic clergy 
whose  power  was  broken  in  1803 was  far more 
worldly-minded than the priesthood  of  to-day, 
it may  be  questioned,  nevertheless,  whether  we 
have not good reason to mourn it.  The princely 
scions of  Wittelsbach and Nassau  were  after all 
attached to the country  by  a  thousand  ties  of 
interest and affection ;  the modern clergy, plebeian 
and  poor,  is  chained  to  Rome.  Nevertheless 
the small German theocracies  had  become  com- 
pletely atrophied in the eighteenth century under 
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ments  were  out  of  the question,  and plans  of 
reform,  of  which  many  were  made,  invariably 
proved  vain.  At  last  the "  Reichsdeputations- 
hauptschluss,"  as the final act of  the old Imperial 
Diet  was  called,  put  an end to these States in 
1803, without causing any one a pang. 
The political effects of their system are felt to 
this day, and are clearly noticeable in  the way 
votes  are  cast  in  the  Rhine  country.  In any 
place  that has belonged  to the Palatinate both 
Catholics  and  Protestants  vote  more  or  less 
independently,  while  any  district  formerly  in 
ecclesiastical  territory  is  sure  to  vote  for  the 
clericals.  In these regions it has in fact become 
extremely  difficult for the Prussian Government 
to  collect  taxes.  The  iron  grasp  of  Napoleon 
had  been  meekly  endured,  but when  it became 
Prussia's  task to establish a secular government 
by pacific means, the Rhinelanders began to count 
every farthing due to their Protestant king with 
a grudging parsimony that was both comical and 
petty.  To them it seemed a fantastic innovation 
that  such  claims  should  be  put  forward  by  a 
temporal Government in peace time. 
Thus  the  effects  of  ecclesiastical  rule  long 
remained  perceptible  in the customs and habits 
of  mind  of  the people.  But if  we  inquire what 
its permanent achievements have been, the answer 
is indeed a gloomy one.  During the last hundred 
years under  the old  system, the people  became 
so estranged from the national life that Cologne 
and  Treves  were  entirely  untouched  by  the 
intellectual revival  of  the time ; the incorpora- 
tion of  the Rhenish provinces by France was at 
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first  hardly noticed by them.  The new  currents 
of  German  thought  were  so  unfamiliar  on  the 
Rhine  when  the Prussians  entered  Cologne  and 
Bonn  that the names  Goethe and Schiller were 
totally unknown to the people.  It is appropriate 
here to recall the impudent claims of  the Catholic 
clergy  to control  education,  an audacity  which 
is  all  the more  striking when  it is  remembered 
that  the first elementary  schools  were  founded 
by the King of  Prussia.  With the exception of 
a few  dame schools and ambulating teachers no 
means  of  education  whatever  existed  in  rural 
districts. 
Once  more  we  meet  those  characteristic 
features of  priestly rule,  immobility and love of 
ease,  which  made  these  countries  incapable  of 
reform  from  within,  and  the  predestined  prey 
of  revolution.  A certain grandeur of  conception 
and  majestic  consistency  of  method  cannot  be 
denied  to Theocracy,  but  for  modern  nations 
the  final  conclusion  must  be  that this  form  of 
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MONARCHY 
IN direct  contrast  to  Theocracy,  Monarchy 
proclaims  the  essentially  secular  nature  of  all 
State  authority.  Doubtless  primitive  peoples 
have  shown  an inclination  to trace  their  king- 
ship to a  divine origin,  but the royal  authority 
once  established  nevertheless  bears  a  distinctly 
temporal stamp.  Of  this fact and of  the funda- 
mental  difference  which  divides  it from  theo- 
cracy, monarchy makes no secret.  The claim to 
rule "  by the grace of  God " is no more than a 
devout  aspiration  which  does  not  attempt  to 
formulate a mystical and spiritual right to power, 
but simply to assert that the inscrutable will  of 
Providence  has  decreed the elevation  of  a  par- 
ticular family above its rivals.  Piety is a funda- 
mental  requirement  in  a  monarch,  since  the 
notion  that he  stands immeasurably  above  all 
other  men  may  actually  unsettle  his reason,  if 
it be  not  balanced  by personal  humility  which 
compels him to acknowledge himself God's instru- 
ment.  All this does not abrogate the axiom that 
it is the nature and aim of  monarchy to be of  this 
world.  Genuine  monarchy  does  not  aspire  to 
partnership with the Almighty. 
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On  the other hand, monarchy stands opposed 
to republicanism.  In  a  republic,  authority  is 
founded upon the will  of  the governed, while  in 
a monarchy it is derived from the historical claim 
of  a  particular  family,  and concentrated  in the 
will  of  one man who wears the crown and who, 
though  surrounded  by  more  or  less  responsible 
advisers,  ultimately  decides  every  question 
himself.  It is idle to toy with metaphors : the 
minimum test of monarchy is whether or not the 
will  of  the  monarch  can be  overruled.  We  are 
confronted  by  the  conflict  between  unity  and 
division.  It  is  an  ancient  experience  that 
monarchy presents more perfectly than any other 
form  of  government  a  tangible  expression  of 
political  power  and national  unity.  Hence  its 
marvellous appeal to the average understanding, 
and to natural reason, of  which we  Germans saw 
such a striking example in the early years of  our 
new Empire.  For us the conception  of  a  united 
Fatherland  became  incarnate in  the  person  of 
our venerable Emperor.  Our  emotions  when  it 
once more became possible to say, " In this man 
Germany is one,"  were beyond all expression. 
Nevertheless  it is  only  a  secondary  feature 
of monarchy that in it authority resides in the will 
of  a single individual ;  the primary consideration 
is that this authority is not delegated but original 
and inherent  in  him.  One  may,  to use  an ex- 
pression  familiar  to  the  schoolmen,  speak  of 
the  aseitas  of  royal  authority,  and  the  fact 
that  this  authority  is  self-derived  produces  a 
much  higher  level  of  social justice  under  mon- 
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Republics  are less  likely to be  just,  because all 
government  is  necessarily  party  government, 
and this contention is fully borne out by historical 
experience.  Revolutions  are  caused  not  by 
hatred  of  monarchy,  but  of  a  privileged  class. 
It  is  precisely  to the monarch  that the masses 
will  turn for  help  against  their  oppressors.  A 
king worthy of  the name is so exalted above all 
private  animosities  that  he  can  survey  the 
struggles of  parties and classes from an immense 
height.  At the time of  their greatness the French 
had  a  profound  insight  into  the  nature  of 
monarchy, and it was a maxim of  their constitu- 
tional law that the King at his accession suffered 
a capitis diminutio in respect  of  his legal person- 
ality ; his private property merged in the Crown. 
This is a maxim of  first-rate importance when 
considered  in  the  light  of  its  ultimate  conse- 
quences.  In so far as monarchy  bases its right 
on  history  it  implies  an  aristocratic  element : 
the  claim  of  certain  families  to preponderance 
in virtue of  an alleged superiority.  History also 
supports the contention  that a  flourishing aris- 
tocracy  is  always  politically  competent  and  a 
support  to the  Crown.  On  the other  hand,  it 
is peculiar  to all healthy monarchies to contain 
a  strong  democratic  force.  Raised  above  all 
parties the King is naturally drawn to the weak 
and humble amongst  his  subjects ; as Frederick 
the Great  said, "  To  be  the friend  of  the poor 
has ever been the glory of  monarchy." 
Monarchy  implies  the  idea  of  equal  justice 
for all, which is realized in the person of  the King. 
This is the cause of  a phenomenon which appears 
in all genuine monarchies, and which consists in 
the  unlimited  confidence  of  the  people  in  the 
of  their  King.  Even  to-day  it 
may be said with truth that in spite of  all hostile 
agitators  the  mass  of  the  people  have  more 
confidence in  the  Crown  than  in  Parliament. 
The spontaneous judgment  of  average men  who 
invariably seek a final cause will always discern 
in the King a manifestation of  that self-sufficing 
power which typifies the suum cuique. 
Furthermore it  is possible for the monarch from 
the height  of  his exalted  station to see  further 
than ordinary mortals, who survey only a narrow 
sphere  of  practical  life,  and  whose  limitations 
are  revealed  by their  well-nigh  incredible  pre- 
judices.  Class hostility is no less frequent in the 
professional  and academic  sections of  the com- 
munity than in the aristocracy ;  no class regards 
society as a whole, but sees  only  fractions of  it, 
whereas  it  is  obvious  that  a  monarch  is  in 
a position to take a comprehensive  view  of  the 
national life, and to gauge more accurately than 
any  one  of  his  subjects  the rival  forces which 
shape its course.  Foreign affairs are particularly 
subject  to this  rule.  A  monarch  is  eompetcnt 
to judge  of  external relations  in  a  manner  far 
beyond the scope either of  private individuals or 
of republican administration.  A far-seeing policy 
is possible only to him who is the true centre of 
affairs. 
In addition to this consideration  it must  be 
remembered that as a matter of  fact all the royal 
houses  of  Europe form  one  great  complexus  of 
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sanguinity ; and in this way  monarchies obtain 
a  great  practical  advantage  recognized  by  all 
great republicans.  Washington  often and sadly 
declared it to be his experience that a sovereign 
people requires to suffer before it can be made to 
understand, and this dictum is confirmed by the 
War of Independence.  Had the American people 
been  guided  by a right  political judgment, that 
inevitable war would  have broken  out a genera- 
tion earlier ; but in fact it required  to be forced 
into it by dire necessity.  A monarchy  is better 
able to foresee the future, and there is  many a 
historical crisis of  which it may be truly said that 
the decisive act could have been performed only 
by a monarch.  Prussian policy up to 1866 could 
only have been carried  out by a great king and 
a great minister, never  by  a republic.  At  that 
time  only  a  small  group, at Freiburg  no more 
than five of  us, adhered to Bismarck.  Such was 
the  extent  of  the  public  approval  which  is 
alleged  to have  supported  him.  He alone was 
able to accomplish what was necessary, in spite 
of  the  opposition  of  the  people.  Fortunately 
the  great  statesman possessed  the  gift  of  pre- 
senting things in such a light that every Prussian 
must  feel  in  his  heart  that the  honour  of  his 
country was at stake, and thus was infused into 
the struggle the impetus and vigour of  a national 
war. 
Amongst  the  other  advantages  of  monarchy 
over republicanism must be  counted the force of 
tradition.  In  a  well - balanced  monarchy  the 
keynote  of  its  character  is  expressed  with 
peculiar  force in  the  customs and  conventions, 
in  short  in  the  traditions  of  its  public  life, 
because  the  habits  and  circumstances  of  the 
reigning family are inseparable  from the history 
of  the  State.  This  fact  was  symbolized  with 
exceptional  dignity under the old  French  mon- 
archy,  wlien  on  the  death  of  a  sovereign  the 
principal officer of  State broke his staff  over the 
body  of  the dead  Prince,  exclaiming, "  Le  Roy 
est  mort " ; then  immediately grasping  a  fresh 
staff, raised  it over  the  people  with  the  cry, 
"  Vive  le  Roy ! "  The  person  of  the sovereign 
passed away, the identity of  the Crown remained 
intact.  That  even  Homer  was  familiar  with 
this conception is proved by his speaking of  the 
imperishable  hereditary  sceptre  of  the  King. 
Generally  speaking,  a  fixed  rule  of  succession 
may  be  regarded  as a  conditio sine qua  non in 
monarchy, and it is facilitated by the recurrence in 
ruling families of certain hereditary characteristics. 
It is not of  course an exclusive privilege of royal 
families  to  transmit  their  peculiarities  from 
generation to generation, it is common to all men. 
Although  the  Hohenzollerns  are  a  gifted  race 
which  has  produced  many  individuals  with 
strongly  marked  characteristics,  yet  it may  be 
said  of  them  collectively  that they  have  been 
simple - minded  people.  With  all  his  genius 
Frederick  the  Great  had  plain  common  sense 
which enabled him always to see the main issue. 
A long experience of  affairs turns certain political 
opinions into hereditary habits of  mind in reign- 
ing families : such was the origin of  the efforts of 
the Hohenzollerns to bring about German unity. 
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their own defence.  By throwing in his lot with 
the  Reformers  the  reigning  sovereign  joined  a 
small minority, and was compelled to seek allies. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  stability  of 
family  traditions  involves  the danger  of  torpor 
and stagnation.  There have been dynasties like 
the Hanoverians in England, so devoid of  origin- 
ality that one king can  hardly  be  distinguished 
from the other.  Or let us turn and contemplate 
the  Hapsburgs.  Everywhere  we  recognize  the 
same  stolid  caste  of  features :  one  and  all 
were  priest-ridden.  The  house  of  Oldenburg, 
too, is remarkable in all its branches for uniform 
nullity.  In the  reigning  branch  the  Christians 
can only be distinguished from the Fredericks by 
their higher numerals.  Christian  IV.  alone was 
able to unseal the lips of  the muse,  and lives in 
the recollection of  his people as the hero of  whom 
the  national  anthem  sings,  "  King  Christian 
stood by the lofty mast."  Notwithstanding, the 
dynasty  was  always  beloved,  for  with  all  its 
monotonous  mediocrity  there  was  nothing  re- 
pellent about it. 
The  danger  of  becoming  stereotyped  would 
be  greater  for  monarchy  even  than  it  is,  did 
not nature everywhere supply an antidote;  the 
rivalry  between  elder and younger  which  exists 
in all classes of  society is especially keen in these 
high  spheres.  No  position  in  the world  offers 
greater  moral  temptations  than  those  which 
assail the heir-apparent of  a great kingdom.  It 
has long been a fact of  experience that energetic 
and duty-loving  rulers  are especially jealous  of 
their  successor,  and  will  not  allow  him  the 
share  in  public  affairs.  The  Emperor 
William I. made a point of gently eliminating the 
Crown  Prince.  When the heir  to the throne in 
spite of his  exalted rank is deprived of  influence,  , 
he  is forced  into opposition which  is  bound  to 
assert itself in a more or less questionable manner. 
NO Hohenzollern has ever yet been of  the same 
opinion as his father.  This is the corrective which 
nature  employs for our benefit against the evils 
of  a  too  prolonged  predominance,  and  which 
saves  monarchy  from  that monotony  which  is 
the  bane  of  theocratic  rule.  The  individuality 
of  the  ruler  has  ever  asserted  itself  as  a 
source  of  renewed  vitality,  for  his  government 
and monarchy  is  no  exception  to the universal 
rule  that  personality  is  the  decisive  factor  in 
history.  Monarchy  rests  upon  the  profound 
belief, derided by all modern Liberals, that history 
is  made  by  men.  Whoever  believes  that  the 
perpetuum  mobile  known to be  an impossibility 
in  the material order can yet be  maintained  in 
the realm of  thought, will  lean to republicanism 
and  persuade  himself  that effects  can  dispense 
with  a  cause.  Whosoever,  on  the  other  hand, 
takes his stand upon the conviction that history 
is  made by  assertions  of  the will,  and therefore 
of  the personality  of  individuals,  will  embrace 
the  monarchical  faith.  Gervinus  is  the  chief 
exponent  of  the doctrine that public opinion or 
general  conditions  develop themselves  and con- 
stitute the sole cause of  progress.  This absurdity 
brought matters to such a pass that the force of 
a movement came to be gauged by the fact that 
no man of  mark was found at its head.  Gervinus 
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predicted  a  great  future  for  the  "  German- 
Catholic " movement, because it proceeded from 
the  people  and  because  it failed  to enlist  the 
support  of  a  single  eminent  man.l  It  failed 
precisely for these reasons.  The more we  pene- 
trate history the more we  are driven to conclude 
that it is a  mere academic abstraction to speak 
of  the  evolution  of  circumstances.  The  indis- 
pensable factor in shaping events is personality. 
History  is  not  made  by  rule  of  thumb.  What 
succeeding generations call an historical necessity 
was once a complexus of  circumstances, more or 
less  favourable,  upon  which  an individual  will 
understand how to stamp his mark. 
Far be it from me  to minimize the claims of 
the economic view of  history, but I cannot over- 
look that it takes only one aspect into considera- 
tion ; and  when  it invites  the  conclusion  that 
events shape themselves it leads the student into 
error. 
The  belief, then, that history is  the outcome 
not of  the brainless power  called public opinion, 
but of  the  deliberate  will  of  men  of  action, is 
the foundation-stone of  monarchy.  There can be 
no  doubt that monarchy  affords  a  wider  scope 
than any other form of  constitution to that force 
which no human ingenuity can tame, and which 
we call character.  Although Frederick the Great's 
saying  that  monarchy  is  the  best  and  worst 
constitution  according  to  the  disposition  of 
the  monarch,  is an  exaggeration,  it  contains  a 
deep truth.  A ruler's characteristics are of  incal- 
culable importance ;  not so much because genius 
1 See Treitschke's Hisloly of  Gennany, vol. v. p. am,  5th ed., 1905. 
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is  essential  though  always  valuable,  but rather 
because  sound  judgment  is  the  indispensable 
faculty. 
1t  has  already  been  stated  that  the  funda- 
mental  principle  of  any  constitution  contains 
the  defects  of  its  qualities,  and  this  maxim 
with special force to monarchy ; for kings 
are  their  own  worst  enemies.  Their  exalted 
position is a temptation to pride  of  every kind. 
There is a danger by no means remote that the 
and merely  human  foibles of  the prince 
will receive the respect  due only  to the Crown, 
that  adulation,  with  all  its  demoralizing 
consequences, will  ensue.  If  every  whim  of  a 
capricious  prince  were  to become  law  without 
delay, monarchy would be caricatured,  and con- 
sternation would seize all free and generous minds. 
Arbitrary  monarchs  are  compelled to resort  to 
their  enemies  because  they  are  abandoned  by 
their friends.  It must, of  course, be remembered 
that much depends not only upon the real char- 
acter of  the monarch,  but upon  the idea  which 
his people have of  him.  An immeasurable altera- 
tion  in  the  general  attitude towards  monarchy 
has  taken  place  even  in  my  own  lifetime.  At 
the beginning of  his reign Frederick William IV. 
was  as much overrated by public opinion as his 
great brother was under-estimated. 
Some monarchies have been especially favoured 
by  fortune.  Such  were  Prussia,  Sweden under 
the  Vasas,  and  Holland  under  the  House  of 
Orange.  Others  again  have  been  particularly 
afflicted  in their dynasties.  Piedmont is the only 
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unhappy  Spain  can  only  boast  of  two  since 
Philip 11.  who can  even be  called  good  men- 
Charles III., who made a feeble effort at reform, 
and young Alphonso XII., whose premature death 
was mourned by our own generation.  Monarchy is 
indeed  strong  when  it  has  withstood  the  test 
revealed  by  Spanish  annals.  In France,  Louis 
XVI. was an exception, but he appeared when it 
was  too  late  to save  the  State.  In England, 
after the line of  blood-stained mediaeval tyrants 
had  come to an end,  the hereditary  villainy  of 
the Stewarts made way for the hereditary nullity 
of  the Guelphs, and the whole presents an abject 
picture.  How  could  a  true  monarchical  spirit 
flourish in a country ruled by such kings ?  It is 
the special merit of  monarchy to be easily under- 
stood and to adapt itself readily to the natural 
order  of  things.  It fascinates the plain  man to 
see a single figure at the helm on whose word all 
depends,  and for such  the term "  Father of  his 
people " has genuine meaning.  When the crown 
is worn  by a  weak  or a  bad man nature is dis- 
torted; when the monarch  is penetrated with  a 
sense of  lofty  duty it is glorious to behold  the 
purifying  influence  of  his  exalted  office.  Of 
such  kingly  manhood  Prussian  history  affords 
us  splendid  examples  in  Frederick  the  Great 
and King William I. 
Let  us  survey  the  career  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  who,  after all,  is  the greatest king  that 
ever  reigned  on earth.  In early life he  was  an 
impressionable  poetaster,  full  of  dreams  and 
fancies,  a  prey  to sentimental reverie.  On  the 
very  day when  he  gave orders for the invasion 
of  Silesia he  composed  an ode  in praise  of  the 
peace  of  rural  life.  Suddenly  the  hero  hidden 
within him  stood  revealed,  and  from  that day 
forth the imperial  instinct grew more and more 
pronounced.  In his  old age his whole being was 
absorbed by the care of  the States he ruled, and 
this one solicitude banished all personal predilec- 
tions and hostilities.  During the last phase of  his 
life he became entirely selfless and dominated by 
the  desire to execute  ideal justice.  Such is the 
evolution  of  a  monarch  built  on  heroic  lines. 
The  Emperor  William  I.  offers  some  analogy 
with his great predecessor, although the evening 
of  his life was brighter.  Already during his last 
years he  seemed transfigured by the idea  of  his 
political mission,  beyond  the limits of  which  he 
cherished no personal aspirations or desires. 
Monarchs  of  his  stamp set the seal  of  truth 
upon the saying common to all nations, that the 
royal word  is  sacred.  No  doubt the expression 
is  sometimes used  in  a  minatory  sense,  but its 
primary implication is that loyalty to the plighted 
word  lies at the root of  monarchy.  When John 
11. of  France found that the humiliating terms of 
peace which he had been compelled to sign while 
a prisoner in England were rejected by his  own 
people, he once more delivered himself up to his 
enemies, saying that when faith and honour had 
vanished  everywhere  else  in  the  world,  they 
would still be found amongst princes.  Frederick 
the Great who quoted this saying fully endorsed 
it.  The reason is clear.  The sense of  responsi- 
bility  is  weakened  amongst  men  in  proportion 
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unscrupulous  than  princes,  because  all  their 
members  shirk  responsibility  by  throwing  it 
upon  each  other, whereas monarchs  are kept in 
check  by  the  knowledge  that  their  family's 
honour is at stake as well as their own. 
But things are very different when the monarch 
is a weak  and frivolous man, and the danger of 
his being such is the relative justification for the 
distrust of  monarchy felt by the ancients.  Plato, 
who  had  been  tutor  to Dionysius  of  Syracuse, 
and whose teaching was attended by the success 
usual to the practical efforts of  great philosophers, 
has  attempted  to  define  ideal  kingship.  His 
definition made so deep an impression upon the 
mind of  his contemporaries that they were driven 
to accept  Aristotle's  false  conclusion that since 
men cannot be gods, monarchy must in practice 
always  be  an  inferior  form  of  constitution  or 
~apl~/cpaar~.  The  truth is,  on  the contrary, that 
a certain degree of  mediocrity, provided it be not 
malevolent,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Hanoverian 
Guelphs, is quite compatible with true monarchy, 
and when  supported  by  tradition may  even  be 
elevated and dignified by it. 
If we  attempt to strike an average we  cannot 
fail  to perceive  the  profound  truth  that  only 
democratic  prejudice  can  attribute  happier 
results  to the  elective  than  to  the  hereditary 
principles.  Will  any one seriously contend that 
the sovereign people's  wisdom has raised  better 
men to the presidency of  the United States than 
destiny  has  placed  upon  the  Prussian  throne ? 
At first eminent men came to the front over there, 
of  whom the last was Lincoln ; at the present day 
only respectable  mediocrities are elected.  Elec- 
tion  does  not  promote  the men  who  have  the 
peatest ability, but those who have the greatest 
I 
following.  All  the prominent  party leaders  are 
so  besmirched  in  the  course  of  the  frenzied 
struggle  of  democratic  politics  that  they  are 
scarcely  thought fit candidates  for  the honours 
of  the  presidency.  On  entering  political  life 
every man must face the fact that, with the single 
exception of  suicide, every conceivable crime will 
be  attributed  to  him  in  the  newspapers.  At 
length,  immediately before  the election,  an  in- 
dividual  appears  known  as  the "  dark  horse." 
Neither  party has time  to annihilate  him  com- 
pletely,  and a  compromise leads to the election 
of  a man of  third- or fourth-rate ability. 
It is, then, demonstrably clear that the vulgar 
passions which so frequently govern the electoral 
campaigns of  democracy do not lead  to a  more 
rational  result  than  the  accidents  of  heredity. 
A prince becomes identified by birth and training 
with certain traditions, but the stability derived 
from this gradual evolution is necessarily lacking 
in  the man  raised  to power  by the vote of  the 
people.  From all time eminent men have treated 
the  education  of  princes  as  a  political  problem 
worthy of  the most careful study ; and as princes 
have quite different duties to perform from their 
subjects, it has always been held that they should 
be  differently  trained  from  other  men.  It  has 
been  reserved for the Houses of  Orlbans and of 
Coburg to diverge from this immemorial precept. 
It may well be asked if  the Orlbans princes have 
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training.  It has left their inward pride  greater 
even than that of  other royal  personages, and, 
furthermore, they received  an inferior course of 
instruction.  Princes  have  no  place  in  public 
schools, where  their  position  is  bound  to be  a 
false one.  Deceived by the same mistaken notion 
of  liberalism,  the  Coburgs  have  followed  the 
Orldans in an error of  judgment  which certainly 
will not be persisted in, and there will be a return 
to  the  rule  that  princes  must  be  differently 
educated from subjects.  Let us take an obvious 
example : it is an inevitable consequence of  the 
innumerable  family  ties  which  connect  modern 
dynasties, that a  prince  should speak three lan- 
guages like a native.  Why on earth should a young 
prince be bothered with Latin, let alone Greek ? 
He has no place at a public school : it is enough 
to surround him with some youths of  good family 
to excite his emulation and to counteract a sense 
of  isolation. 
When  the  reins  of  government  are  in  the 
hands of  a tolerably  competent  ruler,  especially 
of  one who  is naturally humble-minded,  even if 
only  moderately gifted, the inherent strength  of 
monarchy  will  be  revealed  in the close  relation 
between the king and his troops.  Nowhere more 
than  in  the army  is  there  need  of  a  supreme, 
final, and unrestricted will, and as the king alone 
stands above faction, no one can be more fitted 
than  he  to realize  the  idea  of  sovereignty  by 
means  of  military  command.  It  is  the  birth- 
right of  the king to be  commander-in-chief, and 
if, in fact, he  is born  with a genius for war,  no 
man  can resist the conviction that in him  mon- 
archy has found its highest expression.  A perfect 
military  organization  is  undoubtedly  an easier 
task  for  a  monarchy  than  for  a  republic.  A 
soldier  swears  fealty  more  readily  to  a  visible 
&ief  than to a political idea.  A king can employ 
the  army  without  the  slightest  danger  to the 
internal peace of  the kingdom, while a republican 
general  is  always  exposed  to the  suspicion  of 
utilizing a victorious army for his personal ends. 
Such  designs  were  not  unfamiliar  to the army 
of  Washington.  In  modern  France  this  point 
of  view  is  perfectly  well  understood,  and  the 
conqueror  of  Germany  would  infallibly  become 
Emperor of  the French.  Republics are therefore 
often  obliged  to  take  artificial  precautions : 
Venice in her decline invariably employed foreign 
condottieri. 
What is true of  the army is equally true of  the 
Civil  Service.  No  republic  is  as  well  fitted  to 
train  competent  public  servants  as  a  healthy 
monarchy.  Aristocratic  republics  have  also  a 
relative  latitude  of  choice,  but  dare  not  enlist 
all the talents, and must sooner or later become 
exclusive;  a  monarchy  can  afford  to  leave 
every  man  his  rank  and to establish  a  regular 
rotation  by  seniority.  Such  things  are  impos- 
sible in  republics with  the incessant  alternation 
of  election  and  retirement,  and  official  incom- 
petence  is  as  frequent under  democracy as are 
ability and integrity under  genuine monarchical 
rule. 
Monarchies, therefore, in which the succession 
is  secure  are  distinguished  from  most  repub- 
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the placid  development  of  political  institutions, 
simply  because  a  definite  barrier  is  opposed  to 
the ambition of  gifted and energetic men.  Under 
a monarchy the question who is to rule is settled 
once  and  for  all,  and  this  fact  has  a  special 
influence on the chiefs of  the army.  The pretorian 
spirit is an impossibility in a monarchy which is 
rooted  in  the  moral  convictions  of  the  people. 
In a  republic, unless its institutions  are  excep- 
tionally  ancient  and dear  ton  the hearts  of  the 
people, there is always a  danger that some over- 
mastering  ambition  will  be  fascinated  by  the 
desire  to  overthrow  the  constitution.  The 
feverish unrest in France leads to the continual 
recurrence  of  the question whether  this or  that 
one will venture to make himself supreme master 
of  the  State.  Old-  established  institutions may 
of  course exist under a republic and have a similar 
influence as under a monarchy.  In a republic as 
ancient  as that of  Switzerland  certain constitu- 
tional notions have  become  as deeply  ingrained 
in the mind of  the people as monarchical concep- 
tions are with us.  In spite of  intestine struggles, 
solidarity of  sentiment between the Swiss cantons 
has  always survived.  Both after the fierce war 
in which Zwingli lost his life as well  as after the 
Sonderbund war in our own century, the country 
returned with extraordinary rapidity to peaceful 
occupations.  The stubbornness of  a constitution 
hallowed by tradition in this case proved itself to 
be a source of  unification. 
All  that  has  here  been  said  in  support  of 
monarchy  presupposes  that the  people  subject 
to that form of  constitution  cherishes a  strong 
faith in the hereditary right of the dynasty, and 
the moral basis of  its government.  It is  no less 
impossible  to  create  a  royal  family than  arti- 
ficially to manufacture a  nobility,  but  even  a 
legitimate dynasty may easily forfeit its rights to 
the throne by its own  misdeeds.  The rights of 
sovereigns,  as,  those of  other human beings,  are 
not imperishable.  The whole history  of  France 
is  monarchical,  and while  her  principal  institu- 
tions have remained so to this day, the pinnacle 
of  the monarchical edifice is lacking, because the 
undoubtedly  legitimate heirs  of  the immemorial 
house of  Capet have entered the lists as leaders of 
faction and are now unable to assume the position 
of  natural  sovereign.  That attachment  to the 
royal person, that religion of  royalty which once 
supported the old French kings, has disappeared 
without  leaving  a  trace.  That  even  such  a 
race  as theirs could ultimately lose  the ethical 
right to  make good its claim to power is a moment- 
ous warning  to all rulers to put no illegitimate 
strain  upon  their  hereditary  prerogatives.  The 
principle of  heredity has a profound justification, 
but the intimate trust of  a  people in  its rulers 
must constantly be earned afresh, and no dynasty 
can be certain that destiny does not reserve for it 
also the fate which has befallen the descendant of 
Hugh Capet in modern France. 
Hence  it clearly  cannot  be  laid  down  that 
monarchy  is  necessarily  superior  to  a  republic 
as a  form  of  government.  A  monarchy  would 
be  madness  under  the conditions  which  prevail 
in  North  America.  All  the essential  conditions 
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to  contend  that  the  country  would  attain  a 
higher level of  prosperity by adopting monarchy. 
There will always be nations whose genius is ill 
adapted  to  find  expression  under  monarchical 
institutions-witness  the Greeks.  Modern Europe 
is the home of  true monarchy, which has always 
been  rejected  by  the  theocratic  East,  by  the 
democratic  Western  Continent,  and by  the re- 
publican spirit of  antiquity. 
The  infinite  variety  of  type  presented  by 
monarchy, and the facility with which that form 
of  government  can  assimilate extraneous insti- 
tutions, makes it extremely difficult to construct 
any  system  of  classification.  It  is,  however, 
possible to distinguish six main groups of  mon- 
archy.  Firstly, legendary monarchy, prevailing 
under  aboriginal  conditions.  Secondly,  feudal 
kingship,  in  which  we  include  its  emanation, 
monarchy  limited  by  representative  Estates. 
In this category monarchical forms have become 
so evanescent that it may  be  doubted  whether 
mediaeval  monarchy  should  not  rather  be  de- 
scribed as polyarchy.  Of  these the former is the 
least  mature  but the most  vigorous,  the latter 
the  weakest  and  most  incomplete.  Thirdly, 
elective  kingship  as  known  in  Poland,  which 
may be considered as the caricature of  monarchy 
in  its  last  stage  of  degeneration.  Nothing  is 
more  instructive  than to examine corrupt  con- 
stitutions, and the example of  Poland teaches us 
how a State should not be constituted.  Fourthly, 
hereditary absolute kingship as known in France 
in the hey-day of  her  monarchy,  or  in  Prussia 
before she had a constitution.  Fifthly, constitu- 
tional kingship, which presents so many varieties 
of  form that they can only  be comprised under 
one  head  for  convenience.  It  is  obvious  that 
aristocratic  as  well  as  democratico-republican 
ideas frequently take refuge under the constitu- 
tional  label.  Lastly,  a  very  peculiar  form  of 
kingship  which  stands  on  the  very  brink  of 
republicanism, because it rejects the fundamental 
monarchical  principle  of  heredity.  Specimens 
of this type are found either on a small scale in 
the tyrannies of  ancient Greece and of  Italy, or 
on the grand scale in the Roman Empire and in 
Bonapartism.  The  sovereign  people  transmits 
its authority in some form or other to the tyrant, 
who  governs  by  means  of  the  personal  sway 
which  his  vices  and virtues  have  won  for  him 
over the people.  The  people,  incarnate  in  one 
man, l'homme peuple, then reigns supreme. HELLENIC MONARCHIES 
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EARLY  TYPES  OF MONARCHY 
WE  will  next  examine  some  types  of  early 
mona~chy. In doing  so  it is  highly  important 
to bear in mind that the most primitive form of 
early  kingship  has  affected  the  great  nations 
differently, according to the nature of  their innate 
political  bent.  There  are  nations  who  have  a 
natural  aptitude  for  monarchy  and  who  have 
therefore preserved  it intact.  In the beginning 
it was  universal,  for  since  it both  implies  and 
embodies the idea  of  unity,  it  is  indispensable 
at  least  as  a  transition  stage ;  it is  further 
necessary almost everywhere, in order to secure 
unity upon an unshakable foundation as well  as 
to force alien tendencies within the State to sub- 
mission.  Nor  should  it be  forgotten  that  the 
young  republics  of  the  new  world  all  have 
monarchical antecedents of  considerable import- 
ance.  The common law, trial by jury, the two- 
Chamber  system,  and  the  government  of  the 
country  by  individual  administrators  are  all 
emanations from  the monarchical  period. 
The  political  temperament  of  nations  is  re- 
vealed by the maintenance or destruction of these 
traditions.  Purely  temporal  monarchy  makes 
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its  first  appearance  in  history  amongst  the 
Greeks, but there can be no doubt that their true 
political  instinct  was  for  democracy.  Unlike 
the  early  kingdom  of  Rome,  the  monarchy  of 
Homeric  stamp  has  vanished  almost  without 
leaving  a  trace upon subsequent history.  At a 
later  date we  find the dual kingship  of  Sparta, 
but  monarchical  ideas,  strictly  speaking,  are 
nowhere  to be  found  in  Hellenic  institutions. 
So soon as the Greeks attained a clear conscious- 
ness  of  their  national  unity  they  are  seen  to 
incline  towards  Republicanism.  Homer  is  a 
monarchist,  and  repeats  a  thousand  times  the 
oft-quoted line : 06% byaB6v rroXv~or~avl~,  el$ ~ol~avo~ 
&TW.  He speaks of  the divine descent of  kings, 
but  this  opinion  must  not  be  thought  to arise 
out of  a theocratic state of things, but rather to 
spring from  the childlike tendency  of  a youth- 
ful nation  to derive  from  the  gods  all  that  it 
reveres.  The characteristic  feature of  Homeric 
monarchy  was  a  peculiar  blend  of  the elective 
and the hereditary principles.  The crown became 
hereditary in a family because it transcended  its 
rivals  by  wealth  or  warlike  achievements,  but 
on the death of  the king his companions in arms 
chose as his successor that member of  his family 
who seemed to them most worthy to fill his place. 
A  characteristic mark of  Hellenic monarchies 
was  the  sharp  contrast  between  their  political 
importance and the magnificence of  their outward 
display.  No  clear  distinction  had  yet  been 
drawn  between  the  legal  prerogatives  of  the 
monarch and the functions of the other authorities 
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Homer designated the real sovereign Agamemnon 
by  the  very  title  of  paa~Xe&, which  was  also 
given  to  his  subordinates,  chiefs  of  smaller 
districts.  He  wielded  a  huge  power  as  their 
leader in war, and as supreme judge  in difficult 
cases.  But  the  relation  of  the  princelings  to 
him was so uncertain, and the notion of  obedience 
so lax, that it is hard to imagine how  obedience 
could  be  enforced  by  the  suzerain  once  the 
campaign was at  an end.  Monarchy of  this type 
presents  rather  the  aspect  of  a  confederation 
whose members are quasi-independent than of  a 
single unified State ; and so long as the conditions 
of  life  in  Greece  remained  pastoral  as  distinct 
from  urban,  the kingship  was  restricted  to its 
primitive functions of  leadership in war and of  a 
final court of  appeal.  Of  administrative affairs 
he  knew  nothing,  for  in the simple  rustic  con- 
ditions  then  prevailing  administration  was  out 
of  the question.  The inner flaw of  ancient Greek 
monarchy is then beyond dispute, and in addition 
it must  be  remembered  that, notwithstanding 
the divine  origin  claimed  for  some of  its regal 
families, the Hellenes were conspicuously lacking 
in that virile fidelity which the ancient Germans 
bore  to their  chieftains.  Such  a  standard  of 
manly honour must necessarily be unintelligible 
to  a  people  who  recognized  in  Odysseus  the 
embodiment of  their moral ideal. 
If  we  turn our gaze from the Homeric to the 
ancient  Roman  type  of  monarchy  we  perceive 
clearly  the  whole  difference  between  an  agri- 
cultural and a town-dwelling community.  It is 
significant that the Greek language possesses no 
~nequivocal  word  for justice.  811crl, 8~lca~oo;b~  are 
capable of  a moral and strictly legal interpreta- 
tion.  Greek thought was never entirely successful 
in formulating an original and adequate theory of 
political authority.  Contrast with this the vigour 
with  which  even  the earliest Roman  kings de- 
veloped institutions peculiar to their nation.  It 
is undoubtedly true that the Romans preserved 
a  strong monarchical  instinct  throughout  their 
history.  The  lez  regia  was  never  formally 
repealed,  and  even  under the Caesars the legal 
fiction endured in virtue of  which the Imperator 
was  subject  to  the  summa  potestas  of  the 
people  vested  in  himself.  The  legendary  king- 
ship of  Servius Tullius  was  invoked  to  provide 
a theoretic legitimacy for the Flavian Emperors. 
And yet in comparison with its Greek counterpart 
this primitive  Roman monarchy reveals a great 
deficiency :  it  was  not  hereditary.  The  dead 
king's  successor was chosen by the Senate after 
an  interval  during  which  an "  interrex " con- 
ducted the business of  State.  But once the new 
king was installed, he far exceeded in authority 
the Greek paa~Xe69.  He was possessed of  the Im- 
perium in its fullest sense ; he had the supreme 
command  in war;  the right to pardon,  and to 
punish with death ; he not only rendered justice, 
but he interpreted and extended the law by his 
judgments.  He  was  a  high-priest,  and  at the 
same time  exercised very  far-reaching adminis- 
trative  functions  within  the walls  of  his  City 
State.  The power  of  these early kings may  be 
measured by the magnitude of  the oldest existing 
architectural  monument  of  Rome,  the  cloaca 
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mamima,  which  is  their  work,  and  which  pre- 
supposes a  highly  centralized  authority capable 
of  enforcing the sacrifice of  domestic concerns to 
official requirements. 
Nothing is more remarkable than the persistent 
way in which the royal office of  primitive Rome 
continued to influence the history of  her people. 
Not  without  reason  have the consuls been  de- 
scribed as kings for one year.  The introduction 
of  the consulship effected only two changes in the 
old  constitutional order  of  things : the annual 
change  of  officers of  State, and the balance  of 
authority by  its division  between  two  equally 
entitled partners.  The energy of  the Imperium 
as understood  by the kings was  never  lost, but 
monarchical  ideas  were  preserved  with  concen- 
trated intensity under  republican forms,  and it 
is  not  surprising  that  a  return  to  monarchy 
should ultimately have taken place.  Greece, on 
the other  hand,  was  never  able  to achieve  its 
organic  reconstruction,  but  was  compelled  to 
import  it  from  Macedonia.  The  Greeks  were 
temperamentally republicans, the Romans mon- 
archists,  or,  at  the  very  least,  mindful  to 
preserve  in the central authority a  power  most 
easily compatible with monarchical views. 
The kingship of  our original German ancestors 
is more  akin to that of  Greece than to that of 
Rome.  This  is  quite  in  accordance  with  the 
fundamental nature of  things, for in both cases 
the purely rural conditions of  life restricted  the 
king  to  judicial  and military  functions.  As  in 
Greece so in primitive Germany, the outlines of  the 
monarchical  State were at first fluctuating, and 
its manifestations therefore various and unstable, 
but  in  spite  of  this  it contained  the germs of 
a  mighty  future.  Something  profoundly  noble 
but  at the  same  time  fantastic  and  nebulous 
lay concealed  in  these  ancient Teutons.  Their 
mythology reveals a sublime and glorious insight 
into the divine which the Greeks never attained, 
and the notion of another life was strong in them. 
The weird personalities of  their gods glide before 
us in such confusion that only one or two leave 
a distinct impression upon the memory, and as a 
whole Valhalla is not presented to our view with 
the same plastic clearness as Olympus. 
The same  fundamental  characteristic  is  per- 
ceptible in the political sphere, in which we  find 
evidences  of  a  genius  for  government  coupled 
with much unclearness of  thought.  Heredity was 
nowhere  the  absolute  rule,  but  was  practised 
conjointly  with  the  elective  principle.  Some 
chief  or  other  was  presumed  to descend  from 
Wotan, and as such he and his family were held 
to be sacred and called upon to rule.  But since 
leadership  in  war  and  military  capacity  were 
obviously required of the king, descent could not 
be  an unconditional  claim to succeed  him,  and 
the chief men of  the clan raised the most capable 
amongst his family to fill his place.  An element 
of  instability  was  thus introduced,  and also  in 
other respects the type of  royal authority might 
vary.  We  find at one time petty local kings, as 
amongst the Allemanni,  and at another a  more 
powerful  king  who  raises  himself  to  be  their 
suzerain,  and  who  stands  in  the  relation  of 
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Amongst  the Anglo-Saxons it was  not till  a 
later date that the king emerged distinctly from 
amongst  the Bldormen, and that he  was  able, 
although unsustained by the dignity of  an heredi- 
tary office, to emancipate his authority from the 
traditional control,  and  finally to assume  com- 
mand  of  the State.  Thus it may  be said  that 
the ancient Germanic monarchy, like the Homeric, 
was  weak  and  immature.  In  the  Teutonic 
character there is a fundamental strain of  manly 
sincerity which  contributed to the development 
of  the originally  imperfect  monarchical  institu- 
tions. 
Already  in  primitive  times,  overshadowed 
as they are by myths and legends, we  perceive 
that  the king  was  leader  in  war  and  supreme 
judge  in peace, but we  also find the first germs 
of  modern  representative institutions.  In some 
form  or  other  the free-born  German  demanded 
to be summoned to all deliberations momentously 
affecting  the  State.  The  issues  of  peace  and 
war  were  first  debated  in  assemblies  of  minor 
chiefs  gathered  around  the  king ; they  were 
then  presented  for  ratification  to the  host  of 
tribesmen capable of  bearing arms who mustered 
annually in March  or  in  May.  These  meetings 
decided whether or not war should be waged the 
following summer.  All  this was  very primitive 
and  imperfect,  but  the  elements  of  a  repre- 
sentative  constitution  were  traceable  from  the 
beginning, and, as Montesquieu with the instinct 
of  genius  has  said,  the cradle  of  constitutional 
government is to be found in the forest glades of 
Germany. 
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Brought into contact with  Rome, these  rude 
institutions  were  further  expanded.  Sybel  is 
certainly  quite  inaccurate  in  asserting  that 
Germanic  kingship  owed  the attainment of  its 
full vigour to the migration of  peoples and to the 
conquest of Roman provinces.  Long before these 
events the royal office had a recognized and legal 
authority,  but Sybel is right inasmuch  as they 
created  for  it a  multitude  of  fresh  problems 
and opportunities.  Henceforward the king could 
not be restricted to his military and judicial r6le. 
It became incumbent  upon  him  to organize an 
administration  and to rule over peoples of  alien 
blood.  A  code  of  personal  rights  came  to be 
recognized.  At  first  these  barbarian  princes 
decorated  themselves  with foreign titles such as 
Quaestor and Consul, much as the modern South 
Sea Islander fancies himself improved by donning 
a  frock-coat.  But the scope of  their  authority 
was gradually extended as fresh tasks occasioned 
by  the conquest  of  towns presented  themselves 
for solution;  and though  it is untrue  that the 
monarchy  was  created  by  the  necessities  of  a 
people on the march, it may not be too much to 
say that they gave an irresistible impetus to its 
activity. 
The  phases  of  this  transformation  were  ex- 
tremely  varied,  according as the migrating unit 
was an entire nation or a smaller group, cornitatus. 
The  latter  had  naturally  not  the same  facility 
as the former in transplanting and consolidating 
their  institutions.  Thus  Odoacer, so  often  de- 
scribed as the destroyer of  the Western Empire, 
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leader of  a faction, a Roman captain who returned 
amongst  the  barbarians  and  founded  a  comi- 
tatus,  and  then  succeeded  in  capturing  the 
Eternal City,  which  he  held  for  a  short  time. 
Even Byzantium, as its power declined, realized 
that  the  youthful  Teutonic  community  which 
confronted  it  contained  a  political  principle 
surpassing its own in moral value.  "  What shall 
befall the Empire,"  says  Synesius in addressing 
Arcadius, "  when you its rulers shun the cold of 
winter, garbed in robes of silk and adorned with 
peacocks' feathers ; when you aim at  being saints 
and fail to be men ?  If  we are to be saved we need 
a  God  and a King."  The Byzantine statesman 
felt instinctively  that the Teutonic State stood 
on  a  higher  moral  plane,  and  was  even  more 
formidable than the Empire of  the Caesars. 
The fair beginnings of  the Germanic Empire 
were strangely vitiated in the course of  time.  No 
doubt the Germans in their gradual conquest of 
Rome learnt much from her superior civilization 
that  was  previously  unknown  to them  in  the 
various  branches  of  the  art  of  government : 
perfectly  to administer  her  vast  territory  was 
beyond their scope.  Indeed we  can trace in the 
great  Frankish  Empire  a  gradual  disintegration 
which  can  only  be  described  as  decay.  Since 
the immediate personal rule of  the sovereign was 
practically  impossible  in  the  vast  areas  that 
acknowledged  his  sway,  high  officers  of  State 
invested  with  far - reaching  prerogatives  were 
appointed by the Crown, which rewarded them in 
the currency of  the day, that is, with lands and 
vassals.  This led little by littIe to the establish- 
ment  of  feudal  monarchy,  which  perfected  the 
system of  universal subordination by means of  a 
personal  relationship  exactly  expressed  in  the 
words of  the oath taken by the Norman baron in 
swearing fealty to his  suzerain :  "  I will  be  thy 
man  for  the  fief  which  I  have  received  from 
thee."  Here the idea of  the subordination ef all 
subjects  is  obscured;  instead  the  sanction  of 
a  personal  relationship is  adduced  as the  basis 
of  a  contract  in  virtue  of  which  obedience  is 
promised. 
A  State  so  constituted  may,  under  certain 
circumstances,  be  extremely  strong,  as,  for 
instance,  the  Norman  monarchy  in  England 
during the first century and a half of  its duration, 
which  may be  roughly  described as a  despotism 
under feudal restraints.  William the Conqueror 
regarded the island he had invaded as his property 
in the literal sense : terra mea, dominium meum. 
A  Norman  host  40,000  strong  attacked  and 
subdued  a  profoundly  hostile  people ;  a  com- 
pletely new order of  things was grafted upon the 
ancient  stem  of  Anglo-Saxon institutions.  The 
Norman  lawyers  were  perfectly  accurate  when 
they laid down that all rights emanate from the 
king.  His  authority was  further  immeasurably 
increased  by  the power  of  declaring  forfeiture 
of  fiefs  in  cases  of  disobedience.  This  feudal 
monarchy, then, was immensely strong, so strong 
indeed that the Norman barons were at last com- 
pelled to ally themselves with the despised Saxon 
Thanes and yeomen in order to break the hated 
yoke. 
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feudal and absolute is quite exceptional, and its 
possibility was  due to abnormal  circumstances ; 
as  a  general  rule,  feudal  institutions  tend  to 
deflect the nature of  monarchy,  and to promote 
the  creation  within  the  State  of  a  number  of 
smaller  sovereignties.  The  necessary  attributes 
of  office came to be regarded as profitable rights 
at the  disposal  of  individuals  and  their  heirs. 
By  degrees  the  royal  officers  appropriated  to 
themselves  the  specific  functions  of  the  Crown 
and  became  hereditary  owners  of  the  lands 
originally bestowed on them for life as fiefs.  This 
progressive  usurpation  produced  the  barons  in 
France,  the princes in Germany.  A number  of 
territorial magnates sprang up subordinate  only 
in  name  to  the  authority  of  the  king,  who 
retained  simply  the  feudal  overlordship  with 
prerogatives  as  uncertain  as  those  of  true 
sovereignty  are clear  and  precise.  For  men  of 
to-day it is hard to grasp the ingenious view of 
law and right prevailing in that age, and an ex- 
pression current in mediaeval Paris is  character- 
istic of  it.  The French expression for satisfying 
a  man  by  smooth  words  is  to pay  en  monnaie 
de  singe.  This  saying  recalls  the  fact  that 
although  every  man  who  entered  Paris  had  to 
pay  his  penny  at the  gate,  a  juggler  with  a 
monkey paid nothing, but instead let his monkey 
dance  before  the gate-keeper.  The amusement 
thus afforded him was held to have redeemed the 
debt to the city.  So did that age think and feel, 
and gradually developed the amazingly distorted 
system  of  ideas  which  was  characteristic  of 
mediaeval  civilization.  The  idea  of  individual 
rights entirely outweighed the idea  of  the State, 
which well-nigh perished. 
More especially in Germany we see the collect- 
ive liberties of  the separate Estates gain ground 
by means of  a feudal doctrine entirely antagon- 
istic to the State, which  it has been  the  merit 
of  modern  absolutism  to  extirpate.  In  these 
monarchies  based  upon  rigid  class  divisions, 
common  law was almost set aside ; each estate 
of the realm had its bwn special privileges which 
it was  the  object  of  its  corporate  existence  to 
defend.  The aim  was freedom  from  the State, 
not  freedom within it.  The State was regarded 
as the natural enemy of  individual liberty,  as a 
power  to be  checked  and  muzzled, which  must 
never be allowed to proceed an inch beyond the 
stipulated  limits.  Subjects  did  not  look  upon 
themselves as subjects but as joint  parties to a 
contract.  This  appears  with  special  clearness 
from the forms in which allegiance was promised. 
The  new  lord  must  swear to grant fresh  privi- 
leges  called "  joyeuse entre'e," and every accession 
was  made  an excuse  for  their  extension.  This 
method  was  employed  on a large  scale by  the 
Estates of  the Realm in the Imperial  Capitula- 
tions.  Such  compacts  were  sworn  to  by  all 
parties,  but their  oath reached  no  further than 
the  parchment  on  which  it was  recorded.  The 
conception  of  duty  existing  ipso jure  between 
subject and sovereign was nowhere apparent. 
This  stands in close  relationship to the right 
of  resistance,  which  was  either  formally  recog- 
nized  or  practically  exercised  by  the  Estates. 
The  Aragonese  swore  fealty  to  their  king  in 90  EARLY TYPES OF MONARCHY  ESTATES  9  1 
these words : "  If thou wilt observe these statutes 
we  will  obey thee; if  not, not."  In Germany we 
find the right of  resistance guaranteed  in  several 
of the smaller States, such as Bavaria and Lune- 
burg.  Thus  it comes  to pass  that the majesty 
of the State, the fountain of  law and order which 
as such never can be placed in a purely contractual 
relationship to its subjects, is  mutilated and de- 
filed, and it may therefore be truly said that con- 
stitutional monarchy as exhibited in England and 
in Belgium presents a negation of  the monarchical 
principle.  Hence it seems to  us like derision when 
the  ancient Estates of  Germany  are held  up to 
admiration by self-styled orthodox monarchists. 
On the occasion of  the Congress of  Carlsbad 
in 1819,Friederich Gentz wrote a pamphlet entitled 
"  Of  the  Difference  between  Representative 
Assemblies and Delegated  Estates," which  must 
be called a masterpiece of  sophistical controversy. 
In this he  contends that representative  govern- 
ment depends  upon  the idea  of  the sovereignty 
of  the people, which is not true, although it may 
be  true that such  rubbish  has  been  taught  by 
certain  purblind  theorists  like  Rotteck.  In no 
genuine  monarchy  can  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people form the basis of  its representative system. 
With  that  system  Gentz  contrasts  the  Estates 
alleged  to  be  specifically  German  in  origin, 
whose  authority he  derives from the conscious- 
ness of  caste privilege, a consciousness which  he 
considers  disposes  them  to  uphold  the  sacred 
rights of monarchy with more vigour than can be 
expected from any representative system. 
Treitschke, History of  Germany, vol. ii. 
This  ingenuity  in  perverting  historical  facts 
is  nothing  short of  amazing.  Whcre was  royal 
authority weakest  at that time ?  Undoubtedly 
in  Mecklenburg,  where  there was  practically no 
monarchy  at  all.  How  Gentz  could  support 
so untenable a doctrine is explained by the fact 
that he had in mind  neither  the old  Estates of 
Wurtemberg  nor  of  Mecklenburg,  but  the 
mandatory  provincial  assemblies  of  Austria. 
There prolonged struggles had completely under- 
mined  the power  of  the  old  provincial  Estates, 
whose  functions were now  exhausted after three 
days' session : First day, arrival of their lordships 
in  their  state coaches ; second  day, unanimous 
adoption  of  the provincial mandate ; third day, 
departure of  their lordships in their state coaches. 
Gentz had  before  his  eyes this specimen  of  the 
utter decline and decay of  the provincial Estates 
when, with cynical disregard for historical facts, 
he  laid  down  that  provincial  Estates  do  not 
impair  the  credit  of  the monarchy.  Of  course 
they do; and what  is more, they make it their 
object to bring the sovereign to his knees.  They 
regard their duty as strictly limited to the per- 
formance of their written pledge, and thus develop 
that peculiar stubbornness of  attitude which not 
infrequently  presents  a  dignified  aspect.  Of  a 
true political spirit, however, there is no trace. 
Profound  social  injustice  characterizes  the 
whole system, and the idea of  the general good is 
lost in this oligarchical caricature of  public life. 
The Law  of  Succession of  Mecklenburg of  1755, 
which  still subsists as a  well-preserved mummy, 
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affect  the  lawfully  acquired  privileges  of  the 
nobility  and the  provinces,"  but "  which  have 
been enacted for the common weal  of  the whole 
country,  are  laws  of  indifferent consequence." 
In the old legal terminology "  indifferent "  means 
that which applies equally to all and not to one 
class only, but the word is appropriate to  Mecklen- 
burg  even  in its modern  and reproachful  sense. 
Here the Diet with all the burlesque features of 
its  composition  has  remained  intact  till  the 
present day.  Those of the Grand Duke's vassals 
who  are  of  noble  birth  appear  in  person  and 
represent no one but themselves.  Regular  pro- 
cedure and orderly  methods of  business are un- 
known ; spectators may wander at pleasure into 
the middle  of  the  assembly.  When  I asked  a 
Mecklenburg noble if  these visitors  did not lead 
to confusion in  the ballot,  he  replied, "  Oh  no, 
they are easily detected by the meekness of  their 
bearing."  Everywhere  the  Estates  represent 
only their own class ; a conception of  the general 
good,  of  solidarity  of  interests,  in  short,  of 
nationality, are totally lacking under this type of 
constitution.  For this reason revolutions in such 
States are never, properly  speaking, conflicts of 
political principle, but more in the nature of  law- 
suits in arms.  If the difference cannot be settled 
peaceably, recourse is had to arms.  But the idea 
of  establishing  any  new  constitutional  maxim 
was  utterly  alien from mediaeval  minds.  They 
fought  for  their  acquired  liberties  and  did  not 
look beyond. 
Any  popular  representation  was  then  simply 
out of  the question  in those States of  Germany 
where provincial  diets existed.  Even the prince 
was not superior to the Estates ; he represented 
only himself, and the group of  unconferred  pre- 
rogative~  known collectively as "  jus territoriale " 
were  an aggregate  of  rights  gradually acquired 
by him, not as sovereign but as territorial over- 
lord  restricted  within  the  limits  of  his  feudal 
suzerainty.  The theory that the sovereign repre- 
sents the nation as a whole was totally obscured. 
If Ludwig von Haller intended to set up monarchy 
based on Estates as the ideal constitution, it must 
be  admitted  that  this  positive  aspect  of  his 
doctrine  is  entirely  erroneous.  Haller's  great 
achievement  was  his  attack on  the doctrine  of 
Natural Rights ; in this direction he dealt mighty 
blows  which  even  to-day command  admiration. 
The moral courage required in his day for such a 
task can hardly be over-estimated by us.  Haller's 
idealism,  however,  completely  disintegrates  the 
conception of  the State.  According to him  the 
prince is no more than a very powerful landlord 
who  has  divided  the land  amongst  his  faithful 
dependants  and  bound  them  to himself  by  a 
contractual tie.  It is clear, then, that Haller also 
took  refuge  in  the  theory  of  a  social  contract 
although  on  different  lines,  which  logically ex- 
cluded both the notion of  sovereignty and that of 
the general good. 
Hence it was the uniform rule in the old diets 
that  the  Estates  did  not  represent  the  whole 
community but only  its privileged  classes.  We 
nowhere  find  the  peasantry  represented  except 
in a few districts of  South Germany and on the 
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agricultural.  Generally speaking, the only classes 
represented  were  the  clergy,  whose  place  in 
Protestant  countries  was  taken  by  secularized 
chapters limited to noblemen ; the nobility, who 
were regarded as protecting the interests of  their 
tenants ; and lastly, the towns, but amongst these 
only the Free Towns of  the Empire.  Moreover, 
the deputies of the towns were not representatives 
in  the strict sense, but delegates,  who  received 
positive  mandates  curtailing  their  liberty  of 
action.  The  representative  character  of  the 
assembly  was  therefore  very  imperfect,  and 
although  the  fiction  whereby  the  nobility  was 
supposed to represent the interests of its depend- 
ants  sometimes  corresponded  with  reality,  it 
was in most cases a mere mockery, especially in 
later times.  This form of  Constitution therefore 
came to be especially abhorred.  While absolute 
monarchy  in more  or less competent hands was 
often  popular  amongst  the  lower  orders,  they 
have  always  regarded  monarchy  based  on  the 
Estates with peculiar hatred.  Is it not notorious 
that the popular fury displayed during the French 
Revolution was directed chiefly against the clergy 
and the nobility?  Had it been  possible  at the 
right  moment  to found  a  democratic monarchy 
the storm would probably have been avoided. 
The  injustice  and inequality  of  this form of 
class-representation is proved by its whole fiscal 
system.  As  a  matter  of  general  rule  it is true 
that the lord of  the manor paid  no taxes on his 
land, but it is well to avoid the distorted picture 
dear to modern  Radicals, and to remember that 
the territorial  aristocracy  bore  all  the  burdens 
of  local  administration  and  justice.  The  con- 
ditions were certainly primitive, but it is impos- 
sible  to  maintain  that  the  landed  gentry  of 
Germany were at any time so exempt from public 
dues as it is the fashion to contend to-day.  They 
were  expected  to give  their  blood,  not  their 
treasure, for the prince.  Payment of  taxes was 
not recognized as a universal duty.  On the attack 
of  a foreign enemy, the capture of  the suzerain, 
or the marriage of  his daughter, levies were raised ; 
in all other cases taxes were regarded as the badge 
of  serfdom. 
It  is  curious  to  observe  how  long  ancient 
notions  of  law  derived  from  the  Romans  con- 
tinued to subsist amongst us.  The Germanic con- 
queror of  Roman soil was free from taxation as a 
matter of  course ;  he had acquired his land at the 
point of  the sword, and was, moreover, an agricul- 
turalist who rarely saw ready money.  Taxes were 
for the Romans, who  were  the  more  oppressed 
because  secretly  admired.  Such  archaic  con- 
ditions could only be stamped out after a severe 
conflict.  It  is  a  misunderstanding  of  German 
character  to ascribe  the  dislike  of  taxation  to 
avarice, which is not one of  its characteristics, so 
much as a tendency to live from hand to mouth. 
The aversion to taxation is in reality the aversion 
felt by free-born men to the symbol of  subjection. 
This point of  view was encouraged and maintained 
under  altered  conditions  by  the  circumstance 
that money was  scarce in the Middle Ages,  and 
the collection of dues often impossible.  Although 
with the rise  and development  of  the science of 
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became  imperative,  still  the  Estates  continued 
to regard the grants made in the light of  voluntary 
aids.  Supplies must  be  begged  for,  and it was 
held to be within the competence of  the Estates 
to vote or to refuse them. 
This state of  affairs led to a curious  dualism 
in  the  management  of  the  exchequer.  In this 
matter  the  legal  theory,  so  much  admired  by 
Haller, was that the prince must meet the ordinary 
expenses of  the government out of  the revenue 
of  his private domain, and was  only entitled  to 
appeal  to  the  Estates  under  exceptional  con- 
ditions.  The  Estates  provided  against  such 
emergencies by creating a fund raised out of  taxes 
and  intended  to  supplement  the  Treasury  in 
extraordinary  cases.  This  twofold  Treasury 
system was  the rule from the sixteenth century 
onwards,  and  survived  in  Hanover  until  1833, 
when it was suppressed.  It was restored  by the 
coup d'Etat  of  1837, but was  finally abolished in 
1848.  In Mecklenburg,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
still  continues in  a  modified  form.  The  Grand 
Dukes of  Mecklenburg are sovereigns upon their 
immense estates, beyond the boundaries of  which 
they have  absolutely  no  power  to  levy  taxes 
except  in  virtue  of  the  carefully  appropriated 
grants made by the Diet. 
This  type  of  monarchy,  though  imperfect, 
may, however, under favourable conditions attain 
to a  high  level  of  prosperity,  as shown  by  the 
example  of  Sweden  under  Gustavus  Adolphus, 
and his immediate successors.  But her strength 
lay  not  in  the  combination  of  monarchy  with 
representation  by  classes,  of  which  even  the 
peasant delegates formed one, but in the fortuit- 
ous  talent  for  government  of  a  succession  of 
individual kings,  and above all in the fact that 
universal  military  service  was  introduced  as 
early as the reign of  Gustavus Adolphus.  Fiefs 
from the Crown  were  forfeited  by  all  who  pre- 
ferred domestic interests to military duty in war 
time.  The male population was annually exhorted 
from the pulpit  in the king's  name to join  the 
colours ; and so arose in rude form the obligation 
to bear arms. 
Thus  it happened  that Sweden,  through  the 
ability of  her rulers, for a time at least, reaped the 
benefit  of  a  well-balanced  Constitution,  to the 
essential merits of  which her sudden pre-eminence, 
and  her  temporary  superiority  to the  German 
States at this time must in no small measure be 
attributed.  Our nobility, it must be remembered, 
adhered to the old notion that its sole duty was 
to take the field as heavily armed cavalry ; when 
that went  out of  date it remained  passively  at 
home.  Hence the defencelessness of  a monarchy, 
based  on Estates, in its later days all the more 
ominous  because  in  essential  conflict  with  the 
fundamental principle  of  that  political  system. 
After  all,  the  feudal  monarchy  as  limited  by 
delegated Estates was dominated by the nobility ; 
it was by definition aristocratic, and the character- 
istic feature of  healthy aristocracy  has from  all 
time  been  military  prowess.  As  paid  infantry 
replaced the  feudal cavalry in  war, the  special 
function  of  the  aristocratic  caste  disappeared. 
Individual gentlemen could no doubt take service 
as officers,  but the contingent they raised amongst 
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their dependants no  longer  had  military value. 
Thus arose  the  repulsive  anomaly  of  a  pre- 
dominantly civilian nobility. 
Moreover,  to  grant  to  the  local  suzerain 
supplies necessary for the upkeep of  a  standing 
army  was  a  larger  sacrifice  of  constitutional 
liberties  than could  be  obtained.  In this  way 
the nobility of  Brandenburg, always distinguished 
for valour, was directly responsible for the defence- 
lessness  of  the country  at the outbreak of  the 
Thirty Years' War.  The Elector George William 
may be said to have had no army whatever ; for 
the  contemptible  handful  of  bodyguards  and 
troopers  which  he collected at such  pains  were 
useless when pitted against the military efficiency 
of  the vast armies  controlled  by  Austria.  The 
ridiculous  impotence  in  war  of  the  German 
Electors  which  enabled  Sweden to intervene  in 
her affairs as their protector must be laid at the 
door  of  the  various  Diets  which  would  never 
tolerate the idea of the miles perpetuus.  Standing 
armies and regular taxes, which had come to be 
the  two  bugbears of  the landed  nobility,  were 
finally established  by  the Great  Elector  at the 
expense  of  violating  constitutional  liberty.  It 
was inevitable that the idea of  uniform taxation 
should  at last  take  root,  and  to-day  we  see 
clearly that in this change lay the earnest of  a 
great advance towards freedom. 
From what we  have said it must be apparent 
that no free spirit could feel any enthusiasm for 
the political  conditions  of  the old  order.  They 
produced  hard  stubborn  characters  and  stiff- 
necked men like the Great Elector's contemporary, 
~udwig  von Burgsdorf, who  typifies  the Junker 
class at its best.  What it may be at its worst 
Konigsberg  learnt  from  the  Kalksteins.  A 
supreme example of this attitude of  mind towards 
the  State  was  known  to  our  century  in  the 
person of Baron von der Marwitz, whom Harden- 
berg was  compelled to imprison  out of  hand at 
Spandau for the violence  of  his  opposition.  If 
this  spirit  was  narrow  it was  also  firm,  and 
nothing is more inaccurate than Radical chatter 
about aristocratic servility in Brandenburg.  The 
contrary  is  the  fact  and  holds  good  also  of 
Iklllecklenburg, where the nobility, though indisput- 
ably narrow-minded, is conscious of  its independ- 
ence and determined to preserve it. 
Another  feature  of  monarchy  limited  by 
aristocracy  was  to encourage  a  certain  sort  of 
egoism  which,  like bribery  and nepotism,  flour- 
ished  under  its sway  with  peculiar  luxuriance. 
Chartered  rights  were  only  too often made the 
opportunity  of  oppression  by landlords  against 
their  tenants,  and  there  was  urgent  need  of  a 
hand  strong enough to compel these gentry not 
to press the letter of the law too far.  Nepotism, 
which  is  not characteristic of  the nobility only, 
but of  all close corporations, was universal,  and 
we  find  it no less firmly rooted  in Wiirtemberg 
under  the  auspices  of  a  purely  middle-class 
parliament, well known to have been  the worst 
in Germany.  The noble families of  Wurtemberg, 
although  in  many  cases  they  had  altered  their 
status by  gaining  admission  to the chivalry  of 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  still  readily  entered 
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as his subjects.  Therefore the Diet was composed 
almost  entirely  of  assistants  who  were  doctors 
of  divinity  and  of  clerks  who  were  attorneys. 
The  whole  body  was  collectively  designated  as 
honourable,  but none the less pillaged the State 
by corruption  and place-hunting as consistently 
as any assembly  of  nobles.  The final result  of 
this  form of  Constitution is,  taken all  in all,  a 
deeply  disappointing one,  especially for us  Ger- 
mans,  for  it proved  to be  the  nursery  of  our 
innate provincj  alism. 
It  is  well  known  that Frederick  the  Great 
was the first to establish an interprovincial code 
of  rights applicable to all his subjects.  Before his 
time a native of  the Mark could not enter public 
employment in Cleves, nor a Rhinelander in East 
Prussia.  In this connection  it is interesting  to 
note how  these  old  provincial  conceptions con- 
tinued  to influence our  own  time,  and that as 
late as 1815, Rhinelanders, for  all their boasted 
liberalism,  were  incensed  at officials from  East 
Prussia  being  appointed  to  posts  over  them. 
They recalled with bitterness that even the Great 
Elector  had  given  a  solemn  promise  to  the 
Estates of  Cleves to give no places to strangers. 
Suddenly  these  ancient  doctrines  came  once 
more to the surface.  Ultimately representative 
institutions  were  adopted  all over  Europe,  and 
it is instructive to trace their evolution in certain 
States from  the old  conditions.  In France  all 
bridges  leading  to the  past  have  been  broken 
down,  and  the  ancient  monarchy  destroyed 
beyond repair.  In England, on the other hand, 
the outward forms of  the traditional order never 
entirely  perished,  and  under  their  protecting 
cloak  a  feudal  assembly  has  gradually  been 
transformed into a modern parliament.  England's 
extraordinary  stability  is  due  to  her  feudal 
having early been very highly central- 
ized,  and to the king  having  always  retained 
control  over  legislation  and the administration 
of justice.  For this reason her parliament never 
could become the dissolving and dangerous force 
which  it has been in other States.  As  early as 
1352 English  law  had  developed  and incisively 
formulated  an entirely  native  doctrine  of  high 
treason.  By such means  does a  State arrive at 
consciousness of  its own  dignity,  and thus does 
it become aware that the violation of  its constitu- 
tion  is not an act comparable with an infringe- 
ment of  a private right.  The following century 
reveals, even in Germany, attempts to formulate 
the  obligations  both  of  sovereign  and  subject 
towards the State, in the interests of the common- 
weal ; examples from the history of  Brandenburg 
are  Frederick  I.'s  Act  of  General  Pacification 
and the Dispositio Achilles, which laid down the 
inalienability  of  the  national  territory.  Such 
arrangements  conflicted  with  the  spirit  of  the 
feudal monarchy, for if  the country was originally 
the  property  of  the prince  from  which  he  had 
from time to time  made  grants to his  vassals, 
then he might also partition it by will. 
It is significant, however, that the continental 
jurists  did  not  discover  their  doctrine  of  High 
Treason  for themselves,  but  borrowed  it from 
the  Roman  Law,  and  generally  speaking  their 
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the organic development of  English constitutional 
history.  As already stated, the modern Constitu- 
tion of  France is connected by no link with  her 
past, and the same may be said of  Spain, whose 
present  Constitution  is  entirely  the creation  of 
political  theory.  During the Middle Ages  Italy 
remained  a  land  of  cities,  whose  republican 
tendencies  prevailed  over  representative  caste 
tendencies,  which never  reached  any high  level 
of  maturity.  At last Italy too adopted a  Con- 
stitution  on  the  French  pattern,  devoid  of 
national antecedents.  Germany stands half-way 
between  England  and  the  Latin  States.  Our 
country  was  always  so  rich  in  currents  and 
counter-currents  that  political  problems  have 
rarely admitted of  a direct solution, while complex 
remedies  suggested  themselves  with  inevitable 
urgency.  The time-honoured contrivances of  the 
aristocratic  State were  not  abolished  but  died 
of  inanition.  The  old  social  divisions  lost  all 
power  and  all  sense  by  standing  armies  and 
regular  taxes.  An  additional  blow  to  the  old 
system was  the erection of  Committees which in 
most  States  superseded  the  Diets  themselves. 
None  the less the old  traditions remained  alive 
and were still traceable with certain modifications 
long  after 1815 in the Upper  Chambers of  our 
early Parliaments, especially in the minor States. 
It is  most striking in Saxony, where the Upper 
House, though altered in a few unimportant points, 
is still composed entirely of  the old spiritual and 
temporal Lords.  But the continued influence of 
the old  conception  of  constitutional freedom  is 
also clearly perceptible in the political mentality 
of  radicalism.  Even  Rotteck  is 
at bottom  a  political  thinker of  the old  school 
penetrated  by  the  conviction  that  individual 
liberty must be protected  from violation  on the 
part  of  the  State  by  contractual  guarantees. 
Even at  the present day the opinions of  Radicals, 
when  not thorough-paced  Democrats,  bear  the 
impress  of  French  Jacobinism  combined  with 
that view  of  liberty so characteristic  of  the old 
order,  which  regarded  it as the  privilege  of  a 
class. 
This  political  structure  was  dominant  for 
centuries, and still casts its shadow over Europe. 
Though it be impossible to sum  it up in a  few 
words,  we  may  yet say with  confidence that it 
has  brought  no  blessing  to any  country,  least 
of  all to our own.  Monarchical authority amongst 
us at last declined so  entirely that the essential 
justice inherent in its nature was reduced to im- 
potence,  the privileged  classes  assented  to  the 
exploitation of  the poor and humble.  Patriotism 
fell into decay, and the State, conceived  simply 
as  an organic  agglomeration  of  private  rights, 
was united by no bond of  ideal aspirations.  Pro- 
vincial  Diets  often  proceeded  to measures  of 
open treason like the Prussian League, which in 
1440 actually placed Western  Prussia  under the 
domination of  Poland.  Not long after, in 1460, 
the Provincial Councils of  Schleswig and Holstein 
chose Christian I., King of  Denmark, to be their 
suzerain,  and  thus  inaugurated  a  connection 
destined to last four hundred years.  Even this 
transaction  revealed  the  jealousy  felt  by  the 
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they strained every nerve to preserve intact.  It 
may be said then that the frenzy to uphold class 
privilege not only caused countless minor dissen- 
sions within the Empire, but directly contributed 
to  bring  its  Northern  and  Western  Marches 
under foreign rule.  It is the peculiarity of  this 
view of  society that while resting upon a supposed 
contract  it has  always  failed  to  discover  any 
secure basis for authority ;  under such conditions 
no adequate idea  of  the State is possible.  This 
will  appear  even  more  clearly  when  we  come 
to consider elective monarchy  pure and  simple, 
which  is  the  ~a~dxpaa~q  of  monarchy  limited 
by  privileged  Estates.  It  often  happens  that 
nothing  throws  a  clearer  light upon  the funda- 
mental  principles  of  a  Constitution  than  its 
caricature ; and  the  comparative  method  may 
therefore  lead  more  quickly  than any other  to 
the perfect understanding of  the essential nature 
of  monarchy. 
If  for  no  other  reason  elective  kingship  is 
clearly proved  to be a corrupt specimen of  true 
monarchy by the fact that it almost invariably 
arises out of  violent  conflicts.  To establish the 
reasonableness  and  necessity  of  the  hereditary 
principle in monarchy  seems, as Dahlmann once 
said at Frankfort, like pronouncing  a laudatory 
oration in honour of the multiplication table.  Only 
a king by right of  inheritance  can rise superior 
to the contending parties and currents amongst 
his  people,  whereas a  king  by right  of  election 
is  the natural enemy  of  the Constitution  from 
the moment he becomes the father of  a family. 
The greater his power, the greater his temptation 
to evade or annihilate his  constitutional limita- 
tions.  Moreover, it is  as  perilous to elevate  a 
native  as  a  foreigner  to  the  supreme  dignity. 
On the one hand a foreigner involves the country 
in external wars alien to its interests ; whilst on 
the  other  hand  a  native  candidate  never  com- 
mands  his  due measure  of  authority.  Since he 
lacks the support derived from dynastic prestige, 
he is necessarily compelled either to avail himself 
of  demagogic influences or to become the tool of 
aristocratic faction. 
Both in Latin and Germanic States it  was not, 
as we  have seen, uncommon to find an amalgam 
of  the  hereditary  and  elective  principles.  In 
such cases  the new  ruler  belonged  to the same 
family as his predecessor, but his  selection was 
left  to the  magnates, whose  choice was  subse- 
quently  acclaimed  by  the people.  Out of  this 
condition  hereditary  monarchy  developed  in 
Western  Europe  at  an  early  date,  and  a 
transition to the same system  could have been 
achieved  far sooner even  in  Germany,  had  not 
her  various  dynasties,  unlike  the  long-lived 
royal  house  of  France,  frequently  died  out. 
The  gloomy  and  gifted  despot,  Henry  VI., 
nearly  succeeded  in  establishing the hereditary 
right of  the Hohenstaufen to the Imperial Crown. 
An  inscrutable  destiny  condemned  even  this 
glorious  race  of  rulers to premature  extinction. 
Nevertheless the Empire became at last, in fact, 
an hereditary monarchy.  During the last three 
centuries of  its existence it seemed unthinkable 
that  any  but  a  Habsburg  prince  should  be 
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Charles VII. of  Bavaria, lives in the recollection 
of  posterity,  not as a  legitimate  sovereign, but 
rather as a kind of  usurper. 
The advantage of  securing  the succession to 
the throne from all hazards was almost univers- 
ally felt as an instinctive need, and was therefore 
little  by  little  adopted  automatically.  It  is  a 
significant  fact  that the final  establishment  of 
hereditary  monarchy  in  the  states  of  Eastern 
Europe  synchronized  with  the  definite  pre- 
ponderance  of  Western  culture.  The  election 
of  the  king  ceased  in  Denmark  after  1660,  in 
Bohemia  during  the catastrophe of  the Thirty 
Years'  War.  In Hungary the elective principle 
remained in force up to  the end of  the seventeenth 
century.  In Russia  it was not till the reign of 
Alexander  I.  that accession  to the throne  was 
freed  from  dangerous  vicissitudes.  Until  his 
time the authority  of  the Czar  was  a  question 
of  fact,  not  a  right.  The  period  between  the 
death  of  Peter  the  Great  and  the  advent  of 
Catherine  11.  was  a  continuous  and  frenzied 
struggle  for  power  between  rival  claimants. 
Each successful competitor was in his turn com- 
pelled  to resort  to acts of  atrocious violence in 
order to stamp out resistance.  If  to-day Russia 
is entitled to call herself a regularly constituted 
State, which is by no  means  beyond  discussion, 
she owes  it chiefly to the fact  that the Crown 
devolves on  a  recognized  principle  and that no 
doubt can  arise  as to  the identity of  the heir- 
apparent. 
Of  all the States of Eastern Europe one only 
failed  to conform  its  constitution  to the  occi- 
dental  type :  it  was  reserved  for  the  great 
aristocratic republic of  Poland to ring the death- 
knell  of  aristocratic licence.  Countless conflict- 
ing causes complicate the annals of  this unhappy 
people.  The ruling  nationality  of  pure-blooded 
Poles was always numerically too weak to inspire 
and  dominate  the  confused  medley  of  Red 
Russians,  White  Russians,  Germans,  Gypsies, 
Jews,  Vlachs,  and  Lithuanians.  Such  ethno- 
graphic conditions inevitably led to the tyranny 
of  the ruling race.  Furthermore the geographical 
position  of  the country  influenced  its fate ; it 
was  separated  from  the  Baltic  by  Teutonic 
colonies, and although  at one time it extended 
its  borders  to  the  Black  Sea  by  annexing 
Bessarabia,  yet  its  intimate  union  with  and 
ultimate  retention  of  that territory  was  made 
impracticable  by  insurmountable  differences  of 
custom  and  language.  We  have  already  said 
that no great power can long be severed from the 
sea.  Poland  was  destined  to  suffer  the  full 
penalty of her ill-favoured latitude, but her fate 
was sealed by the vices of  her Constitution.  In 
the days of  Boleslav the resources and bulwarks 
of  the monarchy were stronger than in Germany, 
and as late as the fourteenth century the country 
could boast of  a really vigorous ruler in Casimir 
the Great.  On  his death the magnates invaded 
and usurped the prerogatives of  the Crown. 
To  this  must  be  added  the disastrous social 
fact that no commercial  middle  class  of  native 
extraction ever succeeded in taking root.  In the 
early days of  vigorous monarchy, large numbers 
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founded  flourishing  industrial  cities  on  Polish 
soil.  Urban  life  as  a  whole  all  over  Eastern 
Europe is a  German  creation.  That Slavs and 
Magyars  are alike incapable  of  founding  towns 
on their own  initiative is clearly  proved  to-day 
by looking  at Hungary.  The Magyar,  born  to 
life on  the "  Pussta,"  is  a  kind  of  Bedouin  to 
whom  existence  in  towns  is  incomprehensible. 
Debreczin,  with  50,000  inhabitants, is  but  an 
overgrown  village  composed  of  cottages  separ- 
ated  from  each  other  by  widely  intervening 
spaces. 
The  corner  stone  of  German  mediaeval 
cities  was  their  charter  of  liberties ; they  had 
their own tribunals, their own penal laws, their 
local  corporations  whose  statutes  forbade  any 
stranger  from  practising  any  of  the recognized 
crafts.  The  prime  condition  of  their  rise  was 
their  isolation  from  the  country  beyond  their 
city walls ; without this protecting barrier  and 
the right of  banishment,  they could never  in a 
chaotic  and  barbarous  State like  Poland  have 
attained prosperity. 
Such results could never have been  produced 
by  any  but  Western  stock.  Here  we  have  a 
patent illustration of  Bismarck's  aphorism about 
masculine  and  feminine  nations,  for  even  in 
Polish  towns urban life has  a  German  flavour ; 
any one standing before the church of  St. John 
in Warsaw, or in the principal square of  Cracow, 
might  fancy  himself  in  the  market - place  at 
Leipzig. 
After  a  time  the  native  aristocracy  were 
alarmed at the growth of  German  civic institu- 
tions,  which had taken root amongst them, and 
became  suspicious of  their  influence.  Like  the 
Teutonic Order, the German burgher, ever growing 
richer, appeared to be the natural foe.  Life was 
made so bitter to the Germans that great numbers 
of  them were obliged to withdraw from the un- 
grateful  country ; but  since  trade  had  to be 
Earried  on  somehow Jews were  allowed to take 
their place and to dwell in the "  realms of peace and 
plenty."  But  this makeshift commercialclass  never 
succeeded in putting forth the requisite mercantile 
energy, and was never able to form an adequate 
counterweight  to  the  power  of  the  national 
aristocracy.  No  Pole would consent to consider 
a  Jew  his  equal.  Gradually  Poland  developed 
into a State where nobility of  birth was the only 
standard, and we  behold the appalling spectacle 
of  an aristocratic domination  which  maintained 
the  semblance  of  a  monarchy  while  scouting 
every pretence of  the justice which is monarchy's 
very  nature.  That  a  nation  cannot  consist of 
knights errant, it has been  the unhappy destiny 
of  the Polish people, in spite of its many valuable 
and chivalrous qualities, to prove beyond dispute. 
A  fully developed feudal hierarchy as under- 
stood  in  Germany  was  never  adopted  by  the 
Polish  nobility.  Instead  they  possessed  an 
analogous institution which affected the State no 
less  detrimentally.  The  magnates  surrounded 
themselves  with  so-called "  Brotherhoods " or 
clans formed from the Schlachta or minor nobility. 
They  all bore  the arms of  their  chief  and were 
ready at all times to use their broadsword in his 
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ally  sapped  the  old  kingdom's  strength,  and 
from the fourteenth century onwards the nobility 
ruled  with  unbridled  violence  over  it.  The 
Voivods  were  invariably  magnates,  and  their 
position,  especially  in  the  frontier  territories, 
was  so  independent  as to  make  it  doubtful 
whether  at this  time  Poland  should  be  con- 
sidered a single State or  a  federation  of  princi- 
palities.  At  times the very  name  of  a  central 
authority seems to have  fallen  into  disuse, and 
the  appellation  of  Royal  Republic  of  Poland, 
applied  at  a  somewhat  later  date  to  this 
constitutional hornets'  nest,  is no less strikingly 
apt  than  Frederick  the  Great's  epigrammatic 
description  of  the Holy Roman Empire as "  the 
illustrious  Commonwealth  of  German  Princes." 
The nobility finally closed its ranks to newcomers 
in 1374 and constituted itself the governing caste, 
which on the accession of  the Lithuanian  house 
of  Jagellon  was  able to exact great concessions 
as  the  price  of  its  support.  Consequently  it 
obtained in 1386 the grant of  a charter by which 
the  entire  nobility  was  withdrawn  from  the 
jurisdiction of  the common law, and was invested 
with the sole privilege of  appearing at the pro- 
vincial  and general  assemblies of  the kingdom. 
For it alone was reserved the governorship of  all 
royal castles  and domains, and the filling of  all 
places  of  profit  under  the Crown.  Hence  from 
that date onwards the towns were systematically 
excluded  from  all  share  in  the  Government 
representation. 
Aristocratic  aggrandizement,  having  once 
found acceptance, expanded  with  uncontrollable 
fertility,  and  its  promoters  understood  to per- 
fection  the  art  of  consolidating  their  mastery 
over  the  Crown by  the  continued  extortion  of 
well  calculated  privileges.  The  maxim  gained 
ground that Royal offices must be provided with 
Crown  lands  to maintain  their  establishments, 
which affords a striking parallel  to the so-called 
"  Immunities " which  prevailed  in the Frankish 
Empire.  The  consequence  of  this  fatal  indis- 
cipline  may  be  easily  divined.  Such  methods 
laid the foundation  for the princely  fortunes  of 
the Czartoryski, Radziwill, Lesczinski, etc., while 
the  royal  revenues  melted  away.  Poland  ex- 
hibits  the  crude  contrast  between  a  poverty- 
stricken  and  brutalized  peasantry  living  in  de- 
gradation and misery side by side with a nobility 
housed  in  palaces  of  fairy  beauty.  The  con- 
dition of  the Polish bondmen was so pitiable, and 
their intellectual outlook so brutal and  limited, that 
by comparison the Russian serfs seemed to live in 
cultured ease.  Their lot could be alleviated from 
time to time by the benevolence of  an omnipotent 
ruler ; but  the  kings  of  Poland  after  a  time 
totally renounced the right of  intervening between 
the  nobility  and  their  dependants.  Bound  by 
law to the soil the Polish peasants  were further 
badgered and buffeted like dumb animals by the 
extortions  of  corrupt  and  dishonest  pedlars. 
The Schlachta numbered hundreds of  thousands, 
and  it even  happened  that whole  armies  which 
had  been  victorious  against  the  Turks  were 
ennobled by a single act. 
In  1413, contemporaneously  with  consolida- 
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privilege  was  bestowed  upon  the  nobility,  by 
which every nobleman who had not already been 
convicted  was  exempt  from  arrest.  Untold 
distress gradually overspread the land.  We know, 
for  instance,  that Bromberg  under  the  rule  of 
the Teutonic Order  was  a  prosperous  city with 
about  10,000  thriving  inhabitants.  It  became 
Polish ; and when after 250 years it returned to 
us  under  Frederick  the  Great,  we  found  it  a 
charred  heap  of  ruins  inhabited  by  some  200 
ill-favoured rascals.  How did this come to pass ? 
None can tell, it was the normal consequence of 
Polish rule.  Anarchical conditions were a source 
of  pride, and perpetual war a condition of  happi- 
ness ;  even  to-day  that  is  the  standpoint  of 
every genuine  Pole.  To  him  German  methods, 
German  justice,  German  industry  seem  as con- 
temptible as the wild doings which we colloquially 
call  "  Polish  inn-keeping " does  to us.  Every 
hope of  improvement vanished when religious dif- 
ferences were added to the already existing causes 
of  social and political  confusion.  Protestantism 
had  made  great  headway  in  Poland,  and  the 
sects whose teaching contained germs of  radical- 
ism were especially influential.  In opposition to 
these,  a  counter-Reformation  led  by  Stanislaus 
Hosius joined hands with the Society of  Jesus and 
the nobility in order to suppress  the dissenters, 
whose  fate we  can estimate by the massacre of 
Thorn,  and  the  saying  current  amongst  the 
nobility, "  Beat a Lutheran and he will give you 
money." 
The  climax  of  this  constitutional  chaos  was 
reached  on  the  extinction  of  the  Jagellons  in 
1573,  when  elective  monarchy  was  definitely 
established by law.  On the demise of  the Crown 
the  entire  nobility,  headed  by  the  Magnates 
attended by the Schlachta, arrayed according to 
territorial  precedence, gathered in the vast plain 
of  Wola before the gates of  Warsaw for the royal 
election.  The successful candidate was installed 
on a golden throne raised high above the assembled 
host,  and was  acclaimed by the clash of  swords 
and bucklers.  As  a  condition precedent  he was 
compelled  to sign  the  so-called  pacta  convents, 
equivalent to the Electoral Capitulations of  the 
German  Emperors.  Certain  liberties  remained 
invariable,  and  at every  fresh  election  further 
concessions  were  extorted.  So  the  idea  grew 
that the king's  duty was  not to govern but to 
function  as  a  figurehead.  "  Rege,  sed  non 
impera ! " exclaimed  Zamoiski  the  Vorvod  to 
Sigismund 111.  When Thiers in 1830 coined his 
celebrated  maxim,  "  The  king  reigns,  but  does 
not  govern,"  he  little  dreamt that  it had  been 
proclaimed many centuries earlier  in a  State of 
very different type.  The coincidence is no mere 
accident ;  there  is  an  unmistakable  parallel 
between  the  constitutional  principles  of  Polish 
magnates  and  those  of  modern  Radicals. 
Rousseau  stands alone amongst  philosophers as 
an admirer of  the Polish pandemonium which will 
remain forever proverbial as an example of  what 
the State should not be.  Before the first partition 
of  Poland Rousseau  published a  short pamphlet 
in which he warned that country against adopting 
the coercive  doctrine  of  the  State held  by  the 
nations of the West.  With the Frenchman's bliss- 
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ful ignorance of  foreign conditions he was unaware 
that these far-famed liberties of  Poland were the 
liberties of  the nobility only, beneath whose yoke 
groaned  a  multitude  of  serfs.  Frederick  the 
Great sickened at the sight of  Polish degeneracy, 
as  his  satires show, and, paraphrasing  Voltaire, 
denounced  Rousseau's  constitutional  theory  in 
these  words,  "  If  he  had  his  way  sovereigns 
would once more have to crawl on all fours." 
The  Polish  Parliament consisted of  the Mag- 
nates and the Schlachta plus the King.  The local 
assemblies of  the various provinces sent a repre- 
sentative, who  must be  unanimously  chosen, to 
the  Lower  Chamber  of  the  central  Parliament. 
The  Upper  Chamber  was  composed  exclusively 
of  Magnates who sat in virtue of  a personal right. 
The  King,  the  Magnates,  and  the  representa- 
tives  of  the  provinces  were  separate  and  co- 
ordinated  Estates.  The king was  not  superior 
to the other  two;  he  attended  the sittings of 
parliament in person, placed upon the throne as 
the first  amongst equals.  In such an assembly, 
as no concluding motion was conceivable, business 
was  brought  to  a  close,  via  facti.  It  was 
enacted  that no lights should  be  used, in  order 
that proceedings  might  terminate before  night- 
fall.  Occasionally even this method failed of  its 
object, and the country then enjoyed the stimu- 
lating spectacle of  a slumbering parliament.  The 
King,  the Lords,  and the Schlachta  dozed  and 
snored through the night, so as to be on the spot 
by  daybreak.  The  rules  of  procedure  were  of 
the simplest,  and permitted the intervention of 
guests, or so-called "  arbitri,"  who were frequently 
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of  the opposite sex.  The flashing black eyes and 
nimble wits of  Polish ladies often played a sinister 
part in the conduct of  business. 
The liberum veto, that famous "  jewel of Polish 
freedom " introduced  in 1652, was the inevitable 
consequence  of  unrestricted  aristocratic  pre- 
dominance.  If the relation of  the subject to the 
State depend only upon a supposed contract, then 
every subject is clearly entitled to be  consulted 
upon  any change in the terms of  that contract. 
It was further enacted that if  in any parliament 
a single  Bill was  lost,  parliament itself  must  be 
dissolved  and  all  its  previous  legislation  be 
cancelled.  Thus it was within the power of  any 
member of  the Schlachta to annihilate the labours 
of  an entire session.  Already then men could be 
found who felt that the State was treading the 
paths  of  destruction.  "  A  stronger  than  you 
shall arise,"  cried John Casimir to the rebellious 
nobility.  From 1652 to 1704 only seven parlia- 
ments ran their normal course, while forty-eight 
dispersed in disorder. 
Here it cannot be  doubted that we  are  face 
to face with  constituted  folly, but  as unreason 
when  it  has  reached  a  certain  pitch  becomes 
hateful  to the nature  of  man,  a  homoeopathic 
remedy  was  found  by  legalizing  anarchy.  To 
the  political  mind  it is  highly  interesting  and 
instructive to observe  that the instinct  of  self- 
preservation  was  maintained  even  in  this  re- 
publican  degeneracy.  It  was  a  time-honoured 
privilege  of  every  Polish  nobleman  to conclude 
treaties  and to indulge  in  private warfare ; on 
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and one black, respectively symbolizing fire and 
murder.  From  this  it  followed  that  when  a 
parliament  was  dispersed  because parties  could 
not agree, they had the right to constitute them- 
selves into two separate assemblies, not  subject 
to  the  ordinary  rules  of  procedure.  The 
bracchium  saeculare  was  then  proclaimed,  which 
simply  meant  that  the  two  bodies  resorted  to 
the appeal  of  arms.  If  one  or  other  of  them 
succeeded  in  capturing  the  king  it proclaimed 
itself  a  General  Assembly  and  established 
the  dictatorship.  By  its  authority  a  parlia- 
ment of  the whole kingdom would then be called, 
with the power to take decisions by the vote of 
the majority  which  naturally commanded  scant 
respect except when backed by the larger number 
of  scimitars.  So  it  comes  about  that  what  a 
party cannot attain by legal means it achieves by 
force. 
Such  was  the  Constitution  which  Rousseau 
and his  modern  Radical  followers have so long 
extolled  as  a  pattern.  For  our  part  we  have 
learnt  enough  to know  that if  ever  a  country 
perished  by the inexorable  necessity  of  interior 
decay  it is  Poland.  But  it must  be  admitted 
that since the loss of  its independence the Polish 
nation shows remarkable signs of  transformation. 
A  distinction  must  be  drawn between  the pro- 
vinces.  Throughout  Polish  history  the inhabit- 
ants  of  Greater  Poland,  that  is  to say  of  the 
districts between  Gnesen  and Posen,  have  been 
specially remarkable  for  their frivolity,  and for 
that longing for adventure which is found in all 
Poles.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  both  parties 
that  these  fantastically - minded  people  should 
fall to Prussia, and it is all the more important 
that we  should  show severity in order that the 
establishment  of  German  civilization  may  be 
hastened.  In spite  of  all  the  mistakes  of  our 
Government, which changes its system regularly 
every five years, we  may confidently look forward 
to the final victory  of  Teutonism in these  pro- 
vince~.~  A rising in Prussian Poland is, however, 
not  unthinkable.  There  the  population  has 
enormously increased, and the novel phenomenon 
of  a Polish middle class has made its appearance. 
Although  it is  largely  leavened  by  Jews,  this 
class may be the means of  restoring a Polish State 
in  Russia.  In  the  midst  of  these  difficult 
problems  one  thing  is  certain : Poland  as  an 
aristocratic  commonwealth  can never live again, 
for  feudalism  is  in  complete  conflict  with  our 
industrial age. 
A fourth type of  Constitution, namely absolute 
monarchy,  stands  out  in  striking  contrast  to 
monarchy limited by Estates, which  has been as 
much hated by the people as absolute monarchy 
may  be  said  generally  to  have  been  beloved. 
The masses of  the people were driven by a natural 
instinct  to see  in the man  who  was  the visible 
embodiment  of  the national unity their natural 
protector against their many petty tyrants.  The 
pith  and kernel  of  absolutism is that the whole 
function  of  the  State,  legislative  as  well  as 
administrative,  is  united  in  the  hands  of  the 
monarch.  Civil  jurisdiction  is  exercised  in  his 
name,  although  in  practice  it  is  directed  by 
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authorities independent of  him.  Personal rights 
are sacred even to the absolute ruler, and secret 
justice is always presumed to be arbitrary. 
Even this profound  and fertile form  of  Con- 
stitution contains a contradiction, and has there- 
fore  always  been  a  stepping-stone  to  further 
constitutional development  amongst  progressive 
peoples.  If absolute monarchy be conceived  in 
a  generous spirit, and if  it be  granted that the 
benevolent  autocrat  who  guides  the  State  is 
endowed with such limitless power only that he 
may the better promote the people's welfare, the 
necessity  of  governing  not  only for  but by the 
people will  soon appear, and it will  not  be  long 
before the nation is in some way  or other made 
to participate in the conduct of  affairs.  For this 
reason  the  vogue  of  absolutism  was  short, as 
we learn from Prussia.  The ideal of  the absolute 
monarch was realized in Frederick the Great, but 
already  in  his  time  the lower  orders  began  to 
raise  their heads and become  conscious of  their 
claims.  Soon after the death of  the great king 
his system began to crumble. 
Absolutism  is  rarely  found  in  unmitigated 
form, for it almost always tolerates the fragments 
of  extinct liberties, and absorbs the power of  an 
earlier Constitution, while  maintaining its form. 
In  this  way  the  old  mandatory  provincial 
Assemblies  of  Austria,  which  we  have  already 
examined,  long  continued  to  enjoy  a  peaceful 
existence  in  complete  inactivity.  In  Prussia, 
too,  previous  to the  fall  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire it was quite exceptional for the Govern- 
ment  to  dissolve  provincial  Diets.  The  chief 
examples  of  such  proceedings  are  in  Miinster, 
where  a  dangerous  clerical  opposition  was 
fomented by the Cathedral  Chapter ;  in  Silesia, 
where  the  principal  nobility  long  remained 
Austrian in sympathy ;  in Western Prussia, where 
the  Polish  aristocracy  formed  a  centre  of  dis- 
affection.  In the other dominions of  the Crown 
the  provincial  Diets  continued  to exist  though 
shorn of  their privileges,  and allowed to retain 
only certain administrative functions. 
The attack on ancient forms of  representation 
was most successful in Latin States.  The French 
States were not once convened between 1614 and 
1789, although  the idea  of  their  legal existence 
was  as firmly rooted in the public consciousness 
as the necessity  of  the Cortes in  every Spanish 
mind.  In theory pure absolutism has prevailed 
nowhere in Europe, in practice its career has been 
brilliant  and  eventful.  Its  most  consistent 
theoretical formulation is contained in the Danish 
royal  code  of  1665, which  sets no limits to the 
prerogatives  of  the  Crown.  It  can  be  argued 
that absolutism, owing to  the energy of  the central 
authority,  is  a  necessary  transition  stage  for 
expanding  nations  if  they  are  to  avoid  pro- 
vincialism and lay the foundations of  unity and 
equality before the law. 
Apart from the petty democratic tyrannies of 
Italy, which form a separate category, four stages 
may be roughly distinguished in the development 
of absolute monarchy in Europe.  All absolutism 
presupposes  a  certain  degree  of  legitimacy,  the 
authority of  the Crown must at least be acknow- 
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respect  by  force.  The  first  stage  of  absolute 
monarchy is typified for us by Philip the Fair of 
France.  He  represents  for  us  the self-sufficing 
sovereign will which constituted itself the tangible 
expression  of  the State and reduced  mediaeval 
chaos  to  order.  In England,  as we  have  seen, 
authority was already centralized under the early 
Norman  kings ; but  true  absolutism  attained 
maturity  only  through  the  Tudors,  who,  after 
the internecine butchery of  the Wars of  the Roses, 
were  able  as national  rulers  to dominate  repre- 
sentative institutions without suppressing them. 
This process  was  even  more  marked  in  France. 
Not only was absolute monarchy a practical fact 
far  earlier  in  France  than  elsewhere,  but  the 
theory of  it was far more idealistically conceived 
by the French than by any other nation.  There 
is  a  real  grandeur  about  the  doctrines  of  the 
fourteenth - century  jurists  who  received  their 
training  at Bologna.  A  more  recent  exponent 
of  the theory of absolutism, Jean Bodin, developed 
the  doctrine  of  the  independence  of  the  State 
from  all  authority  but  its own.  It  is  possible 
to  trace  the  gradual  steps  by  which  absolute 
government in France first grew powerful through 
the  ancient  Constitution,  then  supplanted  it. 
Feudal  law  had  upheld  the  maxim, "  No  land 
without a Suzerain."  The Barons were practical 
sovereigns  of  their  fiefs,  subject  only  to  the 
vague  prerogatives  of  their  overlords.  Little 
by  little,  supported  by  the  Third  Estate,  the 
Suzerain  of  all,  who  was  the king,  constructed 
his  own  sovereignty  out  of  the  amalgamated 
sovereignties of  his vassals.  Abandoned  by the 
two superior orders, the third order could not but 
see in them their natural enemies.  Peasants as 
well as burghers found conditions of  life far more 
tolerable on the royal domains than on the lands 
of  private lords, where the lot of  the peasantry 
was  miserable  beyond  all  description.  Royal 
administration  offered  comparative  safety,  and 
it  became  the  custom  for  citizens  of  towns 
subject to private lords to take refuge within the 
jurisdiction of  the Crown.  By such an act private 
allegiance  dissolved,  and  by  this  means  the 
nucleus of  a healthy middle class began to grow 
up under the protection of  the king.  Royal Com- 
missioners,  so-called "  baillis,"  were  despatched 
into the provinces to extend wherever possible the 
royal  authority, which,  while everywhere resist- 
ing the claims of  the lords, finally displaced them.  * 
Later  on  Richelieu  replaced  the "  baillis " by 
"  intendants,"  who were the predecessors of  the 
modern prefects, and who as plebeians were more 
trusted  than  noblemen.  Governorships  were 
reserved  for the aristocracy, whose  ostentatious 
extravagance  brought  the  purely  honorary 
functions of  their office into disrepute. 
Even the Estates of  the realm never possessed 
a legal right to be  summoned periodically ;  they 
always remained an extra legal authority as dis- 
tinct from the Crown and its Ministers, and were 
ruined as an institution by the fury of  class hatred. 
In the midst of  the deadly peril of  the Hundred 
Years' War, the nobility and the clergy, by an act 
of  criminal folly, conferred upon  the Crown  the 
right  to tax the  Third  Estate  at pleasure  on 
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exempt.  Nothing could  contrast more strongly 
than this suicidal  conduct with  the attitude of 
the  aristocracy  of  England  which  was  always 
careful to preserve  its relations  with  the other 
Estates of  the realm.  Thus the Etats gknkrauz 
disappeared  more and more  from  view.  They 
were brought  into some  prominence  during  the 
wars  of  religion, when they held their sittings at 
Blois and at Orlkans, but they enacted  fanatical 
decrees  with  unfailing  regularity,  and,  having 
become the arena of  religious strife between the 
rival persuasions in the aristocracy, were gradually 
pushed more and more into the background.  By 
Henry IV.'s  time they had fallen into such  dis- 
repute that it was felt by the Third Estate as an 
alleviation when, in his reign, the sittings began to 
be less frequently convoked, and finally entirely 
ceased under his successor.  Of  the once powerful 
provincial  Assemblies  of  France  only  those  of 
Languedoc  and of  Normandy retained their im- 
portance, and were not entirely devitalized.  The 
assembly of  the Estates of  Dauphiny which met 
at  Vizille in 1787 was the pattern upon which the 
great National Assembly of  1789 was modelled. 
The first phase of unlimited monarchy, during 
which  the  king  appeared  especially  in  France 
as the restorer of  peace and centre of  unity, was 
followed by one which may be described as the 
theocratic  period.  Of  this  fanatical  school  of 
absolutism,  which  inscribed  cujus  regio,  ejus 
religio upon its banners, Philip II., the cloistered 
king-monk  of  the  Escurial,  is  the  perfect  and 
abhorrent type.  Philip was not only the secular 
head  of  the State he  was  also  an ecclesiastical 
dignitary.  The resources of the Inquisition were 
at his disposal, and the Crown derived additional 
strength from the almost unlimited powers over 
Bishops which Philip wrung from the Pope.  To 
restore the unity of  faith was his sole and absorb- 
ing aim.  In other respects  he barely  governed 
at all, the material welfare and instruction of  the 
people  were  totally  neglected.  In spite  of  its 
wealth the country fell into general  decay,  and 
bled to death spell-bound by the idea of  universal 
Catholic empire.  The development of  theocratic 
absolutism followed a similar course in Germany 
during the great wars of  religion.  Ferdinand 11. 
boldly laid down the maxim, novus rex, nova  lex, 
and  repudiated  the  liberties  conferred  by  his 
predecessors  upon  the  Bohemians.  In  virtue 
of  the  royal  supremacy,  and  armed  with  the 
Papal blessing, he proceeded to promote the wel- 
fare of  his people by means of  the Lichtenstein 
dragoons.  The conception of  government which 
limited its ambition to the restoration and main- 
tenance of  religious uniformity,  and ignored  all 
other  internal  questions  prevailed  in  Austria 
until the time of  Metternich.  A somewhat milder 
version  of  the  same  political  principles  was 
professed  in  Protestant  countries,  where  the 
princes, supported by the Court preachers,  were 
above all concerned to enforce the precept, cujus 
regio, ejus religio. 
At  the close  of  the religious turmoil  of  the 
seventeenth century absolutism modified its char- 
acter, and its theocratic form was succeeded by 
what may be called a courtly absolutism, which 
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development  and  its  earliest  decline.  It  was 
the tragic  destiny of  that people which, earlier 
than any other, had understood  and valued  the 
virtue of  unlimited monarchy to be the first to 
suffer from its most deadly errors.  Till the era 
of  the  two  great  Cardinals,  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin, who completed the unification of  France 
about  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
the monarchy may be said in spite of  some crimes 
to have been true to its mission.  The numerous 
illegalities of  which  the Government was  guilty 
must be regarded as expiated by the noble purpose 
of  securing the  State from the disruption which 
was  the darling aim  of  a  turbulent aristocracy. 
Under Henry IV. France had enjoyed the benefits 
of  a peculiarly lofty and healing phase of  absolute 
monarchy.  The  king,  although  one  of  the 
greatest liars known to history, was  idolized by 
the people, and was endowed with the irresistible 
charm  of  a  perfectly  chivalrous  bearing.  Any 
attack on Henry IV.  involves the whole French 
nation, and no one has the right to dismiss with 
contempt the genius of  an entire people. 
The idea  of  monarchy  had  matured  to such 
a pitch in France, that the nation felt its glory 
embodied  in  the  person  of  the  king;  the 
two  Cardinals  secured  its  practical  guarantees 
upon  an unshakable  foundation.  The  Fronde 
having been quelled, Louis XIV. on his majority 
took  over  the  legacy  of  absolute  and  unques- 
tioned  sovereignty.  From  that  date  forward 
began the monarchy's  career of  guilt.  By that 
time  every  possibility  of  the revival  of  aristo- 
cratic and centrifugal tendencies  was  out of  the 
question.  The sole object of  the Crown  should 
have been to employ its undisputed predominance 
in the interests of  national prosperity and enlight- 
enment.  The  shallowness  of  Louis's  character 
made him  sacrifice such  considerations  for  out- 
ward  show  in  which  the  essence  of  monarchy 
consisted for him.  His whole attitude is summed 
up in the odious motto,  L'Etat  c'est  moi.  This 
expression is  said  first to have been  used  as a 
retort to Louvois, whom the king reproached for 
the devastation of  the Palatinate, and who excused 
it by saying that the blame would be laid upon 
the State and not upon the king.  Such an origin 
of  the saying would  have done him  credit,  but 
he  later employed it to justify  the most  repre- 
hensible  proceedings,  and it has therefore since 
become  a  byword  for  fulsome  and  repellant 
self-glorification.  This  incident  has  a  psycho- 
logical aspect which it is important to note.  All 
nations know the saying, "  Self-praise is no com- 
mendation,"  but in the highest place of  all, self- 
praise  has  something  outrageous  and implies  a 
challenge.  There  is  no  doubt  that  unlimited 
power bestowed upon a single individual not only 
excites but distorts his understanding, but when 
it  degenerates  into  petulant  arrogance,  and  a 
nation  is constantly reminded  that it would  be 
in the shade but for the light which radiates from 
this  same  individual,  it  is  inevitable  amongst 
thinking people that a  reaction  must sooner or 
later set in which will  culminate  in  revolution. 
France has had to taste the bitter experience of 
this  revolution  which  was  precipitated  by  the 
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of  the Huguenots deprived the nation of  its last 
chance of  uniting freedom with piety, and obliged 
it to choose between frivolous  free-thinking and 
blind  surrender  to the fiat  of  the  Church.  It 
is not too much to say that the French Revolution 
was the logical outcome of  the Revocation of the 
Edict of  Nantes. 
Another  repulsive  feature of  the later stages 
of  French absolutism was that it associated itself 
entirely with the interests of  the courtiers instead 
of  applying its resources to the intellectual and 
material  improvements  of  the nation,  and was 
blind enough to identify its cause with that of  a 
hated  aristocracy.  The  infatuation  of  such  a 
policy was made manifest by subsequent events. 
Under Louis XIV. the small gentry of  the Vendke 
and  other  Western  Provinces,  although  the 
healthiest  element  of  the  French  aristocracy, 
were in bad odour at Court because, unlike the 
other  nobles,  they  preferred  to live  as honest 
gentlemen  on  their  estates  in  friendly  contact 
with  their  dependants  rather than waste  their 
substance at Versailles.  But, when  the day  of 
reckoning was at  hand, who fought for the rights 
of  the Crown ?  Not  the polished nobles of  the 
Court, who  fled  the country in attendance upon 
the  degenerate  princes.  None  were  found  to 
fight  for  the  golden  lilies  but  the  provincial 
squireens.  Nothing  could  be  more  significant. 
Thus the noble  spirit of  absolute kingship  was 
poisoned by the air of  Courts. 
Yet another brand of  monarchy existed which 
took root and may be said to have flourished best 
i11  Prussia.  Of  the three final stages of  absolut- 
ism--the  theocratic,  the  courtly,  and  the  en- 
lightened--ur country  became  familiar  only 
with the last and noblest ;  for, at the time when 
theocratic notions  had  the upper hand, even in 
  denbur burg  our  monarchy  was  not  absolute 
but limited  by Estates, and the powers  of  the 
prince were extremely restricted.  The career of 
courtly absolutism among us was  but short and 
stunted.  King  Frederick  I.,  a  man  of  very 
moderate  intellect,  attempted, according  to his 
poor ability, to emulate Louis XIV., but at  heart 
felt a keen  sense of  his duty to the State.  His 
imitation,  confined  to  externals,  soon  became 
ridiculous.  The heavy German lacks the danger- 
ous  French  gift  of  making  wrong  alluring; 
Germans  who  attempt to tread such  paths  are 
only  coarse  and  clumsy.  On  this  principle 
Frederick  I. kept a  State mistress  as a  part of 
the insignia of  absolutism.  It may be said with 
truth that enlightened  autocracy  has  prevailed 
with us since the days of  the Great Elector, and 
found  in  Frederick  the  Great  its  most  accom- 
plished representative.  The State policy is  fitly 
epitomized  in  the saying,  "  Everything  for  the 
people,  nothing  through  the people,"  but more 
nobly still in the words  of  the Great Frederick 
himself, "  The  sovereign  is  the  chief  servant 
of  the State."  As  heir-apparent  the youthful 
prince  took  pleasure  in  using  almost  offensive 
terms to express his belief  in the unconditional 
subordination  of  the  monarch  to  the  welfare 
of  the  nation  as  a  whole,  and  his  "  Anti- 
Machiavelli "  therefore  employs  the  term 
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also  regarded  himself  as  perpetually  on  duty. 
In his  own  eyes he was  a  Prussian  officer  who 
happened also to be King of  Prussia.  His whole 
being was absorbed by the sense of  service to the 
common weal.  There is an  awe-inspiring sternness 
in a life so penetrated by a sense of  duty. 
This  fact  is  even  more  vividly  brought  to 
light by a  study of  Frederick the Great's  char- 
acter.  The  average  man  can  scarcely  grasp 
the  standpoint  of  personal  abnegation and  of 
detachment  from  all  selfish  aims  which  char- 
acterized  the  wise,  lonely  old  gentleman  who 
wandered to and fro with his greyhound in the 
picture-gallery at Sans Souci.  Hence the foolish 
verdicts on the great king  to which we  are so 
often  treated.  Enlightened  despotism  reached 
its zenith in Frederick the Great, whose historical 
importance in  this respect  has  been  misjudged 
by  most  historians.  Because  he  had  a  genius 
for  despotism it is assumed  by a  tempting but 
treacherous  analogy that he was  also a  pioneer 
in  Statecraft.  No  doubt  he  deserved  this 
appellation  for  having been  the  first  to declare 
emancipation from  Austria  as the true political 
goal.  But  as  regards  internal  affairs  such  a 
claim  cannot be  supported ; in this respect  he 
did  not  initiate  but  concluded  a  great  epoch. 
With a few isolated modifications he maintained 
the institutions  inaugurated  by his  father.  He 
showed  creative zeal  only  in regard  to the ad- 
ministration  of  justice.  By  the  General  Pro- 
vincial  Code  (Allgemeine  Landrecht)  he  con- 
solidated  the legislative  structure begun by the 
Great Elector. 
Genius alone possesses the talisman of  inspiring 
and many European Courts were spurred 
to imitate Frederick's  example by the glamour 
of  his  renown.  If  we  compare  Augustus  of 
Saxony and Eberhard of Wurtemberg, who strove 
to  out-strip  Louis  XIV.  in  self-adulation  and 
riotous  living,  with  Frederick  Christian  of 
Saxony,  Charles  Frederick  of  Baden,  Charles 
Augustus of  Weimar, who  endeavoured to walk 
in the footsteps of our great King, we fully realize 
that  he  alone  taught  the  German  princes  to 
conceive their royal mission aright.  His father's 
grim and narrow austerity unredeemed by genius 
was  repellent  in  the  extreme.  The  startling 
anomaly of  an historic people at  once so venerable 
and so undisciplined had in him its living embodi- 
ment.  The key to the problem lies in that return 
to barbarism  of  which  the Thirty  Years'  War 
was at once the cause and the climax.  Regarded 
from this angle  our  history has  a tragic aspect 
not  fully  redeemed  by the subsequent  glory  of 
the  absolutist  era.  Frederick's  conception  of 
kingship  is  set  forth  with  perfect  logicality 
in his Mirror  of  Princes, which he dedicated to 
Charles  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg.  Even  the 
greatest  of  Austrian  monarchs,  Maria  Theresa 
herself, felt the spell of  his  influence, and it is 
perhaps  her greatest merit  that she,  a woman, 
was yet able to recognize the greatness of  a man 
who  had earned her unbounded hatred, and she 
was  magnanimous  enough to attempt the intro- 
duction  of  his  system  into  her  government  as 
far as local  conditions  would  allow.  Monarchs 
and ministers pledged to progress arose even in 
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Catholic  and  Latin  States ; Italy,  Spain,  and 
Portugal began to initiate reforms. 
It is unfortunate that the enlightened absolut- 
ism which emanated from Sans Souci began  its 
triumphal march through Europe when it was too 
late for most countries to profit by its benefits. 
The form of  absolutism native to Prussia rests 
upon, and is inseparable from, a firm hierarchical 
division  of  the people,  which  is  bred  upon  the 
tradition  that each  of  its separate classes  has 
an unalterable function to perform.  While the 
nobility  own  and  administer  the  large  landed 
estates,  the smaller holdings are left in the un- 
disturbed  possession  of  the farming  peasantry. 
It is the right as well as the duty of  the nobility 
to shed its blood in defence of  the King and to 
occupy  the  high  offices  of  State.  Below  it 
comes the citizen class, whose avocation is  prin- 
cipally trade and commerce, and which for that 
reason  was  exempt  even  as  late  as  the  Great 
Frederick  from  military  duty in most Prussian 
towns.  The  function  of  the  peasantry  was  to 
provide the main body of  the army, and in addi- 
tion  to cultivate  its share of  the  soil in peace 
time.  To maintain intact the frontiers between 
the classes was regarded by the absolute monarchy 
as  indispensable  to social  justice.  Out  of  the 
humble  town -dwellers  which  he  found  at his 
accession,  Frederick's  measures  and  policy 
gradually,  though  no  doubt  unintentionally, 
evolved  a  middle  class  which little by little ac- 
quired, at  least in part, the refinement and wealth 
of  the nobility, and began to feel itself the back- 
bone  of  the nation.  The transition to another 
and  freer  form  of  constitution  became  inevit- 
able.  It is evident that when monarchy is con- 
ceived in the lofty spirit in which Frederick 11. 
it, the power of  the monarch increases 
in proportion  as he holds himself to be invested 
with a political office for the benefit of  all.  Even 
a government inspired by theocratic notions like 
that  of  Philip  11.  recognized  the  Church  as 
limiting  its  power,  just  as  courtly  absolutism 
was  restrained  by  the  nobility.  The  French 
monarchy  succumbed  not  to its  own  inherent 
faults, but to the fact that it allowed  its aims 
to be hampered by the interests of  an aristocracy 
which had become an integral part of  its system. 
In contrast with  these  types of  absolutism,  so- 
called  enlightened  autocracy  can  detach  itself 
from the clogging influence both of  ecclesiastical 
and aristocratic prepossessions and carry out its 
task  with  noble  concentration.  In Prussia  the 
power of  the Crown had expanded in every direc- 
tion, and though the King was unable to intervene 
in civil causes, and had to learn the danger of 
such  meddling  when  he  tried  to dispossess the 
miller  of  Sans Souci, yet  it was  always  within 
his competence to appoint Courts of  High Com- 
mission  and  to  apprehend  any  individuals  in 
the  interests  of  public  policy.  These  preroga- 
tives vested  an immense  discretionary power in 
the King, and the use made of  them against the 
Popular  leaders  in  1819  was  in  a  legal  sense 
perfectly  justified  and  in  accordance  with  the 
recognized  rights  of  the  Crown.  This  great 
discretionary  authority  left  the  Crown  full 
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when  it so  desired,  as  shown  by  the tolerant 
attitude of  Frederick the Great and Catherine 11. 
towards  the  Jesuits  after  their  dissolution  by 
the Pope. 
It is generally overlooked that in other spheres 
the old absolute monarchy  was far weaker than 
modern  constitutional kingdoms, and its lack of 
elasticity  was  particularly  apparent  in  finance. 
Under the old system each Provincial  Assembly 
raised by direct taxation fixed sums which could 
not be increased at the demand of  the King, who 
in point of  fact had full control only over revenue 
yielded  by  direct  taxes.  The  weakness  of  the 
Government  in  this  respect  led  Frederick  the 
Great,  when  his  financial  necessities  became 
pressing, to that system of  State monopolies and 
surveyors  which  ultimately  made  him  so  un- 
popular.  The result was that Frederick had not 
the power to raise the total yield of  direct taxa- 
tion.  The drawbacks to such a  state of  things 
were  especially  onerous  in  war-time.  Without 
England's  assistance  Frederick  the Great  could 
never  have  carried  on  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
and  his  successor  soon  found  himself  in  great 
financial  straits.  Generally  speaking,  at  that 
time, just  because it had such an overwhelming 
share of  power, the Crown felt a far greater moral 
responsibility  towards public  opinion than con- 
stitutional monarchs of  the present day, who are 
shielded from criticism by representative govern- 
ments.  When  under  Frederick  William  111.  it 
was  proposed to establish  monopolies, which  at 
that time would have been a salutary proceeding, 
and to introduce a paper currency,  the King on 
both occasions held back from a fear lest public 
opinion  would  condemn  these  measures.  If  a 
State monopoly in  the tobacco  trade  had  then 
been  established  and  maintained,  a  valuable 
source of  revenue would have been created.  The 
Government  of  that  day,  however,  showed  a 
greater deference to public  opinion than do our 
contemporary  authorities.  Although  the  pro- 
posed monopolies broke down under insurmount- 
able  difficulties,  our  present  Government  felt 
strong  enough  to  attempt  their  introduction. 
It remains  true that a Constitutional Monarchy 
can proceed far more boldly in finance than any 
other  because  it shares  responsibility  with  the 
representatives  of  the people. 
The  theory  of  absolutism  lays  down  as  a 
general  maxim  that the  monarch  is  bound  by 
the  promises  of  his  predecessors  so  long  as  he 
has not formally repudiated  them, but since his 
powers  in  legislation  are  unlimited,  he  may 
abrogate any law and a fortiori  a mere promise. 
Its practice, indeed, is very different, and experi- 
ence  has  proved  the  moral  prestige  of  such 
pledges to be so powerful as virtually to preclude 
their  repeal.  Filial  reverence  alone  suffices  to 
make a son averse from cancelling the promises of 
his  father,  and  this  natural  sentiment  brought 
Frederick  William  IV.  to the brink  of  disaster. 
It would have been possible for him to repudiate 
his  father's  pledge  to grant a  Constitution  and 
substitute  some  project  of  his  own,  but  he  re- 
frained out of  respect  for the paternal memory. 
Without  taking  this  course he  nevertheless  did 
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ticable  on  legal  grounds.  While  the  original 
~romises  remained  both  unredeemed  and  un- 
repealed,  Parliament  was  perfectly  justified  in 
demanding  their  fulfilment.  A  constitutional 
State,  on  the  other  hand,  can  easily  solve 
such  problems  by  a  legislative  method.  When 
Government  finds  itself  committed  to  a  law 
which has proved inapplicable in practice, it has 
only to convince the legislature  of  this fact and 
to pass a second measure annulling the first. 
It  is  a  further  defect  of  absolute  monarchy 
that all opposition to Government must assume 
the  appearance  of  personal  resistance  to  the 
Sovereign ;  all public servants are his instruments, 
and ministers are answerable to him alone.  The 
choice  of  the  prince  in  making  appointments 
may,  as a  general  rule,  be  guided  by  the pre- 
scribed examination tests, but he is fully entitled 
to  make  exceptions  at his  pleasure.  It  is  no 
uncommon thing amongst us for troopers to have 
risen rapidly from the ranks to prominent posts 
because  on  some  occasion  they  have  attracted 
the favourable notice of  the King.  The relative 
independence from control by the Crown, which 
is claimed at the present  day by chiefs of  great 
departments, would have been unthinkable under 
the old  monarchy,  when  every  criticism  inevit- 
ably  implied  a  personal  attack upon  the  ruler 
himself.  On the accession of  Frederick William 
II. a complete change from the spirit which had 
animated  the reign  of  Frederick  the  Great  set 
in, and we  still have to blush for the torrent of 
scurrilous  lampoons  against  the  King  which 
flooded  the  country.  That  opposition  should 
take this form is natural and unavoidable  when 
the  King,  in  whom  everything  centres,  proves 
inadequate  to his task, as it must  be  confessed 
that  Frederick  William  11.  turned  out  to  be. 
Thus we  are led to the conclusion that even the 
loftiest and most  perfect type of  absolutism can 
be  no  more  than  a  transition  stage to a  Con- 
stitutional  Monarchy,  which  governs  not  only 
for the people but through it. 
For this reason our own time knows despotism 
in  one  European  State alone, namely in Russia, 
where  it is  so closely  bound  up with  the social 
habits  and  outlook  of  the  people,  and  so  well 
suited to its educational level, that, given com- 
petent rulers, it is certain of  a prolonged future. 
To class the Prussian absolutism with the Russian, 
as  the  Radicals  do,  is  an  error.  Just  as  the 
Russian  Empire  extends  far  into  Asia,  so  the 
Russian  monarchy  is  half  orientalized  in  char- 
acter.  The White Czar is not only the unques- 
tioned master in temporal  affairs, he is also the 
head  of  the Orthodox  Church.  That fact  is  of 
course disguised by the veil of  official terminology, 
but  deep  down  in  the  hearts  of  the  people  is 
rooted the belief that the true faith is guarded by 
the White Czar of  Holy Russia. 
Only  after  a  prolonged  struggle  with  the 
nobility  have  the  Czars  made  themselves  sole 
masters  of  the  State,  and the immense  power 
which they wield to-day rests upon the complete 
democratizing of  society.  In Russia there is no 
hereditary  nobility  strictly  speaking,  but  the 
whole  community  is  divided  in  Chinese  fashion 
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and any one who wishes to preserve his status in 
that hierarchy must enter the service of  the State. 
If  two  successive generations  of  a  family  have 
failed  to hold  public  employment  that  family 
forfeits its place in the "  tchin." 
The absolute power of  the Emperor is exercised 
through  four  main  channels  which  are  the 
Ministry of  State, whose  decrees have executive 
force ; the Council of  the Empire, in which the 
Imperial  Ukases are drawn up,  and which  con- 
sists exclusively of  superior ,officials ; the Senate, 
which  is  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal;  and, 
lastly, the Holy Synod, which is the final author- 
ity in ecclesiastical affairs.  This assembly, which 
consists  entirely of  Bishops, has  preserved  only 
the appearance  of  independence and is  brought 
under the immediate control of  the Emperor by 
the  presence  in  its  midst  of  an Imperial  Pro- 
curator, whose functions are apparently nominal 
and in fact despotic.  On its side, the Holy Synod 
raises the very natural claim that the White Czar 
should  own  no subjects but such as profess the 
orthodox  faith.  Special  dispensations  are  the 
only  legitimate means  of  evading this rule,  but 
reasons of  secular policy may deter the State from 
its rigorous assertion.  Mohammedans are usually 
the beneficiaries of  this calculated leniency, which 
the  Russian  Church  has  ever  extended  more 
readily  to them than to Protestants or  Roman 
Catholics.  Nothing  can  be  achieved  amongst 
Kalmucks,  Kirghese,  or  other  engaging Tartars 
by religious propaganda.  Owing  to their  semi- 
Oriental temperament, Russians have a peculiar 
facility for dealing with Moslems,  who, for their 
part,  fully  realize  the  half-Asiatic  character  of 
Russians.  At  Constantinople  and  in  the  East 
generally the difference is recognized in colloquial 
speech between Franks and Moscos. 
Long after Peter the Great had imported the 
outward forms  of  Western  civilization  into  his 
dominions, it fell to the lot of the magnanimous 
Emperor  Alexander 11.  to attempt the infusion 
of  the Western  spirit into the rigid  mould  of  a 
semi-Asiatic  despotism.  It  is  surprising  that 
one  and  the  same  man  should  combine  such 
moral  fortitude  with  such  physical  timidity. 
The nineteenth century can boast no more admir- 
able example of  political courage than the aboli- 
tion  of  serfdom in a State like  Russia.  At the 
date of  this event,  which  took  place  soon after 
the Crimean War, the position  of  Russia may be 
compared with  that  of  Prussia  after  1806. 
Alexander possessed in Count Waluieff  a talented 
adviser imbued  with the spirit of  Stein, though 
less  profound  than  he.  The  happiest  results 
were  anticipated  from  the  Emperor's  reforms, 
but he was unfortunately lacking in the sustained 
energy which stamps creative genius, and allowed 
himself  to be  arrested  half-way  to his  goal  by 
the passive  resistance  of  the well-to-do classes. 
A middle class is only now  beginning to emerge, 
but in those days the lack of  it made itself  felt 
as Russia's  greatest weakness.  Personal libera- 
tion meant little to the serf  unless he were also 
endowed  with  his  plot  of  land.  A  Russian 
Peasant  has  scarcely  any  property  beyond  his 
hut,  which  is  worth  but  little.  Even  at the 
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group, which Russian Radicals have the audacity 
to hold  up as a  pattern.  Every commune has 
its portion  of  arable land,  in  the cultivation  of 
which  all  collaborate,  subject  to certain  rules. 
In  order to allow some parts to lie fallow in defer- 
ence to the requirements of  the soil the allotment 
cultivated  by  each  peasant  farmer  under  com- 
munal  supervision  is  intermittent.  This  in- 
stability  of  tenure  is  Russia's  misfortune,  and 
fosters the nomadic strain in the character of  her 
people. 
Another  factor in  the rural  life  of  Russia  is 
the  configuration  of  the  country,  which  is  so 
featureless  as to make it difficult for any one to 
remember  his  bearings.  The  same  repellent 
monotony extends for hundreds of  miles, and the 
total absence of  what we  consider the amenities 
of  landscape  further  impedes  the  civilizing 
process.  The quickest method  of  counteracting 
the primary  encouragement  to a  wandering  life 
which  these  conditions  constitute  would  have 
been  to  create  peasant  ownership.  But  Alex- 
ander  unfortunately  stopped  half-way  in  his 
magnanimous  project,  which,  like  his  other 
grandly-conceived  reform,  the  establishment  of 
Zemstvos,  was  arrested  in  its  infancy  and  has 
to-day  been  lost  sight  of.  Instead,  representa- 
tives  of  the landed  interest  were  appointed  to 
act as advisers  to the Governors of  the various 
provinces in order to co-operate with them in the 
administration,  notably  with  regard  to  road- 
making  and  the  poor-laws.  This again  was  a 
well-considered plan, for without the preliminary 
experience of  some measure of  local government, 
no scheme of  popular representation had a chance 
of  holding its own  against  a centralized bureau- 
cracy.  Once more the opposition of  the wealthy 
classes  proved  too  strong,  and  already  in  the 
lifetime of  Alexander 11. it became apparent that 
in an Empire of  such vast extent even the most 
carefully  balanced  reforms  are  dependent  for 
their success on the personality of  those who are 
entrusted  with  their  execution.  Where  the 
Governors were men of  ability the Zemstvos were 
tolerably successful ; where the Governors were 
tyrannical the whole system remained  a  fiction. 
It is unfortunate that, in addition to these whole- 
some  innovations,  Alexander  should  have  im- 
ported  a  number  of  Western  institutions  with 
no  better claim to consideration  than that they 
have  found favour  with  liberal theorists.  First 
among these importations stands trial by  jury. 
,es  a  The mere mention of  a Russian jury  provol- 
smile, for, while their value may sometimes be con- 
tested  even  amongst  ourselves, in  Russia ,their 
success is infinitely more impeded by the good, as 
well  as by the bad traits of  the Slav, who  is far 
more  easily  swayed  by  his  passions  than  the 
Teuton.  The Russian lacks moral discipline rather 
than intelligence.  How could even an approxim- 
ately just verdict be expected when the educational 
and  moral level of  the nation is no higher than 
it is in Russia ?  The unreasonable conclusions at 
which Russian juries have been known to arrive, 
are fully  explained by the general conditions in 
which the people live. 
It was to be expected that the lessons taught 
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be  followed  by  a  violent  reaction,  which  took 
place  indeed, but in such uncompromising form 
that it is hard to foresee what course may still be 
open to the internal development of  Russia.  As 
we  have  already  said,  the  greatest  strength of 
hereditary  monarchy  is  that  the  interests  of 
the  reigning  dynasty  are  inseparable  from  the 
fundamental principle  of  the Constitution ; the 
necessary  degree  of  continuity  is  thus secured, 
but it is precisely this essential element of  healthy 
political life which is lacking in Russia.  Not until 
the accession  of  Alexander  I.  in  1801 was  the 
order of  succession to the throne securely settled. 
That conditions have remained unstable in spite 
of  this  consolidating  change  is  proved  by  the 
circumstance that every  new  Czar  reverses  the 
policy  of  his  predecessor, and by  the fact that 
the  throne  has  been  occupied  alternately  by 
innovators  and  reactionaries  with  monotonous 
regularity.  The  modernizer,  Catherine  II.,  was 
succeeded by  the  Muscovite,  Paul  I.,  who  was 
followed  by  the  Germanophile  Philo-pole, 
Alexander  I.  Then  came  the  nationalist, 
Nicholas I., and following upon the high-minded, 
cultivated European  Alexander  PI.  we  see  the 
primitive Muscovite ideal personified in Alexander 
111. 
This continual fluctuation is an unmistakable 
symptom  of  immaturity,  the  origin  of  which 
must be sought in complex and abnormal ethno- 
graphical  conditions.  The  precise  character  of 
their civilization is therefore difficult to analyse. 
Contemporary  Russian  history  has  revealed  to 
us that sheer madness may seize upon the rulers 
of  such  a  State.  A  measure  so  suicidal as the 
annihilation of  the German-speaking community 
in  the Baltic Provinces is  a  phenomenon which 
has rarely,  if  ever, been attempted before.  The 
inhabitants  of  that part of  the Empire were,  if 
anything,  too  faithful.  Their  share  in  making 
Russian history is enormous, and it is hardly too 
to say that every third name in the roll of 
Russian soldiers and statesmen belongs to a native 
of these regions.  Add to this the ethnographical 
conditions.  The Baltic Provinces are at bottom 
not  German  at all.  Although  there  is  a  thin 
crust of  German nobles and merchants, the great 
bulk  of  the inhabitants spring from Lithuanian 
and Finnish  stock,  and a  German  rising would 
therefore  have  been  a  practical  impossibility. 
These are the provinces which  Russia,  with  un- 
paralleled  cruelty,  determined  to partition  and 
persecute in spite of  all she owed them.  If  the 
expulsion  of  all  Germans  from  Russia  were 
carried out, it would be followed by the collapse 
cjf  her  public services, for the proper conduct of 
which  native  ability  is  totally  inadequate.  In 
spite  of  this,  or perhaps  because of  it, hostility 
to  Germans  is  rampant.  A  new  reign  would 
probably  once more bring Western  notions into 
fashion.  No  great  power  can  flourish  whose 
Government  is  subject  to such  convulsive  im- 
pulses.  The panacea  of  German Liberals for  all 
evils  is  the  introduction  of  a  representative 
Government.  No  one  can  prophesy  with  cer- 
tainty whether that system can  ever  take  root 
in  Russia,  but  for  the  present  a  constitution 
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are  Russia's  most  crying  need.  Serfdom  must 
entirely  disappear,  and  the  peasantry  must  be 
enabled  to hold  land ; the miserable  system of 
elementary  education  must  be  radically  recast. 
On  inquiry the only opponents  of  the improve- 
ments are found to be the great landlords, who, 
together  with  a  few  representatives  from  the 
great towns,  would  alone constitute an eventual 
Russian  Parliament.  Such  a  body,  therefore, 
would  necessarily  be  reactionary  in  the  worst 
sense  and  would  only  serve  to  handicap  the 
Crown.  Doubtless  educated  Russians  felt 
kecnly the need  of  a  constitution between  1815 
and  1830,  when  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
revelled in its independence, and even later, when 
the small states which  Russia wished  to detach 
from Turkey began to indulge in all manner  of 
constitutional experiments.  Every one  of  them 
must  needs  have  its  Skupshtina,  in  which,  of 
course,  the  members  belabour  and  shoot  each 
other,  but  which  suffices to prove  that Parlia- 
mentary  institutions  may  have  a  future  even 
among Slavs and Vlachs. 
Although the result may be doubtful, there are 
many  things  which  show  that Russia  will  one 
day  attempt  the  experiment  of  a  Parliament, 
but even the actual conditions should not mislead 
us  into  underestimating  her  gigantic  vitality. 
The unrivalled power of  assimilation which char- 
acterizes Russia is an asset of  the greatest value 
in the political life of  a nation and must not be 
overlooked.  If  there  be  a  people  which  seems 
predestined  to  greatness,  it  is  the  people  of 
Russia.  Its  civilizing  mission  in  Asia  is  un- 
deniable, and many unsolved problems lie before 
it  in  that  Continent;  but  it  is  a  danger  for 
Europe that successes in Asia fill the nation with 
an overweening sense of  victory to which it is not 
entitled.  Its Western frontier is of  such a nature 
as to make it unassailable and it has attained to 
such  a  pitch  of  national conceit  that it thinks 
itself capable of  conquering and ruling the West. 
The imagination of  Russian subalterns has no diffi- 
culty in sketching a campaign in which one half 
of  the army would invade India, while the other 
half  would  march  on  Constantinople  by  way  of 
Berlin and Vienna. 
In Asia the Russians, as an Aryan people with 
a  semi-oriental  form  of  government,  are  the 
obvious  bringers  of  Western  culture ;  but  to 
Europeans  the present  conditions  in  Russia  are 
an object  lesson  that any return to absolutism 
would  be  a  sheer  impossibility  for  Western 
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XVII 
CONSTITUTIONAL  MONARCHY 
THE infinite  variety  of  aspects  assumed  in 
history  by Constitutional Monarchy are dictated 
by  the  course  of  political  evolutions  and  the 
changing  needs  of  nations.  There  are  three 
indispensable tests in the proper analysis of  this 
form  of  government.  Firstly,  although  both 
in fact and in law the entire power  of  the State 
is  centred  in  the  Crown,  no  legislation  can  be 
made  effective  without  the co-operation  of  the 
elected  representatives of  the people,  that is to 
say, of  an assembly whose members vote individu- 
ally and not by classes.  Secondly, the administra- 
tion itself is in one way or another controlled by 
the representative  assembly,  which  at the very 
least  has  the right  to grant  or  refuse supplies. 
Thirdly,  justice  is  administered  in  the  King's 
name,  but  in  such  a  manner  that  civil  and 
criminal  proceedings  are  protected  from  his 
interference,  and  that the royal  prerogative  of 
pardon  alone  remains  to him.  These  are  the 
characteristics  common  to  all  representative 
systems.  The circumstances of  each case, how- 
ever,  differ  so  widely  that  it  is  impossible  to 
regard States like England, Belgium, and Prussia 
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as governed by  identical constitutions.  In this 
Connexion  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that 
parliamentary  institutions  on  the  Continent 
originated in a  cult of  the British  Constitution, 
which  gave  rise  to a  great  misunderstanding. 
We  know that to Montesquieu England, though 
ruled  by  the  proudest  aristocracy  of  his  day, 
appeared  as  the  paragon  State  combining  the 
advantages  of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  de- 
mocracy.  He believed  that she had  solved the 
problem of  maintaining while co-ordinating these 
three elements in the State ; the patent fact that 
Parliament  controlled  both  the  executive  and 
the legislative power seems to have escaped him. 
With Montesquieu's erroneous presentation before 
us,  it becomes our duty to inquire what was the 
real  condition  of  English  institutions  in  their 
classic period towards  the end of  the eighteenth 
century,  and  what  were  the  precise  features 
which  gave  those  institutions  their  world-wide 
influence.  That  influence  has  been  immense, 
and the triumphal  progress  of  English  constitu- 
tional law throughout Europe in the nineteenth 
century  is  comparable  only  with  the once  irre- 
sistible sway of  the Roman Law of  Persons.  A 
vogue so unparalleled  cannot be due to accident 
or caprice. 
The  Norman  doctrine that all power  and all 
law emanates from the King is to this day main- 
tained in England in theory, and is exemplified 
in  practice  by the absurdities  of  etiquette.  On 
close  scrutiny,  English  public  life  shows  traces 
of that same subtle hypocrisy which also colours 
its social life, and for which the English language 
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provides  an  untranslatable  expression.  The 
clerical  drawl  is  all-pervading :  it is  heard  not 
only in the pulpit, but in the fashionable drawing- 
rooms of  London, where frivolity is as prevalent 
as in Paris, though hidden by a tedious veneer of 
outward decorum, which  is kept up even in the 
political  arena.  The  epidemic  aptly  described 
by  a  contemporary  publicist  as "  constitutional 
cant " has everywhere disseminated the doctrine 
of  the legitimacy of  the Hanoverian claim.  What 
are the facts ?  With the destruction of  legitimate 
monarchy in England by the Revolution of  1688, 
the effective power of  the Crown was annihilated. 
James 11. was the last governing King of  England, 
and William 111.  a mere usurper.  The "  glorious 
Revolution "  was an upheaval in the widest sense, 
and was  a  signal  for  the gradual  decay  of  all 
national traditions.  Thenceforward the monarchy 
existed  by the grace, not  of  God  but of  Parlia- 
ment,  although  William  111.'~  personal  ability 
enabled him still to play the part of  a true king. 
The  Act  which  placed  William III., upon  the 
throne laid  down  that  King  James II., having 
broken the original contract between prince and 
people,  the  Crown  should  be  held  forfeited. 
Modern  English  constitutional  law  rests  upon 
the  false  doctrine  of  an  original  contract,  yet 
another specimen  of  the sort of  thing which  is 
hushed  up  by  liberal  doctrinaires.  By  a  sub- 
sequent  resolution  Parliament  then  summoned 
the Guelphs to the throne, although their heredi- 
tary pretensions to it were of  the remotest nature, 
and the claims of  some five-and-forty members 
of  the Stuart family were thereby set aside.  The 
title by which the House of  Hanover reigns to-day, 
and by which the House of  Coburg will one day 
reign in its stead, is an Act of  Parliament which, 
in  contravention  of  an ancient hereditary right, 
called  in  a  distant  relative  of  the  legitimate 
~~vereign  to supplant him.  Now,  if  it is of  the 
essence  of  monarchy  that authority  should  be 
self-derived,  it  must  be  clear  to  every  unpre- 
judiced  mind  that  the  British  Constitution  is 
closely  akin  to an  aristocratic  republic,  since, 
notwithstanding the formalities of  an obsequious 
ceremonial,  the  King  has  been  deprived  of  all 
real political power,  and since the legal basis of 
his  government  rests,  not  upon  an  inherent 
historical  right, but  upon  an  arbitrary act  of 
the legislature.  These conditions,  to the main- 
tenance  of  which  the extraordinary tenacity  of 
certain  personal  characteristics  has  powerfully 
contributed,  are  in  every  respect  peculiar 
and  local.  The  last  eminent  man  to  occupy 
the  throne  of  England  passed  away  with 
William  III.,  and even he,  as +a  foreigner and a 
usurper,  did  not  wield  the  plenitude  of  royal 
authority.  Under his successors the personality 
of the sovereign was so completely overshadowed 
that there  could be  no  question of  maintaining 
the  Crown's  freedom  of  action  against  the  en- 
croachments of  a haughty native aristocracy.  A 
Duke of  Norfolk could not look up with venera- 
tion  to  the  new-born  majesty  of  a  German 
princeling.  The  first  two  Georges  were  not 
Englishmen at all, and the former was so ignorant 
of  his adopted  country's  language  that he  was 
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dog-Latin ; the consequence was that he absented 
himself  from  the  meetings  of  the  Council.  A 
new  direction  was  thus  given  to constitutional 
development,  and  matters came to such a  pass 
that  it  was  no  longer  seemly  to mention  the 
King's  name in debate for the plain reason that 
that name had lost, and was intended to lose, all 
influence.  George  111.  was  the  last  English 
Sovereign  who  attempted  the  re-establishment 
of  personal  rule.  His machinations began  with 
the betrayal  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  ended 
in  disgrace  and  disaster  with  the  loss  of  the 
American colonies.  Such were the consequences 
of  the  final  effort  of  a  small-minded  king  to 
restore  the  lapsed  prerogatives  of  the  Crown. 
At  a  subsequent period  the Prince  Consort  was 
compelled  to abandon  as  chimerical  the  plans 
which he had harboured for the revival in England 
of  monarchy in the German sense.  He resigned 
himself to the task of  instructing his wife  in the 
difficult  art  of  maintaining  with  decency  the 
ridiculous  position  assigned to her  between  the 
rival  parties,  an art which  she  in fact practised 
with considerable grace. 
Regarded as a whole, the conditions of  English 
public  life  explain  why  Montesquieu laid  down 
that suspicion is the predominant factor in con- 
stitutional monarchy, and how it is that he made 
himself  responsible  for  the  repulsive  doctrine 
which attempts to found a noble form of  govern- 
ment  upon  one  of  the ugliest  traits  of  human 
nature.  Yet this doctrine is accepted as axiomatic 
even at the present day by all Radicals, although 
they may  not venture to proclaim it broadcast. 
Even my own revered master, Dahlmana, taught 
that  freedom had  probably less to fear 
from the Crown  when  it is  worn  by  a mediocre 
man  than  from  the  dangerous  gifts  of  genius. 
It is a marvel that such words could be uttered 
by a lofty and spirited thinker, as though genius, 
the greatest of  all Heaven's blessings, could ever 
become a public danger. 
It  should  be  obvious  that  even  if  it  were 
possible,  it would  remain highly  undesirable  to 
transplant  to other countries such  a  degenerate 
phenomenon  as  English  monarchy  has  now 
become.  Common  sense  suffices  to tell us that 
the  best  political  institutions  are  those  from 
which the strongest hands can evolve the greatest 
results.  Any  one,  therefore,  who  asserts  that 
monarchy should be constructed  with  a view to 
suffering the least possible harm from mediocrity 
may be said to have studied history in Bedlam. 
The education of  English princes is well calculated 
to propagate the hereditary nullity of  the House 
of Guelph, and may be said to have achieved its 
object  with  admirable success.  Not  one  of  the 
possible heirs to the throne can be called a soldier 
in the professional sense, and it is no presumption 
to surmise that the ancestral  peculiarity  of  the 
Hanoverian line in this respect, which has become 
a  commonplace  of  English  public  life,  will  be 
transmitted  to the next  two generations  of  the 
House  of  Coburg.  Germans,  however,  will  not 
diverge  from the  paths  of  common  sense,  and 
will not propose to their countrymen to exchange 
a  healthy  and  living  limb  for  even  the  most 
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by experience that our monarchy is so devised as 
to yield the best  fruits under monarchs of  strong 
personality.  In the last resort it cannot be the 
aim  of  constitutional  government  to  deprive 
monarchy of  all reason for existence ;  in a nation 
politically mature the maintenance of  its vigour 
and popularity  should  rather  be  the  object  of 
the  Government's  solicitude.  In  our  country 
the  monarchy  is  about  the  only  institution 
which  unites  us  to our  historic  past.  Can  we 
desire  to barter  our  glorious  Mohenzollerns for 
the English Georges ?  The  annals  of  our  mon- 
archy  are so glittering that every Prussian  has 
a right to say that the best  conceivable king  is 
only just  good  enough for  him.  According  to 
our law the monarch alone is invested  with the 
authority of  the State, and he  who  asserts  the 
contrary must prove his allegation by the evidence 
of  examples  peculiar  to the history  of  foreign 
countries. 
We  have  established  that the first  factor in 
English  constitutional  life  is  an  impotent 
monarchy.  The  second  is  the  existence  of  an 
exceedingly  powerful  and  politically  astute 
aristocracy.  The  yeomen  had  been  completely 
bought out by the end of the sixteenth century. 
Conditions which survive as a curiosity in Meck- 
lenburg and parts of  Pomerania are the rule  in 
England at the present day.  The life of the rural 
classes bears the stamp of  servility.  The great 
landlords occupy beautiful castles ; next to them 
and wholly dependent upon them come the tenant- 
farmers ;  and  finally  a  host  of  day - labourers, 
who  have  no  other  cause for  existence than to 
serve the landlord.  In England the gentry have 
devoured  the  peasantry, who  in  Germany  con- 
stitute  the  backbone  of  the  community.  The 
perfectly  logical  result  has  been  that  aristo- 
cratic  influences  have  preponderated  in  the 
development  of  her  Parliamentary  institutions. 
Although decisive debates have always had to be 
conducted  in  the  Lower  House  since  the  days 
of the elder Pitt, it would be an error to conclude 
that impotence seized upon the House of  Lords 
from  that  time  onwards.  Who  in  those  days 
nominated the Commons?  None other than the 
Lords, who figured as the klite of  the nation while 
they packed the Lower House with their younger 
sons,  nephews,  and  cousins,  and  caused  their 
henchmen  to be  returned  to it  by  subservient 
voters.  Every  Peer  had  a  number  of  electoral 
divisions in his pocket. 
Any  fundamental  difference  of  outlook  was 
therefore  impossible, and  in  fact  did  not  arise 
throughout  the  eighteenth  century.  Hence  it 
follows that the whole trend of  political life was 
determined  by  the  aristocracy,  which  so  over- 
shadowed the Court that it ceased to be, and has 
never again  become, the centre of  society.  The 
two  historic  parties  of  Whigs  and  Tories  were 
agreed on the principles which should guide the 
conduct of  State affairs ;  the struggle raged only 
round  the  application  of  those  principles  in 
individual cases.  The chief object of  contention 
was  office for  its own  sake.  The  hollowness  of 
their  political  contest  softened  the asperities  of 
Party  warfare,  and  saved  the  State  from  the 
dangers  of  revolution.  It  is  due  to England's 152  CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY  ENGLISH CIVIL SERVICE  153 
immemorial  habits  of  self-government that the 
orderliness  and  justice  of  civil  administration 
could  remain  undisturbed  by  the  conflict  of 
parties.  As  Justices  of  the  Peace  the  country 
squires carried  on the entire current business  of 
the county,  which  they  conducted in the spirit 
of  free  men,  though  no  doubt  in  a  slow  and 
cumbrous  manner.  It  was  a  point  of  honour 
with the well-born young gentleman, on conclud- 
ing his studies and on returning from the Grand 
Tour, to be inscribed on the list of  magistrates, and 
this privilege was never refused to a landowner. 
Justices of  the Peace  might  belong to either  of 
the two political parties,  but as the jurisdiction 
of  all alike  extended to the whole  county,  each 
could check the partisan  decisions of  the other ; 
at the same time they were sufficiently independ- 
ent to be unaffected by the change in the Ministry, 
and justice  took  its course  slowly  but  without 
corruption. 
Standing above this aristocratic local adminis- 
tration are a small body of  Parliamentary officials, 
some sixty-four in number, who change with the 
Ministry, and who are selected from one or other 
of  the Houses of  Parliament.  These are the real 
heads  of  the administrative departments  round 
which  all  political  ambition  centres.  Below 
them  is  another grade of  officials, who  bear  the 
significant title of  "clerks."  All English officials 
are  so  designated ; they  have  no  latitude  in 
taking  decisions,  and  only  exist  to carry  out 
the orders  of  chiefs sitting in  Parliament, from 
which they are themselves excluded by law.  It 
is a  very  ancient  experience that a  class which 
is cut off  from the full satisfaction of  its ambition 
suffers a capitis diminutio.  Let us suppose 
our Prussian corps of  officers to be so constituted 
that the generals were necessarily chosen from a 
different class from the other officers.  All would 
instantly  be  changed.  This  is  the  position  in 
England.  The  whole  category  of  Civil  Service 
clerks  is  excluded  from  the  highest  offices ; 
they  are therefore  underlings  in the  full  sense, 
and  in  this  respect  can  be  compared  only 
with  our  Councillors  of  Chancery.  They, too, 
know  that  they  will  never  really  govern,  but 
must  for  ever  remain  mere  instruments.  A 
Civil  Service whose  functions are thus curtailed 
will  attract  a  very  different  type  of  man 
from one which will afford scope to his capacity 
for  government.  The  aristocratic  nature  of 
the  English  Constitution  here  stands  revealed. 
Every  administration,  like  every  army,  must 
recognize  a  distinction  between  superior  and 
subordinate ;  the  vital  question  is  where  the 
line of  demarcation is drawn.  In Germany this 
line is drawn much lower down than in England, 
and therefore our social life has a far more demo- 
cratic aspect than hers. 
The  apex  of  the  marvellous  English  state- 
machine  is the Cabinet,  which  is  the Sovereign 
de facto, and is composed of  the King's confidential 
servants.  These  persons,  chosen  from  amongst 
the  men  who  have  won  the favour  of  Parlia- 
ment,  form  a  Government  of  which the law to 
this  day knows  nothing.  The law recognizes a 
Privy Council, of  which ministers are invariably 
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should  hold  the  reigns  of  Government.  The 
chief  members  of  the  Parliamentary  majority 
for the time being occupy places in the Cabinet, 
which  has  been  rightly  called  a  Committee  of 
that majority.  Thus  there is  no representation 
of  the Government  as such, for the Government 
itself  forms  part  of  Parliament.  Ministers  sit 
on the front-bench either of  the House of  Lords 
or the House  of  Commons,  and Peers  may only 
speak  in the Upper  House,  Commoners only  in 
the Lower. 
What  a  contrast  with  our  own  institutions, 
and what a situation would have arisen if  Prince 
Bismarck  had  been  prevented  from speaking in 
the  representative  Chamber,  simply  because  he 
happened  to be  a  member  of  the  Chamber  of 
Peers.  As  only  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons may  speak in their House,  our whole 
system  of  Government  Commissioners  would 
be  an  impossibility  in  England.  The  totally 
different  position  of  the  permanent  officials  in 
Germany and in England is here revealed.  Our 
Civil  Service  is  an  independent  bureaucratic 
body  consisting  of  the  King's  servants,  which, 
while  standing  outside  Parliament,  confronts  it 
and addresses it in the name of  the Government. 
The  English  Civil  Service  is  literally  controlled 
by  Parliament, and all its officials can  be  sum- 
moned to appear at the bar of  either the Upper 
or the Lower House. 
All  these elements have combined to create a 
State much to be admired, no doubt, but no more 
democratic in spirit than the House of  Commons 
is in composition.  It is a  surprising thing that 
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that body  should  ever have come  to be  spoken 
of as a popular assembly.  Until  1832 not one of 
its members owed  his seat to the free choice of 
~eople. Pocket boroughs were not the exclusive 
privilege of  Peers; in the great towns too, as in 
Germany  during  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
Parliamentary vote was controlled by a handful 
of  town councillors, whose numbers were renewed 
by co-option.  In Portsmouth, whose population 
even  before  the  first  Reform  Bill  had  reached 
over  one  hundred  thousand  souls,  the  electors 
numbered  only  sixteen.  It  is  ridiculous  to be 
asked to regard as a  popular assembly a  House 
elected under such conditions, and which possesses 
qualities of  quite a different order. 
The fact that the candidates for election were 
always  drawn  from  the aristocracy  enabled  its 
members to enter public life at a very early age, 
and the younger  Pitt to become Prime Minister 
at the age of  twenty-three.  Thus it was possible 
for the aristocracy to train its political  heirs in 
its own  school.  The  Prussian  bureaucracy also 
trains  its  own  political  successors.  The  differ- 
ence is that in Germany the young men are trained 
by their superiors, whereas in England they are 
trained  by  Parliament.  It goes  without saying 
that in  England  no  man  can  hope  to maintain 
himself in power without the support of  a majority 
in both Houses of  Parliament at his back.  It is 
astonishing  that  so  predominantly  aristocratic 
a  Constitution  could  ever  have  appeared  to a 
continental  student  as  an  amalgam  of  demo- 
cratic,  aristocratic,  and  monarchical  elements. 
The  truth is  that democracy  was  non-existent, 156  CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
that monarchy  had  become  a  shadow, and that 
a powerful, well-organized  aristocracy alone sur- 
vived.  These conditions of  course cannot afford 
to be weighed in the scales of  the moralist.  Only 
two  methods  were  practical  in  attempting  to 
influence  such  a  powerful  oligarchy,  and  both 
were occasionally employed at the same time by 
the same  Ministry.  Either the mind  of  Parlia- 
ment must be  persuaded,  hence the great power 
of  oratory ;  or else, in Sir Robert Walpole's words, 
"The  wheels  of  Parliament  must  be  oiled." 
Enormous bribes were continually needed in order 
to preserve the Government's  majority ; corrup- 
tion became systematic, and one  of  the officials 
of  the Treasury  still retains the bombastic title 
of "  Patronage Secretary."  Such an aristocratic 
system could never  be  kept  alive  if  there were 
not a good chance of  becoming rich in its service, 
and only the very few realize with what perfect 
unconcern  Englishmen  themselves  are prepared 
to admit  this fact.  There  are some  character- 
istic English lines to the effect that other States 
are  governed  with  the  full  rigour  of  the  law, 
whereas in  England the State is  maintained  by 
the gentle bonds of  friendship.  Existence under 
such  circumstances  may  be  very  agreeable 
indeed,  but it is  absurd to hold  them  up as a 
pattern  to  the  stern  sense  of  justice  which 
governs  the  German  conception  of  the  State. 
The  German  plan  of  filling minor  posts  in  the 
public  offices  with  discharged non-commissioned 
officers, who, after all, have deserved well  of  the 
State in their modest way, is far more equitable 
than  the  English  custom  of  distributing  such 
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places  the old servants and ex-flunkeys 
of  noblemen. 
So the old  British Constitution  rattled along, 
held together by some mysterious inner cohesion 
which  would  instantly  have  been  destroyed  if 
any  part  of  the machinery  had  been  tampered 
with.  Since the close of  the eighteenth century, 
however, the middle classes have steadily grown 
in  strength  and  power.  New  classes  with 
hitherto  undiscovered  claims were  brought  into 
being by the great manufacturing industries and 
knocked peremptorily at the gates of  Parliament. 
The younger Pitt quickly discerned the symptoms 
of this new social formation.  No sooner had the 
French  Revolution  broken  out than he  eagerly 
began to urge a reform of  the franchise in order 
that at least  a  part  of  the House  of  Commons 
might represent the working-classes of  the people. 
The  great  struggle  with  France  which  ensued 
absorbed the whole life of  the nation for many 
years, during which Pitt's reforms had to be post- 
poned.  The  old  order  of  things  survived  until 
1830, when the democratic movement had become 
too  strong to be  resisted  any longer.  Popular 
forces  had  become  so  powerful  outside  that  it 
was  necessary to admit their representatives  to 
some  proportion  of  influence  in  public  affairs. 
The first  Reform  Bill  became law  in  1832,  and 
has  since  been  followed  by  three  others.  By 
that measure the electorate was doubled, and in 
half  the  constituencies  the  vote  of  the  middle 
class thenceforward predominated. 
The  attitude of  the  House  was  now  funda- 
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parties  doomed  to  disappear.  The  House  of 
Commons has to a great extent emancipated itself 
from  the  control  of  the  Rouse  of  Lords,  and 
may to-day be  regarded  as a  genuinely popular 
assembly.  The importance of  the Peers is sub- 
stantially diminished, especially when  compared 
with  what  it  was  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
These  social  changes  have  entirely  altered  the 
aspect of  the House of  Commons, in which proud 
scions  of  the  nobility  sit  cheek  by  jowl  with 
bankers  and  chairmen  of  railway  companies. 
Nearly  a  third  of  the  members  of  the  Lower 
House  are  railway  directors,  and  it is  easy  to 
understand  the significance of  such  a  fact  in  a 
country which has more railways than any other 
in  the world.  The strife of  parties, which  once 
consisted  in  a  monotonous  contest  for  power 
between  two  aristocratic  factions,  no  longer 
centres  in struggle for  office,  but has developed 
into a  conflict  of  social  forces and rivalries,  to 
which  denominational  animosities  were  added 
when  Irish  members  took  their  seats  at West- 
minster.  This  Irish  crew  has  been  shot  like 
somc foreign  body  into the heart of  the House 
of  Commons,  and,  after  the  fashion  of  our 
Polish deputies, lurch 3rst one way and then the 
other. 
On close examination the two historic factions 
will  be  found to have split  up into at least  six 
groups,  which  only remotely  follow the lines of 
the old aristocratic parties.  These groups contain 
men  who  seek  to promote  the interests of  the 
working classes, but whose views approach very 
near  to Socialism.  The old appellations of  Whig 
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and Tory have nearly passed out of use, and have 
been replaced by the hollow names of  Liberal and 
conservative,  borrowed from the Continent ; in 
England  they  are  peculiarly  inappropriate,  for 
the Whigs were always the haughtiest section of 
a haughty aristocracy, and it is a mere accident, 
due to a fortuitous  connexion with the financial 
interests of  the great towns, that made the Whig 
party  occasionally  appear  to  lean  to  liberal 
measures.  The  illuminating  fact  is  that  there 
was no fundamental difference of  principle between 
the two aristocratic parties, both of  which have 
in turn attacked and defended long Parliaments, 
Irish  Reform,  Catholic  Emancipation,  etc., 
according  to whether  they  were  in  or  out  of 
office. 
Not  only  have  repeated  reforms  altered  the 
character  of  the  British  Parliament,  but  the 
time-honoured  tradition  by  which  the  gentry 
carried  on the local government of  the country 
has long been undermined,  and is to-day almost 
at an end.  It is  obvious that the old  Justices 
of the Peace must be inadequate to the political 
control of  the complicated conditions of  modern 
urban life.  A great central police authority was 
first  established  in  London  and  given  a  half- 
military,  half-bureaucratic  organization  on  the 
Continental  pattern.  The  Poor  Law  was  re- 
formed and a Board of Public Health introduced. 
The Justices of the Peace have been succeeded 
by  the  County  Councils,  who  appoint  paid 
officials  to conduct public business.  The general 
principles  of  administration  are  in  process  of 
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be foreseen.  The ancient boast that every noble 
landlord  was  a  born  adviser  of  the  Crown  is 
rapidly being transformed into a patent untruth 
by  changes  in  the  economic  conditions  of  the 
nation.  The immense power of capitalism tempted 
the  Peers  themselves  to  gain  some  control  of 
that engine of  influence by taking part in financial 
speculations.  Since  railway  "  kings "  and 
cotton  "  lords " have  become  masters  of  the 
State the House of  Beers has sunk into the shade ; 
but the British aristocracy is at once so wealthy 
and so politically astute that it is not unreason- 
able  to hope  that it will  be  able  to adapt  its 
course to the altered institutions required by the 
advent of  new social forccs. 
This rough-and-ready sketch-picture of  English 
institutions and their recent  development shows 
once  more,  and  very  plainly,  how  frivolous 
it  is  to  attempt  to  transplant  institutions 
which  have  their  roots  in  the  history  of  the 
country  in  which  they  originate.  Experiments 
of  this kind have always failed.  In France Mon- 
tesquieu7s teaching,  which  implies  a  complete 
misunderstanding  of  English  political  thought, 
came  to be  amalgamated  with  Rousseau7s doc- 
trine  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  They 
are no  more  akin than fire  and water,  but the 
Contrat Social  became  the  rage  in  Europe  just 
as the  Esprit  des  Lois  had  been.  Rousseau 
taught  that  freedom  was  alone  secure  under 
the one and indivisible authority of  the Nation. 
As  no  single  individual  is  superior  to  any 
other, he,  in  fact,  obeys  only  his  own  will  in 
submitting  to  the  will  of  all.  Herein  is  con- 
tained Rousseau's  tremendous fallacy, which  all 
have  shared,  and  which,  though  a 
patent delusion, has nevertheless  fascinated  the 
minds of  men.  It is  quite easy  to detect  that 
the  doctrines  of  Montesquieu  and  Rousseau 
have  often been  simultaneously  entertained  by 
political  thinkers.  The  addled  brain  of  the 
AbbC  Siey&s was  crammed  with  the  dogmas 
both of  the Esprit  des  Lois  and of  the Contrat 
Social,  and  the  French  Constitution  which  he 
drew  up was  founded  upon  contradictions  and 
foredoomed to failure.  When  it was  suspended 
it was  at once apparent that the idea of  the in- 
divisibility of  the people's  sovereignty  had sunk 
infinitely  deeper  into  the  minds  of  Frenchmen 
than  the  idea  of  constitutional  checks  and 
balances.  Finally  nothing  remained  but  the 
undivided  Convention and its undivided  guillo- 
tine.  The  inexorable  logic of  the  situation at 
last led to the annihilation of the sovereignty of 
the  people  through  its  most  complete  embodi- 
ment  "  l'homme - peuple,"  Napoleon.  More 
recent attempts artificially to reproduce English 
institutions  on  French  soil  have  also  failed. 
When  we  consider  the types  produced  to-day 
as  the  finest  flowers  of  French  civilization,  we 
cannot but be struck by the prophetic insight of 
the two men  who,  in their own time,  were  de- 
nounced as reactionaries, Burke and Genz.  Has 
not  the latter's  terrible  dictum -  "  France will 
drift from one form of  Constitution to another, 
and from disaster to disaster "-been  confirmed 
even in our own time ? 
Similar experiments have succeeded better in 
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Germany, Belgium, and Italy, partly because  in 
these  countries  Rousseau's  ideas  have  had  less 
influence, partly because in them the more prac- 
tical though  somewhat  mechanical  contrivances 
of  Montesquieu  were  more  acceptable  than 
unadulterated  Radicalism.  In  Belgium  the 
Monarchy  is  a  shadow  raised  into  transient 
importance  by  the  great  political  ability  of 
Leopold of  Coburg, the founder of  the dynasty, 
which,  because  it was  imported,  was  incapable 
of  asserting the legitimate rights  of  the  Crown 
against the encroachments of  the people's  repre- 
sentatives.  In that respect it offers some analogy 
with  the  history  of  the  Guelphs  in  England, 
although  the  principles  of  the  respective  Con- 
stitutions  differ  fundamentally.  Under  the 
Belgian  Constitution  all  authority  emanates 
from the people ; a King hemmed in by such an 
axiom is no longer a Monarch in the true sense. 
In Italy, too, the position of  the dynasty is full 
of  difficulty ; its title to the Crown has not the 
same origin in all parts of  the Kingdom,  and is 
only hereditary in certain portions of  it.  A small 
proportion  of  the population  owes  a  traditional 
allegiance to the House of  Savoy, while the vast 
majority have accepted it  by periodical plebiscites. 
In Belgium as in Italy there is  a  fixed  order 
of  succession  to the  throne,  but  in  both  the 
Monarchy rests upon a  more or less  democratic 
foundation,  and the constitutional  and  parlia- 
mentary arrangements, originally borrowed from 
England,  have  consequently  undergone  some 
inevitable changes in a democratic direction.  In 
Germany  things  are  quite  different;  faith  in 
~~~archy,  and in the indefeasible right of  native 
dynasties  to rule,  is  still  a  living  force.  This 
faith, which is  inseparable  from  our deeper and 
more  historical  conception  of  the  State,  could 
not  fail to find expression in  our  constitutional 
system.  These  German  conditions  will  be  the 
of  our  further  inquiries.  Thiers'  saying 
that the king should reign  but not  govern may 
be  well  suited  to an aristocratic  republic  such 
as  Poland, and yet  this favourite expression of 
the oligarchical view of  freedom  is thoughtlessly 
endorsed  even  amongst  ourselves  by  men  who 
call  themselves  Liberals.  Most  of  us,  however, 
take it for granted that our Constitution means 
what it says, and that the power of  the Crown is 
genuine  and  living.  The  nature  of  a  Constitu- 
tion is tested by the question whether or not the 
principle  that executive  authority  is  centred  in 
the  Crown  retains effective  vitality.  The reply 
will  show  the line  of  demarcation  between  the 
aristocratic Constitution  of  England,  the demo- 
cratic Monarchies of  Italy and Belgium, and the 
constitutional Monarchy as it exists in Germany 
and especially in Prussia. 
To  secure  that  heredity  of  the  royal  office, 
the  rational  justification  of  which  we  have 
already  considered, it is necessary first of  all to 
establish  a  regular  order  of  succession  to  the 
throne.  The descent  of  the Crown  in the male 
line has always proved itself  the most adequate 
means  of  ensuring  this  end,  for  it avoids  the 
risk of  frequent changes of  dynasty which involve 
great  dangers  in  countries  where  monarchical 
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of  the strongest political bonds which can unite 
a people, namely love and reverence for a native 
dynasty. 
Another  bulwark  of  Monarchy  is  the  strict 
regulation  of  royal  marriages.  In this  matter 
political  interest  must  be  given  due  considera- 
tion  without  much  regard  being  paid  to  the 
wishes of  Phyllis and Corydon, which  are irrele- 
vant  to the political  question at stake, though 
a  marriage  of  inclination  which  coincides  with 
political  expediency  would  of  course be  doubly 
desirable.  Democratic  platitudes should also be 
avoided.  The rules relating to equality of  birth 
as applied  to royal  marriages  on  the Continent 
are well founded.  It is not desirable that princes 
of  the blood should ally themselves with subjects, 
or that the descendants of  subjects should occupy 
the  throne.  Although  the  early  life  of  the 
Emperor  William  I. was  turned  into a  tragedy 
by  the  enforced  sacrifice of  his  love  for  Elise 
Radziwill, his father was  justified  in demanding 
it for other reasons besides inequality of  station. 
We  could not wish  a Radziwill to be  our queen 
if  we  reflect  for a moment  upon  the encourage- 
ment  of  faction  wTthin  the  State which  would 
inevitably have resulted  from the elevation of  a 
private  family  to such  an exalted  height.  In 
comparison  with  such  a  marriage,  an  alliance 
with one of  the reigning houses of  Europe is in- 
finitely more advantageous, if  only because those 
houses  are so linked together by ties of  blood as 
almost to form  a single family,  with  whose  in- 
terests and concerns it is necessary for a powerful 
dynasty to be connected. 
After Henry VIII.'s hymeneal prodigies, it was 
enacted by the English Parliament that its assent 
should be necessary to the validity of  any royal 
marriage  in  England.  Such  an  affront  to the 
Monarchy  can only be explained by the terrible 
experiences  which  England  has  undergone  in 
this respect.  No  private  person  at the present 
day  would  endure  such  a  restraint  upon  his 
individual  action.  A  man  may  tolerate  inter- 
vention  by  his  family, but to be  compelled  to 
accept the tutelage of  an entirely external author- 
ity in such a question is unworthy and unbearable. 
These legal provisions have in practice produced 
much the same result as we experience in Germany, 
for  Parliament  only  recognizes  royal  marriages 
when the contracting parties are of  equal birth. 
All the world knew that the Duke of  Cambridge 
had for years been united to an actress, and yet 
it was possible for a Minister publicly to say, "  I 
dare affirm that H.R.H. the Duke of  Cambridge 
is not married to any one."  In the eyes of  the 
law this was the exact truth.  The public mind 
is penetrated  with the conviction that the com- 
munity  of  royal  families  represents  a  power 
which  no single  reigning  House  standing  alone 
can afford to challenge or disregard. 
One  of  the principal  weaknesses of  monarchy 
lies in the possibility that the head of  the State 
may be  either a minor or of unsound  mind ; in 
the latter case his removal is far more difficult than 
it would be in a Republic, where he is either not 
re-elected  or  may  be  compelled  to  retire.  A 
sovereign cannot be subjected to such an external 
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one.  Hence a regency has always been regarded 
as a  misfortune,  and has  always been  curtailed 
by  every  available  means.  It  is  no  folly,  as 
superficial  satire  would  have  us  believe,  but 
sound  sense,  that  our  monarchs  attain  their 
majority  and  assume  the reins  of  government 
at eighteen.  The  underlying  motive  of  such 
a  daring  expedient  is  the dread  of  a  regency, 
which  seems  so  distasteful  an  alternative  that 
even  the government  of  a  youth of  eighteen  is 
preferable to it.  The practical failure of  regencies 
is taught on every page of  history.  Their forma- 
tion is a matter of the  greatest difficulty, and under 
our  Constitution  is  regulated  by  very  precise 
dispositions.  These  provide  firstly,  that  the 
agnates  of  the  family  shall  meet  together  in 
order  to  decide  whether  a  sovereign  or  heir 
apparent  is  competent  to  govern ;  secondly, 
after  their  decision  has  been  confirmed  by  the 
Diet,  the  oath  is  administered  to  the  agnate 
next entitled to the  regency.  The  incalculable 
chances of  life defeat the most precise and skil- 
fully  formulated  enactments.  It is  easy  to lay 
down the generakule that mental disease shall 
suspend a man's legal personality, but as medical 
science  has  so  far  discovered  no  infallible  rule 
in this matter, the intervention would  probably 
come too late in  the case of  a  sovereign as in 
that  of  a  private  individual  who  is  placed 
under  restraint  by  an  ordinary  right-minded 
family.  The idea of  deposing a legitimate ruler 
has something so repellent to the public conscience 
of  a monarchical  State, and at the same time a 
weak-minded sovereign is so convenient an instru- 
ment jn  the hands of  interested parties, that when 
such a  calamity arises dissensions cannot fail to 
ensue.  It is  very likely that the complications 
which arose in Prussia in  1857 sprang from the 
prolongation  of  the too often renewed 
appointment  of  Prince  William  to  represent 
his  brother;  after  the  first  three  months  of 
~~ederick  William IV.'s illness it became apparent 
that he would never again be of  sufficiently sound 
mind  to  conduct  State  business.  The  refined 
susceptibilities  of  those  who  surrounded  the 
stricken sovereign, and the generous disposition 
of  his younger brother, shrank from  pressing his 
claim  to  the  regency  as  senior  agnate.  The 
nomination  to represent  the Crown  was  thrice 
renewed, and only after the lapse of  three years 
was a regular regency installed.  This delay need 
not  be  regretted,  for  it  revealed  the  secret 
calculations of  faction. 
An ugly contrast with these events is evoked by 
the partisan  struggles in the British Parliament 
after  the  mental  seizure  of  George  111.  The 
repeated  attacks of  lunacy which  afflicted  that 
monarch  brought  to  light  how  little  reliance 
can  be  placed  upon  the  profession  of  English 
political  parties.  The  Prince  of  Wales  having 
ranged himself amongst the Whigs, they hastened 
with sudden demonstrations of  loyalty to declare 
that the regency  belonged  to him  as  of  right, 
notwithstanding  that  it  had  previously  been 
the  distinguishing  mark  of  their  party  to 
champion  the  rights  of  Parliament  stgainst 
assertions  of  prerogative by the Crown ; while 
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that  this  right  must  be  conferred  on  him  by 
Parliament. 
Such agitations may imperil the very existence 
of  a  State,  but  we  have  been  taught  by  the 
Bavarian precedent  that a  country may  endure 
without danger even the melancholy fate of  an 
indefinitely  protracted  regency,  provided  that 
legal  measures have paved  the way  for  such  a 
contingency.  In the Bavarian  case one insane 
king  has  succeeded  another  for,  as  King  Otto 
was  incurably  mad  even  before  his  accession, 
and therefore incapable of  any valid act of  will, 
absolutely  no  legal  means  existed  of  bringing 
about his  abdication.  The question  was  raised 
whether  it would  not be  preferable  that Prince 
Luitpold  should at once ascend  the throne,  but 
it was  deemed inadvisable  to vary an order of 
succession the stability of  which lies at the root 
of  the monarchical idea. 
What are the further disabilities which may be 
said to incapacitate a monarch for government ? 
In former times  the answer was  a  simple  one. 
No  man  could  receive  the  electoral  hat unless 
fitted  to lead  an-army.  To-day  the  personal 
direction of  military operations by the sovereign 
is no longer indispensable.  Blindness is the only 
bodily defect which is an absolute barrier to the 
practical  exercise  of  the  office  of  ruler;  for, 
although  it has  not a  deleterious  effect  upon  a 
man's  mental  faculties  but  is  compatible  with 
great  sagacity  and  may  develop  a  profound 
knowledge of  human nature, yet in the case of  a 
blind  monarch,  the grave question of  the royal 
signature is involved.  There can be no certainty 
that the document  which  he  has  signed is  the 
one  which  has  been  read  to him.  Everything 
depends upon  the honesty  and good  faith of  a 
secretary.  For this reason no great States have 
ever tolerated blind sovereigns with the exception 
of the Byzantine Empire, whose example should 
be as deterrent in this respect as in others.  We 
need  not  here  consider  phenomenal  exceptions 
like  the  great  blind  Doge  of  Venice,  Enrico 
Dandolo, who, in spite of  his infirmity, conducted 
a naval war, conquered Constantinople in person, 
and  rendered  other  invaluable  services  to the 
State when over ninety years of  age. 
We have here to  deal with the question whether 
or not blindness should exclude from the succes- 
sion, and we must regretfully admit that Germany 
is the only country in which blind men have been 
permitted to rule in modern times.  The succes- 
sion  of  George  V.  of  Hanover was  a  European 
scandal.  One  scarcely  likes  to hazard  a  guess 
as  to what  that unfortunate  prince  may  have 
been induced to sign.  Furthermore his accession 
was  a  flagrant  violation  of  immemorial  right. 
As  an  Electorate  of  the  Empire  Hanover  had 
remained subject to the provisions of  the Golden 
Bull, which stipulates that blindness should be a 
notabilis defectus.  Moreover it was an hereditary 
ailment in the Guelph family, by reason of which 
many  of  its members have been  silently forced 
to renounce  their  claim.  It  was  all  the more 
outrageous  that  King  Ernest  Augustus  should 
have taken steps to secure the succession for his 
son in defiance of  family compacts as well as of 
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himself  gloried  in  his  accession  in  spite  of  his 
infirmity, and saw in  this event a  direct  mani- 
festation  of  God's  will.  Mecklenburg  can  also 
point to a blind Duke in the roll of  its rulers, but 
in such dwarf States these things do not matter, 
for in them history  dissolves into anecdote. 
According to the letter  and  to the  spirit of 
nearly all constitutions, the king is inviolable in 
his  person  as well  as irresponsible for  his  acts, 
for  this is  in  the nature of  things.  To  govern 
and  at the  same time to be  held  accountable 
for  acts  of  government  is  incompatible ;  no 
one  can  be  made  answerable  for  his  acts until 
they  are  past.  When  Republican  officials  are 
called  to account  they  are  suspended ; but  a 
king,  being  irremovable,  is  for  this  reason,  if 
for  no  other,  precluded  from  accountability. 
The necessary consequence of  the king's personal 
irresponsibility for his  acts as ruler  is that the 
constitutional responsibility  for them falls upon 
the shoulders of  his Ministers. 
Ministerial  responsibility  is  another  subject 
which has  become  the  shuttlecock  of  partisan 
theorists.  What  =ally  matters  is  political  re- 
sponsibility,  and  that  cannot  be  taken  too 
seriously.  To  struggle  with  the susceptibilities 
of  public  opinion, to overcome the resistance of 
opponents,  and yet perhaps  after two  years to 
find one's self discarded like scrapped iron, is but 
an ungrateful  prospect.  Political  responsibility 
is  an  extremely  serious  matter,  whereas  legal 
responsibility,  in  the  usual  acceptation,  for 
political  acts  is of  very  doubtful  efficacy.  In 
every  well-governed  constitutional  State  there 
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must be  some form  of  administrative  jurisdic- 
tion  to which  even  Ministers are liable.  These 
legal  safeguards  are  valuable  and  form  a 
guarantee  against  ministerial  caprice ; on  the 
other  hand  it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether 
the right to bring an action against Ministers is 
as  precious  as  constitutional  theorists  formerly 
supposed;  and  in  our  own  Constitution  it 
is  unsupported  by  an  executive  clause.  As 
a  rule  this liability  of  Ministers to prosecution 
for their official acts will not be found satisfactory; 
in practice I am aware of  no instance in which 
such proceedings were conducted with convincing 
impartiality.  A  Minister  who  has  committed 
an offence may  be  cited  before the Courts  like 
an  ordinary  subject  even  if  the offence  has  a 
political  character.  There  are,  in  fact,  no 
political  crimes  peculiar  to Ministers  as  such. 
Ministerial indictments always  spring from  con- 
flicts of authority between Parliament and Govern- 
ment;  impartial  justice  is  therefore  rarely  if 
ever possible. 
Strafford, the unscrupulous Minister of  Charles 
I., had the letter of  the law on his side, for the 
Stuarts  seldom  departed  from  strict  legality, 
which  is  a  point  of  material importance to the 
subject.  They continued to do what the Tudors 
had  done  throughout  the  sixteenth  century: 
they  made  use  of  the dispensing  power,  which 
rested  upon  no  Act  of  Parliament,  but  which 
was  supported by innumerable precedents  from 
the reign  of  Henry  VII.  to that of  Elizabeth. 
The difference was that the Tudors exercised their 
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theirs  to  promote  rank  tyranny.  Strafford's 
trial raised  a  purely  political  question ; it was 
a  struggle for  power,  and it must  be  admitted 
that Strafford lost his life illegally. 
Similarly, the proceedings against Charles X.'s 
Ministers also bear the stamp of  a partisan trial. 
mihat was the charge brought against Polignac ? 
He had made high-handed use  of  Article  14 of 
the Constitution, which conferred upon the king 
the right to issue decrees of  his own authority in 
cases  of  emergency.  That  that  article  had  a 
valid  existence  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  its 
abolition  was  the  first  act  of  the  victorious 
opponents  of  the fallen  dynasty.  Such  a  step 
would  have been  superfluous if  the late King's 
Ministers  really  had  violated  the  Constitution. 
It is very doubtful whether their conviction could 
be  maintained  at law  or  whether  their  punish- 
ment  could  be  equitably  defended ; they  were 
probably  the  innocent  victims  of  the  innate 
French  craving  for  a  scapegoat  when  things 
turn  out badly,  a  characteristic  which  is  con- 
stantly revealing  itself  anew  in  times  of  peace 
as of  war, and to  whichJ3azaine also was sacrificed. 
As Moltke has shown, his offence could not by any 
possibility be  construed into an act of  treason. 
The law cannot compel a general to be a genius, 
and Bazaine  certainly  was  not one. 
We  have  had  some  unpleasant  experiences 
in  Germany  also  in  connexion  with  Ministerial 
trials.  Hassenpflug,  one  of  the ablest  and un- 
worthiest  amongst  the  Ministers  of  our  minor 
States, was three times impeached by the Diet of 
Electoral Hesse.  The Hessian  constitution con- 
tained a provision obliging the Chambers to im- 
peach  a  Minister whom  they believed  guilty of 
high  treason.  This  was  stigmatized  as  official 
encouragement of  German  quarrelsomeness and 
self - righteousness.  Nevertheless  EIassenpflug 
found  a  distinguished  constitutional  jurist  to 
defend him and was repeatedly acquitted, in my 
opinion rightly, by the Supreme Court of  Appeal, 
which  was by no means disposed to favour him. 
His object was to undermine the Constitution, but 
it was impossible to give  evidence of  facts which 
would have proved such an intention.  It is the 
art of  individuals like him so to cover their game 
that the arm of  the law cannot reach them. 
All this explains why Ministerial impeachments 
are  antiquated  in  England  since  the  regular 
alternation in office of the two great parliamentary 
parties  has  become  a  matter  of  course.  Since 
the  reign  of  Queen  Anne,  which  saw  the  last 
attempt  to impeach  a  Minister  of  the  Crown, 
it has  become  an axiom  with  every  successive 
administration  to let the waters  of  Lethe  flow 
over the past.  When  one of  the parties  comes 
into power it knows very well that it may go out 
the following year, and that it would then be its 
turn to have  its dirty linen  washed  in  public. 
Such  is  the  quixotic  calculation  which  makes 
each party in succession agree to bury the past 
deeds of  its rival in oblivion.  This unmitigated 
party-system  cannot  fail  to produce  a  certain 
slackness in public morality, a certain coarsening 
of  political sense of  honour.  Under George 111. 
a political trial once more took place,  this time 
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Governor - General  of  India.  Even  the  trial of 
Warren Hastings presents the aspect of  a conflict 
between  two  political  parties,  who  chose  this 
arena in which to measure their strength. 
The weapon of  impeachment was thus silently 
eliminated  from  the armoury  of  party  warfare 
for  reasons  of  tactical  expediency  which  com- 
mended itself to both sides.  For even in countries 
where  Parliamentary  Government  is  otherwise 
understood,  as  on  the  Continent,  this  double- 
edged sword is of  very doubtful value, if  for no 
other reason, because no provision exists for the 
composition  of  a  court  competent  to try such 
cases.  In  England  that  point  presents  no 
difficulties, for the House of  Lords is the legally 
established  tribunal before  which  an impeached 
Minister  is  cited to render  account of  his  acts. 
As  the principal Ministers are peers, it is evident 
that they can only clear themselves before other 
peers.  In continental  States a  solution  of  the 
problem is not so easy, and our Upper House, for 
example, obviously does not lend itself to a hasty 
transformation  into  a  court  of  justice  for  the 
trial of  accused Minisths.  For such a  purpose 
the aristocracy in our country no longer enjoys 
a  sufficient  consideration  amongst  the  people, 
who  would  never believe that such a Court had 
not taken a partisan view and had not returned 
a verdict  dictated by a conservative bias.  Our 
Upper Houses not having the necessary compet- 
ence  to deal  with  such  cases,  it was  proposed, 
amongst other remedies, to bring them within the 
venue  of  the High  Court  of  Justice.  But this 
tribunal is ill-adapted to try political  causes by 
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reason of  its dependence on the Minister of Justice, 
who  may be a party in cases to be  adjudicated 
by it and who has a large share in making appoint- 
ments, to  the  Bench.  Another  expedient  was 
therefore devised, whereby a body  of  lawyers of 
repute nominated  ad  hoc,  partly  by  the Crown 
and  partly  by  the  Chambers,  is  summoned  to 
sit as a Court of  Justice ; but even this arrange- 
ment  offers great  scope  to  partisan  verdicts. 
The  nominees  of  the  Chambers  in  the  small 
German  States were  always  men  who  could  be 
counted upon as aggressive partisans. 
The net upshot of  all this is that little good 
can  be  expected  from  saddling  Ministers  with 
legal  responsibility.  There  is  on  this  point  a 
gap in  Prussian law, which I should like to see 
remedied so as once for all to silence the Radical 
cavillers, who are for ever whining at the inade- 
quacy of Constitutional guarantees.  It is, how- 
ever, dangerous to raise hopes too high.  Public 
opinion  may  easily  become  inflamed  in  favour 
of  one  side or the other, and a  Court, however 
composed, will be more or less influenced by it. 
Had the article of the Constitution dealing with 
Ministerial  responsibility  been  carried  out,  and 
had a tribunal been  seized of  the matter at the 
time  of  the  Constitutional  dead-lock,  one  may 
well  ask whether its verdict  wouId  have carried 
any weight, however framed.  The letter of  the 
law told against the King and his great Minister, 
but  the  letter  of  the  law  was  resisted  by  a 
material obstacle : supplies had not been  voted 
and  yet  the Government  must  be  carried  on. 
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of  law, for they do not admit of  a clear and final 
solution.  If  it were  humanly  possible  to form 
a  tribunal to settle such problems, which  could 
hold out a hope of  satisfying t,he moral conscience, 
it would  be  seized upon  with enthusiasm by all 
parties ;  but where should it be found?  Security 
from  violation  of  the  Constitution, even  when 
perpetrated  by a  Minister, should  be  sought  in 
a regularly  organized administrative code rather 
than in measures of  such difficult application as 
those already referred to.  The whole doctrine of 
Ministerial accountability before the law belongs 
to a bygone school of  political thought, of  which 
Rotteck and Schlosser were disciples. 
Under a monarchy in which the whole authority 
of  the State is centred in the person of  the King, 
it follows  that the choice of  ministers  must  lie 
with him, and that they must become the instru- 
ments of  his will.  Only on these terms can the 
monarchy  perform  its  duty of  standing  above 
parties.  It has been contended that the independ- 
ence  of  Ministers  versus  the  Crown  should  be 
safeguarded since they cannot otherwise be held 
responsible  by  Parliament,  for  no  one  can  be 
drawn to account for things which he has not done 
of  his  own  free will.  Nevertheless,  it is  a  fact 
that divergencies frequently  arise  between  the 
will  of  the King and the will  of  the Chambers. 
If  we  examine this aspect of  the matter, which 
was  given  such  careful  attention  by  Mohl,  it 
will appear that wherever monarchy is more than 
a  name,  these  divergencies  always  do  in  fact 
occur, and that the will of  the King often differs 
very materially from the will of the representatives 
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of  multifarious interests.  The healthy  develop- 
ment  of  our  Constitution  requires  that  this 
should be allayed, however unpalat- 
able the task may seem to the Minister to whom 
it may  be  confided.  The  theorists  who  would 
abolish  it  by  a  mere  fiat  conveniently  forget 
that Ministers are responsible not to the Chambers 
alone, but also to the Crown. 
Calm and lucid reasoning leads to  the conclusion 
that  the  existence  of  the  Monarchy  itself  is 
involved  in  the  solution  of  this  question.  If 
it be true that the essence of  Monarchy consists 
in  the  concentration  of  the  State's  authority 
in  the King,  it is  obvious  that that system  is 
vitiated when the King can be coerced by Parlia- 
ment in his choice of  counsellors.  The assertion 
that it is the final end of  constitutional Monarchy 
to evolve into a system of  Parliamentary Govern- 
ment  on  the  English  pattern,  that  is  to say, 
government by a fleeting majority in one House 
only, is the negation of  Monarchy itself.  Where 
and by whom is it laid down that Germany with 
her  glorious history  is  bound  to follow  in  the 
footsteps of  an island  State, of  which  one may 
roughly say that where it is strong we  are weak, 
and vice versa. 
We have, it must be admitted, imported much 
shallow  clap-trap  from  England,  such  as  the 
avoiding  of  the  King's  name  in  Parliamentary 
debates.  With characteristic hypocrisy English- 
men  profess  to consider  that the  name  of  the 
King should no more be taken in vain than the 
name  of  God.  The  will  of  the  King  has  no 
weight whatever under this Guelphic monarchy, 
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whose  founder  could  not  speak the language  of 
his subjects, and who therefore could not preside 
over the meetings of  his Council.  It is a matter 
of  no  consequence  what  Queen  Victoria  thinks 
on any political question, and yet we  are asked 
to accept the system under  which she reigns as 
a  model  for  our  own  country,  where,  after all, 
the  Sovereign  understands  German  very  well. 
In  Germany  the  King's  will  still  has  a  very 
definite meaning.  This truth applies with special 
force to Prussia, which  is  alone in still having a 
monarch  whose  authority  is  underived  or  sui 
generis.  In our country a minister need not hide 
timidly  behind  the  Sovereign,  but  there  is  no 
reason why he should not, in a given case, warn 
Parliament against coming to a  certain decision 
by announcing beforehand  that it would  never 
receive the Royal Assent. 
The briefest survey of  our present Parliament 
will  show how ridiculous it would be to attempt 
the  establishment  of  party  government,  more 
especially as the text of  the Constitution of  the 
Empire  is  contrary  to  such  a  project.  The 
Chancellor, who  is tke only responsible Minister 
of  the  Crown,  is  entrusted  with  the  execution 
of  the decisions of  the Federal Council (Bundes- 
rath), consisting of  the representatives of  twenty- 
five separate Governments ; he is therefore under 
the obligation to represent views with which he 
may very possibly disagree, and of  championing 
in  the  Reichstag  the  interests  of  twenty-five 
different  sovereigns.  The Imperial Constitution 
enacts that no  member  of  the Federal  Council 
shall also be a member of  the Imperial Diet, and 
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further, that all the chiefs of  the administrative 
departments shall  ipso jure  be  members  of  the 
Federal  Council ; hence  a  Parliamentary  form 
of  Government  is a  constitutional impossibility. 
I trust that you will carefully ponder these things 
in order to realize that there is an inherent fallacy 
in attempting to cast German institutions in an 
English  mould.  We  all  have  cause  to rejoice 
that we  possess  a  vigorous-minded Civil Service, 
which,  by its achievements,  its social standing, 
and by the support of  the Crown, wields a genuine 
power,  and  we  need  desire  no  change  in  this 
respect. 
The  French  have  been  foolish  enough  to 
preserve  English  forms  of  Parliamentary  life 
while  adopting  a  Constitution  at  bottom  in- 
compatible with them.  The attractive American 
pattern  of  a  Constitutional  Republic  does  not 
admit  of  parliamentary  government,  and  for 
good reasons.  The President, being a responsible 
official,  must govern in accordance with his per- 
sonal convictions, for no one can be  responsible 
except for what he has himself resolved.  Parlia- 
mentary  government  is  possible  in a  monarchy 
when  the  monarch  is  not  held  responsible, 
whereas such government is practically impossible 
in  a  republic.  As  Presidential  elections in  the 
United  States  are  generally  held  at no  great 
interval of  time from Congressional elections, it 
often turns out that the President  and Congress 
are of  the same mind ; but this is not inevitable. 
After the death of  Lincoln, his successor, Johnson, 
found himself in continual conflict with Congress, 
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him  to account  for  his  administration.  This  is 
conspicuous proof  that the  Government  of  the 
United States is not conducted on parliamentary 
lines. 
The French discerned rightly that a President 
who  is  responsible for the administration must 
wield  a  very  effective power,  and the fear of  it 
induced them to adopt the anomaly of  a President 
bound to a parliamentary system of  government. 
He  can  be  personally  called  to  account  only 
for  a  coup  d'ttat ; in  ordinary  cases  ministers 
are  responsible,  not  the  President.  All  this  is 
very  characteristic  of  the French  nation,  which 
lives in perpetual fear of  another 2nd of  December, 
but on the whole  desires that Ministries should 
be the sport of  faction, and that an irresponsible 
President  should  govern  through  responsible 
ministers.  Who  shall say  how  many  Ministers 
of  the Interior  France has had since 1870 ?  A 
short time  ago  they numbered  twenty-one;  by 
now  they may  have had twenty-four.  What is 
the practical result ?  When more than twenty- 
one  ministers  have-succeeded  each  other  in  as 
many years as the heads  of  a department with 
such  vast  ramifications  as the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior,  the inevitable consequence must be  to 
make  the permanent  officials  omnipotent.  The 
bureaucracy  tightens  its  grip  more  and  more, 
and the continual  change  of  ministers confirms 
the  sway  of  stupid  routine.  Such  a  system 
cannot  be  desired  by  any  one  who  wishes  the 
Civil Service to breathe a wholesome spirit.  To 
sum up,  it is clear  that a  purely  parliamentary 
rdgime  is  unsuited  to German  conditions.  This 
is no cause for complaint ; on the contrary, we 
must  congratulate  ourselves that our  Constitu- 
tional  Monarchy  has  preserved  the  character 
implied by its name. 
Thus we are brought face to face with the ques- 
tion of  the royal  prerogative of  assenting to and 
promulgating laws.  All legislation must be initi- 
ated by  the Crown, in whom  is also vested  the 
right  of  assent  and  promulgation.  The  precise 
meaning of  the prerogative of  assent has been lost 
sight of through the prevalence of a Radical theory, 
which  substitutes the blessed  word  Veto for an 
accurate description of  the positive right of  assent. 
A veto is the right vested in some person or other 
in protection of  his own interests, or of interests of 
which he is guardian, to  forbid a measure complete 
in itself.  This occurs, for example, when a Govern- 
ment decides that a Papal decree has encroached 
upon its rights,,and therefore is subject to  theRoyal 
prohibition.  This  matter,  says  the State, does 
not in itself  concern me,  but in the present case 
this particular decree prejudices public interests ; 
therefore I intervene.  It  is  an abuse  of  terms 
peculiar to colloquial speech to use the negative 
word  Veto  in  referring  to the  King's  positive 
right to give the royal assent, that is to say, a 
placet without which no law is valid. 
In England  matters  are arranged as follows. 
If the  King is  not  in  his  conscience  convinced 
that a  particular  measure  approved  by  Parlia- 
ment is desirable, he has only the choice between 
a  new  Ministry  and  a  Dissolution.  Even  this 
choice is not  entirely free, for the King cannot 
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command  a  majority  in  Parliament  or has  the 
certain prospect of  doing so, otherwise no states- 
man of  note will consent to form an administra- 
tion.  At  the  present  day  the  king  has  no 
longer a decisive voice in selecting the members 
of  the Cabinet ; he summons the leader of  one or 
other of  the aristocratic parties and commissions 
him  in general terms to form a  Ministry.  The 
example  of  English  conditions had a  contagious 
effect upon the French National Assembly.  The 
idea gained ground that the positive right to give 
assent should in fact operate solely as a right to 
refuse  it,  and  the  struggle  continued  to rage 
round the question whether  such  refusal  should 
be  permanent or merely suspensive.  A suspen- 
sive veto is  no veto  at all, for it converts  the 
king into a  republican  official  with  a  mandate 
derived from others.  These ideas were never more 
eloquently expounded than by Mirabeau.  They 
finally  led  to the  conclusion  endorsed  by  the 
Parliament  of  Frankfort that even in questions 
affecting the constitution the veto of  the Crown 
shall  cause  only  a-temporary  delay.  On  these 
lines  the  German  Empire  might  have  been 
legally transformed into a republic without valid 
objection from the Emperor. 
The positive  right of  assent  to all legislation 
is so essential a prerogative of  the Crown that the 
real power  of  monarchy  stands or falls with  it. 
We have often suffered from the personal inter- 
vention  of  the king  and may  expect  to do  so 
again, but so long as we  are monarchists we  shall 
remain convinced that this prospect is preferable 
to the king  becoming  a  puppet.  In Germany 
there is very little probability of such a constitu- 
tional  deformation.  We  need  only  remember 
that  our Ministers  are the king's  servants, who 
must  possess his confidence and require it more 
than the confidence of the Chambers.  In England, 
Italy, and Belgium the position is quite different, 
for the balance  of  power  is  reversed.  In those 
~ountries  we  find  government  based  on  party 
majorities  as contrasted  with  government  by  a 
monarchical  Civil  Service,  which  on  principle 
stands outside parties. 
The Gerrnan system is not only better adapted 
to the spirit of  monarchy, it also affords a better 
guarantee  of  political  integrity  than  any  party 
government  can  offer.  There  is  literally  no 
country  in  Europe  where  the administration is 
so  effectively controlled  by  Parliament  as  in 
Germany,  for  the reason  that in  Germany  the 
power of  the Government is a real counterweight 
to the  power  of  Parliament.  In England  the 
task  of  criticizing  the  administration  is  left 
entirely  to the  Opposition,  whose  attacks  are 
tempered by the knowledge that it too will  one 
day stand in the pillory ; whereas the inquiries 
of  our Parliament are searching and exhaustive 
just  because its members know that they them- 
selves  will  never  be  called  to the  helm.  The 
effect upon  our  full-dress  debates  is  sometimes 
almost  an offensive one, but they often present a 
more gratifying spectacle of  men who are really 
in  earnest  about  the  removal  of  every  abuse 
from public life.  It is almost impossible to con- 
ceive  that Spain  should  ever  be  delivered from 
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system,  for  all  prominent  party-leaders  have 
received  presents  of  railway  shares from  Roth- 
schild and his  Paris friends, and when  new men 
come  into office they,  too,  are gratified  in  the 
same way.  Therefore no  Government  will  ever 
attempt to eradicate the mischief. 
The impartiality of  the royal authority implies 
independent  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Crown.  Of  all the delusions of  average radicalism 
one of  the strangest is to extol the cheapness of 
republican  governments  in*  contrast  with  the 
lavish  expenditure  of  kings  and  courts.  The 
extravagance  of  the  Lilliputian  princes  of 
Germany,  who  all  wanted  to ape  the ways  of 
Versailles,  is  certainly  a  blot  upon  our history, 
but  waste  of  public  money  has  never  reached 
such  heights  as under  the republican  rdgime  in 
France,  where  the Third Republic  has  made  it 
the order of  the day.  The Budget must not be 
made  the  only  gauge  of  public  expenditure ; 
Parliamentary elections and the bribery incidental 
to them  swallow  up such  huge  sums  that the 
expenses  of  a  court  are  in  comparison  hardly 
worth  considering.  Wealth  and  brilliancy  are 
necessary to preserve  the dignity  and influence 
of  the court.  Dahlmann  said  with  great truth 
that Germany paid a heavy price before it got so 
inexpensive an Emperor.  The modern establish- 
ment  of  our courts is on  a  very modest footing, 
while the large republics spend immense sums on ' 
outward show. 
The  history  of  the royal  revenue  has  varied 
greatly  in  different  countries and in proportion 
to the extent of  the Crown lands.  In the older 
States  it  was  the  accepted  practice  that  the 
of  government  should  be  defrayed by 
'the king from the income derived from the royal 
domains.  In  cases  of  urgent  need  the  great 
vassals were  exhorted to grant aids.  In course 
of time the resources of  the royal domains became 
insufficient to meet  the strain put  upon  them. 
Already  in  the  seventeenth  century  taxes  had 
become the rule, while the Crown lands furnished 
only  a  portion  of  the  revenue.  It  gradually 
became incumbent upon the Government sharply 
to divide the hereditary revenues  of  the Crown 
from  the  domain  of  public  finance.  In  this 
respect  Prussia  was  a  hundred  years  ahead  of 
England, where the Crown lands were recklessly 
alienated  by  the  kings,  partly  to  meet  the 
expenses  of  civil  war,  but  more  especially  to 
provide  the means  of  oiling the Parliamentary 
machine.  At an early date, in fact in the seven- 
teenth century, the court  had to rely on Parlia- 
mentary  grants to cover the whole  cost  of  the 
royal household.  It became the custom to divide 
the whole  expenditure into two parts : the one 
to  be  voted  annually  by  Parliament  to meet 
the needs of  the Army, the Navy, Foreign Affairs, 
and the National Debt, according to the trend of 
public  events ; the other, styled the Civil List, 
to be  voted  at the beginning of  every reign  for 
the requirements of  the Civil Service and of  the 
Court. 
The attempts to reorganize this eccentric and 
unsound  financial  arrangement  were  protracted 
throughout the eighteenth century.  It could not 
fail to lead  to chaos  under  extravagant kings, 186  CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY  PRUSSIAN  CROWN LANDS  187 
when  confusion  had  been  the  rule  under  the 
cheeseparing Guelphs.  They no doubt occasion- 
ally sent their savings to Germany, and of  course 
spent vast sums on  maintaining their numerous 
mistresses and in bribing Parliament.  The crude 
English temperament took pleasure at the begin- 
ning of  every new reign in having the dirty linen 
of  the  last  washed  publicly  before  all  Europe. 
Pitt  tried  to improve  a  state of  things  which 
had gradually become intolerable, but the French 
Revolution  relegated  all  reforms  to the  back- 
ground,  and  a  clear  distinction  between  the 
expenditure  of  the Court and that of  the State 
was not established until 1831.  The term "  Civil 
List,"  however, was  still applied  to the former 
alone,  for  Britons  have  difficulty in  discarding 
expressions which they have got accustomed to. 
On  the Continent,  or at any rate in  Germany, 
conditions  were  more  satisfactory,  for  all  our 
petty  sovereigns  possessed  large  hereditary 
domains, and therefore were not dependent upon 
the Diets  for their- personal  maintenance.  The 
old constitutional maxim that public expenditure 
should  be  entirely  defrayed  by  the revenues  of 
the Crown lands had of  course been abandoned, 
but they were  still everywhere sufficient for the 
upkeep of  the Court.  The position of  the reigning 
houses  was  therefore  sounder amongst  us  than 
elsewhere.  Prussia  set  the  example  of  further 
changes  to  all  other  States.  Already,  under 
Frederick  William  I.,  the  royal  domains  were 
declared  to be  the  property  of  the  State,  the 
Crown reserving the right annually to fix a sum 
for its own use out of the revenue of such domains. 
This  arrangement  was  again  altered  in  1820 
under Frederick William 111.  in such a way that 
a definite proportion  of  the total income of  the 
royal  domains was once for all appropriated  by 
law  to the use  of  the royal  family,  which  dis- 
played  an  unparalleled  magnanimity  in  the 
transaction,  for a great part of  the Crown lands 
were  originally their family estates.  In point of 
fact the country is not put to any expense in sup- 
porting its king, for' in the  course of  historical 
events a greater portion of  the legitimate posses- 
sions  of  the royal  house  have  been  transferred 
to the State than is equivalent to the expenditure 
of  the  Court.  Had  our  royal  family retained 
the royal domains as private  property  it would 
have enjoyed a far larger income than it disposes 
of  to-day. 
Such  being  the  historical  position,  bitter 
controversies like those  which  arise  in England 
are  impossible  in  Prussia.  Here  the  normal 
condition is that the royal  family  is supported 
out  of  the revenues  of  what  were  formerly the 
royal domains, and therefore finds itself independ- 
ent of  the Prussian Diet.  In many of  the petty 
German  States  the  dignity  of  the  Crown  was 
forgotten to such  a  degree that a  Civil  List  in 
the full sense of  the term has been  adopted, by 
which  the  income  of  the  Prince  is  fixed  for 
life, or even, as in Bavaria, for a  period  of  five 
Years.  The  indecency  of  such  an arrangement 
should be obvious to everybody.  Even a Govern- 
ment  official  would  not  submit  to having  his 
salary fixed for a specified term of  years, and it 
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worse  than his  officials.  One  cannot  resist  the 
impression  that, in  this  respect,  many  injuries 
have been inflicted upon the Princes. 
I now turn for a brief space to the composition 
and  rights  of  Parliament.  The  two-chamber 
system, which  we  find  established  to-day in all 
constitutionally  governed  states,  has  its  origin 
in England, where, as early as the twelfth century, 
there existed an assembly of  barons whose support 
and  assent  was  necessary  to  the  king;  this 
assembly was the nucleus of the House of  Lords. 
The  representatives  of  shires  and  cities  were 
first summoned in the thirteenth century, under 
the auspices of  the powerful  dictator  Simon de 
Montfort.  The great barons themselves felt the 
need  of  gaining the support of  the Commons in 
order to resist the despotic fiscal methods of  the 
Crown.  The  two-chamber  system  proved  so 
advantageous  that,  like  freedom  of  association, 
trial by jury,  and local government, it has been 
copied wherever Anglo-Saxon influence has pene- 
trated.  Even tke superficial causes of  this success 
are  obvious.  Every  one  who  has  lived  in  a 
college  knows  that it breathes a  certain  atmo- 
sphere,  from  which  the  average  man  cannot 
emancipate  himself.  The  two  Chambers  of  a 
Parliament will always act as a mutual corrective, 
and this  co-operation  and interaction  is  highly 
desirable where such vast issues depend upon the 
cautious  sifting of  every  question.  The  moral 
value  of  a  law  is  greater  when  it  has  been 
elaborated  and  adopted  by  two  assemblies 
rather  than  by  one ; a  further  advantage  is 
that if  a  conflict arises between the  Crown  and 
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0.e  of  the two  Houses, the  other  can  act  as 
Nor must the different composition of the two  --  - 
assemblies be forgotten.  If  the reason be sought 
why the House  of  Lords  so long controlled the 
destinies of  England, the answer is to be  found 
in  the  fact  that  its  members  represented  the 
genuine governing  classes  of  the country.  For 
neither  birth,  nor  wealth  and  landed  estates, 
nor the unknown quantity described as intellectual 
ability, are of  themselves sufficient to provide an 
Upper  Chamber  with  a  sound  foundation,  the 
only reliable constituents of  which are men who 
habitually  take  the  lead  in  conducting  local 
affairs.  Political  activity  invariably  placed  at 
the service of  the country or of  local government 
on  an  extended scale is  certain to be honoured 
by all ; for this reason the consideration  of  the 
House of  Lords was  extremely great so long as 
England retained her patriarchal system of  local 
administration.  Everybody  in those  days  felt 
in  regard  to the Lords : These  are the men  in 
whose  hands the political  future  of  the country 
really lies. 
A sound Constitution is the indispensable con- 
dition of  a satisfactory system of  local adminis- 
tration, without which the country cannot provide 
an adequate upper chamber, for it must, in that 
case, be lacking either in prestige or independence. 
In this respect the history of  French institutions 
is highly instructive.  France has no local Govern- 
ment ; the whole nation consists of  Government 
officials  and those whom they govern.  No French- 
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by  his  prefect,  provided  that  the  relationship 
offers him the opportunity of  securing the petty 
advantages which he  covets.  Our officials  were 
thunderstruck  when  the  Alsatian  notables  ap- 
peared  in  their  offices  in  order  to begin  their 
trumpery  traffic.  The  French  all  assume  the 
right  to criticize the  Government, and  even to 
eject  it,  but  in  practice  every  one  submits to 
official  tyranny.  According  to French  writers, 
who  should  know  their  own  nation,  the  pro- 
vincial communities have no living individuality 
of  their own, and desire none. 
It has therefore from all time been impossible 
to form an Upper House in France consisting of 
the representatives  of  the governing  class ; for 
that class is  composed  entirely  of  officials,  and 
what an Upper House consisting of  such elements 
may become  we  see in Napoleon's  Senate, which 
was  undoubtedly  a  brilliant  assembly  replete 
with  talent  and  technical  ability,  but  totally 
without  indepenqence  towards  the  authorities 
and servile beyond all precedent.  The Restora- 
tion took a different line, and set up a Chamber 
of  Peers representing aristocratic and territorial 
interests.  Under  Louis - Philippe  the  Upper 
House  was  composed  of  capitalists,  but  these 
purse-proud  money-grubbers  merely  helped  to 
encourage communism.  The notion that wealth 
alone  entitles  a  man  to become  a  legislator  is 
so  monstrous that it could not fail  to turn the 
great  bulk  of  the  people  against  all  forms  of 
property.  Latterly  we  have  seen  the  French 
make  the  most  extraordinary  experiments  in 
order to create a Senate which might enjoy some 
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measure  of  consideration,  but  without  success. 
This continued failure is due to the fact that a 
politically  vigorous  First  Chamber  is  an  im- 
posSibility unless a  healthy lo-  ~al  administration 
concurrently with it. 
unfortunately when  the German Constitution 
was framed this fact was not sufficiently realized. 
In Saxony  and  other  central  States the  First 
Chamber is simply the old Diet in modified form, 
while the Second  Chamber contains the popular 
representatives.  It is no wonder that the confid- 
ence of the people centres in the latter, while the 
former languishes  in  obscurity.  In Prussia too, 
owing to the romantic fads of  Frederick William 
IV., the composition of  the Upper House has been 
a total failure, and this fact would be even more 
apparent than it is, had not the majority of  the 
"lords " acquired the habit of  shining by  their 
absence.  It  would  only  provoke  derision if  all 
the  so - called  representatives  of  ancient  and 
established  territorial  interests,  who  populate 
the  boarding - houses  of  Berlin,  were  to make 
their  appearance  in  a  body.  It  is  perfectly 
obvious that the overwhelming majority  of  our 
aristocracy is perfectly unfitted to have a parlia- 
mentary career.  Of  course there are many illustri- 
ous  families  in  Germany  whose  pedigree would 
justify  a  claim  to hereditary  membership  of  a 
Chamber  of  Peers ;  such  are  the  Mediatized 
Princes of  the Empire  or the Stolbergs,  Counts 
of  the Harz, who  are so closely connected  with 
their  localities that they would  be fully entitled 
to collaborate in the making  of  our laws.  It  is 
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are not more numerous or more evenly distributed. 
The  native  nobility  of  North-East  Prussia  un- 
doubtedly  presents  some  of  the  most  precious 
of  aristocratic  qualities,  but  it cannot,  on  the 
whole,  be  called  an  independent  and  high- 
spirited  aristocracy  in  the  same  sense  as  the 
ancient houses referred to above ; it has preserved 
its loyalty to the Monarchy by continually serving 
it  in  civil  and  military  employments,  and  its 
interests are so closely linked to the Crown that 
it could never maintain a sufficiently independent 
attitude in any conceivable Upper House. 
It would appear, then, that a purely aristocratic 
chamber  could  never  in  our  country  enjoy 
sufficient  credit  with  the  people  to  form  an 
adequate counterweight  and complement to the 
popular  Assembly.  An  Upper  House  really 
representative of  the governing classes in Prussia 
would  have to include delegates from the great 
administrative  corporations.  Let  us  suppose 
that the Prussiah  Provincial Diet  presented  six 
of  its members to the King every  six years  as 
candidates for nomination  to the Upper House ; 
it is quite certain that the choice would fall upon 
men who had played a part in the local govern- 
ment of  the country, or upon great land-owners 
or great capitalists in some way distinguished by 
their  services.  They would provide  an excellent 
storehouse of  expert political knowledge ;  blended 
with  the  hereditary  aristocracy,  they  would 
form an Upper  House  sure to command  public 
esteem.  But a reform in this sense is no longer 
practicable,  for our Upper House is so unstable 
a structure that any alteration would  infallibly 
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muse  its collapse.  The  course  of  development 
is  left  to chance.  The  great  majority  of  the 
including  the  landlords,  no  longer 
present  themselves,  and  the  remnant  of  the 
Assembly  is so insipid in character that it only 
occasionally  sums  up  courage  to  readjust  the 
partiality of  the Second Chamber by a correcting 
amendment.  However,  the  potential  activities 
of  the Upper House, of  which  symptoms are so 
rarely  perceptible,  should  not  be  too  much 
scorned.  It  is  beyond  question  that  many  a 
foolish  proposal  fails  to find  a  hearing  in  the 
Lower  House  because  it is  felt  that it is  fore- 
doomed in the Upper Chamber. 
The  Lower  House  should  principally  stand 
for the mass of  the tax-payers and be the specific- 
ally  popular  Assembly,  representing  those  who 
perform  the most  general  duties  of  citizenship, 
such as tax-paying and military  service ; while 
the  Upper  House  should  represent  the  ruling 
classes,  upon  whom  fall  the  more  complicated 
tasks  of  public  life.  An  immense  amount  of 
ingenious theorizing  has  already been  expended 
upon the proper constitution of  a Second Chamber. 
It  is  a  constitutional  axiom  that  the  Second 
Chamber should be regarded as representing the 
nation as a whole, and not particular classes within 
it.  It  is  possible to imagine a  Chamber whose 
members  should  be  chosen  from  professional 
categories, but who  in  their  collective capacity 
had to represent the nation.  It is a matter for 
regret that such  caste divisions do not  exist  in 
our  Second Chamber, so that the peasantry, for 
instance, remain  unrepresented, while the whole 
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trend of  modern culture and all known forms of 
parliamentary life  incline to give the intellectual 
element  an  undue  political  preponderance. 
Lawyers, men of  birth with a classical education 
and  practice  in  public  speaking,  officials  of  all 
sorts,  including  many  who  have  imbibed  and 
periodically  emit  the  venom  of  some  fancied 
grievance : such are the elements which compose 
Parliaments.  A  modern  deputy  is  required  to 
have  an opinion upon  so many subjects that a 
man  of  average education will  naturally be  in a 
better position to form a judgment upon them all, 
even  though  often  only  a  shallow  one.  The 
legal  mind  is  particularly  well  suited  to this 
exercise;  Lasker  is  a  good  example  of  the 
influence  which  a  man  without  political  genius 
can  attain.  His  talent  lay  in  his  rapidity  of 
grasp,  and hardly  one  sitting passed  without  a 
Lasker  amendment.  The peasant's  mind moves 
with difficulty in such an atmosphere ; he there- 
fore gives his vote b  the townsman  who  seems 
to have most insight  into rural concerns.  How 
many  candidates  on  seeing  their  prospective 
constituents have not  wondered  in their hearts, 
"What  made  such  men  fix  upon  me  as  their 
chosen  representative ? "  The  good folk of  the 
Hunsriick, who once elected me,  were a fine and 
sturdy set, but their only link with  me  was the 
recommendation  of  a  few  men  whom  they 
trusted. 
This  predominance  of  the  book - learned  in 
Parliament  over  the plain  peasant  and  artisan 
is a serious flaw in modern popular representation, 
against which no remedy seems effective.  Suppose 
attempt were  made  to introduce representa- 
tion by estates, the question would  immediately 
arise of  what those estates are composed, and a 
candid  survey  would  show  that  their  outlines 
are no longer clearly visible.  The only hereditary 
caste  now  remaining  is  the nobility,  which,  in 
its  capacity  as  such,  has  lost  all  its  ancient 
prestige  owing to its anomalous  position.  The 
professional  castes  are  so  inextricably  inter- 
mingled  that  it would  be  impossible  to make 
the boundaries between them the basis of  franchise 
legislation.  Caste  divisions  were  indeed  still 
the  foundation  of  the  Prussian  United  Diet 
(Vereinigter Landtag),  an assembly  representing 
the great and small land-owners and the towns ; 
but already before 1848 this system had become 
almost  unworkable  on  account  of  the  gigantic 
changes wrought  by the spread  of  industrialism 
in  the  Western  provinces.  On  the  Rhine  and 
in Westphalia it is often impossible to say where 
the  village  ends  and  the  open  country  begins. 
Any  system  of  representation  based  on  caste 
distinctions  could  only  be  artificially  produced 
under our present conditions. 
All this has led to the adoption of  the principle 
of  universal  suffrage  and the formation  of  geo- 
graphical  electoral  areas  in  which  all  the  in- 
habitants  are called upon  to vote according to 
a  certain  franchise  law,  or  even  without  one ; 
the choice therefore lies  only between  universal 
suffrage and a  franchise.  The  answer  is  ready 
to hand : all franchises are arbitrary and must 
therefore be  rejected.  This is true enough, but 
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a  limit  of  age and calls to the polls  every man 
who came into the world twenty-five years ago. 
Without  doubt  there  are  innumerable  young 
men  of  twenty-four  who  are  more  competent 
to vote  than  some  of  their  seniors.  Therefore 
every  franchise  must  become,  to some  extent, 
arbitrary;  but,  broadly  speaking,  it remains  a 
sound principle to exclude the wholly irresponsible 
section  of  society  from  the  exercise  of  a  right 
which  implies  a  capacity  for  independent judg- 
ment.  The  democratic  current  of  our  century 
has fostered  the idea that the effective right to 
vote is an innate right of  man.  Since, however, 
it is more a duty of  citizenship than an individual 
prerogative,  and since  it must  be  exercised  for 
the common good, i.e. for the good of  the State, 
it must rest  with the State to decide who  shall 
exercise  it.  This  right  becomes  unreasonable 
when  pushed  to  its  furthest  conclusion,  and 
ignores  the  time-honoured  truth  long  ago  laid 
down  by  ~ristotlb,  that the  greatest  wrong  is 
to equalize the unequal.  It has  but one merit, 
which is to allay the political mania of  Radicalism 
by applying a homoeopathic remedy, for it makes 
it possible to meet the wildest Radical with the 
retort, "  You have all got votes, get a  majority 
if  you can." 
Except  for  this  one  advantage,  it  remains 
true  that  in  Universal  Suffrage  a  dispropor- 
tionate  share of  influence  is  given to stupidity, 
superstition, malice and mendacity, crude egoism 
and  nebulous  waves  of  sentiment,  all  of  which 
introduce  an incalculable  element  into the  life 
of  the  State.  It  is  a  patent  error  to assume 
that Universal Suffrage will always serve Radical 
interests ; it  is  far  more  accurate  to describe 
its influence as uncertain.  The social conditions 
in any given province decide which of  the social 
forces  will  benefit  by  Universal  Suffrage.  In 
our  Eastern  Provinces,  where  a  real  territorial 
nobility still survives, it operates in preservation 
of  the feudal  spirit, for the peasants  vote  as a 
matter of  course on the same side as their masters. 
The squire brings his labourers in their hundreds 
to the polling-booth and there issues his directions ; 
this  cannot  be  otherwise, for it is the outcome 
of  the  actual  balance  of  social  forces.  This 
kind  of  influence, however,  is  an  impossibility 
in  industrial  districts,  owing to the resentment 
which  has accumulated there against employers. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Radicalism  runs 
riot  in these parts of  the country.  No  one but 
a  doctrinaire  Radical  can  suppose  that  true 
liberty  can  emerge  from  any  manipulation  of 
Universal  Suffrage.  It  is  visibly  tending,  on 
the  contrary,  towards  a  weakening  of  Parlia- 
mentary institutions.  In  the turmoil of  economic, 
political,  and  ecclesiastical  currents  no  single 
group can achieve a reliable majority or exercise 
decisive influence upon Government. 
We may, indeed, ascribe to Universal Suffrage 
a certain power  of  alleviating the lot of  toilers, 
and  in  any  case,  once  conceded,  it can  hardly 
be  repealed.  Such  a  step  would  call  forth  a 
sense of  bitterness and injury among the masses 
that  would  far  outweigh  the  present  dis- 
advantages.  The  undue  extension  of  the 
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of the effect  upon  a  particular election as upon 
the  general  character  of  political  life.  The 
strongest  lungs  always  prevail  with  the  mob, 
and  there  is  now  no  hope  of  eliminating  that 
peculiar  touch  of  brutality and that coarsening 
and vulgarizing  element which  has  entered into 
public life.  These consequences are unavoidable, 
and unfortunately  react  upon  the whole  moral 
outlook  of  the  people;  just  as the  unchecked 
railing  and  lying  of  the  platform  corrupts  the 
tone  of  daily  intercourse.  Beyond  this  comes 
the  further  danger  that  the  really  educated 
classes withdraw more and more from a political 
struggle  which  adopts  such  methods.  A  cor- 
rective  to the  unreason  of  Universal  Suffrage 
has  been  sought  in  the  no  less  unreasoning 
and immoral  secrecy of  the ballot.  Its privacy 
is designed to confer upon weak spirits qualities 
which  they  naturally  lack.  We  are  fools  to 
prate of  the frwdom and enlightenment  of  our 
age,  when  we  have  lost  the  plainest  sense  of 
manly honour.  The very liberty of  our institu- 
tions  has  introduced forms  of  moral  corruption 
of  which earlier and more submissive generations 
knew nothing.  If the exercise of  a parliamentary 
vote is a citizen's highest duty it should be carried 
out  in  a  form which  free  and  honourable  men 
need  not  despise,  i.e.  publicly  and  with  full 
responsibility.  No  man  can  have  a  true  sense 
of  political honour  who does not feel humiliated 
when  he  slinks  up to the  ballot-box  and  slips 
his  paper  in.  All  the reasons urged  in support 
of  secret voting are specious.  It is not a function 
of  the State to debilitate the moral sense of  its 
citizens.  A  real  conflict  of  duties  arises  when 
fathers and sons differ  in  politics.  A son must 
decide  for  himself  whether  he  places  political 
conviction  above  filial  respect  and  gratitude, 
and it is not the part of  the State to solve these 
problems for him. 
In England this was formerly never in doubt. 
Well  into the nineteenth century secret balloting 
was  regarded as a symptom of  complete corrup- 
tion.  But  the  notion,  which  the  Press  has 
encouraged, that freedom consists in the evasion 
of  responsibility, has been extended to the polls, 
and  is  the  result  of  enfranchising  classes  who 
have  no  real  claim  to vote  since  they  are  in- 
capable of  independent judgment. 
A  curious  ignorance  of  practical  affairs  lies 
at  the  root  of  the  whole  matter.  In  rural 
constituencies  and  small  localities  it  is  usually 
quite impossible for any man to hide for whom 
his  vote  has  been  cast.  Even  in  towns  there 
are all  kinds  of  little  ways  of  finding out how 
this  or  that  individual  has  voted.  The  next 
step is to adopt the shabbiest trick that ever was 
proposed  in the name  of  Liberalism ; and which 
consists  in  the  expedient  of  sending  the  voter 
to a tavern, there to deliver his vote in a sealed 
envelope  provided  by  the  Government.  What 
manner of proposal is this to make to honourable 
men ?  Manly courage is utterly undermined  by 
such  subterranean  methods  on  the  part  of  the 
State,  which  artificially  propagate  hypocrisy 
among  millions  of  working- men,  who  have  no 
real  choice  in  the  matter.  The  immorality  of 
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which  a  respectable  individual  would  regard 
as dishonouring must have a deteriorating effect 
when  practised  on  the  whole  community.  In 
this question,  however,  our  enlightened century 
has  become  so narrow-minded  that all  hope  of 
improvement  in  respect  of  it has  vanished.  A 
generation is growing up which we  have deprived 
of  the power  of  plain and straightforward judg- 
ment, and the consequences will be only too often 
and  too  sadly  revealed.  These  are  ethical  far 
more than political questions. 
Let us now  turn to the consideration  of  the 
rights  of  popular  assemblies.  They  may  be 
divided  into  three  categories :  the  right  to 
control  administration,  the right  to collaborate 
in  legislation,  and,  lastly,  the  right  to  grant 
supplies.  The  test  of  what  our  Provincial  and 
Imperial Diets have accomplished is to be found 
not in what they have achieved but in all that they 
have prevented.  Political experience shows that 
every  governing  class,  if  left to itself,  becomes 
either  stereotyped  or  corrupt.  The  rough-and- 
tumble of  a  popular Assembly is well  calculated 
to  resist  this  tendency,  and  I  have  already 
shown  that  this  check  is  particularly  effective 
in States which are not subject to party-govern- 
ment. 
Here  we  see  the great  merit  of  the  German 
parliamentary  system.  It  leads  to  much  use- 
less  talking,  gives  scope  for  much  unnecessary 
clamour and petty jobbery,  but when  all is said 
and done  it has  great advantages.  We  are in- 
debted to the watchful  care of  our  Parliament, 
cantankerous  though  it may  sometimes be,  for 
the virtual elimination of  corrupt practices from 
our  administration.  There  is  no  saying  how 
far  this  influence  extends.  A  highly - placed 
officer  once said to me that the Army itself would 
not be  in  its present  efficient  condition without 
the Reichstag.  Army administration must exert 
itself  to  avoid  everything  which  could  lay  it 
open to criticism, because there is always a group 
of  privileged  cavillers  in  Parliament  ready  to 
beat the big drum about every little failing.  If 
it were possible amongst us, as it is in England, 
to  rise  from  the  parliamentary  ranks  to  be 
Minister  of  War,  what  happens  there  would 
also happen  here : criticism would  be  tempered 
by  the reflection, "  Your  turn to-day, mine  to- 
morrow,"  and our Army would become accessible 
to the same  abuses  as hers.  This  brings  us to 
the  crux  of  the  matter,  which  is  to ascertain 
the  truth  of  the  comparison  so  often  made 
between  the  alleged  freedom  of  France  and 
England with the slavery of  Germany.  Although 
as  a  rule  our  members  of  Parliament  cannot 
become Ministers we have the far more important 
advantage of  an honest  and effective control of 
government by Parliament. 
Next  amongst the chief  rights  of  Parliament 
comes collaboration in making laws.  In England, 
where  Parliament  governs,  Bills  are  usually 
brought  forward  by the party in  power ; while, 
on the Continent, it is the general rule that new 
legislation  should  originate  with  the  Ministry 
although Parliament possesses the technical right 
to  initiate  it.  Our  Parliaments  frequently  de- 
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to  the  Government.  It  is  needless  to  dwell 
upon  the fact that without  this co-operation  of 
Parliament,  laws  in  harmony  with  the  ethical 
instincts of  a thinking people cannot be framed. 
The  technique  of  legislation  has  suffered  much 
through the parliamentary rhgime.  Its tendency 
to compromise has  introduced  every  variety  of 
implied  and  palpable  contradiction  into  con- 
temporary  laws.  This  undeniable  defect,  how- 
ever,  is  not  sufficiently grave  to outweigh  the 
advantages of  parliamentary co-operation. 
Lastly comes the right of  the popular assembly 
to grant supplies.  In this connexion the most 
singular  prejudices  are  rampant.  The  con- 
ventional  and  primitive  notion  is  as  follows : 
since  most  Constitutions  explicitly  mention  the 
voting  of  the Budget,  the Chamber  may  reject 
such  of  the Estimates  as it pleases  and reduce 
taxation  acco~dingly. Here  again  we  see  how 
strongly  bygone  class  - conceptions  survive  in 
modern  Liberalism.  The  State  is  the enemy 
to be resisted, and every request which it makes 
for  money is  ab  initio suspected  as unjust  and 
tyrannical.  It  is  the  Chamber's  duty  to keep 
a  tight  grip  on  the  purse-strings,  and  if  the 
Government  does  not  resist,  it starves.  Is not 
this the exact counterpart of  the ancient notion 
that  Parliament  day  was  pay-day,  and  that 
the  Government  was  a  wild  beast  which  must 
be caged as long as possible? 
When  we  turn  to  the  subject  of  national 
finance, we  see  at once  that a  distinction must 
be  drawn  between  revenue  and  expenditure. 
In every  conceivable  kind  of  Constitution  the 
outgoings  fall  into  three  different  classes : 
Standing  expenses, classified  according  to their 
amount and their character, such as the interest 
on  the National  Debt,  official  salaries,  etc.  A 
State  which  has  contracted  a  Public  Debt  is 
bound to pay a certain sum in interest on  that 
debt  every  half - year,  and  the  legal  obligation 
to do this is created not by the Budget but by 
the  law  which  authorized  the  creation  of  the 
Loan.  The Budget, generally speaking, does not 
create  legal  obligations,  but  the  expenditure 
proposed  by  it arises out of  previous legal  con- 
tracts, which have usually already been embodied 
in laws.  Now,  who  was  the author of  the laws 
in virtue of  which these sums became payable ? 
Without doubt the King and the two Chambers, 
whence  it follows that the  Second  Chamber  by 
itself  is not at liberty to cancel such payments. 
This  is  obvious,  and  was  practically  admitted 
even by the party of  progress at the time of  the 
constitutional  struggle.  They  were  themselves 
incapable  of  carrying  a  Budget,  though  there 
was a chorus of  denunciation against a Budgetless 
Government ; but  any man  amongst  them who 
happened to be a Government creditor or public 
servant  still  went  quite  najively  every  quarter- 
day  to collect  his  interest  or  his  salary.  The 
extravagances of  their theory were  thus refuted 
by  facts.  An  official  has  a  legal  claim  to his 
salary, and if  it be not paid to him, he can take 
action at law and must receive his rights. 
There  is  in  every  State  another  section  of 
public  expenditure  which,  while  resting  on  the 
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invariable  in  its amount.  When,  for  example, 
the creation of  new  cavalry regiments  has been 
approved  by  law,  the  necessary  expenses  will 
include  certain  fixed  items,  such  as  officers' 
salaries ; while,  on the other hand,  the cost  of 
food  for  the  men  and  fodder  for  their  horses 
cannot  be  laid  down  beforehand.  But  once 
the  measure  has  been  passed,  the  expenses 
incidental  to it  must  be  paid,  however  much 
the price  of  a  particular  commodity  may  vary. 
The  task  of  the  Provincial  Diet  (Landtag), in 
regard  to these  items  is,  therefore,  somewhat 
different from that which it performs in relation 
to the first-mentioned  category  of  expenditure. 
In the former case its function is merely super- 
visory;  it  audits  accounts  and  sees  that  all 
is  in  order,  but its actual sanction  is  not  here 
required.  Its  control has a wider scope with regard 
to the second class of  expenditure, and here too, 
with regard to the items which  have fluctuated 
with prices, it may examine whether due economy 
has been practised.  When the creation of  a new 
tribunal  has  been  decreed  by  law,  and  the 
Landtag  considers  the  appointment  of  two 
councillors  to  be  excessive,  it  can  suppress 
their  posts  for  the  future,  although  no  civil 
servant  already  provided  with  a  post  can  be 
dismissed  from  it without  another  being  found 
for  him  elsewhere in  Government  service.  For 
the rest, the Landtag has the right to ear-mark 
for  suppression  everything  which  it  considers 
superfluous.  There  is  a  third  class  of  expenses 
which are neither fixed in amount nor sanctioned 
beforehand  by  law.  Under  this  heading  come 
all  the new  demands  made  upon  the  Landtag, 
which that body  is  perfectly  at liberty  to deal 
with as it pleases. 
If  it  were  possible  to fit  facts to theories, 
the  simplest  course  would  be  to  arrange  the 
Budget  in  three  sections  in  accordance  with 
these three classes of  expenditure.  An  attempt 
has  been  made  to draw  up two Budgets,  the 
one  to deal  with  fixed,  the  other  with  fluctu- 
ating expenditure; but when  this system is put 
to the  test  it  will  be  found  that  practically 
every  item  of  State  expenditure  belongs  to 
more  than one  of  the above - named  categories. 
There is  in fact no remedy but that Parliament 
should  recognize  its  own  limitations  in  this 
respect.  Except for  a  handful  of  Social Demo- 
crats, there are, at the present  day, probably no 
deputies  left  who  can  be  called  whole-hearted 
supporters of  the unconditional  right  of  Parlia- 
ment to control finance.  This right  is  effective 
only when  Parliaments discriminate between the 
legal  differences in  the nature  of  the functions 
which  they exercise in voting the various  kinds 
of  Estimates.  The  expression  "to  grant sup- 
plies " is merely misleading, for it represents the 
Landtag as having complete freedom to vote or 
to reject the whale of  the Estimates. 
The same thing may be  said of  the revenues 
of  the State, for neither  in regard  to them can 
there be  any question  of  a  general  sanction  on 
the  part  of  the  Chambers.  It  is  nonsense  to 
say that the Chambers sanction any part of  the 
revenue  derived  from  the  Crown  lands.  The 
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previous laws which  made  them the property of 
the State, and hence it is clear that the present 
Landtag is incompetent to abrogate these laws. 
Similarly every State has necessarily an elaborate 
and interdependent  fiscal system.  It is obvious 
that  Customs  cannot  be  altered  every  year, 
for  they  depend  upon  treaties  extending  over 
a  number  of  years.  Some  items  of  Revenue 
there  are  whose  amount  and  legal  basis  is 
unvarying,  and  also  items  which  are  still  un- 
fixed  and in  regard  to which  Parliament has  a 
completely free hand.  Mechanical classifications 
are impossible  in practice, and the best  method 
for a calm despatch of  public business is a mature 
grasp of  its legal aspects. 
XVIII 
TYRANNY AND CAESARISM 
DEMOCRATIC  Tyranny,  the  last  of  the  chief 
categories  into  which  monarchy  falls,  really 
stands  half-way  between  the  monarchical  and 
republican  forms  of  government.  It  springs 
from the soil of  democratic society, and is always 
found to be the product either of  the transition 
from  aristocratic  organization  to  a  completer 
realization  of  the  democratic  principle,  or  else 
a  result  of  democracy  itself  pursued  with  that 
fanatical logic which is an attribute of  political 
extremes,  to the  point  at which  the  ideal  of 
popular sovereignty is at once made actual and 
nullified.  The whole  authority  of  the  State is 
then  made  over  to a  single  individual  who  is 
regarded as an embodiment of  the entire people. 
The scope of  the monarchical power is enormous, 
in fact often unlimited, but since it reposes upon 
no  assured  foundation  of  law,  the  struggle  to 
assert it absorbs a great portion of  the political 
strength  inherent  in  monarchic  forms,  and  de- 
prives  them  of  the calm  security and  stability 
which are their best and fairest attributes. 
The study of  this type of  State is particularly 
instructive,  because  the  power  of  personality 
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plays so important a part in it.  A ruler who has 
nothing  at his  back  but  good  luck  and  a  full 
purse, his wits and his good sword, relies absolutely 
and  entirely  upon  himself.  There  is  in  him  a 
kind of  elective affinity with the great artist, who 
is the sovereign "  I " as well  as he.  There was 
a  deep  psychological  reason  for  the  friendship 
which  existed  between  Leonardo  da  Vinci  and 
the Tyrants of  Italy, for the words  of  the poet 
apply very specially to that group of  rulers : 
Es sol1 der Sanger mit dem Kijnig gehen, 
Sie beide wohnen auf  der Menschheit Hohen. 
(The highest peaks scaled by the mind of  man 
Shall be the home of  poets and of  kings.) 
A man who has risen above his fellows solely by 
his  own  personality  and daring, will  have  other 
reasons  for  making  his  Court  a  splendid  home 
for  Art  and  Science  beyond  the hope  of  thus 
consoling the people for their vanished freedom. 
Care for the safety of  his own  existence forbids 
him  to  have  anything  in  common  with  the 
masses whom he must hold  in subjection to his 
iron will,  and he therefore feels an inward sym- 
pathy  with  the  artist,  who  like  himself  draws 
nothing from direct intercourse with the common 
world of men.  The tyrant shows us the individual 
man in his greatness as well  as in the height of 
his presumption.  The psychology of  the Roman 
Emperors  in  the  madness  of  their  Caesarian 
dreams can only be properly apprehended in the 
light  of  these  political  forms,  where  one  man 
may rise as high above other men as the Heavens 
stand above the earth. 
We  find democratic Tyrannies existing in the 
smaller  City-States  of  ancient  Greece,  and  we 
meet them again in Italy during the Renaissance. 
But we  see them also on a greater, grander scale 
under the Roman Caesars, and under Bonaparte 
in  the  modern  world.  The  spirit  of  antiquity 
was  Republican  through  and through,  and the 
Romans  only  expressed  the  sentiment  of  all 
contemporary nations  when  they freely applied 
the term servitium to the Monarchy and libertas 
to the  Republic.  Thus it came  about  that in 
Rome as well as in Greece the period of  the old 
kingship  was  brief.  Greece  was  indeed  again 
a  kingdom of  wide  extent in later times  under 
Philip  of  Macedon  and  his  successors,  but this 
far-reaching  monarchy  was  only  half  Hellenic, 
and  stands in  sharpest  contrast  to  the  City- 
States of  older Greece.  Alexander's rapid career 
of  conquest  brought  half  Asia  under  his  yoke, 
and his death was followed by the rise of  the wide 
Empires of  the Diadochi;  but these again were 
semi-oriental  in  character,  and  they too  were 
obsessed  by the theocratic  notions of  the East. 
The new  princes  adopted Oriental customs, and 
the Ptolemies had themselves portrayed on their 
coins in the image of  divinities, like the Pharaohs 
of  old.  The real political ideal of  the Hellenes, 
on the other hand, was always a Republic.  The 
fall of  the ancient original kingdoms was followed 
everywhere throughout Greece first of  all by the 
rule  of  the great  families in  the  cities.  Then, 
when the mass of  the people grew in prosperity 
and  in  ambition,  and  the  times  required  the 
strong hand of  a monarch,  the national instinct 
VOL. I1  P 210  TYRANNY AND CAESARISM  MEDIAEVAL TYRANNIES  211 
of  self-preservation  produced  the rulers  known 
by the originally  harmless  title  of  Tyrant, who 
provided  the necessary point  from  whence  his- 
torical development could proceed.  They broke 
the  power  of  the  old  city  families,  and  they 
sought  to  increase  the  glory  of  the  city  by 
brilliantly  successful  wars,  as  well  as  by  the 
fostering of  science and art. 
What a  galaxy of  men, made great by their 
service  to their  cities,  history  has  recorded  for 
us  among  them !  Periander  of  Corinth,  Poly- 
crates  of  Samos,  and  most  gifted  of  them  all, 
Pisistratus  of  Athens,  who  began  the  turning 
of  the  Acropolis  into  the  treasure-house  of 
Greece.  All the glamour which poetry can lend 
hangs  about  the  Courts  where  Polycrates  and 
the Pisistradi harboured Simonides and Anacreon, 
and  collected  the  songs  of  Homer.  The  great 
conception  and plan  of  the Iliad,  with  all  the 
deep aesthetic feeling which the brothers Grimm 
have lately expounded  for us again, could only 
have been  put together  by  the hand  of  a  true 
poet.  It was  a  creative genius  which  came to 
light in those days under  the sheltering care of 
a race of  tyrants who  were  lovers of  the things 
of  the mind. 
Yet, in spite of  all this, the fall of  the Pisistrids 
came  quickly,  and  the  people  sang  paeons  of 
praise to the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristo- 
geiton.  Not  all the brilliance and glory of  this 
purely  usurped  dominion had  availed  to strike 
its roots  into the nation,  and here  we  lay  our 
finger upon the weakness which has at all times 
beset this form of  government.  It is this which 
makes  Gervinus  so  ridiculous  when  he,  inter- 
preting  history  after his  own  fashion,  draws  a 
comparison  between  modern  monarchies  and 
the tyrannies of Greece, and maintains that they 
are nothing  but a  transition  stage between  the 
aristocracies of the Middle Ages  and the purely 
democratic Republics of  the future.  Only a man 
like  Gervinus,  whose  abysmal  ignorance  blinds 
him  to the reverence  due to universal history, 
could  draw  so  senseless  a  parallel  between  a 
monarchy  like  our  own,  which  has  stood  for 
centuries  upon  a  foundation  of  law,  and  the 
ephemeral power of  city rulers, whose span was 
often only twenty or thirty years. 
In more  modern  times,  towards  the  end  of 
the Middle Ages,  Italy became the classic home 
of  city tyrannies.  Here the nobility were com- 
pelled to congregate in the towns, and the country 
districts  fell  in  consequence  quite  out  of  the 
development of  social conditions.  In the demo- 
cratized  urban  life,  where  rich  merchants  and 
bankers  rubbed  shoulders  with  the  aristocracy, 
children of  fortune gradually rose into prominence 
and gained  adherents among  the people,  either 
by the arts of  the demagogue or by the power of 
the  purse,  or  else  they  roved  the  country  as 
condottieri,  to pick  up what  luck or  their  good 
swords  might  bring  them ; in  any  case  rulers 
by no right but that of  possession, and emphatic 
champions of  the worship of  the sovereign "I." 
They were a swaggering race, self-reliant to a de- 
gree, and they fill us with daemoniac feelings-half 
of admiration, half of  repulsion.  It was for them 
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One of  the oldest of  these lines of  rulers were 
the Della  Scalas in Verona.  They were the very 
personification of  the worship of  their sovereign 
selves.  Until their day princes had been content 
to seek burial in the churches among the com- 
munity  of the faithful, but these Scaligeri built 
outside the Cathedral doors, and under the free 
air  of  Heaven,  the tombs  on  which  they  were 
sculptured high upon their chargers.  It is very 
significant, this revival of  the antique worship of 
personality  in  the  midst  of  a  Christian  world. 
The mediaeval man  sought salvation in Heaven 
after he was  dead, but the ancient desired that 
his  fame  should  endure  upon  earth.  Schiller 
never wrote lines more beautiful than these- 
Wenn der Lcib in Staub zerfallen 
Lebt der grosse Name noch, 
(When in dust the body crumbles 
Still the glorious name lives on,) 
and  they  are  thoroughly  Hellenic.  Now  the 
tyrants  made  the  antique  conception  of  the 
value  and  immortality  of  personal  renown  a 
living  thought  again  in  Italy.  We  must  not 
speak  of  their  rule  as a  monarchy,  for  it was 
rather a sense of  power  which had no limits but 
those  it set for  itself.  Vbre  have  another  clear 
example of  it in the Sforzas in Milan, one of  the 
most  interesting  among  these  races  of  tyrants. 
When  the Milanese  built  a  triumphal arch  for 
Francesco Sforza, he turned his horse outside it 
and said, "  These are the superstitious apparatus 
of  kings, but I am the Sforza." 
These words of his express at  once the greatness 
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and  the  moral  frailty  of  this  whole  form  of 
government.  A  ruler  of  this  kind  is  well-nigh 
omnipotent  so  long  as he  enjoys  the  smiles  of 
Fortune and the favour of  the people ;  let these 
desert him  and he  is  lost.  Not  for  him  is  the 
support of loyalty, dependence, or gratitude, upon 
which  an old-established  monarchy  can  reckon 
even in its evil day, and the terrible fate which 
befell countless Italian tyrants is very significant 
of  the  nature  of  these  political  forms.  This 
naturally  does  not  exclude  the possibility  of  a 
brief  period  of  truly  brilliant  intellectual  life 
unfolding  under  such  usurpers.  In Italy  they 
promoted  for  a  time  a  marvellous  intensity  of 
culture ; to  this  day  almost  everv  important 
city  in  the  land  bears  the  stamp 'of  its great 
tyrants in immortal works of  architecture.  We 
can trace it in Milan through the three dynasties 
of the Della Torre, the Visconti, and the Sforza. 
Here, for a short space, a kind of  family tradition 
was  developed in a ruling family, but again and 
again a  contrary  Fate brought  its dominion to 
an  end,  because favourable Fortune was  a  sine 
qua non for its stability. 
Yet nevertheless  this purely actual dominion 
showed greater power  of  resistance  in  the City- 
States  of  Italy  than  in  the  towns  of  ancient 
Greece.  In  Italy  democratic  tyrannies  were 
not  always  the  stepping-stone  to democracies, 
but  developed  sometimes  into  hereditary  mon- 
archies.  It is very singular to observe how these 
tyrants deteriorated both morally and politically 
as  soon  as  they  succeeded  in  establishing  a 
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Medicis  were  great  while  they  were  rulers  of 
the city of  Florence.  The power  of  money was 
the  ultimate  factor  of  their  government,  but 
with  it all  they  were  filled  with  artistic  sense 
and fine aesthetic taste.  But after Pisa had been 
forced to bow  her  haughty neck  and the whole 
valley  of  the Arno  lay  in  the hollow  of  their 
hand,  this gifted  race  of  usurpers  declined into 
the  undistinguished  line  of  Grand  Dukes  of 
Tuscany,  and  became  just  as  petty  a  race  of 
princes  as  our  own  House  of  Gotha.  The 
Estes ran a  similar course, for their importance 
was  greater  while they were  purely  city tyrants 
than in the later period when they had gradually 
got themselves recognized  as Dukes of  Modena, 
with  a  certain  amount  of  legitimate  claim  to 
the title.  Thenceforward the incentive was lack- 
ing  which  drives  tyrants  to  make  supreme 
efforts.  The  old  Italian  tyrannies,  with  no 
foothold  of  established  law,  were  cruel  very 
often, and were obliged to understand the art of 
governing by fear ; it was their  age which gave 
their  name  the  significance  it  has  gradually 
acquired.  To this day the cages in which Ludo- 
vico Moro  kept his enemies are still hanging  in 
the  Church  Tower  at Piacenza.  Milder  forms 
were adopted when the governments were legiti- 
matized,  but  when  the  throne  was  secure  the 
reason  for  straining every  nerve  vanished,  and 
with it the greatest qualities of  the old tyrannies 
disappeared as well. 
Thus  we  find  democratic  tyranny  recurring 
twice in history,  at different times, but in each 
instance in the government  of  little States.  It 
is  remarkable that we  should also meet it twice 
upon  the grander  scale.  First of  all  in  Rome, 
where, however, it was  not a  transitional stage 
towards democracy but the prelude  to a  period 
in which the Romans lost their grip upon republi- 
can ideals.  On the one side we see an aristocracy 
split  by  cliques,  thoroughly  small-minded  and 
outworn,  on  the  other  an  autocrat  of  genius, 
bent on founding a kingdom with the power the 
sovereign people  had  put  within  his  grasp.  It 
is well  known how  Caesar wished to restore the 
ancient  Roman  monarchy  as  the  settled  Con- 
stitution of the State.  The dream was shattered 
by his death, for there was no one of  his successors 
who  could  dare  so  great  a  thing.  When  the 
Constitution  was  crystallized  under  Augustus 
and Tiberius it held  by  the law that the whole 
of  the  Emperor's  authority  should  be  derived 
from the Roman people.  The Caesar united  in 
his  own  person  the will  of  the nation  and the 
whole  majesty  of  the  State, and upon  this his 
power  depended.  Legally,  the  fact  never  ad- 
mitted of  any argument.  To this day the great 
tablet  of  marble  shines  in  the  Capitol  which 
sets  forth  that  the  nation  has  bestowed  the 
supreme  power  upon  the  Emperor  Vespasian. 
Thus  the  Caesarship  was  never  a  matter  of 
legitimate  inheritance,  its possessor  held  it by 
no  established right, therefore it was a Tyranny 
and  not  a  Monarchy.  In it everything turned 
upon whether the Caesar was personally adequate 
to his task.  It is significant of  the nature of  this 
form  of  government  that  its  title  should  be 
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A man  of  genius created  it, and  left it for  his 
successors to live up to. 
The installation of  a new Emperor was carried 
out  either  by  decree  of  the  Senate,  with  the 
nominal  agreement  of  the  Comitia,  or  else  by 
the legions  in  the  provinces  elevating  one  of 
their  leaders  upon  their  shields,  in  which  case 
the  citizens  assembled  in  the  army were  held 
to  be  representative  of  the  sovereign  people. 
We  see  by this to what legal  quibbles an order 
of  things which  had  no  foundation  in law  was 
forced  to  resort.  It  is  clear  that  here  the 
characteristics  of  true  monarchy,  peace,  and 
security  are  all  totally  lacking.  In  the  later 
centuries  of  antiquity  the  Ancients  themselves 
seem sometimes to have felt that the monarchies 
of  the young, inwardly sound Germanic peoples 
were,  even in their  immaturity,  superior to the 
older  forms  of  State.  But  in  the  Rome  of 
Caesar's  day  a  hereditary  monarchy  was  an 
impossibility, for the old kingly institutions had 
been  utterly  destroyed,  and  a  republican  de- 
velopment  of  centuries  had  made  the  term 
servitium synonymous  with  monarchy,  even  as 
Eibertas  was  with  Republic.  No  kingship  was 
possible but one of actual possession.  Trace for 
a moment  the remarkable  process by which the 
attributes of the ancient monarchy were lopped 
off, and how, many generations later, they revive 
and flourish.  The  plenitude  of  sovereignty  en- 
joyed  by the ancient kings was divided amongst 
the various  great  offices of  the Republic,  each 
of  which  represented  a  fragment  of  a  kingly 
authority which  had  once  been  a  single  whole. 
~hus  it  continued to be throughout the centuries 
until the rise of  the Empire, and then the Em- 
perors  once  more  united  in  thcir  ow11  persons 
the offices  which  had  been  separa-ted under 
the Republic. 
To  all  outward  appearance  the  change  was 
very gradually made, for neither the Senate nor 
the old  popular  assemblies  were  abolished.  At 
first even the idea of a dual government, divided 
between the Senate and the Princeps, was retained 
in the law, and the time was not yet ripe for the 
Emperor to take formal precedence of  the Senate. 
In actual fact he stood above it already, for the 
Senate was  mostly  composed  of  men  who  were 
his  creatures.  The  ultimate  decision  lay  with 
the Emperor,  because  he united  in  himself  the 
whole group of  offices of  the Republic, and above 
all  the  office  of  Tribune  of  the  People.  This 
made him the formal representakive of  the sove- 
reign people, and gave him, in this capacity, the 
right  of  veto  upon  any  decree  passed  by  the 
Senate.  The actual effect of  this was  to create 
a new authority, which struck at  the very essence 
of the Republic.  The abrogation of  the principle 
of  divided  control and of  a short term of  office 
were  both  likewise  innovations.  The  Emperor 
was invested with the purple for the period of  his 
life, and nothing but assassination or the victory 
of  another  usurper  could  depose  him  from  his 
seat.  Lastly,  and  most  important  of  all,  the 
Empire  abolished  the  old  republican  principle 
that in Rome itself the civil and military power 
might never lie in the hand of one man.  Within 
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their  arms,  and  the  civil  authority  alone  held 
sway.  In the Provinces, on the other hand,  in 
the last period  of  the Republic, we  find a practi- 
cal state of  siege existing.  Here the Proconsuls 
and Propraetors combined the civil and military 
supremacy.  What had  been the actual state of 
affairs  in  the  Provinces  was  now  approved  by 
law for the whole orbis terrarum, and all power in 
both departments of  the State was put into the 
Emperor's hands. 
These  very  conditioqs,  however,  were  what 
made  it possible to govern  all the parts of  the 
Empire  with  more  justice  than  they  had  ever 
enjoyed under the Republic.  When we  compare 
the  state of  affairs in  the Provinces  under  the 
old  order  and under  the new  we  cannot fail to 
see  how  needful  the  change  in  the  forms  of 
government had become for the decaying world 
of  antiquity.  For  one  thing the idea  that far 
distant parts might  be  represented  by  deputies 
was quite unfamiliar to the Ancients, who  could 
only conceive political liberty as direct participa- 
tion by the citizens in the conduct of  the State. 
Therefore so  soon as the antique State widened 
beyond  the  confines  of  the  city  into  broad 
dominions,  or  into  a  World-empire,  its ancient 
freedom  was  bound  to become  a  hollow  form. 
Rome might indeed bestow the rights of  citizen- 
ship upon  provincials  such  as the Italic tribes, 
but  in  practice  it was  impossible for  all  these 
cives  Romani to travel to the city to take part 
in  a  consular  election.  In the Provinces  the 
only  real  value  of  the  privileges  of  citizenship 
was in respect  of  the law of  persons.  Only one 
solution was possible, and instead of the Provinces 
being  dominated  by  a  City  the  whole  Empire 
was  made subject to an individual.  In the last 
days  of  the  Republic  the government  of  Rome 
had  been  the rule  of  a  town  which  had  sucked 
into itself  the very  life-blood  of  Italy and  the 
Provinces.  We  have  a  terrible  example  of  it 
in  the  administration  of  Sicily  under  Verres, 
which was no exceptional case, for the aristocratic 
Civil Service of  ancient Rome received no salaries, 
and  its  officials  were  compelled  to  squander 
millions in pandering to  the mob.  It is impossible 
to estimate the cost of  the Aediles office, but all 
this expenditure had then to be made up in the 
fat harvest of  a Proconsul or a Propraetor. 
The only remedy lay in an absolute monarchy. 
Thenceforward most  of  the Provinces  lay in the 
hand  of  the Emperor,  and he appointed legates 
to  be  his  responsible  representatives  in  them. 
They  received  a  fixed  salary,  and  held  their 
position  for  as  long  as  they  possessed  their 
master's confidence, in contrast to the Republican 
governors  who,  being  compelled  to leave  the 
Province  after  a  few  years,  had  always  made 
haste to squeeze it dry as fast as possible.  Then 
again  it  soon  came  about  that  the  Imperial 
throne was not always filled by Italians, but by 
Spaniards,  Africans,  and other  provincials,  who 
did  not  necessarily  take  up  their  residence  in 
Rome,  so  that the  system  of  government  was 
able  to  be  relatively  just  to all  parts  of  the 
Empire.  Half against his will Tacitus admits that 
the  Provinces  were  not  hostile  to the Empire. 
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bant,"  he  says in the Annals.  We  may  trans- 
late  the  double  negative  with  confidence  into 
the  positive  assertion  that  they  could  breathe 
freely under  the rule  of  richly-paid officials who 
were not out for plunder. 
Thus the Roman Empire is seen as a necessary 
transition  from the  City-State  of  antiquity  to 
the  Continental  State  of  the  Germans.  When 
we  observe  how  a  peaceful  civilization  spread 
over  the  orbis  terrarum,  and  how  wars  were 
gradually relegated to the fringes of  the Empire, 
we  cannot deny that in spite of  its many isolated 
horrors,  this  form  of  government  provided  a 
tranquil close  for the life  of  the ancient  world. 
Until then war had been  as normal a  condition 
as  peace  is  to-day.  Everything  Roman  which 
is still left for us to admire upon the earth is a 
relic of  Imperial Rome.  The older Rome was un- 
cultured through and through, and the Republic 
was  finally swept  away in a  tornado of  license. 
Originally  the  Romans  were  semi - barbarians, 
with no sort of  capacity for the finer enjoyments 
of  existence.  Under  the Emperors  all this was 
changed,  although  there  was  still  no  develop- 
ment  of  really  independent  art.  Horace  and 
Virgil  merely  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the 
Greeks and had  none  of  the youthful freshness 
which we  see, for instance, in Ennius.  Neverthe- 
less in the reign  of  Hadrian, Greek art renewed 
its youth  so vigorously that Winckelmann  held 
some  of  the  work  of  this  period  to  have  the 
genuine Hellenic stamp. 
Yet  in  spite  of  all  this  it is  impossible  to 
feel  any  great  enthusiasm  for  the  conditions 
that  prevailed,  for  we  are assailed  on  all  sides 
by  the  feeling  that the  nations  of  the  ancient 
world had outlived themselves, and that morally 
and physically their strength was ebbing.  Their 
day was closing in twilight after a brilliant noon, 
and  the  light  of  their  evening  came  to  them 
from  a  monarchic  power,  which  could  never 
clothe itself  completely in the garb of  legitimate 
authority. 
There  was  indeed  a  wide  difference  between 
lawful  kingship  and  the  self-deification of  the 
Caesars, which arose from no individual caprice, 
but  had  its root  in  political  forms themselves. 
If a modern monarch were to exalt himself  thus 
it would  be  reckoned  to his  personal  disgrace, 
but in Rome the Emperor  was  in  very truth a 
god.  The  nations  of  antiquity  put  the  State 
above every  other thing, and therefore its veri- 
table  head  was  bound  to receive  the  honour 
due  to a  divinity.  Temples  were  built  to the 
Emperor, even while he yet lived.  What mortal 
man,  thus treated, could avoid  having his head 
turned ?  The mad  dreams of  the Caesars were 
the  inevitable  psychological  result  of  this  form 
of  State,  for  only  a  man  of  real  genius  could 
remain  undazzled by the giddy height  to which 
he  had  been  raised  by  a  freak of  Fortune and 
by no inherent right. 
Under  Diocletian  the  Empire  underwent  a 
very essential alteration, both inwardly and out- 
wardly.  Rome  was  transported  across  the 
Bosphorus  into  the  theocratic  dream-world  of 
the  East,  and the eastern  half  of  the Mediter- 
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over  its western shores.  The  wars  with  Persia 
followed, and, for a further misfortune,  brought 
points  of  contact  with  the  Persian  Kingdom. 
Persian ceremonial crept into Europe.  The Em- 
peror  became numen sacra numen, like any theo- 
cratic ruler of  the Orient.  Everything about him 
became sacred, down to the purple dye of  his robe. 
Under these forms the Byzantine Empire shaped 
itself  into  a  logical  "Panbasileia."  The theo- 
cratic element entered into it more and more, and 
when  it adopted Christianity under Constantine, 
Caesaro-Papalism was an absolutely natural result. 
Roman  Caesarism  has  found  its  modern 
counterpart  in the Bonapartism  of  France.  In 
its later setting this form of  State is unmoral in 
all  its aspects, because  the French  formed  part 
of  a  community  of  civilized  nations.  Neither 
can they be  called  outworn in the same degree 
that the Romans were when the Caesars reigned, 
for  such  a  decay  is  contrary  to the  nature  of 
Christian civilization.  The gracious mutual give 
and  take  which  rejuvenates  and  reinvigorates 
Christian nations  was  lacking  in the old  Pagan 
world.  It is because it was an unnatural portent 
in a civilized and independent world that Bona- 
partism  is  so  much  more  hideous  than  the 
Caesarism of  old.  It,  too, has taken its title from 
a  mighty  historical  personality.  Here, too,  the 
ruler must stand out from his fellow-men either 
by  his  military  glory  and his  power  of  govern- 
ment,  or by his wealth,  and as a  patron  of  the 
arts ; in him  the nation must  recognize the re- 
flection of  its own  innermost self.  Napoleon  1. 
understood  this well, for  he  knew the needs and 
the wishes of  the  French  people.  His foreign 
policy was just  one gigantic gamble, and his idea 
of  a  world  empire was  contrary to reason  and 
could  never  actually  have  endured.  He  was 
in  this  a  destroyer,  and nothing  more,  and by 
rousing the  nations  beyond  the limits  of  their 
endurance he helped them finally, against his own 
intention,  to  unity and freedom upon national lines. 
Within his own country, however, his achieve- 
ments have become part of  the nation's  life, and 
the institutions which  he  created  have  survived 
the  lapse  of  time.  The  greatness  of  Napoleon 
lay in  his insight  into the French character; he 
knew that what they wanted was to be governed 
like a flock of  sheep, as slaves in reality, but with 
absolute freedom of  speech.  He formed his judg- 
ment of  them coldly and cynically from his own 
Italian  standpoint,  and  no  amount  of  phrases 
ever  blinded him  to their failings.  With a con- 
sistency which  compels our admiration he  built 
up a State of  soldiers and police ; in other words 
he  founded  his  own  despotic  power  upon  the 
army, and a  strictly centralized  administration. 
He was unable to dispense with the simulacrum 
of  a  Parliament, but he  was  able by  a  master- 
stroke to prevent it from gaining an asce  dancy. 
He  constructed  three representative bodies : the 
Senate,  consisting  of  State  dignitaries,  were 
puppets  of  his  will;  then  a  Tribunate,  whose 
function  was  only  to  discuss  projected  laws; 
and finally a legislative body, which had nothing 
to do but ratify the measures whose  details had 
been settled  elsewhere.  Here we  see the Janus- 
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Revolution, but it was  a  democratic  despotism. 
Very characteristic was the malicious and mock- 
ing  contempt with  which  Napoleon treated the 
German  princes,  who  indeed  deserved  nothing 
better.  The  crowned  Plebeian  wished  to prove 
that  he  was  worth  more  than  all  their  titles 
could  make  them,  and that he,  a  child  of  the 
Revolution, stood above any prince of  them all. 
Yet  here  again  the  only  possibility  for  the 
stability  of  such  a  system  lay  in  the  nation 
seeing  itself  embodied  in  the  power  and  good 
fortune  of  this  single  man,  for  in  a  State  so 
constituted  the moral forces  of  loyalty and law 
could never  make  themselves  felt.  The French 
had long since ceased to hesitate before a broken 
oath.  Napoleon  III., who  also tried to rule by 
virtue  of  the people's  will,  soon  discovered  on 
what  a  broken  reed  he  was  relying.  There  is 
no doubt that at first he, too, was beloved by the 
masses,  who  were  wearied  of  the  self-seeking 
strife  of  parties,  and  yearned  for  tranquillity. 
It  was  fear,  that basest  instinct  of  the human 
soul,  which  raised  both  the  Napoleons  to  the 
throne.  Society was  divided  into two opposing 
camps ; the nivelleurs who stood  for a  universal 
destruction,  and the trembleurs of  the  educated 
classes, who knew how to turn to their own profit 
the struggle at  the Barricades which they had left 
it to other men to fight. 
A nation  so  sunk in  cowardice  is  ripe  for a 
despot.  It  is  the  fashion  to  call  the  French 
lovers  of  novelty,  but  in  reality  there  is  very 
little  political  ground  for  this  reproach.  The 
last  hundred  years  have  brought  less  change 
to France than they have to Germany,  for  the 
only affected the surface of  the State. 
The  unprejudiced  observer  is  bound  to admit 
that it was under the rule of  the first and third 
Napoleons  that the country presented  the most 
harmonious  impression  of  a  relatively  sound 
political development.  There  is  no  use  in  at- 
tacking  Bonapartism  with  moral  aphorisms, for 
it, and not the bureaucratic  Republic of  to-day, 
expressed for  France  the  laws  of  her  political 
logic.  To  this  day  the  governmental  forms  of 
the country  are based  upon  the institutions  of 
the First  Consul.  The  firmly  centralized  hier- 
archy  of  a  thoroughly  despotic  Civil  Service, 
which  dispenses the citizens from the labours of 
self - government,  and  leaves  them  only  the 
privilege  of  criticizing, paying,  and  occasionally 
taking refuge in a revolution, is the substructure 
of  the State, and demands a despot at its head. 
The  Republic  only  lives  on  because  no  new 
Bonaparte  has  arisen  to replace  the  man  who 
beat the Germans. 
In themselves, the forms of  democratic tyranny 
have  of  course formed the stepping- stone to a 
Republic.  The  chosen  leader  of  the  nation 
may  be  invested  with  an undefined,  unlimited 
power  such as no legitimate monarch of  our own 
day can ever hope to possess, but, either formally 
or actually, the will  of  the people  must  still be 
its  only  legal  basis,  and it may  be  withdrawn 
from him at any moment.  Even the Napoleons 
Were  dependent upon Fortune, and when Fortune 
forsook them they fell, even  as the Tyrants of 
Ancient Greece had fallen long ago. 
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XIX 
THE ARISTOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
ALL  Republics have this characteristic in common, 
that in them the authority of  the State is dele- 
gated, and does not rule by its own  right, as it 
does  in  a  monarchy,  so  that  consequently  the 
rulers  are  subjects  at  the  same  time.  The 
central  authority  cannot  possess  that complete 
independence which  is,  at any rate potentially, 
the  attribute  of  monarchy,  for  it is  appointed 
directly, and ruled  indirectly,  by the will  either 
of  the  nation  as  a  whole  or  of  a  ruling  class 
within the nation. 
As  long  as there was  belief  in a natural law, 
and absolute acceptation  of  the principle of  the 
sovereignty of  the people, it was logical to derive 
the will of  the State from the will of  the Many. 
If  we  start  from  the  delusion  that  a  natural 
condition,  in  which  States  were  non-existent, 
was the precursor of  all political forms, and that 
upon  it followed the appointment  of  a  supreme 
authority by the sovereign people, we  are already 
thinking as Republicans,  and the institution  of 
monarchy  becomes  quite  inexplicable.  It  was 
only after the school of  historical  law had van- 
quished  this  doctrine  of  Natural  Right  that it 
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became possible to criticize the republican  State 
from the same unprejudiced standpoint as other 
political forms.  It then  at once  becomes  clear 
that the classical  State does not  by any means 
the ideals  which  the philosophers  con- 
stantly  depicted  in  their  conception  of  a 
contented  and innocent  antique  world,  firstly, 
because  it was  inherently unfree,  and, secondly, 
because of  its limitations, for it was a City State. 
Speaking  generally,  these  limitations  reappear 
in the Republics of  modern history, for, as a rule, 
this form of  government has only stood  its test 
in the little States.  Republican rule is impossible 
in a great State unless it be made up of  a federa- 
tion of small ones, for it is only adapted to narrow 
horizons,  where  considerations  of  foreign policy 
play no part. 
Republican forms themselves  may be  divided 
into two kinds,  sharply distinguished  from  each 
other by the difference between aristocracy and 
democracy.  So  wide  is  the gulf  that we  may 
say  that  monarchy  stands  between  these  two 
forms of  Republic.  It is no matter for astonish- 
ment that mathematical minds so seldom under- 
stand  the world  of  history,  which  is  so full  of 
conflicting lines that it is useless to try to divide 
it  into  any  geometric  pattern.  The  monarchy 
and the aristocratic Republic have tradition and 
inheritance  in  common,  they  both  cherish  the 
belief  that some  kind  of  historical  dispensation 
has called either a family or a whole nobility to 
rulership,  and  herein  lies  the  natural  affinity 
between these two  forms of  government.  Mon- 
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because the high  position  of  the monarch  gives 
him at all events the power  to join  hands with 
the  simple  man  as  his  protector  against  the 
strong and the arrogant.  To this we  must add 
a  point  of  psychology.  When  rule  is  divided 
aniong  a  number  of  persons,  old  experience 
seems to show that it is exercised for the benefit 
of  the majority, whereas a single ruler, responsible 
only to himself,  appears  rather to consider the 
welfare of  the whole community.  For this reason 
monarchies  can  rarely  incur as much  dislike as 
purely  aristocratic  States  may  do.  Human 
opinion  is  a  real  force  in  these  matters,  and 
human  sentiment  must  be  reckoned  with  by 
those who strive to  understand the effect produced 
by  different  political  forms  in  actual operation. 
It explains why a more or less latent monarchical 
force has always been the support of  the nation, 
and the defence of  the weak  and the oppressed 
in aristocratic States. 
Aristocratic government is  always difficult to 
manage, because it is founded upon a conception 
of  class  distinctions  which  is  undoubtedly  at 
variance  with  the natural  instincts  of  equality 
in  the  human  race.  I have  already  remarked 
how equality is postulated with peculiar emphasis 
in respect  of  those highest possessions which are 
the  common  property  and  the  distinguishing 
mark of  the race of  men ;  nowhere is inequality 
more intolerable than in legislation for the family. 
All  aristocratic domination is founded  upon the 
idea that one class is called into a higher position 
than the others.  The very  name  signifies  that 
this form of  State reposes upon  the belief  that 
the purest blood flows in the veins of  the rulers, 
which  in  itself  throws  a  certain  odium  upon 
those who are ruled.  There is something terribly 
inhuman  and  arrogant  in  a  purely  aristocratic 
temper  of  mind,  which  has  a  far more  baneful 
effect than the haughtiness of  a  monarch.  The 
aristocracies of  the Middle Ages were character- 
ized by a cynical contempt for their fellow-men ; 
it  was  they  who  turned  the word  for  peasant 
(villanus) into a term -of abuse.  In the Council 
House  of  Augsburg  there  are  three  allegorical 
paintings.  Aristocracy  is  there depicted  in the 
guise of  a solemn Senate, Monarchy as a brooding 
despot  receiving  the humble  homage  of  a  gor- 
geous  train  of  followers,  but  Democracy  is  a 
drunken Cleon encircled by a yelling mob.  These 
illustrate the point  of  view  of  the nobility,  and 
the  principle,  "  Better  be  destroyed  than  en- 
slaved,"  for in that world the serf  could expect 
no consideration.  It  was  from the middle-class 
aristocracy  of  Holland  that  we  got  our  con- 
temptuous  nickname  of  "  Janhagel "  for  the 
lower  classes.  It  brings  out  clearly  the  hard- 
hearted  pride of  wealth  and learning which the 
Dutch  displayed  towards "  Jan Hagel " or  the 
simple man; it is the temper of  lords who have 
no overlord. 
This  violation  of  the  natural  instincts  of 
humanity  is  then  the  reason  of  the  difficulties 
which  beset  this  form  of  State.  The  demand 
for  distinctions  and  divisions  in  political  life 
can only be reasonably raised in a nation where 
the  differences of  social  conditions  are  patent 
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Cantons  old  and new,  its protectorates  and its 
territories,  which  were  absolutely subject  either 
to  the  whole  Confederation  or  to  individual 
Cantons, the distinction was reflected in the legal 
position of  the three different kinds of  Province. 
We  find  similar  conditions  in  the Netherlands, 
where the Seven Provinces  composed the back- 
bone  of  the nation, and where there was  no in- 
sistent call for complete equality. 
A  flourishing  aristocratic  State  presupposes 
the existence  of  an astute ruling  class,  holding 
firmly  by  the  settled  tradition  of  their  policy. 
The  tendency of  democracy is always levelling, 
and its demand is for a fixed  and rational code 
of  laws,  while  an aristocracy always  prefers  to 
rule along historical lines.  Hence the aristocratic 
temper  of  historians  of  the  first  rank.  The 
man who is steeped in history  is bound to have 
a certain predilection for what has gone before ; 
Stein spoke  as  a  pure aristocrat  when  he  said 
that  making  a  Constitution  meant  developing 
the present  out  of  the past.  Wise  aristocratic 
statesmanship is  founded  upon  the further  de- 
velopment  of  the past  in the present ;  it has to 
watch lest the will  of  the past, as expressed for 
instance in the law of  inheritance, should cramp 
and control  free  action  in the directions  which 
the present desires to pursue.  Most aristocratic 
governments  are  inclined  to  permit  this  to 
happen,  and to introduce  no  changes,  although 
the  economic  life  of  the  nation  is  perpetually 
driving new  social forces into action.  The  idea 
of  rule  by  virtue  of  inheritance  runs  through 
everything,  as the peculiar  reverence  shown  to 
family tradition shows.  This has displayed itself 
at all periods under the most diverse forms.  The 
ancestral portraits borne in the funeral procession 
of  the Roman  patrician  denote  as much  as  do 
the tombs of  the Venetian Doges in San Giovanni 
e  Paolo  how  much  stress  was  laid  upon  the 
family  and  its  inherited  tradition.  An  aristo- 
cracy is often unable to do justice to the natural 
tendency  of  the  human  spirit  towards  perfect- 
ability,  therefore  this  form  of  government  is 
seldom  tolerant,  and yet  it is  in  a  position to 
compel  respect.  Its  policy  is  consistent  and 
well considered, for the very reason that it takes 
no count of  the natural inclinations of the common 
people, and its history will always have a peculiar 
attraction for the professed student of  politics. 
In an aristocratic State everything naturally 
depends upon  the kind  of  political  training the 
ruling class have received.  A family education, 
in which father transmits to son the judgments 
and  prejudices  of  his  class,  together  with  the 
habit  of  command,  is  necessary  for  the  main- 
tenance of  political tradition, with its rights and 
customs.  Much sagacity therefore has been pro- 
perly expended upon the attainment of  this end. 
The  practical  training  of  the nobility  upon  the 
ladder of  official life has an unspeakable import- 
ance,  which  the Roman  aristocracy  understood 
better  than  any  other  nation  when  they  put 
their  young  patricians  through  all  the  grades 
of office from that of  quaestor onwards.  We see 
the same process in the Teutonic Orders, in which 
the individual knight could rise  from the lowest 
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The thing to be  aimed at is the construction 
of  a  type in  which  individuality  shall  be  kept 
in  the  background.  Aristocracies  only  wish  to 
bring  into  prominence  the  habit  of  mind  and 
inherited  wisdom  of  their  class,  and they  look 
coldly upon the development of  great and original 
personalities.  Monarchy,  on  the  other  hand, 
works  upon  the opposite  theory that history  is 
made by individual men-great  kings with great 
ministers  to  seize  great  opportunities.  Hence 
it follows that aristocratic States will not always 
permit  great  military  glory  to be  won ; they 
begrudge the crown of  victory to their generals, 
lest  it  be  followed  by  the  crown  of  royalty. 
Venice  usually appointed foreigners to lead  her 
armies,  because  these  would  not  easily  find 
enough following in the State to bring about a 
revolution. 
Think  for a  moment  of  ancient  Rome.  Her 
Consuls were all as like one another as two peas ; 
we  read  of  them celebrating their triumphs over 
the enemies of  the city, but of  their personalities 
we  can  form  no  picture.  Her  aristocratic his- 
torians make a principle of  mentioning the names 
of  individuals as seldom as possible.  Look, too, 
at the history of  the Teutonic Order, which was, 
as I have explained  before,  a  theocratic  aristo- 
cracy.  We  do  not  know  to this  day  whether 
Meinhard von  Querfurt, the great  dyke-builder, 
was  a  mythical  or  a  historical  personage.  An 
aristocracy  such  as this  could  not  tolerate  the 
genius  of  a  Heinrich  von  Plauen.  Praise  and 
blame both fell to the lot of  the Order as a whole, 
and as a whole it carried on its great work.  No 
can  avoid  a  strain of  hardness  and 
narrowness, and we  may describe it as following 
national  aims in  a  peculiarly  harsh  and logical 
manner.  Those who would  understand to what 
greatness world-wide commerce can rise, as well 
as to what baseness it can stoop, must study the 
merchant  aristocracy  of  Carthage,  while  Sparta 
shows what a warrior aristocracy is like when it 
has  made  war  the  be-all  and  the  end-all  of 
existence. 
In such a world of  fixed tradition the violation 
of  long-established law was held to be a contra- 
diction  of  the  political  forms  themselves,  and 
therefore the forms in which  justice  is adminis- 
tered  have  in  all  aristocracies  generally  been 
both strict and good.  The justitia fundamentum 
regnorum  is  eminently aristocratic,  even though 
the  good  Emperor  Franz  also  took  it for  his 
motto.  Justice was always assured  even in the 
aristocracies which  shock us by their harshness. 
Its political trials apart, Venice possessed a good 
civil  and criminal  jurisprudence,  and it is  well 
known that in ancient Rome the body of  Judges 
was the last legacy of  the aristocratic Republic to 
the budding monarchy.  We may safely say that 
the jurists  were the only category of  politicians 
who  survived  under  the  Caesars.  The  main- 
tenance  of  law  in  all  its  severity  is  a  strong 
point  in aristocratic Republics,  but we  have  to 
admit at the same time that they are, and must 
be,  less inclined to mercy either than a monarch 
or  a  sovereign  people.  There  is  something 
thoroughly  aristocratic in  the strength of  char- 
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history shows us pronouncing sentence upon their 
own sons.  If  an aristocracy is to survive it can 
tolerate no disrespect to the laws upon which it 
is founded, for since the rights of the rulers them- 
selves are based upon inherited tradition, all other 
rights must be held  equally sacred.  Everything 
has its sure and logical connection, and the spirit 
of  the  State,  one-sided  though  it  may  be,  is 
thereby invested with a certain grandeur. 
In this strict administration of  justice we  may 
seek a compensation for the undeniable injustice 
which suppresses the development  of  talent, and 
forbids any man  to climb out of  the station in 
which  his  birth  has  placed  him.  A still higher 
recompense is to be found in the outward brilli- 
ance  which  is  another  attribute  of  aristocracy. 
The  splendour  of  the rulers  is  blazoned  to the 
world, and handed down to posterity by buildings 
and monuments  of  every kind.  There is  some- 
thing so imperial about the Palace of  the Doges 
and its surrounding buildings  that it served  as 
a model for the architecture of  the cities subject 
to Venice  upon  terra jirma  and along the Dal- 
matian  coast,  where  we  see  with  astonishment 
St. Mark's  Square  reproduced  again  and again 
by the towns involuntarily compelled to imitate 
their  overlords,  so  soon  as  they  were  drawn 
within the sphere of  their dominion.  The majesty 
of  ancient  Venice  stood  out in  small things  as 
well  as great, for the whole  town  was  laid  out 
with the pomp of  a Presence-Chamber. 
In these directions the old aristocracies  were 
very far ahead of  our  own  democratic  century, 
and this was very forcibly brought home to me 
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in  Stockholm  lately.  There,  upon  the  Ritter 
Island, packed  with memories of  the old aristo- 
cratic  age  of  Sweden,  stands  the  Riddarholm 
Church ; close by  it the Ritter Haus, in whose 
gigantic  hall  hang  all the coats  of  arms of  the 
old  Swedish  and  Pomeranian  families.  Two 
hundred paces farther on we come upon a shabby 
barrack - like  building,  which  serves  as  place 
of  assembly for  Sweden's  two  Chambers at the 
present  day.  In Amsterdam,  too,  we  can visit 
the  splendid  Council  House,  built  upon  40,000 
piles,  with  its seven doors for the governors  of 
the  Seven  Provinces.  The  Council  Houses  of 
our own Free Towns, Cologne, Nuremberg, Augs- 
burg,  all  are likewise  magnificent.  In Rothen- 
burg  three  stand  side  by  side.  They  are  the 
evidences  of  the  pride  of  the  city  aristocracy, 
and also the sop thrown to the people.  The real 
instinct  for  splendour  of  outward  forms  will 
always  be  more  widespread  in  an  aristocratic 
than in a democratic century, except when now 
and again a Demos with keen aesthetic perception 
inhabits a  ruling city, as in the case  of  Athens 
and Florence. 
Everything  which  touches  the  amenities  of 
life will as a rule be more gracefully and skilfully 
provided  for in  an aristocracy,  and this  is  the 
reason why it produces such excellent diplomats. 
Venice  had  the  best  the  world  has  ever  seen, 
and their despatches from foreign Courts are the 
admiration  of  all  historians,  and  the  classical 
model for their kind.  These men had the dignity 
which comes of  early training in the art of  rule. 
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cratic art of  being  bored  without  betraying  it, 
and yet of  never becoming blask ; of  controlling 
their  own  countenances  while  narrowly  scrutin- 
izing  the  expression  of  others.  To  us  all  this 
already seems unfamiliar,  for our upstart demo- 
cratic  manners  have  begun  to lose  touch  with 
these courtesies of  a bygone age. 
A Government whose whole nature is so closely 
entwined  with  the ideas  and forms of  the past 
must  naturally  look  upon  all  the  living  forces 
of  the present with a strong mistrust, and there- 
fore,  since  all  history  is  continually  moving 
forward,  this form  of  State stands always in  a 
certain antagonism to it.  Two classes of  persons 
are  the  inevitable  and  dangerous  enemies  of 
such a government, namely, men of  talent whose 
birth is plebeian, and those whose origin is mixed. 
This was  already known to Aristotle,  for  in no 
aristocracy  can  the separation  of  classes  be  so 
strictly kept but that there will be children born 
who  feel  it an injustice to be  put  below  their 
own  blood  kindred.  Nevertheless,  outstanding 
ability  is  generally  repugnant  to  every  aristo- 
cracy,  even  when  it manifests  itself  among  its 
own  officials.  Therefore  we  find  everywhere 
some system of  control, designed, like the Censor- 
ship  in  Rome,  to keep  strict  watch  over  the 
official class, lest they should exceed their powers. 
The most celebrated  of  all these is the skilfully 
contrived checking system of  Venice,  where one 
authority  was  always  in  close  touch  with  the 
other, where the red  and black  Inquisitors kept 
mutual watch  upon  each  other,  and  the secret 
denunciations  were  thrust  by  night  into  the 
Lion's Mouth.  In the same way Sparta had her 
Ephors, and in this case the spirit of  suspicion 
ruled  so strongly that overseers were  appointed 
by  the  State.  This  political  mistrust  often 
brings  an uncanny  atmosphere  into  the life  of 
aristocratic States. 
A  system of  this kind  may  work  for a long 
time,  but  no  amount  of  political  wisdom  can 
defend it in the long run against the living forces 
of  history.  The  beginnings  of  its  decay  often 
pass  unperceived,  but  Aristotle  had  already 
noted  the  process.  "Aristocracies,"  he  says, 
"  generally  crumble  gradually  and  no  man 
marks it " (XUV~LVOVUL  pe~apLXXovaa~  T@ X~EU~UL  KUT~ 
p~~P6~).  "  When the best cease to be the best," 
when the inward claim that is founded on educa- 
tion,  on  the  greater  instinct  for  justice,  etc., 
gradually disappears, then the ruin begins softly 
and  slowly,  unseen,  until  suddenly  the  whole 
structure  falls  asunder.  Think  of  the  aristo- 
cracies which  collapsed  at the  beginning of  the 
nineteenth century.  Think of the past which lay 
behind  Genoa and  Venice,  and  Berne  as  well. 
Their  history  had  been  proud  indeed, and yet 
how  suddenly they broke under  one  tread from 
Napoleon's  heel.  They fell, never to rise again, 
for  they  were  ripe  for  destruction,  although 
men  had  still thought  them strong ; not  even 
the  Vienna  Congress  was  capable  of  setting 
Venice and Genoa on  their  feet once more.  To- 
day,  we  may  safely  say that  although  almost 
every  highly  developed  nation  has  aristocratic 
elements, yet no form of  State, with the exception 
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modern  Europe  than  a  purely  aristocratic  Re- 
public.  The  conditions  for  it are no  longer to 
hand, for it requires on the part of  the people a 
submissive  acquiescence  in  the  superiority  of 
their ruling class, and they must, moreover, find 
comfort  in  this belief.  So  it was  in Venice  of 
old ; the  common  man  could  earn  money  in 
plenty, he felt a certain pride in his Government, 
and an illumination  on  St. Mark's  Square con- 
soled him for many trials.  No artistic display in 
the world could cast such a spell to-day, and we 
may  almost  declare  with  certainty that Europe 
will never see an aristocratic Republic again.  As 
a  form  of  State it belongs  entirely  to history, 
although its influences are traceable still in many 
of  the traditions of  the States of  our own time. 
If  an aristocracy is to survive it must keep 
its attention fixed  first  upon  the  rejuvenation 
of  its ruling class,  for this alone hinders  secret 
antagonisms  from rising  suddenly  and  danger- 
ously to the surface.  To this extent only  was 
Montesquieu justified in saying that moderation 
was  the leading principle of  this kind  of  State. 
This is only partly true ;  it is one of  the brilliant 
sallies upon  forms  of  government  of  which  his 
book  is  so  full.  An  aristocracy  is  always  in 
danger of exaggerating the system of  exclusion, 
and  thus  giving  opportunity  to  the  detested 
.rrapC~paas~  which  the  Greeks  called  oligarchy. 
It can only avoid falling into torpor by knowing 
how  to revitalize  itself  with  democratic forms, 
without  letting  slip  the  reins  of  government. 
Here the wisdom  of  the Romans showed itself. 
Cicero  made  his  mistake  regarding  the  mixed 
constitution of  Rome because the Roman aristo- 
cracy  had  been  shrewd  enough  to  veil  their 
dominion under democratic forms.  Step by step 
did they apparently give way, yet never did they 
quit the field, and again and again the old aristo- 
cracy found a way to reinforce itself with plebeian 
energies.  By such wise concessions it maintained 
itself  for long.  It has  been  the same with  the 
English nobility,  where the influx of  fresh blood 
is  not  difficult to ensure,  although, in  spite  of 
it, this aristocracy finally so  slighted the  other 
classes that a wide gap arose between them and 
the lower ranks of the nation. 
Thus  all  experience  shows  the  difficulties 
which beset this form of  State, on account of  its 
perpetual  conflict with  the natural impulses  of 
human  nature.  It  is  very  important  to  dis- 
tinguish  correctly  the different forms in  which 
modern and ancient aristocracies are constituted, 
for this is the very point upon which the antagon- 
ism  of  Paganism  and  Christianity  comes  most 
uncompromisingly to the fore.  The foundation 
of  slavery  upon  which  they  rested  made  the 
aristocracies  of  antiquity aristocracy intensified. 
Slavery must have made their frightful harshness 
vastly  harsher  yet,  and  our  modern  world  is 
simply  unable  to  picture  an  aristocratic  rule 
such as Sparta knew.  Slavery is also the primary 
cause  why  antique  democracies,  on  the  other 
hand,  strike us  as so beautiful ; it is  because, 
in our modern sense, they were not democracies 
at all.  Slavery enabled them to be comparatively 
restrained, noble and fine, while it shows up an 
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Another point to consider in forming a judg- 
ment  upon  aristocracies  is  the  character  and 
ideals  of  the ruling  nobility.  We  are  at once 
met  with  the  contrast  between  a  military  and 
a monied aristocracy, and experience and psycho- 
logy are at one in declaring the former superior 
to the latter in every way.  Moral ideas  lie  at 
the root  of  the dominion exercised by right  of 
birth ; conceptions of  knightly  honour,  military 
spirit, and political duty are never utterly lacking, 
although they  are often  dimmed  and faint.  A 
monied  aristocracy  is  founded  upon  principles 
which are the very reverse of  honour.  The spirit 
of  avarice  is  so  strong  within  it that we  may 
call government by merchants the worst rule of 
any.  Republics such as Carthage, or in modern 
times the British  East India  Company, may be 
reckoned among the most abominable,  although 
certainly  also  the most  worldly-wise,  of  men's 
achievements in the sphere of  politics.  The poor 
Hindus were right enough when they called the 
East India  Company "  a  wicked  old  woman," 
for it is impossible to describe how this trading 
Company drained the life out of the nation.  When 
future times pronounce their verdict on the exist- 
ing French Republic, the principles of  this form 
of  government will perhaps be better understood. 
A plutocracy is still a possible form of  aristocratic 
State, even  at the present  day,  decked  out,  as 
it is in France and many  parts of  Switzerland, 
in the trappings of  democracy. 
It  is  well  known  that Greek  theorists-mis- 
understanding  the  nature  of  monarchy,  and 
dismissing  it  as  an  unpractical  dream-have 
pronounced  the  domination  of  the best  to be 
the most perfect form of  Constitution. 
These  theorists were  one  and all  nobles  of  the 
filled with passionate hatred for the Demos. 
Plat0 is  the city aristocrat  personified,  instinct 
to his  finger-tips with  arrogance of  caste ; and 
Aristotle  inherited some of  this from him.  All 
the Greeks looked upon Sparta as the fountain- 
head  of  political  wisdom,  even  as  we  looked 
upon England a few decades ago ; in those days 
we  sought  and  found  a  depth  of  meaning  in 
British  institutions  which  astonished  English- 
men  themselves.  We  see with  amazement  the 
Athenian  philosophers,  filled  as they were  with 
a  culture  and  a  nobility  of  speech  which 
none  but the Ionians  could  compass,  extolling 
the Spartan State which  showed  in  every par- 
ticular an absolute contrast to their own glorious 
civilization.  Plato finds his modern counterpart 
in  Frederick  Gentz,  who  lent the power  of  the 
mind which  had formed itself upon  Goethe and 
Schiller and the Kantian philosophy to serve the 
cramped  and narrow  statesmanship of  Austria. 
Vienna  could never  have produced  such a  man 
as he; he was no native of that  world where Jesuiti- 
cal teaching alternated with pastry gobbling ! 
Plato and Aristotle followed a  course similar 
to his, if  less ignoble.  They committed a crying 
injustice  against  their   ath her land,'  they  vilified 
the Prussia of  Greece in order to exalt its Austria, 
for to Hellas Sparta was the power of  death and 
perpetual stagnation which paralysed the whole. 
From its very beginnings the Spartan character 
was dour and narrow in the highest degree.  The 
VOL. I1  R 242  THE ARISTOCRATIC REPUBLIC  SPARTAN CUSTOMS  243 
State had been carved out by the sword, for when 
its  Dorian  conquerors  had  divided  the  land 
between  them  at one fell swoop nine  thousand 
Spartiates had each received an inalienable patri- 
mony,  and  the  aristocracy  was  thereby  estab- 
lished  on  a  very  firm footing.  As  long  as this 
was  kept to,  the dominion of  the nobility  was 
secure and internally sound.  Below  them  and 
in  dependent  relation  to  them  stood  thirty 
thousand  Lacedemonians as Perioeci, who exer- 
cised  no political  function  whatever,  and below 
them again came more than two hundred thousand 
Helots,  State slaves of  the Spc~rtiates. So long 
as these divisions were  kept up the aristocracy 
was  healthy  at the core.  The real direction  of 
the  State  was  in  the  hands  of  the  yepovaia, 
a  Senate  composed  of  twenty-eight  members, 
whose  minimum  age  was  sixty.  This  body 
supervised  all the various  official authorities on 
behalf of  the State, it exercised penal jurisdiction, 
and directed the lives of  each individual citizen. 
Side by side with it there was a National Assembly 
of  the ruling  nobility,  but it only  met  once  a 
month, for the purpose  of  ratifying or rejecting 
without discussion the decrees of  the y~povcrla. 
This  system  presupposes  the  thorough  and 
comprehensive training of  the ruling class in the 
art  of  government,  and  this  attribute  of  the 
Spartan  State  was  what  chiefly  called  forth 
Plato's admiration.  His pre-eminently pedagogic 
mind always believed that virtue could be taught. 
He thought it came from knowledge and under- 
standing,  and  he  invested  education  with 
absolutely  magical  power  in  consequence.  In 
Sparta  the  boys  and  youths  were  trained  on 
a very methodic  system.  They were  only  left 
to  feminine  care  for  the  first  seven  years  of 
their lives;  after  that they were  taken  out of 
their  mothers'  hands  and  publicly  educated  as 
children of  the State (rra;8eq  TOXLTLICO~)  until their 
thirtieth year.  This system had marvellous re- 
sults in its development of  physical energy ; so 
manly, warlike, and hard was it that even those 
notes  of  musical  instruments which  might tend 
to  soften  the  spirit  were  expressly  forbidden ; 
the  ears  of  Spartan  youths  might  only  hear 
certain specified harsh sounds.  Education in the 
proper intellectual sense was likewise forbidden on 
principle, for fear it should lead to effeminacy of 
character. 
In  Sparta  even  marriage  was  treated  as  a 
purely  political  matter,  and all family  life was 
absolutely suppressed for the sake of  the State. 
The  sole  aim  of  marriage  was  to rear  healthy 
children  for  the  warrior  class ;  youths  and 
maidens  whose  physical  characteristics  seemed 
to promise a vigorous progeny were paired  with 
each other for this purpose only.  In fact marriage 
was hardly worthy of  its name in Sparta, because 
the husband  scarcely  ever  lived  at home.  He 
was obliged to present himself thrice daily to sup 
black  broth  at the  Syssitia  or  common  table. 
The female sex coarsened and deteriorated under 
this purely military development of  the Spartan 
State ;  women were looked down upon in a really 
terrible way, and were given no place at all in a 
world made for men alone.  Their only function 
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they were nothing but weaker men, with all the 
tenderer sides of  their natures forcibly suppressed. 
These masculine creatures, who had lost all their 
womanhood, were the final cause of  the overthrow 
of  the State. 
Another dangerous germ of  destruction lay in 
the  ancient  double  kingship,  which  had  great 
power in the earliest times, but was reduced  to 
complete impotence under the later Constitution. 
Both kings had certain privileges, and they took 
command of  the armies in the field, in the name 
of  the Gerusia, of  which they were both members. 
This fallen royalty  carried  with it the risk  of  a 
strong king arising ; who,  in order to make his 
proud  title  a  reality  once  more,  should  ally 
himself  with  the  Perioeci  and  the  suffering 
masses  of  Helots,  for  in this case  a  king  must 
become  a  demagogue  if  fortune were to favour 
him.  The attempt was  once made and failed; 
its primary result was the appointment of  Ephors, 
a body of  State overseers, five in number, elected 
on the average for the space of  one year, whose 
function was to exercise control over all  officials 
of  the State, including the kings.  It followed, 
by one of  the natural laws of  politics, that the 
authority of  the State was transferred  from the 
Gerusia to this little group of  Ephors, and the 
aristocracy  was  transformed  into  an oligarchy. 
me  office  of  Ephor  became  thenceforward  the 
highest object of  an ambitious Spartan's  desire, 
and  he  sought  to attain it by  all  lawful  and 
unlawful  means.  The  disastrous  spirit  of  sus- 
picion  which  led  to  the  institution  of  these 
Ephors was bound up with the inherent impossi- 
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bility  of  keeping the State always upon  a  war 
footing.  Aristotle hit the right nail on the head 
when he said that Sparta's Constitution would be 
if  the State were a camp.  This, however, 
it was not, and its desire to become so artificially, 
involved its cutting itself off  intentionally  from 
contact  with  States  whose  development  was 
higher.  Sparta tried, for this reason, to prevent 
economic  intercourse  with  neighbouring  lands 
by  introducing  an iron  coinage  and  by  other 
means as well.  Nevertheless,  since  war  brings 
nations  together  as  much  as  it sunders  them, 
and since it has always been one of  the strongest 
influences  for  change  in  history,  the  Spartans 
must have learnt something of  the civilization of 
more cultured peoples during the perpetual wars 
they  waged.  The  spectacle  of  the wealth  and 
beauty  of  the  world  could  only  affect  these 
barbarians in one way.  They ignored the beauty, 
but  they  saw  the power  of  money.  A terrible 
auri sacra fumes took possession of  their untutored 
minds,  until they became like the lion who  has 
once tasted blood.  Robbery and plunder spread 
everywhere, until even  the old  tribal territories 
at home were bought and sold, and with this the 
sexless women of  Sparta began to play a dreadful 
part.  The toll of  war among the men had placed 
two-fifths of  the tribal territories in the hands of 
these shameless creatures, who ruthlessly misused, 
in  their  ever-growing  greed,  the  power  which 
capital placed in their hands. 
The pressure  upon  the lower  classes  became 
unendurable, and a despairing cry for a monarchy 
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Cleomenes  came  too  late,  and  in  the  ensuing 
struggle  of  all  against  all  the State fell  into a 
ruin,  which  could have had  no  better  outcome 
than its final subjugation  beneath  the adminis- 
tration of  a Roman Proconsul. 
Thus did Sparta meet an obscure and miserable 
end.  She  had  had  five  hundred  years  of  life, 
and her discipline and endurance had even made 
her  vanquisher  of  Athens.  Hers too  had  been 
the aristocratic art of  diplomacy, and we  cannot 
but admire the political shrewdness and skill of 
her  ill-educated  and laconic  race,  even  though 
in the other States of  Greece she did find natural 
adherents  who  were  unfortunately  lacking  to 
Athens.  To belong  to the  Spartan party  was 
as common  in the reactionary  circles of  Greece 
as Austrian  inclinations once were in Germany. 
All  the city nobility which  the democracies had 
driven  out  naturally  joined  this  party.  It  is 
difficult nowadays to form any true  conception 
of  the savagery of  these nobles.  We may make 
some guess at  it from the words of the secret oath 
which they swore against their Fatherland : "  I will 
be an enemy to the people, and work them as much 
evil by thought and deed as I can think or do." 
To these elements Sparta looked for support, 
much as Austria has looked to the landed gentry 
of  the Empire and to  the Church of  Rome.  These 
old Greek times are in many ways so strikingly 
like the political conditions of  Germany that we 
sometimes almost feel that we  are studying the 
history of  our  own  country  during the German 
Confederation.  Greece faced her decisive struggle 
in  the Peloponnesian  War,  which  was  for  her 
what the war of 1866 was for us, and Sparta then 
used precisely the same methods against Athens 
Austria did against us.  King Brasidas caused 
himself  to  be  preceded  by  a  proclamation  in 
which  he  offered  release  from  the  oppressive 
preponderance  of  Athens  to  all  Hellenes  who 
should adhere to him.  Benedek made the same 
promises  to Germany  regarding  the oppressive 
preponderance  of  Prussia.  The  high-hearted 
Athenian nation who set out to unify Greece and 
to pursue a Great Greek policy found no natural 
partizans  among  the petty  States,  and  in  this 
lay  the  real  cause  of  the  failure  of  Athenian 
policy. 
The  mere  student  may  find  something  to 
admire in the spectacle of  this crude and brutal 
State in the midst of  a  race whose destiny was 
to lead  the van  of  civilization,  but  ~iote  and 
Niebuhr  have proved  beyond  dispute that with 
all its immorality the Athenian Democracy was 
more moral and more human than Sparta.  The 
breadth  and  greatness  of  Niebuhr  has  seldom 
struck me so forcibly as in his lectures on Greek 
History.  He,  almost  a  reactionary  in  modern 
politics, hates Sparta, and expresses an enthusi- 
asm for Athens,  because he feels that the spirit 
of  Hellenic  life  burned  more  brightly  there. 
We  who  belong  to  a  manly  race,  where 
military  service is  universal  and  skill  in  arms 
is  looked  upon  as a  normal  passion for every 
healthy  man,  can  never  take  for  our  model  a 
State where military efficiency is the only ideal. 
Our  age  is  one  of  fashions  in  learning,  which 
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of  scholars  raves  for  Athens,  the next  reveres 
Sparta.  Yet, when we look at  history dispassion- 
ately, we  do  not  find  the  embodiment  of  the 
Hellenic ideal  in the brutal  warriors  of  Sparta, 
but in the undying loveliness of  Athenian life. 
In Sparta we have seen a military State in all 
its terrible harshness, and we  now turn to study 
the striking contrast  which  the distorted  com- 
mercial State of  Carthage affords, with its equally 
one-sided but decidedly more repulsive extremes. 
World-wide commerce unfolded itself grandly in 
the hand  of  this Semitic people in the Bay  of 
Tunis.  The  Western  Mediterranean  they  re- 
garded  as  their  own  monopoly,  and  they  per- 
mitted  to no  other nation  the right of  passage 
through the Pillars of  Hercules.  The navigation 
of  these straits was regarded as a trade secret of 
Carthage.  They sailed round Africa and reached 
the  East  Indies,  they  journeyed  northwards 
through  the  Atlantic  until  they  came  to  the 
Shetlands,  and  they  gathered  precious  amber 
on  the shores  of  East Prussia.  Everywhere  as 
they went they exploited the subject peoples to 
fill  the  purse  of  Carthage.  The  magnificent 
mining operations which they undertook in Spain 
give us some idea  of  how  well  they understood 
how  to turn  Nature  to their  service,  but  the 
lowness of  the galleries,  in which  men  must lie 
upon their stomachs as they worked, also shows 
us how shockingly this nation of  traders misused 
their  human  labour.  The  State,  as  Aristotle 
tells  us,  was  steeped  in  greed ; its  system,  he 
adds, would  be  perfect if  it were a  speculative 
trading business and not a State at  all. 
To all their refinement of  comfort and luxury 
this  people  joined  a  hideous  combination  of 
immorality, blood-thirstiness,  and  sensuality  in 
their  horrible  worship  of  Moloch  and  Astarte. 
This Semitic merchant State has shown us  how 
little wealth by itself can do to ensure civilization. 
It may  be  that modern  nations are once again 
to make  this experience for themselves,  for  we 
are  rushing  with  lightning  speed  towards  a 
similar  development.  The  motto  of  our  very 
latest Art seems to be, "  We can afford to pay," 
for  what  is  there  to  admire  in  the  aesthetic 
magnificence  of  the  present  day  except  the 
money it has cost ?  Our newest architecture, in 
its  Nuremberg  toy-box  style,  bears  witness  to 
the poverty of our invention, and yet we hear its 
perpetrators  boasting  of  being  greater  artists 
than  Rauch  or  Schinkel  or  Schliiter !  It  may 
easily befall  us  to see the beauty  and nobility 
of human life swallowed up by the greediness of 
commerce.  Carthage has  shown us the terrible 
degeneration that may overtake a nation  which 
is  driven  by  the avarice  of  Semitic  blood  into 
permitting  the  dominion  of  capital  pure  and 
simple.  We  see  it at the acme  of  wealth  and 
prosperity,  pursuing its barbarous worship, and 
producing a literature which is nothing short of 
twaddle.  We  only  know  of  one  single  serious 
book to lay to the credit of  the richest nation of 
the world, namely,  Mago's  Dissertation on  Agri- 
culture, translated into Latin by Cato Uticensis. 
The  political  Constitution  of  Carthage  was 
admirably  suited,  after  its  own  fashion,  to  a 
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find here a Senate, composed, like that of  Sparta, 
of  twenty-eight  Gerusiasts,  with  two  Suffetes 
at their  head,  although  in  Carthage these  were 
elected  annually.  Although  their  power  was 
equally small, they do not present such a striking 
contrast  to  the  governing  aristocracy  as  the 
Spartan kings, because another monarchic opposi- 
tion  party  very  soon  arose.  The  whole  Car- 
thaginian Constitution was  oligarchical from the 
first, and the existence of  cliques was an inevitable 
part of  it.  An Ephorate mas finally instituted in 
it also, though it was  a far larger body than in 
Sparta,  and  it  became  the  real  ruler  of  this 
merchant  nobility.  The  great  business  houses 
joined themselves together in groups of  five, and 
the Board of the Hundred and Four was composed 
from these groups by a sort of  distillation process. 
The masses remained content under this Govern- 
ment, as no direct taxes were required of  them, 
for  the proceeds  of  the high  tariffs  and of  the 
Spanish  mines  sufficed  by  themselves  for  all 
public expenditure. 
Such a  State as this would have crumbled of 
itself, if  it had not contained a healthy strain of 
monarchic-democratic  opposition.  It  is  fortun- 
ately  impossible even  for  Semitic  humanity  to 
give itself up entirely to the pursuit of  gain.  The 
Carthaginian  army  became  a  very  real  power, 
the more attractive in our eyes because it appears 
as a reaction of  the spirit of  heroism against the 
purely material spirit of  the State.  A commercial 
policy  on the Carthaginian scale could not have 
been carried on without a great army.  Yet here, 
as  everywhere else,  the city nobility were slack 
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and lazy,  so,  since  the merchant  princes  would 
not serve, the army was recruited from the lower 
classes  and  from  the  neighbouring  tribes  of 
; to  these  did  the  traders  leave  the 
trade of  arms.  In other ways  as well  the Car- 
thaginian army bore the stamp of  a commercial 
State,  for,  like  the  troops  of  the  Netherlands 
in later times, its strength was in its artillery and 
its  engines  of  war.  Commercial  States,  with 
their  intelligence  and  their  great  command  of 
capital, always produce the best technical weapons, 
and at all times engineers have usually  been  of 
the burgher class, while the horsemen were drawn 
from  the  nobility.  The  Carthaginians  used 
elephants  as  engines  of  wholesale  destruction. 
Perpetual  fighting  went  on,  usually  against  the 
Bedouins  on  the edge  of  the Sahara  or  in  the 
interior of  Spain, where Carthage finally clashed 
steel against  Rome.  These unceasing wars pro- 
duced a race of  great military commanders, who 
had  nothing  in common  with  the Semitic State 
which gave them birth.  All the heroic elements 
of  the nation were  embodied in Hamilcar,  Has- 
drubal, and Hannibal ; they were the chivalrous 
strength  of  the people,  and drew the masses to 
them  by  a  magnetic attraction.  It is  precisely 
in the masses that natural sympathy for heroism 
is always found, and therefore the House of Hamil- 
car  was  much  beloved  in  Carthage.  Relying 
upon  their  popularity,  and yet  more  upon  the 
army,  these  generals  soon  built  up  a  latent 
monarchy, and became a stumbling-block in the 
Way  of  the aristocratic domination,  just  as the 
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in political  institutions that this opposition was 
the  very  means  of  keeping  the  Carthaginian 
State for a time upon its legs.  In itself there is 
something inconsistent  about the existence of  a 
latent monarchical power, with no legal justifica- 
tion,  within  a  logically constructed  aristocratic 
State.  The  power  of  the  Barcidis  was  purely 
founded  upon  facts,  and  had  no  sort  of  basis 
of  law, for nowhere was it written that the leader 
of  the army should be a member of  this family, 
but it was usurped by great and undying military 
prowess.  This  was  fortunate for Carthage ; for 
had  this  great  race  of  soldiers not  existed  the 
merchant  aristocracy  would  have  been  seen  in 
all their  pitiable  sloth, and Carthage could cer- 
tainly  never  have  waged  her  three  great  wars 
against  Rome.  When  misfortune  finally  over- 
took  her  it became  evident  that the State was 
no longer fit  to be the home of  heroes,  and the 
fate  of  Carthage  was  sealed  when  Hannibal 
turned his back upon his spiritless Mother-City. 
How  different is the noble picture  which the 
Roman  aristocracy  offers  us.  Rome  was  the 
greatest,  the wisest,  and  the most  powerful  of 
ancient  republics,  and  in  its  classic  period  it 
was  a  completely  logically  constituted  aristo- 
cracy.  Polybius and his follower Cicero prove the 
purely  superficial  quality  of  their  examination 
when  they try to prove  that this was  a  mixed 
Constitution from the fact that the supreme power 
was  in the hands of  two Consuls,  and that the 
people  were  admitted  to the  Comitia  to ratify 
the decisions.  The triumph of  this aristocracy 
lay precisely in the marvellous skill with which 
they  absorbed  democratic  ideas  into their Con- 
stitution and thereby turned them to their own 
ends.  Niebuhr  got  this point  exactly when  he 
said that we  may recognize the political  insight 
of  the Roman  Patricians in the art with  which 
they receded and gave way step by step without 
ever  being  untrue  to  their  own  nature.  The 
Roman  State was  superior  to the Spartan from 
the  outset,  because  it  possessed  a  power  of 
expansion  which  Sparta  lacked.  Moreover,  in 
Rome  the  family  stood  more  independent  of 
the State, which was not the monstrous vampire 
which  it  became  to  Spartan  life.  Crude  and 
rough the temper of  the Romans may have been, 
but Roman manners can in no way be compared 
with the deliberate brutality of  Sparta. 
At the very beginning of  her history Rome had 
the good  fortune to live through  a  long  period 
of  real  kingship,  which  succeeded  in  softening 
antagonisms  of  class.  After  the  fall  of  the 
monarchy  the  Patricians  understood  how  to 
govern  the State through  the Comitia  Curiata, 
and for a time the Republic was  an aristocracy, 
founded  solely  upon  birth.  Against  this  the 
Plebeians  made  an  increasingly  successful  re- 
sistance.  They  demanded  that  the  Comitia 
Tributa should be joined  to the Comitia Curiata 
for themselves alone ; they finally succeeded in 
obtaining  the Connubium, and therewith  swept 
away the old class distinctions in the legal sense, 
for when  there is  absolute freedom  of  marriage 
between classes no class can maintain its existence 
as a  legally exclusive caste.  Upon this followed 
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ended  in  the  Plebeians  once  more  forcing  an 
entrance into every office of  the State. 
Thus  the  aristocracy  made  concession  after 
concession,  until  at  last  it  appeared  to  have 
taken the lower place.  But it was still in appear- 
ance  only,  for  they  managed  so  to  establish 
relations  with  the  victorious  party  that  its 
best families were merged with the older aristo- 
cracy.  The proud Fabian clan now  held out its 
hand to the Valerian, who had once been liberal 
out and  out,  and the alliance  between  the old 
Patrician class and the leading Plebeian families 
produced the official aristocracy of  the Optimate, 
whose position was never legally defined.  It had 
the advantage over the older aristocracy of  being 
to some extent accessible from below,  although, 
as we  see from the typical instance of  Cicero,  it 
was not possible at  first for homines novi to prosper 
in it without having recourse to servility.  They 
were  continually  excusing  and justifying  them- 
selves  in  the  eyes  of  the  better-born.  It  is 
evident that in Cicero's day the Optimate already 
had  tremendous  power,  but  it  was  not  only 
strong, but also on the road towards deterioration 
and ossification in all directions.  We  can trace 
how  the  number  of  ruling  families  went  on 
shrinking,  and how  the necessity  for  the mon- 
archic coup d'Etat was becoming more and more 
pressing.  The  real  rulers  were  reduced  to  a 
small clique who contemplated sharing the govern- 
ment of  the world between them. 
Nevertheless  it will  always  be  a  marvel how 
the  Roman  aristocracy  in  its  great  days  did 
succeed  in  preserving  its aristocratic  dominion 
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under  democratic forms.  Outwardly, the whole 
machinery  of  the State was  highly  aristocratic. 
The meetings of  the Senate were held in solemn 
form.  At  the  same  time  the formula  Senatus 
populusque Romanus, in which it is significant to 
note that the Senate stands first,  preserved the 
fiction of  its being no more than on a par with 
the people.  In fact, however, the Senate ruled ; 
the sovereignty was vested in it, and it exercised 
control  over the administration.  In those  days 
the  whole  nation  appeared  in  the guise  of  an 
army;  it marched  to its assemblies  in  warlike 
array to the sound of  trumpets, but these assem- 
blies  soon became tumultuous, and sat more for 
the  purpose  of  voting  than for  discussion.  In 
practice  the Senate controlled  them  absolutely. 
The  composition  of  these  National  Assemblies 
was  also  characteristic,  and  its  consequences 
were far-reaching, for the lower classes were but 
weakly  represented,  and  the  centre  of  gravity 
lay  among  the  wealthier  citizens.  All  these 
arrangements were part of  a shrewd consecutive 
policy,  and another masterly  invention was  the 
institute  of  Censors,  with  moral  and  judicial 
authority,  to  which  the  aristocratic  spirit  of 
suspicion had given rise.  Carthage, too, had her 
Ephors,  who  kept  stern  watch  lest  officials 
should exceed  their powers.  A healthy  aristo- 
cracy, such as Rome was through a long period of 
its history,  keeps  intact its code  of  honour  by 
means of  this kind of  self-control. 
We  have further to admire the well-ordered 
gradation  of  offices,  which  prevented  the  rise 
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and  the  energetic  authority  wielded  by  these 
officials.  Polybius, who gives us upon the whole 
a correct picture of  the Roman State, says that 
the power  of  the  Consuls  is  more  kingly  than 
republican.  There was something in this strong 
official  control  which  kept  the  State  together, 
even after it had begun to expand upon Imperial 
lines.  The training  of  this governing class was 
much  more  liberal than in  Sparta.  Rome  had 
no  State education,  for  the upbringing  of  sons 
was left in their parents' hands, and the position 
of the mother of the family was far more respected 
than  in  Sparta.  As  soon  as  the  youth  was 
grown  up he  entered  upon  his  official  career. 
None of  the offices  were salaried, and thus here 
again  the  poorer  classes  were  completely  ex- 
cluded.  In the later period the man  who  took 
the post of  aedile had either to be  a millionaire 
or was forced to borrow hugely from the numerous 
Orientals who inhabited Rome.  We have already 
seen  how  officials  could  reimburse  themselves 
when they became Propraetor or Proconsul of  a 
Province. 
It is not difficult to recognize how this system 
affected the education of  the governing class.  Its 
first  result  was  that  peculiar  Roman  hard- 
heartedness  which  held  everything  permissible 
that could serve the Roman State.  Caesar, who 
was perhaps the mildest of  all the Roman states- 
men  whom  we  know  of,  had  still no hesitation 
about  cutting  the  hands  off  a  whole  German 
tribe.  This  was  a  thoroughly  Roman  frame 
of  mind.  Regarding the resistance made by the 
Germans to Rome he merely remarks that "  by 
nature all men  strive for freedom and hate the 
condition  of  slavery."  This  he  freely  admits, 
but his  own  destiny as a  Roman was to reduce 
the Germans to servitude. 
The first internal cause of  the fall of  the old 
Republic lay in the decay of  the stern moral code 
of  the  governing  class,  and  the  second  in  the 
unreasonable  concessions  made  to the  passions 
of  the lower  classes.  The  peasant  of  Italy was 
sacrificed in his competition with the grain from 
Asia  and Africa, in  order  that the Roman mob 
might  feed  plentifully  and  cheaply.  These  in- 
ternal  conditions  of  the sinking Republic  are a 
warning and an instruction for all time, but the 
primal  cause  of  decay  lay  in  the  extension  of 
its  territories  and  the  resultant  increase  of 
responsibilities which the City  Republic  was  by 
its  whole  situation  incapable  of  coping  with. 
The great  dignitaries who  composed the Senate 
were indeed men of thorough practical experience, 
and the Roman Republic  was  thereby  endowed 
with the power of  getting at the truth of  facts; 
but still a Board of  this kind in a  City State is 
not of  itself capable of carrying on a great foreign 
policy.  It  was  not  genius  in the proper  sense 
which dictated this continual extension of  Roman 
territory ; the cause lay rather in the nature of 
things, in that intolerance of powerful neighbours 
which  drove  Rome  to  victory  upon  victory, 
conquest  upon  conquest.  A  consciousness  of 
her destiny as mistress of the world only appears 
remarkably late in her history ; the idea is first 
expressed clearly under the Empire, when Caesar's 
genius  had  given  the  thought  of  universal 
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dominion  its  magnificent  embodiment.  Taken 
all in all, her wonderful combination of  flexibility 
and conservatism has made Rome a model of  an 
aristocratic  government.  The  skill  with  which 
the  Patricians  made  concession  to the  people, 
without letting fall the reins  of  power,  reminds 
us  of  the way  in which the English  aristocracy 
contrived  for  a  time  to render  justice  to the 
populace by  means  of  the House  of  Commons, 
without  surrendering  the  control  by  the  old 
nobility. 
The cramped conditions of  the antique world 
gave  rise  to a  considerable  number  of  Aristo- 
cracies.  Modern history is otherwise, for in later 
times the middle and lower classes have become 
so  increasingly  conscious  of  their  power  that 
even  in  England  the democratization of  Parlia- 
ment  has  become  a  patent  fact.  Mediaeval 
history,  on  the  other  hand,  exhibits  a  strong 
aristocratic tendency, arising partly from a natural 
conception  of  class distinctions and partly from 
the peculiar immaturity of  States in those days, 
who were eager to acquire great territories, and 
having  done  so,  then  left  them  very  much  to 
themselves.  The politically constructive instinct 
of  the  German  race  did  indeed  give  but  little 
opportunity  to  aristocratic  Republics  on  any 
large scale, and the prevailing  form was  rather 
an aristocratic Monarchy.  When  we  do  find  a 
military  nobility  it is linked  with  Monarchy in 
some form or other.  With the exception of  the 
religious Orders of  Knights, which were in reality 
Theocracies, the Middle Ages only give us govern- 
ing Aristocracies in City life. 
In antiquity, as we  have seen, the harshness 
aristocratic  government  was  accentuated  by 
slavery and by the prevalent  conception of  life, 
but in the Middle Ages it strikes a kindlier note. 
Happiness is of  course a relative term, and yet, 
when we  contrast  present conditions,  we  do get 
the feeling that the simple man was  happier  in 
those days in many ways than he is in this age 
of  social discontent, and for this reason we feel no 
repulsion against the class divisions of  mediaeval 
times. 
After  the  fourteenth  century  this  primitive 
dominion  of  ruling  families  was  followed  by  a 
time in which the power of  the Guilds rose to its 
height, and succeeded here and there in bringing 
full-blown  Democracies  into  existence.  Then, 
as a  rule  in the larger Cities,  we  see  a  reaction 
setting in, and during the later period of  the Holy 
Roman Empire it is safe to describe the greater 
Imperial  Cities  as  thoroughly  aristocratic.  It 
was  of  course long since they had  had  any real 
aim  of  their own,  but when  the life  of  a  body 
politic has lost its aims, its  constitution  ossifies 
of its own accord.  Nuremberg has become a by- 
word  in this respect.  There,  at the end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  we  find  the  "  enjoying 
families " (Geniessende Familien), which  was the 
title given to those whose members enjoyed the 
monopoly of  election into the Council.  The idea 
of  public  duty  had  been  entirely  displaced  by 
the thought  of  the salary to be  enjoyed.  This 
form  of  corporate  life  carried  its  destruction 
within itself. 
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with  the democratic  form  of  State, bears testi- 
mony to their statesmanlike prudence and wisdom. 
The  democratic  Republics  of  Italy  fell  every- 
where into subjection to a Tyranny, and in every 
case  Monarchy  laid  violent  hands  upon  them, 
while  the sternly  aristocratic  City  States lived 
on  until  the  French  Revolution.  Of  all  these 
none  had  so  brilliant  a  history  as  Genoa  and 
Venice.  Of  the  two,  Venice  shone  with  the 
steadier light.  In her, many aristocratic charac- 
teristics  were  peculiarly  prominent,  the uncom- 
promisin0  division  of  classes,  the  ingrained  9 
conservatism,  and, not  least,  the ever-wakeful 
spirit of suspicion.  In spite of  the expansion she 
attained in later times, Venice was never anything 
but a City State, repeating many of  the conditions 
of  antiquity.  Just as Rome had been  the only 
Urbs, so  Venice  was  the ruling City  among  all 
the  others  in  her  territories.  Verona,  Padua, 
and  the  other  subject  towns  upon  terra  firma 
enjoyed  complete  municipal  freedom,  bit their 
nobility  were  not  admitted into the aristocracy 
of  the  ruling  City.  The  Dalmatian  coast  was 
arbitrarily  governed,  and  farther  east  the  de- 
pendence  was  still  more  complete.  When  the 
Peloponnese fell into Venetian hands, it, as well 
as Candia,  and later  on  the Crown  of  Cyprus, 
were  all  governed  as purely  subject  territories, 
and real political rights were reserved solely for 
the citizens of  the ruling City. 
The various communities established upon the 
lagoons  seem  to  have  lived  under  democratic 
conditions  during  a  long  period  of  their  early 
history,  for  we  hear  of  all  the  dwellers in the 
islands being occasiol~ally  sunlnloned to a common 
Assembly  of  the people.  From the end  of  the 
  eve nth  century  they  elected  in  common  a 
Dux " as leader for the period of  his life.  The 
year  997  saw certain  conquests  made  in  Istria, 
and  the  Dalmatian  coast  towns  coming  under 
the  guardianship  of  Venice.  About  the  same 
time  party-strife arose in Venice  itself,  and the 
struggle  brought  a  number  of  great  merchant 
families  into  prominence.  The  beginnings  of 
their  aristocratic  domination  are  only  dimly 
traceable,  but from the very first they bear the 
stamp which makes the history of  Venice so much 
finer a thing than that of  Semitic Carthage,  for 
we  never see her merchant  Princes touched with 
the  repulsive  spirit  of  the  shopkeeper.  The 
whole character of the Venetian State was fearless 
and noble from its youth up.  Many poets have 
sung  of  it;  our  own  Platen  wrote,  after  the 
Republic's inglorious fall : 
Wo ist das Volk von Kanigen geblieben, 
Das diese Marmorhauser durfte bauen ? 
(Where tarries now the royal race 
Who dared to rear these marble palaces ?) 
Venice made everywhere the same impression 
of  mighty riches spent in truly princely fashion, 
and it is this which distinguishes  her  citizens  so 
markedly  from  the  Genoese,  who  were  equally 
wise  politicians,  but  who  always remained  con- 
firmed money-grubbers.  They have indeed  left 
US a few fine monuments,  but the whole tone of 
Genoese  history  is  on  a  lower  plane  of  culture 
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In the  thirteenth  century  Venice  stood  at, 
the height of  her power, and in the fourth Crusade 
her  citizens  captured  the  carrying  trade  of  all 
Europe.  Her  ships  bore  the  Christian  armies 
to the Holy Land, and at the same time Venice 
herself  took  active  part in  the great enterprise, 
for the taking of  Constantinople and the founda- 
tion of  the Latin Empire was carried out in 1204, 
under  the leadership  of  the blind  Doge  Enrico 
Dandolo.  The Duchies  of  Sparta, Athens,  and 
all  the  others  which  were  carved  out  of  the 
ruins of the Byzantine Empire, lay, either directly 
or  indirectly,  under  the commercial domination 
of  Venice.  The City had indeed become  Queen 
of  the Adriatic  in  the true sense of  the word ; 
she italianized the Orient, as far as such a thing 
could  be  done,  and she  did  it with  marvellous 
success.  The  fate  of  Trieste,  and  above  all 
of  Dalmatia  at the present  day, shows to what 
an extent it has been possible to impose Italian 
speech  and  civilization  even  upon  a  Slavonic 
foundation.  These  cities  are  as  thoroughly 
Italian to all outward aspect as the towns of  the 
mainland, although the type of  their inhabitants 
still bears clear witness of  their  Slavonic origin. 
In the success of  their methods with these races 
the Venetian rulers were not unlike the German 
Knightly Orders in their colonizing enterprises. 
In her internal constitution,  however,  Venice 
had  entered  upon  the  downward  road  which 
eventually  led  her  to oligarchy  and  ruin.  In 
1172 a  Grand Council of  480  members was  sub- 
stituted for  the Assembly  of  the whole  people, 
and assumed  an increasingly oligarchical shape. 
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Only  certain  families found  admission into this 
highest  governmental  authority,  and  in  1298 
this practical  exclusion was  given legal  form in 
the  Golden  Book  of  the  Senatorial  Families. 
Thenceforward  the  fall  of  Venice  was  assured. 
By a natural process an Aristocracy  so  shut up 
within itself was bound to ossify, and to dwindle 
both  in  numbers  and  in  vigour.  The  Doge 
became  a  mere instrument  in the hands  of  the 
Senate of  the nobles, and in all important matters 
he  was  furthermore dependent upon  the assent 
of  the governmental board or Signoria.  For the 
rest  he  was "  King in  nothing but the purple." 
He  lacked  nothing  in  princely  ceremonial,  for 
the whole  wealth  of  the State was  called up to 
furnish the trappings for his golden ship. 
Among  the governing  nobility  suspicion  was 
always  on  the  alert.  In  1310  the  Council  of 
Ten was added as a supreme authority over the 
already  existing  governmental  bodies.  The 
Doge,  whose  powers  were  now  so  completely 
crippled,  sought  and found  a  natural  ally  in  a 
Demos as politically helpless as himself, but the 
attempt  made  by  Marino  Falieri  to upset  the 
constitution  miscarried,  and led,  not  only  to a 
further  strengthening  and  development  of  the 
Council of  Ten, but also to the establishment of 
three  State  Inquisitors,  whose  identity  was 
known  only  to the  Ten.  Thus  one  controlling 
body  was  added  to another,  co-ordinated,  and 
re-divided, until the Venetian Constitution came 
to deserve Ranke's  comparison with the Church 
of  St. Mark whose five domes seem to be stuck 
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which  dominates  its  fellow.  It  is  equally  im- 
possible to find the centre of  government  in the 
Venetian State. 
Every institution expressed the extreme spirit 
of  mistrust.  The Lion's  open  mouth upon  the 
Giants7 stair was  placed  there to receive  secret 
accusations,  which  were  certainly  followed  by 
results  when  their  nature  was  political.  The 
attitude in  State trials  was  always  based  on  a 
presumption  in  favour  of  authority.  On  the 
other  hand  this  aristocracy  were  peculiarly 
successful in capturing foreign talent, and turning 
it to the service of the State.  The disappearance 
of  Venetian  generals  from  conduct  of  military 
operations in the later centuries is a  significant 
sign ; they  might  have  been  a  danger  to  the 
Republic.  They  were  replaced  therefore  by 
alien  condottieri,  who  were  heaped  with  riches 
and honour,  but their  status as foreigners gave 
them no hope of  playing any decisive part in the 
councils of  the State.  In other respects  Venice 
followed the practice of  the Tyrants of  antiquity, 
and only  mowed  down  the  heads  which  reared 
themselves too high ; the unswerving justice  of 
aristocratic  government  was  meted  out  to  all 
the rest, and the mob were  appeased pane et  cir- 
cencibus.  The atmosphere was  so rarefied  upon 
this great  Venusberg of  Europe,  that the plain 
man  never  attained the level  of  political  ideas. 
His  life  was  a  round  of  money-getting  and 
pleasure, and the nation was rocked into a slumber 
of  prosperous  content  so  deep  that it was  long 
before  it  awoke  to consciousness  of  the rights 
of  which  it  had  been  so  completely deprived. 
Here again, and even in this, how great is the 
contrast  with  the  vulgarity  of  the  commercial 
spirit in  Carthage !  There we  were  repelled  by 
barbarisms  in  literature  and  art,  here  we  find 
an unerring aesthetic  taste,  and the life  of  the 
intellect  encouraged in  every  direction that did 
not  threaten  danger  to the  State.  Under  the 
rulership  of  Venice  Padua  was  the  leading 
University  of  the world, and the home of  many 
a  German  student.  Venice  played  another 
unique  r81e  in  history  in  her  capacity  as inter- 
mediary  between  East  and  West.  So  long  as 
she  kept  this position  she  was  a  real  influence 
in  the world.  Her streets abound with signs of 
the  influence  of  Byzantine  civilization,  and  in 
St.  Mark's  we  can  trace  clearly how  Byzantine 
architecture  imposed  itself  upon  the  style  of 
Italy.  When we  turn to the Orient  we  see the 
effects of  Venetian  rule  persisting  to this  day : 
the lingua  franca of  the Mediterranean  coast  is 
nothing  but  a  debased  Italian.  To  this  no 
doubt  the  Genoese  contributed,  as  well  as the 
Venetians.  They  established  themselves farther 
north,  dominated  the  Black  Sea,  exploited  the 
mines  in  the Caucasus,  and made  their  central 
mart  in  the  Crimea.  Thus  did  the  two  great 
rivals vie in spreading Italian culture in the east. 
A  mighty  strain  of  majesty  and  strength 
runs  through  the  whole  life  of  the  Venetian 
State.  She  was  unique  in  her  mastery  of  the 
art of government, and in the marvellous brilliance 
and  understanding  of  human  nature  displayed 
by  her ambassadors, but there was at the same 
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more  all  talents,  whose  origin  was  humble. 
Here lay the real canker at the root of  the proud 
Republic,  which  had  disdained  to do  as  Rome 
had  done  and  admit  homines  novi  into  the 
governing class.  In the early  days good  blood 
had  been  allowed  to enter  from  without,  and 
many a noble Venetian family came of  Dalmatian 
stock,  but  unfortunately  this  wise  course  was 
entirely forsaken in  later times, and the wall of 
caste  closed  about  the  dwindling  number  of 
rulers,  until  inter-marriages  and  the  ensuing 
physical  and moral  deterioration  brought  utter 
ruin upon Venice.  Great indeed was the fall of 
these  illustrious  houses !  Their  'decay  is  well 
typified in Manin, the last of  the Doges, and the 
pitiful part he  played  when  Bonaparte came in 
1797 to grind the ancient Queen of  the Adriatic 
with  his  heel  into the  dust,  and offer  the last 
humiliation  to the  State which  had  once  been 
ruler  of  the eastern world.  When the Republic 
of  St. Mark revived again for a moment in 1848, 
and the old historic  memories flickered up once 
more,  the  supreme  mockery  of  Fate  placed 
another  Manin  at  the  helm.  This  one  was 
the  son  of  a  humble  Jewish  family  of  Venice. 
All the old  aristocracy had  been wont  to gather 
a train of  little families of  clients  around them, 
who  often adopted their patron's  name.  From 
one  of  these  sprang  Daniel  Manin,  the  great 
democrat  whose  defence of  Venice  against  the 
Austrians belongs to the sublimest  deeds of  the 
nineteenth century. 
The  Netherlands  Republic  forms  the  most 
remarkable  of  the  few  exceptions  to the  rule 
that in modern history Aristocracies are confined 
to City States.  In this instance the comparison 
with  Carthage  is  still closer  than it was  in the 
case of  Venice, although in it we  are once more 
confronted  with  the  deep  gulf  between  ancient 
and modern civilization, for it shows us that no 
Christian  State  can  ever  pursue  the  power  of 
money as exclusively as that old Semitic merchant 
aristocracy  did.  As  a  commercial  State  the 
Netherlands  shared'many  of  the characteristics 
of  Carthage, but morally it was  vastly superior. 
In spite of  all  its wealth  it stood  upon  a  high 
level  of  scientific  and  artistic  development ; 
in fact  it may  be  called the first  modern  State 
which  gave  a  systematic  encouragement  to 
science  and  art.  In  the  seventeenth  century 
Leyden  was  the  real  centre  of  University  life 
for  the  Protestant  world,  and  Dutch  scholars 
stood at  the head of  men of  learning in Europe. 
The  constitution  of  this  Republic  was 
peculiarly  complicated,  inasmuch  that  it  was 
admittedly  a  Federal  State,  in  which  a  very 
sharp demarcation of  classes was added to great 
mutual  exclusiveness of  territories.  The  Union 
was  composed of  seven Provinces.  Membership 
of  one  of  the  great  aristocratic  Corporations, 
the  Vroedschappen,  made  up  of  powerful 
burgher-families,  was  an  indispensable  pre- 
liminary  to a  share  in  city  government.  The 
Provincial  Estates  of  the seven  Provinces  were 
composed  out  of  these  City  Councillors  from 
a  certain  number  of  privileged  Cities,  and  out 
of  the provincial nobility, while from these again 
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The liberum veto prevailed in these latter, as well 
as in the Provincial Estates, so that the govern- 
ment of  the Netherlands lay ultimately in  6000 
sovereign  hands,  and  any  single  little  town 
technically  had  the  right  to  stop  the  whole 
machinery  of  State.  The  realities  of  political 
power naturally prevented the practical exercise 
of  this theoretic privilege, and the small minority 
was frequently dragged in the wake of  the greater 
number, but the constitution itself  is all framed 
in the spirit of  an autocratic City aristocracy. 
Despite  the liberum veto  the State thus con- 
stituted kept  its strength  and  power  for  more 
than a hundred years, which is another proof  of 
how  spirit  may  prevail  over  defective  political 
forms.  The State was  the product of  the eighty 
years'  fight  for  freedom, and even  at the acme 
of  its prosperity  it could  never  belie  the ideals 
which  gave it birth.  One other safeguard stood 
between  these  ruling  gentry  and  the perils  of 
their  wealth.  The  natural  instinct  for  self- 
preservation in the people had wrought  a tower 
of resistance for itself in the hero line of  Orange. 
Thus the extraordinary analogy with Carthage is 
brought  down  even  into  details.  Just  as  the 
great soldier family of  the Barcids had stood for 
a  democratic  military  opposition,  and  a  latent 
monarchic  element  against  the ruling merchant 
class,  so in the House of  Orange Holland  had a 
hereditary  race  of  generals,  who,  with  their 
claims  to  the  rank  of  Counts  and  Dukes  of 
the Provinces represented  an embryo monarchic 
power which looked to the masses for its support. 
It is well known that when the weapon of  the Jesuit 
assassin  ended  the  great  career  of  William  the 
Silent the Proclamation which named him heredi- 
tary Count of  Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht was 
signed  and  ready  to be  promulgated.  It  was 
only  withdrawn  by the  Provinces  because  the 
tender  years  of  his  son  Maurice  forbade  the 
placing of  so much power within his hands. 
Hugo  Grotius  was  right  therefore  when  he 
said that the Republic arose by accident because 
no king was forthcoming at the moment.  Never- 
theless  this  uncompleted  transference  of  the 
hereditary  Countship  of  the two  most  powerful 
Provinces to the House of  Orange gave the family 
practical title to royal supremacy over the Union, 
for  the  other  Provinces  would  certainly  have 
followed the example of  Utrecht's  acquiescence. 
By  a  marvellous turn of  fortune  the virtues of 
a great ancestry were  continued  into the  third 
and fourth generation, for they were born rulers 
one and all.  The people bore them a love beyond 
description.  Wherever one of the House appeared 
the  masses  of  warriors  who  had  fought  under 
his  victorious  banner  flocked  together  to greet 
him  with  the war-cry  of  his  house.  As  a  rule 
they held the office of  Stadtholder in five or six 
of  the  Provinces ; they  were  seldom  able  to 
unite all the seven. 
Thus  it was  that a  military  and  democratic 
tradition grew up alongside of  the burghers who 
governed from the standpoint of  merchants  and 
professors.  It  was  the  natural  wish  of  every 
man who had followed the banner of  Orange into 
countless battle-fields to  raise the Captain-General 
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was  to be  found  in  the struggle between  these 
two  great  parties.  The  claims  of  both  were 
equal.  The great commercial families were  not 
only the representatives  of  a  world-wide trade, 
but  the  patrons  and  champions  of  intellectual 
culture  as  well ; among  their  adherents  they 
counted  Spinoza  and  his  like.  The  partizans 
of  Orange  on  the  other  hand  kept  a  watchful 
eye  upon  the  place  their  country held  in  the 
shifting  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe ; 
their  minds  were  always  turned  to  war  while 
commercial  interests  often  inclined  the  States 
General towards  a craven policy  of  peace.  The 
preponderance  of  one party or the other meant 
a decline of  national life in Holland.  When the 
office  of  Stadtholder  was  abolished  for  a  time 
and  the  merchants  ruled  alone,  the  terrible 
year  1672  made  the  Netherlands  the  prey  of 
France after an inglorious war,  nor  was  it until 
the  House  of  Orange  was  reinstated,  and  the 
flames of  party strife broke  out anew, that the 
State recovered from the inward lethargy which 
had  overtaken  it under  the government  of  one 
faction alone. 
It is easy to learn from all this that history is 
an eternal ebb and flow  in which any man must 
suffer shipwreck who tries to fit the life of  a nation 
into  the  formulae  of  politics.  No  sooner  did 
the House of  Orange attain its hereditary status 
under  William 111.  than we  see the State begin 
to decline  under  its new  reasonable  and logical 
Constitution.  The victorious reigning house came 
to an understanding  with  the government,  and 
the  rule  of  cliques  began.  Moreover,  fresh  in- 
centive  to vigorous  life  was  not  forthcoming ; 
thenceforward the nation was simply rich, simply 
the capitalists of  Europe.  The Dutch have borne 
witness to one  of  the noblest  truths of  history, 
namely that no nation upon  earth can  bear  up 
for long under  an excess of  wealth,  for when a 
certain measure of  prosperity is passed, its bless- 
ings  become  a  curse.  Holland  was  choked  by 
its  own  fat at last.  It  lacked  all  the  heroic 
elements of a State,  and finally perished ingloriously 
at the  same  time  and for  the  same  causes  as 
Venice.  To-day it is a well-organized monarchy 
in  the  second  rank  of  Powers,  and  its  history 
has lost all its deeper interest. 
In  quite  modern  times  we  have  only  once 
seen an aristocratic Republic enjoy an ephemeral 
existence in fact  though  not  in  law.  I  speak 
of  the Southern  States in  the  North  American 
Union.  Here  again  many  of  the  advantages 
peculiar  to  Aristocracies  appear  to  evoke  our 
admiration.  We  see a  really  astonishing  grasp 
of  the  art  of  government.  From  the  purely 
technical  standpoint  this  Aristocracy  of  slave- 
owners was infinitely superior to the Democracy 
of  the  North.  The  outbreak  of  war  displayed 
the  wealth  of  their  talents.  Our  officers  all 
speak  with  sympathy  of  the  South  because  it 
showed  so  much  the  most  military  capacity. 
West Point, the only military college in the Union, 
was  attended only  by  the youth  of  the South, 
for the North was too busy raking in the dollars, 
and no  military  talent showed itself  there until 
the  war  called  it  forth.  Yet  this  aristocracy 
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heartedness, for it looked upon labour absolutely 
in  the light  of  capital.  Labour  in  general  will 
always  be  despised  where  the  greater  part  of 
it is forced, for under  these circumstances  even 
the  free  workman  will  command  no  respect. 
The slave-owners embody this trait with hideous 
clarity.  They showed their contempt for human 
life  even  in  their  brutal treatment of  prisoners 
of  war.  Nevertheless  this  aristocracy  is  one 
more example of  a power of  governing and using 
the  human  race  which  is  quite  beyond  the 
ordinary. 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
EVEN  as a  Theocracy  is  the  most  stagnant,  a 
Monarchy the most many-sided, and an Aristo- 
cracy  the  most  elaborately planned  of  political 
forms, so a Democracy is the most easily compre- 
hended and the most beloved by the people.  Its 
fundamental idea is the natural equality of all man- 
kind.  This notion has something of  the sublime, 
and it is not hard to understand why it has often 
had an intoxicating effect.  We know well enough 
that it is only a half-truth which can never be com- 
pletely realized, but it strikes its roots deep into 
human nature.  The ordinary vision cannot pene- 
trate far enough to see that although we  may all 
be equal as men we are still unequal as individuals, 
and the average human brain pictures an absolute 
equality.  Therefore, at a certain stage of  national 
development  a  Democracy  may  work  in  the 
interests of  civilization, and when presented in a 
reasonable  shape  it is  the  best  beloved  of  all 
forms  of  government,  and  is  regarded  as  so 
natural  in  the  countries  where  it prevails  that 
all other forms seem crudely tyrannical or devoid 
of  sense.  Its character  may  vary  widely  with 
social  conditions,  but  its ideal  always  remains 
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the  8rjpo~  pdvapXo~.  The  people is  always  to be 
sole ruler, and the aim is to extend their rights 
in such a  manner that all shall finally be equal, 
at all events upon paper. 
Nearly  every  Democracy  begins  with  some 
form of  plebiscite.  Universal suffrage is the next 
step, and finally the citizens  will  even  be  paid 
to fulfil their political duties, for it is the function 
of  the  State to remove  all  distinction  between 
rich and poor, and there is no point at which it is 
possible to call a halt, because the whole system 
starts from a false principle.  If  great and small 
are given legal equality in a Federal State, logic 
sooner  or  later takes  its revenge,  and it is  the 
same with a Democracy.  If we try to ignore the 
differences  between  individuals and place  them 
all on one level, the contradiction must somehow 
or other make itself felt, and we have to fall back 
on violent  measures like the exploitation  of  the 
rich. 
Artificial Democracies are comparatively com- 
moner than artificial Monarchies or Aristocracies. 
You  cannot construct a nobility out of  nothing, 
and it is likewise impossible to make a  dynasty 
at pleasure,  but it is quite feasible to introduce 
democratic  forms  by an  over-hasty revolution, 
even into countries where manners and customs 
present  such  sharp  social  contrasts  that  they 
can find no natural soil.  Once introduced, these 
democratic forms  can  persist,  because  they  are 
very elastic, and an aristocratic element can well 
accommodate  itself  to them.  This  is  the  case 
in  Berne  to-day; or, to take  another  instance, 
look  at modern France.  There,  under a  purely 
democratic Constitution, there flourishes in fact 
a complete plutocracy, an oligarchy of  a few big 
banking  houses,  who  avail  themselves  silently 
of  democratic  forms in order to exploit them for 
their own ends. 
Thus the ideas of  equality and of  the natural 
reasonableness  of  the  average  human  being  of 
full age must have sunk deep into the habits of 
a nation  before Democracy pure and simple can 
maintain itself.  Even so it demands that a faith, 
which  is  often founded  on myths and delusions, 
shall be given to its assurances of liberty, whereas 
it  is  clear  that  a  well-ordered  Monarchy  can 
guarantee a  much  higher  degree  of  freedom  to 
its  subjects.  Nevertheless  this  faith  is  a  very 
power  in  a  Democracy, and works  in  the same 
way  as  monarchical  feeling  and  tradition  in  a 
kingdom.  Upon it is chiefly founded the patriot- 
ism which comes so much to the fore in a moder- 
ately  well - organized  Democracy.  The  Swiss 
patriotism  and  pride  of  liberty  which  found 
expression in  the old  saying, "  We  will  not be 
controlled,"  was  really  only  negative.  It  is 
undeniable  that Swiss  liberty  is  positively  less 
than,  let  us  say,  the  Prussian ;  particularly 
with regard to Communal freedom, which  is far 
greater with us.  It is because the populace were 
flattered  by the notion of  being free when  they 
had no hereditary rulers that the idea has waxed 
so strong in the course of  centuries, and patriot- 
ism  has  become  a  force  within  it.  The  direct 
result is to give a nation a feeling of  respect and 
worship  for  its own  institutions which  will  not 
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writer who would dare to point out the faults of 
Democracy at home with the same freedom with 
which  any one  of  us  might  mention  the weak- 
nesses of  Monarchy.  He would be stoned in the 
streets ! 
This temper is at the same time the strength 
of  all  passably  good  democracies.  A  sovereign 
people  will  make  untold  sacrifices  when  it has 
once  recognized  that  its  existence  is  at stake. 
The  Americans  proved  this  in  the  Civil  War, 
which was not really fought at all upon the negro 
question.  The  whole  Union  would  have  been 
shattered if  the South had won, hence the terrific 
exertions  and sacrifices which  the North  threw 
into the struggle. 
We may therefore regard the belief in freedom 
as one of  the living forces of  this form of  State, 
but  not  freedom  itself.  Here  once  more  we 
stumble against  the fallacy  that Rousseau  first 
put words to, and upon which  every Radical is 
still  nourished,  which  declares  that  every  man 
is obeying himself, and is consequently truly free 
when he is obeying the people as a whole.  This 
is  crudely  untrue,  as  even  Herodotus  realized 
when  he  said "  in Democracies the majority  is 
taken  for  the  whole."  In political  science,  as 
in so much else, we have to go back to  the Ancients 
for our  guiding  principles  and  our  profoundest 
ideas.  From them you will learn what we  should 
come to if  we  threw aside our classical models, 
and to-day we seem to be on the high road to this 
folly. 
This  simple saying of  Herodotus is the clue 
to the whole thing ;  the individual does not obey 
himself, he  obeys the majority.  When  all  men 
are equal before the law the majority must give 
the ultimate  decision.  It  behoves  us  therefore 
to  be  quite  clear  as  to  whether  there  is  any 
inherent  reasonableness  in  this  government  by 
the  majority.  The  answer  is  simple :  the 
dominion  of  the  majority  does  not  give  the 
smallest  guarantee  for  the  dominion  of  reason 
and  law.  "  Majorities  are folly,"  says  Schiller, 
"  and reason has always lodged among the few." 
There  are  certain  questions,  among  them  all 
those  which  concern  science  or  religion,  which 
no  majority  can  ever  be  competent  to decide. 
It is obviously foolish to ask its opinion on any 
point of  history; for here the judgment  of  some 
one individual may be  worth  that of  every one 
else put together.  The same applies to religious 
discussions.  It  is  both  tragic  and  comic  to 
watch  distinguished  men  disputing  and putting 
their  decision to the vote, and then to hear the 
inevitable  assertion  of  the  minority  that  they 
have  not been  defeated.  They are right,  more- 
over, for no vote can settle questions of  principle. 
A  decision  by the majority is  only based  on 
reason  when  the question at issue concerns the 
development of  a real power, and the expression 
of a Will.  In a Democracy supremacy is derived 
solely  from  the  people,  therefore  its  decisions 
must  bow  to the will  of  the people,  which  can 
only be ascertained by the voice of the majority. 
The presumption is that the will of  the majority 
could be  enforced by violence in the last resort, 
consequently the majority decides, as representing 
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dominion, let democratic idealists say what they 
like ; the will of the majority is the strongest, and 
for this reason men give  it the sanction  of  law. 
Every unprejudiced historian  will  admit that it 
is the only reasonable  system  by which  a  State 
can proceed upon democratic lines, but we  need 
not delude ourselves into the idea that there is 
anything inherently  reasonable or ideal in a  set 
of  circumstances in which the final constitutional 
authority  is  not  self-derived.  There  can  be 
absolutely  no  question  of  government  by  the 
majority being in itself either reasonable or just. 
We must envisage these matters only in concreto. 
When the Committee of  Public Safety sent people 
to the guillotine just  as they chose in the name 
of  the majority of  the French nation, they were 
just  as much tyrants as Philip 11.  of  Spain had 
been.  It  made  no  difference to the victims  in 
whose name their heads fell into the basket, for 
the one slavery was  as good  as the other.  Are 
we  to call it liberty when decent people have to 
bow  before  the mob, as we  have known happen 
in Zurich ?  The  Ancients  had  discovered long 
ago that liberty, rightly understood, lies  only in 
~crovopcLla, and  that the word  misconstrued  leads 
to cr~vra~rcrpcLd~,  the dominion of  mere brute force. 
The  rule  of  the  majority,  then,  which  is  a 
necessary  adjunct  of  Democracy,  is  most  cer- 
tainly  no  security  for  political  liberty.  Each 
citizen is given the right to make his voice heard 
in the national  decisions, but if  he  does not  go 
with the majority he  must just  put up with  it, 
and  hope  that  his  turn  will  come  some  day. 
"  One half  of  freedom is  alternately to rule and 
to be  ruled,"  as Aristotle  said  long ago.  He  is 
here  describing  political  liberty,  and  this  con- 
ception of  it finds no guarantee of  fulfilment in 
pvernment by a majority. 
When we turn to the social liberty which forms 
the  other  half  of  freedom,  we  do  not  find  a 
Democracy  affording  it any  particular  security 
either.  "  To  live  according  to our  own  sweet 
will " may  be  possible  in  a  Democracy,  but it 
cannot by any means certainly be so.  The idea 
of  the State was  so predominant  in the Demo- 
cracies  of  antiquity  that the  individual  citizen 
was  accorded  absolutely  no  freedom  of  action, 
but was  early taken under  the discipline of  the 
State,  to  whose  brilliancy  and  greatness  all 
other  considerations  had  to give  way.  Sharp 
indeed  is  the  contrast  between  this  and  the 
modern Democracy, which  as we know  it, seems 
particularly  created  for  an  economic  age  like 
our  own,  which  thinks  only  of  getting  on  by 
every means it can, and lives in the illusion that 
the  heights  of  civilization  can  be  reached  by 
telephones  and telegraphs.  Modern  Democracy 
sets absolutely no restraints upon the commercial 
intercourse between citizens.  Life in the United 
States is a  terribly hard  school, in which many 
perish  altogether, but there is  absolute freedom 
of  action in every direction,  and in this lies the 
secret  of  the  singular  charm  which  this  State 
possesses for the average man of  the present day. 
What  I have  said  suffices  to show  that we 
cannot dismiss this particular political form with 
a  few general  observations.  Republican Demo- 
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Constitution,  even  though  Monarchies  are  still 
richer in types.  First of  all there are the various 
expedients for ascertaining the will of  the majority. 
The idea of  popular government pure and simple 
is  most  completely  realized  by  allowing  each 
individual a direct share in decisions, and assem- 
bling the citizens in the market-place upon sum- 
mons of  a herald,  there to record their votes by 
raising their hands.  This is the ideal of  a very 
small  City-State, or  of  little territories like  Uri 
and Appenzell-Inner  Rhoden,  and in them  it is 
direct  democracy  in  its purest  practical  shape, 
but in bigger States the town in which the voting 
takes place  gets a  complete preponderance  over 
the rest of  the country. 
A  Democracy with  indirect representation  is 
more subtle, more complex, but also less  demo- 
cratic,  for  there  is  an  aristocratic  element  in 
every form of  election.  Outward circumstances 
and considerations of  distance compel this more 
modern  form  of  Democracy to have recourse to 
representation by substitute.  Inevitable it may 
be,  but it is  still  substitution, and is  naturally 
the  cause  of  occasional  discontents,  for  the 
sovereign  people  murmurs  that  its  delegates 
have  no  powers  given  them  to alter  the  Con- 
stitution without  more  ado,  and that it wishes 
to  make  its  own  voice  directly  heard.  This 
leads  up  to the compromise which  we  find  in 
Switzerland at the present day ;  there representa- 
tion is the general rule, replaced by a referendum 
in questions of  particular importance. 
Whether slavery is or is not the basis of  society 
makes a more essential difference in the nature of 
democratic Republics.  We have seen already that 
an  aristocracy  combined  with  slavery  appears 
as an aristocracy intensified, while with a Demo- 
cracy the case is obviously reversed, for it thus 
belies  its  fundamental  principle  of  equality  in 
one direction, and becomes an aristocracy of  the 
total number  of  the free citizens as against the 
toiling and serving class of  slaves.  On the other 
side, however, and herein lies the subtlety, these 
very conditions may give a peculiar completeness 
to the  conception  of  equality  among  the  free 
citizens themselves.  They are able to discharge 
all the sordid cares of life upon the broad shoulders 
of  the  slaves,  and  thus  only  the  finer  social 
elements go to the making of  the nation  which 
enjoys  full  rights  and  privileges.  Under  this 
system  Democracy  may  appear  unusually  fine 
and noble. 
A nation thus composed may not only carry 
out  the  idea  of  legal  equality  to its  ultimate 
conclusion,  but  under  certain  circumstances  it 
may develop a delicacy of  taste and a majesty of 
intellect  which  are otherwise only found among 
an aristocratic ruling  class.  This  possibility  is 
of  infinite importance  in a  Democracy, since ex 
hypothesi  the  vote  of  the  majority  is  decisive 
and  since  it erects  into  a  fundamental  law  of 
the Constitution the dictum vox populi, vox  Dei, 
which  can  only  have  real  validity  in  certain 
moments  of  national excitement.  This  govern- 
ment by the majority can be reduced in practice, 
either  into the vulgar  dominion  of  money,  or 
else,  where  the masses  are better  educated  and 
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by  the  power  of  talent  and  of  great  patriotic 
ambition.  It  is  clear, however, that these finer 
forces of  the soul develop more easily in a society 
which  is  based  upon  slavery.  Without  such  a 
foundation  it is  impossible  to imagine  a  nation 
like  the  Athenians,  who  allowed  Pericles  to 
inspire them not only for great wars but also for 
great artistic enterprises. 
Here again, however, we  must be on our guard 
against  generalizations.  The  historian  knows 
no worse enemy than system, which tempts him 
to arrange life as it is lived to suit the headings 
for the chapters of  his  book.  Slavery  is  not  a 
necessary adjunct to fine and generous ambitions. 
We  must  not  forget  that  the  Democracy  of 
Florence  stood  beside  Athens  to point  the way 
with the clearest certainty to the most ideal goal 
of  human endeavour.  What a place of  memories 
is the Signoria in Florence to this day !  Yet the 
Golden Age  of  this State was but short, and we 
must suppose that it was due rather to the char- 
acter of  the people than to their political forms. 
Nevertheless it is certain that where the majority 
rules  the national instinct  finds  its most  direct 
expression. 
The political temper  of  a truly ruling Demos 
is  a  very  remarkable  study.  It is  clear that it 
must totally lack certain finer attributes of  politi- 
cal  intelligence, and more  especially the gift of 
foresight,  which  is  simply  absent  from  popular 
government.  This  applies  particularly  to  its 
foreign policy, a sphere in which it must always 
act from a very limited range of  vision.  L'esprit 
d'escalier  is  a  pre - eminently democratic  charac- 
teristic.  Besides  this  there  is  a  singular  con- 
tradiction  which always makes itself felt in the 
inner nature of  a governing Demos.  On the one 
hand  we  see  that terrible  demoniacal  and base 
passion-envy,  which  plays  an  immeasurably 
important part in the life  of  a Democracy.  No 
doubt  if  the inner  heart  of  Germany  stood  re- 
~ealed  it would be seen to have reached gigantic 
strength even there, as was proved by the treat- 
ment that Bismarck received.  Now  that he has 
fallen he is beginning once more to find theoretic 
admirers among his ancient enemies, because  he 
has  come  down  to their  level-or  so  it seems. 
They find an intense pleasure in the th0ught.l  In 
their institution of  ostracism the Athenians  had 
absolutely  set up a  public  means  of  gratifying 
this  passion,  which  they  turned  into  a  legal 
weapon. 
The  Presidents  of  the United  States, with  a 
few  exceptions,  have  never  been  men  of  great 
ability, because these are not of  the stuff to make 
head against the flood of  slander which envy lets 
loose  over them.  mere will  always  be  natures 
of  too  rare  a  quality  for  the common  herd  to 
understand;  for  this  reason  Goethe  will  never 
be as popular an author as Schiller.  In the early 
days of  the North  American Republic Alexander 
Hamilton was the most remarkable figure, more 
so  in  fact than  Washington,  yet  the  populace 
regarded him as the proverbial dog looked upon 
the glass  of  wine.  He aroused  the same senti- 
ments  as  William  Humboldt  did  at the  Con- 
federate Diet  at Frankfurt,  for  he  gave  people 
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the  uncomfortable  feeling  that  they  did  not 
understand him. 
In  strange  contrast  with  this  thoroughly 
democratic passion of  envy,  every noble-minded 
and  independent  nation  will  evince  a  capacity 
for hero-worship in times of  excitement, until it 
may absolutely deify some individual great man. 
It  becomes  evident  at such  moments  that the 
people  really  have  an instinct  which  recognizes 
outstanding greatness.  It is impossible to decide 
theoretically when it will display itself, for great- 
ness  alone  is  not  the deciding factor.  It  must 
be admitted that Bismarck has never really been 
beloved by the mass of  the nation, for only the 
educated classes have properly grasped the unique 
greatness  of  the  man.  Pericles,  on  the  other 
hand,  although  his  character  was  essentially 
lofty,  attained  through  his  marvellous  gift  of 
eloquence to such an influence over the Athenian 
people that Thucydides  could say of  him, "  He 
was  not  so much  led  by  the people  as himself 
their leader."  For a  time he ruled  Athens  like 
a  king,  and marvellous  indeed  were  the home- 
truths which he told that Demos to their faces, 
for there was no trace of  the flatterer in him. 
This  phenomenon  of  hero-worship  appears 
from time to time  in every Democracy.  It  ex- 
plains  the  alliance  of  the  populace  with  the 
Barcidae  in  Carthage  and  with  the  House  of 
Orange  in the Netherlands.  We  meet  it again 
in the United  States, when  Washington  had to 
thrust from him the honours which were offered 
him.  His example did much to establish demo- 
cratic institutions firmly in his  country,  but  SO 
great did his fame become, and so devotedly was 
he  worshipped, that  he  had  great  difficulty in 
waving  aside  the  homage  that was  done  him. 
Later  on  General  Jackson,  the  "  Publicola," 
held  a  similar  position  for  a  brief  period.  He 
was  a  thoroughly  coarse-natured  man,  but  he 
was the conqueror of  Texas, and his commercial 
policy  was  very  much  in  accord  with  popular 
taste.  Under him the State was perilously near 
to becoming a  dictatorship, although in the end 
the good  sense  of  the nation  gained  the upper 
hand.  Later  on,  the  reverence  of  the  masses 
for President  Lincoln rose to such  a  pitch  that 
he  could  perfectly  well  have attained to kingly 
power  among them had he so willed it.  But he 
was  of  the same stamp as Washington,  and he 
remained  a  convinced  adherent  of  democratic 
government.  In spite of  all these instances the 
danger of  a dictatorship is as constantly present 
in  a  democratic  Republic  as in  an aristocratic 
one,  although  it is  no  doubt  most  of  all to be 
expected  in  Republics  without  republicans,  as 
France,  with  her  two Napoleons, has proved  to 
us.  Thus we  find Democracies swayed by curi- 
ously  contradictory elements ; on  the one  hand 
envy,  on the other  a  popular  delight  in  great 
heroic figures. 
Where  the foundation  of  slavery  is  lacking, 
that is  to say in  all  modern  Democracies, one 
may expect to find a  dominant note of  political 
mediocrity.  Really  striking  and  distinguished 
qualities  are less  comprehensible by the masses, 
and we  may look in vain to see Art and Science 
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never  known  a  second  Florence.  Switzerland 
is a type of  this form of  government in our own 
day.  There we  see national  schools and public 
health  encouraged  with  praiseworthy  eagerness, 
but the establishment  even  of  polytechnics  has 
been  attended  with  the greatest difficulties,  for 
the Swiss nation could not be brought to realize 
the  usefulness  of  these  institutions.  Neither 
have universities  ever  been  able to take  much 
hold  in  Switzerland.  They are the home of  an 
aristocratic  form  of  culture,  and  the  natural 
inclination of  a Democracy is to extend a modicum 
of  education  and  prosperity  over  the  widest 
possible circle, without any desire to exceed this 
standard. 
These  tendencies  stand  in  close  conn.exion 
with that appearance of  economy which  invests 
a  Democracy  and  endears  it  so  much  to  the 
popular  imagination.  Since it can have neither 
the brilliancy  of  a  Court  nor  the majesty of  a 
Senate to support, it seems that it must  at all 
events  be  cheaper  than  either  a  monarchical 
or an aristocratic form of  State, and absolutely 
mistaken as the notion is it is used for the deIusion 
of  the  populace  and  the  half-educated.  Not 
only  has  France  been  more  expensively admin- 
istered  under  its bureaucratic  Democracy  than 
even  under  Louis  XIV.  himself,  but in  North 
America also democratic government has proved 
extremely costly.  It only differs from a Monarchy 
in  that all  the  outgoings  of  the  State are  not 
clearly set forth in the Budget, but a very simple 
calculation  suffices  to show  that the  President 
of  the United  States is  a  much  more expensive 
official than the Emperor of  Germany.  A single 
presidential  Election,  with  all  the  agitations 
which  accompany  it in  business  circles  and  in 
the Press, costs far more than the Civil  Lists of 
all  our  Princes  put  together.  The  expense  is 
voluntarily  borne  by  the American people,  and 
no mention is made of  it, but it must naturally 
be  counted  in  forming  a  judgment  upon  the 
~heapness  of  government.  A further comparison 
between the budget of  a big American town like 
Cincinnati, and that of  Berlin or Hamburg, would 
show that the various unofficial  associations ad- 
minister far less economically than the German 
Communes  who  have  only  the  public  interest 
to consult, because they are each and all of  them 
limited companies who must consider the worthies 
who hold shares in them.  It is the same through- 
out, and  an examination  in  detail  proves  that 
the whole  theory of  the cheapness of  democratic 
government has very little foundation in fact. 
It is of  course true that Democracies have a 
tendency  to exploit  the rich  for  the benefit  of 
State, which accords with the principle of  demo- 
cratic equality.  It  is the business of  the State 
to do away with the difference between rich and 
poor,  therefore  there  may  be  no  high - salaried 
officials,  and the lower grades of  the Civil Service 
are  well  paid  in  comparison.  Finally,  as  in 
Athens, the citizens themselves are remunerated 
for exercising their  political  duties,  and on  the 
other  side  the  State  reimburses  itself  in  great 
measure by levying contributions from the rich. 
If  the  Athenians  wanted  a  fleet,  certain  rich 
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triremes.  It  is  almost  as if  the  wealthy  must 
purchase  pardon  for exceeding the standard  of 
universal  equality.  The  same  may  be  said  of 
the  system  which  prevailed  in  Swiss  Cantons 
until  the  most  recent  times.  The  Swiss  have 
always  been  the  most  economical  nation  in 
Europe,  and  the  general  frugality  of  habits, 
admirable  as  it  is  in  some  ways,  has  also  a 
very petty side  to it, which  has  reacted  upon 
the State ; while  the old  aristocracies  of  Berne 
and others were in existence, there was a tendency 
to  niggardliness  in  questions  of  expenditure. 
The Canton of  the city of  Basle, which broke off 
from the Province of Basle in 1830, had a definitely 
aristocratic  government  until  quite  lately  in 
spite  of  its  purely  democratic  Constitution. 
Members of  the same old families, the Fischers, 
the Burckhardts, the Sarrazins, etc., were elected 
again and again, and they met the expenses of 
the State out of  their own purses, so that it was 
like a tacit understanding between the sovereign 
people  and  the  old  race  of  rulers.  Thus  the 
cheapness of  Swiss administration  is  not  to be 
explained  by the forms of  its government,  but 
by the customs of  the people.  When the nation 
is not thrifty and close-fisted, but rather resembles 
the citizens of  the United States, then the cheap- 
ness  of  democratic government  is  proved  to be 
an illusion. 
The  ugly  reproach  of  fickleness  is  likewise 
not applicable to Democracies without qualifica- 
tion.  City Democracies may indeed  have an un- 
settled element, because they lack an established 
officialdom, and  because  their  form  of  govern- 
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rnent  is  unfavourable  to  the  development  of 
a  class  of  men  who  are  politicians  by  calling 
with inherited traditions.  Where these are not 
forthcoming,  the  unforeseen  moods  of  fortune 
may  indeed  produce  unstable  conditions.  On 
the whole, however,  experience has  justified  the 
French  historian  who  said  that liberalism  does 
not  make  its  home  among  the  people.  The 
people  are  peculiarly  responsive  to direct  and 
simple sensations,  good  or  bad  alike ; they are 
easily roused  by a  skilful demagogue, but force 
of  habit will  generally make them cling to their 
old ways,  and it is misleading to talk positively 
of  the restless fickleness of  Democracies.  Certain 
party cleavages  strike root  very deeply in  pure 
Democracies, and are carried  on from generation 
to  generation.  Certain  catchwords  cast  over 
the average voter a spell which may remain un- 
broken  for  centuries.  Switzerland  is  not  only 
the most frugal of  European countries, it is also 
the  most  conservative.  When  we  examine  the 
seven Cantons of  the "  Sonderbund " we  find to 
our  amazement  that  they  are  the  very  ones 
which  in  1586 concluded the Borromean League 
for  the  honour  of  the  Catholic  Church.  It  is 
likewise impossible to call the Americans radical 
in the political sense, although the word applies 
to their  social life.  Rather have  they  held  by 
certain  democratic  principles  with  a  reverence 
which is rarely forthcoming in the swifter stream 
of  our  older  European  civilization.  Belief  in 
the  infallibility  of  popular  instinct  and  similar 
theories are long-lived on the other side  of  the 
Atlantic.  In New  York the mob are nothing if 
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not reactionary,  and are a  hindrance to drastic 
reforms  in  any  direction ; they  have  struck  a 
bargain of  reciprocal rascality with the Tammany 
ring,  for  they feel  at home  under  the rule  of 
brothel-keepers. 
In spite  of  this  conservative  temper  among 
the masses it is not to be denied that demagogues 
who understand how to flatter the people and how 
to work  upon  their  feelings  may  exercise  very 
dangerous  influence  in  a  Democracy.  The real 
demagogue is usually morally the inferior of  the 
courtly  flatterer, for the man  who  lavishes  im- 
moderate praise upon princes may at least believe 
that they stand above the common herd, whereas 
the  demagogue  who  burns  incense  before  the 
mob  and  declares  that the real  intelligence  of 
the nation  lies  in their horny  fists, must  know 
that  he  is  a  liar.  This  is  why  the  political 
demagogue is  one  of  the most  repulsive  figures 
in history ; it is his hypocrisy which makes him 
particularly  disgusting.  Brutal  bullies  like 
Danton are the best of  the breed;  there was at 
least  a touch  of  nature  in  his  blatant  lust  for 
blood.  A  beast  himself,  he  sought  to  awake 
the  beast  in  other  men.  Robespierre,  on  the 
other hand, was a humbug through and through, 
and yet  he  was  adored;  every  fishwife  of  the 
Halles  swore  that  he  was  virtue  personified. 
Natures  like  his  can  upset  all  the  calculations 
of state-craft, for their influence upon the nerves 
of  an excitable  nation  can  never  be  reckoned 
with. 
It is quite clear that the democratic equality 
before the law can only represent sound conditions 
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when  there  is  an  approximate  social  equality 
among  the  citizens ; prosperity  more  or  less 
evenly  divided  is  the  right  soil  for  a  thriving 
Democracy.  Switzerland  provided  tolerably 
natural foundations for this form of  government, 
up till a few decades ago, before the introduction 
of  railways.  The  difficulties  arise  when  social 
contrasts  become  marked  and  the  power  of 
wealth  threatens  to  master  the  democratic 
machine.  In  America  men  rise  and  fall  so 
rapidly and so often upon the social ladder that 
a  potential  social  equality  is  really  existent, 
for it is  so  easy  to imagine ; therefore to this 
extent  the  premises  are  forthcoming  on  which 
a legal equality may be constructed.  Neverthe- 
less America, like Switzerland, has now reached a 
point where the wealth of  its millionaires begins 
to be a danger to the State.  It is an open secret 
that powerful rings are constantly being formed 
there,  who  attempt  to set  the  machinery  of 
government  in  motion  to  promote  their  own 
selfish speculations.  If  this process of  develop- 
ment  continues,  as  it  seems  liliely  to  do,  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  is 
already  on  a  downward  path,  may  easily  slide 
into a fearful corruption. 
A  strong instinct for law is another essential 
for the stability of  a  democratic equality.  The 
nation  must  place  a  superstitious  faith  in  the 
magical  wisdom  of  a  majority,  and be  swayed 
by  a  real  respect  for the laws  which  are made 
under  its  sanction.  Without  such  support  no 
democratic government  can keep even tolerable 
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contains many impulses in its very nature which 
are not amenable to law.  If  the people is sove- 
reign  it  follows  that  they  can  give  the  final 
decision,  and  it  was  no  great  step  from  the 
~dpror  d  ~6poq  TO;  8rjp0v  of  Athens to the  d  GePoq 
~6psoq  TGV vdp~v  which  came  after it.  Demos is 
sovereign, therefore what  is there to prevent  it 
from  sweeping aside existing  laws  by a  simple 
+rj+sapa, as indeed was  often done in Athens  in 
the later days ? 
A still greater  danger lies  in  the temptation 
to the individual to commit  crime in mere self- 
defence.  Legal institutions in a  democracy  are 
apt to be  very  imperfect,  because  a  sovereign 
people  is  generally  close - fisted,  and  begrudges 
the  expenditure  needful  for  a  well-organized 
administration  of  justice.  The  appointment  of 
judges  is  another  difficulty,  for  if  they  are to 
enjoy real independence  and respect  they  must 
be  given  a  relatively  secure  position  and  the 
certainty of  a  long term of  office,  if  not  more. 
This cannot exist in a Democracy pure and simple 
which  on  principle  demands  rapidly  recurring 
elections. 
The results  of  this system vary according to 
national characteristics.  We have all heard how 
the  inhabitants  of  the  prison  in  the  Schwyz 
Canton suffer no interruption in their occasional 
sorties  in  quest  of  liquor  and  the  beauties  of 
nature,  because  the  Confederation  finds  it  too 
expensive  to  guard  the  rascals  properly.  In 
America the weakness of  law, combined with the 
reckless  and  anarchical  temper  of  the  nation, 
lead to methods which have something imposing 
in  their  very  vileness.  In  the  year  1891, 
123 condemned criminals were  executed by the 
sheriff's warrant, as against 195 alleged misdoers 
by order of  Judge Lynch.  His procedure strikes 
transatlantic  democrats  as  alluringly  straight- 
forward ; he gets to  work quicker than the Sheriff, 
and  above  all  he  presents  no  costs.  These  are 
terrible conditions  for  a  country  which  has left 
its first youth  behind.  The  number  of  alleged 
criminals  illegally  done  to death  is  fully  half 
as big again as of  those executed with the forms 
of  law !  Moreover,  official  accounts  of  these 
happenings  are  published  in  every  newspaper, 
as if they were matters of  course, and even with 
a  certain  complacency.  The  Yankee  likes  his 
country  to go  one  better  than the rest  of  the 
world  in everything, so in this direction  at any 
rate  he  ought  to  be  content,  for  these  figures 
certainly  outdo  those  of  every  other  country. 
Persons who  pretend to disregard such  matters 
have not learned how to think scientifically. 
This  feebleness  of  law  is  closely  connected 
with the whole of  the country's  institutions, and 
is  assisted  by  the  uncivilized  conditions  which 
still prevail  in the southern parts of  the Union. 
Of course no State can be founded on the negative 
virtues  of  Christianity  alone.  Our  own  Saxon 
forefathers  punished  horse-stealing with  death 
for  the  same  reasons  as  prompt  the  Southern 
States  of  America,  and  their  procedure  was 
equally  summary.  It  is  a  mistake  to take up 
a sentimental attitude upon these questions, but 
still there can be no doubt that this manner of 
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devastate the instinct for law in the nation and 
react  destructively  on  the  Democracy  itself. 
This  much  we  may  safely  say : if  a  firm  and 
reliable  administration  of  law  was  the  strong 
point of  such aristocracies as Berne and Venice, 
it is the weak spot of  Democracy. 
This  peculiar  American  custom  of  eking  out 
defects in the working of  their laws by resorting 
to violent measures on their own account leads us 
to the further questions of  how  far Democracy 
lays down a  general principle of  social freedom, 
and of  whether it is true that this form of  State 
gives  more  openings than  any  other  to  every 
form  of  talent.  From  what  we  have  seen,  it 
is clear that industrial  and financial  talents  do 
indeed  take root  and flourish,  but that subtler 
and  deeper  qualities  find  no  natural  soil,  nor 
indeed  can  they  ever,  for  the  natures  which 
possess  them  are  aristocrats  born.  Bancroft, 
formerly  American  Ambassador  in  Germany, 
often told us that he loved his native land, but 
that when  he returned  there he would  miss the 
kind  of  social intercourse  he found amongst us. 
There  is  a  poverty  of  intellectual  atmosphere 
over  there  which  is  not  only  due  to a  young 
colonial  civilization.  It  is  undemocratic  if  an 
individual's  talent  rises  above  a  certain  level. 
Real brilliance of  intellect is coldly looked upon, 
and  dollar-getting  is  the  only  sphere  in  which 
distinction is readily forgiven. 
Democracy  permits  an absolute  freedom  of 
competition  in  the sphere of  economics,  and it 
is very singular to see side by side with this the 
utter recklessness with which the sovereign people 
does  not  hesitate  to meddle  with  the  private 
of  the  individual  and  the family,  when 
incited thereto by persuasive  demagogues.  The 
unlimited  political  freedom  in  many  American 
States  is  in  sharpest  contrast  to  the  terrific 
temperance  laws  which  exist  side  by  side  with 
it, and the conditions thus created are what the 
German immigrants find hardest to bear.  America 
is  a  country  of  weak  laws  but  stern morality. 
There is still life in the Calvinism whose warring 
sects  were  the real  founders  of  the  Union,  for 
the little States of  New  England were the model 
on  which the whole  body  politic was afterwards 
formed.  In  Germany  we  are  accustomed  to 
identify  our  political  and religious  parties,  and 
we  should expect a liberal politician to be neces- 
sarily  a  member  of  Evangelical  Unions.  In 
Democracies, on the contrary, a stern dogmatism 
is the rule, and its narrowness has proved a real 
blessing in the United States, for there Sabbath- 
keeping in all its repulsiveness is a real necessity. 
Nothing  could  be  more  distasteful  to German 
feeling than this weekly day of  rest and absolute 
idleness.  Our weakness lies rather in the direc- 
tion of  making Sunday too much of  a high day, 
and it would do us no harm to observe it rather 
more  strictly.  God  preserve  us,  however, from 
the  English-  American  Sabbath !  The  six  days 
of  labour  must  have  totally  exhausted  every 
nerve  and muscle  before  such absolute lethargy 
Can  seem  welcome  on  the  seventh.  Thus  the 
hard and narrow Church membership of  America 
Proves  itself  as  a  practical  necessity  there, 
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point  of  view.  We  recognize  that  Democracy 
must  be  grounded  on  very  strict observance of 
religion if  it is not to fall to pieces altogether. 
The temperance laws of  America  are open to 
the same criticism as its keeping of  the Sabbath. 
No doubt Germans often drink rather more than 
they should, but upon the whole it is with us a 
harmless pleasure, whereas if  the American once 
begins  drinking  he  drinks  himself  blind drunk. 
Therefore  the  legislative  bodies  have  wisely 
directed their attention to remedying the evil, and 
their efforts have been  supplemented by clerical 
fanatics, preaching  against  drink in general, and 
putting the innocuous German beer on the same 
level  as  the  fearful  American  spirits.  Hence 
the horrible  temperance  legislation  in  many  of 
the States, which  would  lead  to a  preposterous 
inquisition  into the privacy  of  every home if  it 
were  to be  carried  into  effect.  It  never  could 
be in a Monarchy, for every king would feel that 
such an inquisition would be exceeding his powers. 
The  sovereign people has no such scruples.  " I 
may  allow  myself  to do  everything,"  it  says, 
"  for I am everything, I am the great collectivity 
of the State."  These laws are evaded on a colossal 
scale, they lead to intriguing and all manner of 
deceit, but if  the public morality which inspired 
them  were  less  active  and energetic,  the whole 
State would  fall to pieces from the looseness of 
its political  forms and its defective  instinct for 
justice.  It  is  the  instinct  of  self-preservation, 
calling ethics to aid in correcting and supplying 
the deficiencies of  law. 
You have only got to look at the New  York 
mob,  which  is  composed  of  the offscourings of 
the  world,  and yet  how  these  lost  elements  of 
society  are  compelled  to  exert  themselves  by 
being  thrown,  as  they  are,  upon  their  own 
resources.  Do  you  suppose  that  the  Prussian 
police could hold them in check half as effectively 
as the stern law of  necessity ?  Every man among 
them  knows  well  enough  that  he  may  die  of 
hunger and no living soul will care.  The Germans 
in  America  have  a  proverb  which  the Yankees 
themselves  have  adopted,  which  says  that  no 
immigrant can strike luck till he has spent every 
penny  he  brought  out  of  Europe.  Each  must 
go through a hard and cruel school before he can 
hope  to get  his  foot  upon  the ladder,  and the 
terror  of  starvation  is the chief  teacher  in that 
school. 
Even  good  society  is  not  particularly  lax in 
a  Democracy,  although  it is  often  erroneously 
supposed to be  so.  In America, as a  matter of 
fact, it is  in  many  ways  much  stricter than in 
the old countries of  Europe.  At a  German Spa 
one  can  generally  find  out  the  antecedents  of 
most of  the people one meets there if  they move 
in  good  society,  for  they  all  carry  their  titles 
about with them, and the pot can be constructed 
from the handle.  In America, where everybody 
is  Mr.  So-and-so, one  is  as  likely  to be  sitting 
next  a  discharged  convict as a  great merchant. 
Consequently  the  good  families  withdraw  from 
intercourse as sea-anemones shrivel at the touch 
of  a  finger.  It  is  much  more  difficult to form 
anything  but  the  most  distant  acquaintance- 
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well-bred  man  feels  an  instinctive  distrust  of 
strangers.  Thus we  find a  very  palpable  social 
exclusiveness existing side by side with a complete 
political equality. 
It is quite peculiarly difficult for Democracies 
to find channels  by which the will  of  the State 
may  be  given  a  real  practical  effect,  without 
neglecting  the  principles  of  universal  equality. 
It is inherent in the system that officials should 
be  elected,  and that  at frequent  intervals,  for 
were  it  otherwise  the  so;ereign  people  would 
cease to be really supreme, and yet it is impossible 
to have a really efficient Civil Service without a 
long-established  code  of  honour,  and  certain 
inherited principles of  class tradition and outlook. 
Moreover  Government  is  an  art  which  must 
be learned, and has its trade secrets like any other. 
In a  Democracy the bureaucracy is invaded  by 
amateurs,  and, worse  still,  by  speculators,  who 
destroy  its  peculiar  spirit.  The  question  of 
payment  is  a  further  difficulty.  The  innate 
miserliness of  a  sovereign people  found  an un- 
salaried Civil  Service most  to its taste,  until it 
discovered that it smacked strongly of  an aristo- 
cracy  to  have  only  rich  men  holding  office. 
Paid  officials  were  therefore  substituted,  and 
thus  we  observe  the  marvellous  phenomenon 
of  an  English  local  government  serving  as  a 
rule  without payment,  while  in America  all the 
analogous posts are paid.  It is clear to what an 
extent  this  must  arouse  the  vulgar  spirit  of 
speculation,  and the  United  States are  in  fact 
examples of  the principle that the victor claims 
the  spoil.  The  very  instant  a  new  President 
is elected all official posts are held to be vacant, 
to be filled anew by the hangers-on of the success- 
ful  party.  Recent  history  has  clearly  shown 
how the whole Civil Service is thereby shattered, 
and how  the whole  strife of  parties  degenerates 
into a mere squabble over booty. 
The way in which salaries are graduated is also 
extremely  significant.  Its  principal  character- 
istic is mediocrity.  Clerks and subordinates are 
much better paid than-in  the German Civil Service, 
as this is the only way of  filling posts which are 
less  sought  after  and  enjoy  less  consideration 
than those of  waiters in a hotel.  The President, 
on the other hand, receives a salary ridiculously 
disproportionate to the country's wealth, for the 
scale on which we  pay our Ministers and Generals 
is  considered undemocratic.  Nevertheless these 
high  positions  demand  luxury  and  colossal 
expenditure, which no American official can meet 
out of  his beggarly salary, and so here again the 
result is the intriguing and corruption which has 
already  worked  so  much  mischief  to the  Civil 
Service in the United States. 
The example of  France by no means disproves 
the rule that it is hard for Democracies to produce 
an efficient Civil Service.  The French still have 
the  monarchic  bureaucracy  of  Bonaparte ; no 
one can predict  with certainty what the fate of 
the old machine will be if the passage of  time still 
brings it no new monarch, but up till the present 
it is not a republican organization. 
A  Republic  is  confronted  with  still  more 
serious  difficulties  in  the  matter  of  a  standing 
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army,  whose  commissioned  ranks  are  imbued 
with  definite  class  feelings,  will  always  be 
monarchically  inclined.  A  legitimate  king  has 
much less cause than a Republic to fear a great 
military leader.  Even if  a  king cannot lead his 
army  himself,  his  historic  rights  and  position 
place  him  above the necessity to dread  a  rival 
captain, but Republics look upon their victorious 
generals  with  much  greater  apprehension,  and 
cast about how best to get rid of  them lest they 
should rapidly  make hay with the Constitution. 
The French  Republic  recognized  this danger in 
1848 when  it decreed that its President  should 
never  wear  military  uniform nor  fill  a  military 
post,  although  all  military  appointments  were 
in  his  control.  We  know  how  futile  these 
precautions  proved,  and  how  the  man  who 
directed the destinies of  the army used his power 
to overthrow the Republic.  We may say broadly, 
that the happiest  and most normal position  for 
a  republican  State is  to be  like  the  American 
Union without any neighbours who can threaten 
it from  without.  The  United  States  have  no 
need to  fear Mexico and the decaying Creole States, 
and Canada gives them so little uneasiness that 
their  thoughts  are  much  more  turned  towards 
annexing the country  themselves,  an enterprise 
in which I for one heartily wish them success. 
There  are  thus  peculiar  difficulties  incident 
to the  organization  of  the  army and the  Civil 
Service in a Democracy.  In Germany the State 
can  undertake  many  more  enterprises  than  it 
can  possibly  embark  on  in  America,  where  it 
has  not  been  in  a  position  to create a  reliable 
official class,  and  where  the  word  "politics " 
has  unpleasant  associations,  just  as  the  word 
66 political " was  at one time  synonymous  with 
c6 Machiavellian "  in  German  ears.  All  great 
social legislation is impracticable in the  United 
States because the best  elements  of  society are 
not  enlisted  in  the service  of  the  State,  which 
is here seen  shorn  of  prestige  or  dignity.  This 
in itself is enough to account for the difficulties 
which  confront  the  supreme  authority.  There 
is  in  addition  the  terribly  hard  question  with 
which  every  Republic  must  grapple,  of  how 
this supreme authority shall itself be organized. 
Any single individual elected by popular vote, as 
Louis Napoleon was in France in 1848, is invested 
with so much power that republican institutions 
can  scarcely  withstand  it.  Napoleon  could 
truthfully  remind  the  National  Assembly  that 
he  had more votes behind him than all the rest 
of  them  put  together.  The  present  French 
Republic  has  on  this  account  hedged  in  the 
office  of  President  with  safeguards  most  care- 
fully devised.  It  was  determined  to place  one 
man at the head, but his power was not to exceed 
certain  limits,  therefore  he  was  to be  elected, 
not by  the sovereign people  but by the Repre- 
sentative Assembly with  its few  hundred  votes. 
To this was added the really comic inconsistency 
which  I have referred to already, of  making the 
President  rule through ministers whose responsi- 
bility he  is  not to share, except in the case of  a 
coup d'Etat or violation of  the Constitution. 
In  America,  where  republicanism  is  taken 
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and answerable for his own actions and those of 
his ministers.  Therefore he cannot be compelled 
to follow counsels with which he does not agree, 
as a monarch may, under certain circumstances, 
be forced to do, and consequently parliamentary 
government  is  here  quite  out  of  the  question. 
Thus the American President is very much more 
powerful than the King of  England, simply because 
he  is  directly  responsible.  We  must  not  fail 
to notice that the first colonists of  New  England 
had a very long monarchical history behind them. 
Hence  the  custom  which  placed  an  individual 
official, a governor, at  the head of  every colony, and 
this governor was  afterward simply transformed 
into an  official of  the Republic.  Thus the highest 
posts were normally filled by a single individual, 
and the system found its logical outcome in the 
appointment  of  a  President  at the head  of  the 
whole Union.  In this instance his power was the 
less dangerous because he presided over a Federal 
State, and also because his activity was limited in 
its scope, being confined to the postal system, the 
coinage, and foreign policy, so that even a strong 
man could hardly become a danger to the Demo- 
cracy.  The powers of the governors are likewise 
restricted,  since  State  interference  is  narrowly 
limited,  and political  life  within  its boundaries 
is at once primitive and provincial. 
Where  conditions  are  different,  as they  are 
in  a  single  State like  France,  the power  of  an 
individual ruler may indeed be  a  serious menace 
to a  Democratic  Republic,  but the nomination 
of a Council at the head of  affairs may bring with 
it the  other  danger  of  a  Government  divided 
and disputing within  itself.  We have a  terrify- 
ing example  of  this kind  of  government in the 
Directory  during the French  Revolution,  which 
was  ended by the 18th Brumaire ; history  has 
seldom known a viler.  In this matter also much 
turns on the ancient custom and tradition of the 
State.  Government by a Council in Switzerland 
is  as old  as the Confederation itself,  and many 
party antagonisms are stifled there in the blessed 
name of  peace. 
Roughly  speaking,  the  foregoing  are  the 
characteristics common to  all  Democracies.  It 
is  no  easy  task  to  disentangle  them  from  the 
multiplicity  of  forms  which  democratic  States 
assume. 
It is important to remember  that the demo- 
cratic  principle  of  free  economic  competition is 
beginning  to work  radical  changes  in this form 
of  State, for it is leading to the practical dominion 
of  the  Stock  Exchanges.  This  state of  things 
has  not  so  far  become  intolerable in  America, 
because  the young country is  still making  such 
gigantic advances in prosperity that the question 
has not yet arisen of  whether certain individuals 
are acquiring a  disproportionate  share of  it for 
themselves. 
No  one  who  does  not  parrot-wise  repeat  the 
emptiest  phrases  of  Radical  journals  can  fail 
to see that both the great American parties are 
merely  greedy  cliques.  In  like  manner  one 
reality  at all  events in  the France of  to-day is 
the  dominion  of  the  Bourse  over  the  country, 
and of  the Rothschilds over the Bourse.  This is 
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because  it affords  an opportunity  of  enriching 
himself to every one whose conscience is not over- 
scrupulous.  Enrichissex - vous  was  indeed  the 
motto  of  that  July-Monarchy  which  was  the 
first real  break  in the old  tradition, and opened 
vistas of revolution without end. 
All these are arguments enough to show why 
democratic  forms  of  State  have  never  taken 
root in the oriental world.  With the exception of 
the Phoenician settlements upon her coasts, Asia 
has  never  known  a  Democracy.  The  peculiar 
limitations of  the eastern mind stand as the poles 
asunder  from  democratic  lack  of  restraints and 
carelessness  of  consequences.  The  Greeks,  on 
the other hand, attained their  zenith  under  this 
form of  State, and we  are bound to say that the 
Hellenic  character,  and  the Ionic in  particular, 
was  best  expressed  by  a  Democracy  founded 
upon  slavery.  In the Middle Ages  this form of 
State  was  checked  in  its  development  by  the 
old  class  divisions  of  society,  and  it only  had 
a  brief  age  of  greatness  in  the  Italian  cities, 
particularly in Florence, which resembled ancient 
Athens in so many ways.  Yet even the Hellenic 
Democracy soon had to bow  before the military 
monarchy  of  Macedon,  and  the towns  of  Italy 
were  the  cradle  of  passions  which  foredoomed 
their  political  forms  to  an  early  death.  The 
end  came  almost  always  in  their  subjugation 
under a tyrant who had endeared himself to the 
masses until he seemed to them no tyrant at all. 
It would be foolish to draw an analogy between 
Athens and  the  Democracies  of  modern  times. 
Conditions are quite  different  in  the vast  area 
of  Continental  States, where  economic  freedom 
for  the  individual  is  the  most  essential  point, 
and in those ancient democracies where the indi- 
vidual was fully merged in the idea of  the State. 
Since the Democracy of  the United States came 
into being  in the eighteenth century, the whole 
Continent  of  America  has  resolved  itself  into 
a bundle of  Democracies, which are as a matter 
of  fact quite a  suitable form  of  government  for 
all these  peoples who  have 'but  a  short history 
behind  them.  The  experience  of  Brazil  has 
proved  that it is just as impossible to improvise 
a monarchy as an aristocracy, if  the nation  has 
no  living  monarchical  tradition.  An  Emperor 
who  was  not  lacking  in  personal  bravery  was 
dethroned  by  a  contemptible  little  Revolution, 
because his dynasty had no roots in the country. 
Europe,  on  the other  hand,  does  possess  an 
ancient history with monarchical tradition, there- 
fore, if for no other reason, it affords less oppor- 
tunity than America for the democratic form  of 
State.  It  requires  further  a  much  more  far- 
seeing policy than America  at present  has  any 
need  of, being, as she is,  without  any powerful 
neighbours,  and  consequently  deserving  of 
Washington's  boast,  that  she  is  ignorant  of 
national hatreds.  Moreover  the social contrasts 
of  Europe are much  sharper than those  of  the 
New  World,  therefore  equality, that  important 
basis  of  Democracy, is lacking.  Lastly, our old 
Continent  calls  out  for  an active  Government, 
which is also difficult to  reconcile with Democracy. 
The  European  copies  of  this  form  of  State, 
and their relatively long continuance in France, 
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are only to be explained by the total incapacity of 
the old dynasties to rule. 
Let us now seek for a few examples from history 
to  illustrate  the  nature  of  Democracies  from 
single  instances.  Between  Athens  on  the  one 
side,  and  Switzerland  and  the  United  States 
upon the other, lies the whole gulf which separates 
modern  from  ancient  life,-the  aristocracy  of 
the masses of antiquity from the real democracy 
of  the  new  age.  Without  doubt  the  Hellenic 
idea  found  its  noblest,  truest  embodiment  in 
Attica,  and  not  at all  in  the  crude  military 
State of  Sparta.  The  Athenians  possessed  the 
one Spartan virtue of  courage in equal measure, 
but in a more human and chivalrous guise.  We 
have learned  from  our  excavations  on  Hellenic 
soil that there was in very truth but one Athens. 
Her only possible rival in the artistic sphere was 
Olympia, and none of  the monuments which have 
there  been  brought  to light,  with  the  possible 
exception of  the Hermes and the Nike, can vie 
with  those  of  Attica.  Antiquity  itself  felt  the 
intellectual  and  aesthetic supremacy  of  Athens 
so  strongly  that after  Greece  lay  politically  in 
ruins  the alien  races  competed  to preserve  and 
cherish this one city.  Attalus, King of  Pergamon, 
added  to her  architecture,  and  again  in  much 
later  times  Herodus  Atticus  sought  to  enrich 
her  crown  of  buildings in the new  semi-Roman 
style.  Through all vicissitudes this town  shone 
forth as the jewel of  the whole Greek civilization. 
The Athenian  State is unique  in the world's 
history,  and  the  prosperity  of  this  loose - knit 
Democracy  is  all the  more  astounding  because 
of  the immense difficulties which  confronted  it. 
Athens  is but one  league distant  from the sea, 
and the soil of  Attica was very unfruitful, bear- 
ing no valuable crop but the olive.  Everything 
to seeking  fortune  upon  the sea;  the 
rocky  tongue  of  Munychia  seemed  formed  by 
nature  for a  lighthouse  tower,  and  its  bay  for 
a  first -rate  harbour.  All  this,  however,  men 
either could not or would not see, and it required 
the genius of  Themistocles to bring home to the 
unwilling  mind  of  the  nation  that the  natural 
sphere of  Athens lay upon  the sea.  For a long 
time they remained impervious to his argument. 
Those who have stood upon the historic soil, and 
seen the geographical conditions with their own 
eyes, realize when they hear of  the restless activity 
and  fickleness  of  the  Athenians  that  there  is 
another side to the question.  It is no more than 
half  an hour's  drive from  the Acropolis to the 
harbour;  ancient  Athens  had  been  as good  as 
destroyed in the Persian War ;  and when Themis- 
tocles  carried his plan  for  a  harbour  it seemed 
natural to make  it the  chief  centre,  and leave 
the old  Athens  as its suburb.  But the Demos 
refused  to be  separated from  the  temples their 
fathers  had  built,  and from the Gorgon-slaying 
Athene of  the Acropolis.  Therefore the harbour 
was  built a  league away from the city, and the 
artifice of  the Long Walls was tried to join  the 
two  together.  Here  we  have  the  conservative 
touch  of  the  "  6ijpoq  p6vaP~co~  " clinging  fondly 
to ancient usages. 
The  physical  conditions  of  the country were 
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Republic  had  to contend ; it had  the political 
disadvantage  of  having  no  natural  allies  such 
as Sparta found in the discontented aristocratic 
elements in  every town  in  Greece.  Sparta was 
the  leading  power  in  the  Peloponnesus.  Very 
different was  the position held by Athens.  She 
was  indeed  beloved  in  theory  as  the  city  of 
freedom,  but  in  theory  only,  for  in  her  rising 
star the rival Democracies saw a menace to them- 
selves.  This  beautiful  island  world  had  indeed 
common  commercial  interests  with  Athens  as 
against  Sparta, but then all the trading centres 
on the islands were  also her  rivals,  so that the 
Athenian Confederation was not nearly so strong 
as  the  Spartan  alliance  with  the  aristocratic 
factions.  It  is  marvellous  to  see  what  great 
political  aims  were  kept  in  view  under  such 
conditions,  for  Athens  faced  Sparta in  the full 
consciousness  that she  stood  champion  for  the 
principle of  political independence. 
For a  time  Athens  steered  a  truly  brilliant 
course  through  her  extremely  difficult  foreign 
policy,  owing  her  success  not  so  much  to her 
form  of  government  as to the  noble  character 
of  her people, which found its best development 
in governing itself.  We  cannot but admire the 
great heart, and the natural genius of  an Athenian 
mob,  which  yet  was  able  to feel  sentiment  for 
Greece as a whole. 
Athens bled to death for the idea of  a Greater 
Greece.  Her  vision  of  her  City  State  trans- 
formed into a great Power could not be realized, 
because  her  confederates  were  not  dependable, 
and because the state-craft of  antiquity was not 
capable of  creating a Federal system, which can 
take  no  real  shape  while  every  citizen  has  a 
direct  share  in  political  life.  The  alliance  of 
which  Athens  was the head  was  not even given 
a collective name, but was  always spoken of  as 
Athens  and  her  confederates.  It  became  in 
fact a  hegemony of  a  very  oppressive kind,  for 
the  confederates  were  compelled  to  carry  out 
what  the  sovereign  people  upon  the  Acropolis 
decreed.  This,  coupled  with  the  natural  in- 
discipline  of  the  other  Greek  races,  and  their 
impatience  of  any  strong  control,  was  more 
responsible for the tragic fall of  Athens than was 
the democratic form of  her government.  When 
we  understand  this  aright,  her  history  is  still 
inspiring for us to-day, for in spite of  innumerable 
follies a strain of  inspiring greatness runs through 
Athenian  politics.  The Spartans recognized her 
material and intellectual superiority, and resented 
it fiercely ; their jealousy prompted their perfidi- 
ous saying at the outbreak of  the Peloponnesian 
War,  that the time was  come to free the other 
States from the Athenian yoke. 
From  the  beginning  the  history  of  Athens 
pointed towards democratic developments.  The 
note  of  mildness and humanity  was sounded  in 
the very origin of  the City, which was not founded 
upon  conquest like  Sparta,  but arose, as far as 
we  can tell its dim beginnings, through a gradual 
influx of  immigrants who sought their livelihood 
upon  its hospitable  shores.  This  is  the reason 
why  aristocratic  forms  struck  no  deep  roots 
within it.  It, too,  began  with a monarchy, but 
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this  form  of  government,  which  left  no  trace 
upon the Constitution,  except in the title of  one 
of  the nine  Archons.  It was  succeeded by an 
aristocratic domination, but the arrogance of  the 
reigning families displayed itself first and foremost 
in the despoiling of  the Demos,  and led  to the 
popular upheavals which took a democratic com- 
plexion  under  the  Constitution  of  Solon.  The 
influence of demagogues kept a tyranny in power 
for a  little  while  longer,  but  finally,  after  the 
Tyrants had cut the heads off  most of  the nobles, 
appeared  the Democracy proper,  as  Cleisthenes 
had  reorganized  it,  and  it at once  assumed  a 
logical  shape.  The  centre  of  sovereignty  was 
shifted  more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  the 
whole  body  of  free  citizens,  until  at length  it 
lay  directly  and  absolutely  with  the  National 
Assembly. 
This Democracy  was  formless  in the highest 
degree.  Its  Civil  Service  was  an  example  of 
the dangerous principle of  divided responsibility. 
Even in Army leadership the supreme command 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  more  and  more 
generals  of  equal  status.  The  Command  was 
divided  among  three,  or  even  four  individuals. 
For us this principle of  Boards of  Control is more 
incomprehensible  than  any  other  part  of  the 
whole  system  of  the  State.  We  can  scarcely 
imagine  how  the  Romans  managed  to govern 
through two Consuls at once, and we  are quite 
unable  to understand  how  Greek  armies  could 
ever have been led by three  or  four "  Strategi." 
No doubt it usually happened that one of  the four 
was so superior that in practice  the other three 
were  subordinate  to him.  In  the  "  hlcrc~qcrla" 
the Thousand were finally given direct participa- 
tion in the sovereignty.  It would seem impossible 
for a  State whose  government was  so radically 
democratic  ever  to  have  had  a  great  foreign 
policy.  In theory  the  thing  was  so  incredible 
that  the  Greek  philosophers  rejected  it  with 
contempt. 
It is on this very point that we  must beware 
of  the professorial politician.  Great as Aristotle 
was,  he  still  appears in  the guise  of  a  learned 
schoolmaster  in  the newly  discovered  fragment 
of  his  work  on  the  Athenian  State.  It  was 
an  ancient  principle  that  political  rights  were 
granted on a basis  of  military  service.  As  long 
as land forces  only were  employed, the right to 
vote  was  founded  on  service with  the hoplites, 
and  none  but the well-to-do could  enrol  them- 
selves among these  heavy -armed troops.  When 
Themistocles  led  the  Athenians  from  land  to 
maritime warfare the effect produced upon their 
history  was  analogous  to  the  introduction  of 
universal  service  into  Prussia.  The  banks  of 
rowers for the triremes had to be  supplied from 
the lowest  classes  of  the population,  to whom, 
by inevitable necessity, the suffrage had likewise 
to  be  extended.  To  make  this  a  reproach  to 
Themistocles  would  have  been  as foolish  as it 
was to blame Bismarck for introducing universal 
suffrage  into the  North-German  Confederation. 
We  know  that  this  non-plus-ultra of  political 
rights  gave  Bismarck  the  weapon  he  required 
to appease the great body of  demagogues.  The 
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German  policy.  The  desire  for  German  unity 
was  indeed  widespread,  but  its  attainment  by 
a  war  between  Austria  and  Yrussia  was  by  no 
means  the  wish  of  the  people.  Therefore  the 
founder  of  the policy  of  Union  was  absolutely 
compelled to grasp at these methods of  despair. 
Exactly  similar was  the position  of  Themis- 
tocles,  the  man  who  in  all  history  has  been 
the  nearest  intellectual  parallel  of  Bismarck. 
There is  a  tragic touch about universal suffrage 
extended  to all  classes  of  the population,  but 
it is  not  a subject for the censure  of  pedants. 
Circumstances were responsible for this radicalizing 
of  political  rights,  and in this case the crudest 
forces  of  human  nature were  held  in  check  by 
the broad  foundations  of  slavery  on which the 
Athenian  State reposed.  Another restraint  was 
the  traditional  reverence  with  which  the  Attic 
Demos, for all its fickleness, continued to regard 
certain  of  its  great  ruling  clan.  The  position 
which the two great tribes of  the Philidae  and 
the  Alcmaeonidae  owed  to their  descent  from 
Ajax and Nestor was  purely  one of  inheritance, 
for they  had  no  formal  precedence  over  other 
families in the State.  But it was as if these two 
powerful dynasties handed down certain traditions 
from father to son, for they produced  a  line  of 
born rulers, who persuaded the Demos into a great 
foreign policy, although of  course it was liable to 
constant  relapses,  and  required  the  repeated 
exercise of  all the arts of  oratory to knock it into 
the hard heads of  the mob. 
Human eloquence has never wielded so great, 
so  demoniac  an  influence  as  in  Athens.  We 
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could  not  wish  modern  nations  to be  so much 
under the spell of  the spoken word, for in us the 
substance is more vital than the form.  We have 
to remember  the  almost  super-refined  sense  of 
beauty  in  the  Athenians,  and  imagine  a  sus- 
ceptibility so great that a  single blunder  on the 
part  of  the  orator  would  expose  him  to the 
mocking  laughter of  his  audience.  Our modern 
world  can  no longer  realize  such  a  capacity for 
aesthetic  enjoyment,  or  such  a  joy  in  sacrifice 
upon the altar of  beauty.  Recollect the magni- 
ficent speech in which Demosthenes says, "  Our 
City's  task  is  to be  the  loveliest  of  any."  Of 
course  this  intense  susceptibility to  eloquence 
on  the part of  the Athenian  people  created  the 
grave danger that the Demos would  be  carried 
away  into sudden  decisions  prompted  by  envy 
or  revenge,  and  often  and often did  this actu- 
ally  occur.  It  was  when  a  man  like  Pericles 
arose, a tyrant in the noblest  sense, pre-eminent 
as  statesman,  general,  and  orator  all  in  one, 
that  the  constitution  of  the  Athenian  State 
became  effective, through  the very looseness  of 
its forms. 
By the institution of ostracism as an emergency 
measure  the  Demos  had  provided  itself  with 
another weapon against men whose power might 
threaten  danger  to the  State.  This  was,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  quite  needful,  and although  no 
doubt it sometimes gave scope for envy against 
outstanding figures, and at times  attacked  men 
whose  presence would  have been  a boon  to the 
State, it is not possible to condemn it off-hand. 
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the vote was taken, and each citizen wrote upon 
his potsherd the name of  the man whom he held 
to be  dangerous.  Thus it was not denunciation 
pure  and  simple,  for  it contained  the  element 
of  risk,  as  every  person  who  put  the  motion 
was  naturally  in  a  prominent  position  and ran 
the risk  of  the people's  judgment  being  turned 
against himself. 
The  same  considerations  apply  to other  in- 
stitutions of  the State which  at the first glance 
seem to us  like  madness.  Since there is  some- 
thing  aristocratic  in the nature  of  all  elections, 
it soon  came  to pass  that the appointment  to 
all great offices of  State was made by lot.  The 
illogicality  of  this  method  of  election  provided 
the  very  means  of  safeguard  against  the  one- 
sided  domination  of  a  majority.  There  were 
two  great  parties,  and  it  became  the  rule  for 
both their  lists  of  candidates  to be  submitted, 
and the lot was  drawn among  the names  upon 
these  lists.  Thus  it  might  happen  that  the 
actual  party in power  might be  in  a  minority 
in  certain  administrative  posts,  and  that  the 
rule of  the majority could not be recklessly taken 
advantage of. 
Now,  however,  Democracy  began  to  move 
towards  its  ultimate  conclusion,  with  that un- 
canny logicality which is inherent in its nature. 
Equality was to be  actual, and to this end the 
burdens  of  the State were  laid  with  dispropor- 
tionate heaviness upon the shoulders of  the rich. 
When  a  fleet  was  in  construction the rich  were 
simply  informed  of  the  number  of  ships  they 
were expected to build, while  on the other hand 
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the lower  classes had  an allowance made  them 
for their hours of  labour,  so that they might be 
able to attend the National Assembly. 
Thus an attempt was made to equalize social 
conditions artificially, and to place rich and poor 
upon  a  level.  The  process  went  on  in  dulce 
infiniturn until finally the mob  were  even given 
their  "  B~wpsd" or  money  for  their  seats  in 
the  theatre.  This  Demos  had  its  sycophants, 
even  as monarchs  have  their  flatterers.  Hand 
in hand with political decline went the decay of 
morals from the days  of  the sophists onwards. 
Euripides is a magnificent type of  the period of 
the  old  Hellenic  morality  in  its fall ; he  is  its 
splendid  fruit  with  the worm  at its  core.  He 
stands for the purely personal  morality, "  what 
is then wrong, if  to the doer it seems right ? " 
The final fate of  this  development  could  not 
be difficult to foresee, and the marvel is that the 
end  was  so  long  in  coming.  There  were  great 
men  to stem for a little the inevitable tide, but 
at length it brought with it the era of  the dema- 
gogue  pure  and  simple.  The  opening  days of 
Cleon's  rule  keep  their significance for all  time. 
They  bear  a  very  close  analogy  with  modern 
times, for the Athenian Democracy was equipped 
with the same stock of  phrases as we  have heard 
used  in  our  own  day.  Cleon  had  already  used 
against  Pericles  that pikce  de  rksistance  of  the 
demagogue's  attack  upon  the  statesman  who 
knows power to be the essence of  State-namely, 
the accusation that he  placed  force higher than 
law.  Unfortunately he found a greater following 
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for the people of  Athens began to lend an ear to 
the  counsels  of  sedition.  Finally,  when  Cleon 
had the inexplicable piece of  luck of  a successful 
military  campaign  falling  to  his  credit-how 
this came about Heaven only knows-his  reputa- 
tion  was  established,  and  the  State  fell  more 
and more into the democratic groove.  As  Fate 
willed  it, there then arose  in Alcibiades  the ap- 
pearance of  a genius, but unfortunately there was 
no reality, for he totally lacked the capacity for 
judgment.  Talents he had, in a superabundance 
which  drove him  to try to make them shine in 
every direction with a brilliance which was turned 
far more towards illuminating his own personality 
than the matter in hand.  Natures  such  as his 
rise easily to eminence on democratic soil.  The 
insensate  Sicilian Expedition  prepared  the way 
for  the  catastrophe  of  the  Peloponnesian  War, 
and  Athens never  recovered  from the blow she 
then  received.  All  the mighty  eloquence  with 
which  Demosthenes  smote into the soul  of  the 
nation now came too late.  Yet, when all is said 
and done, Athens  remains  unique  in the world, 
and  her  history  will  ever  be  rich  in  teaching, 
because  it  illustrates  once  more  the  relative 
worthlessness of  all political forms. 
In Florence,  which  was  a  pure  Democracy, 
resting upon a  non-slave basis, the Middle Ages 
produced a noteworthy aftermath of  the culture 
of  ancient Athens.  Here the old ruling families 
of  the City had been compelled at an early stage 
in its history to swallow their pride and become 
members of  the guilds.  To this day magnificent 
monuments  of  architecture bear  witness  to the 
unforgettable period of the Florentine Democracy, 
which placed its people upon the apex of culture 
among the nations  of  the New  Age.  Unfortu- 
nately it bore within  itself  the seeds of  a  quick 
decay.  Democracy  was  soon  forced  to  yield 
to  Tyranny,  for a  strong government  was  im- 
peratively  demanded to restrain  the turbulence 
of  the times,  when  one  deed  of  blood  followed 
upon  another,  and  conscience  was  flung  to all 
the winds of  Heaven. 
The  Democracies  of  modern  days  stand  in 
absolute  antithesis,  both  to the rich  culture  of 
the  Florentine  Democracy  and  to  the  finely 
tempered  popular  aristocracy  of  Athens.  In 
Athens  we  saw  idealism  exalted  to an  almost 
giddy  height,  while  in  Switzerland  and  the 
United  States we  find  an energetic  materialism 
on economic lines, combined with an indifference 
to the intangible possessions  of  intellectual life. 
"  No  Swiss  without  money "  and  "  Time  is 
money,"  such  are the typical  mottoes  of  these 
Republics of  our own day. 
The  strength  of  Swiss  life  undoubtedly  lies 
in  its  good  practical  efficiency.  We  must  not 
speak without qualification of  the commercialism 
of  the  Swiss,  for  this little  country,  whose  in- 
habitants  do not  exceed  those  of  the kingdom 
of  Saxony  in  number,  has  produced  two  great 
branches of the Protestant tree.  Nevertheless both 
Zwingli  and  Calvin  became  more  international 
figures, and any civilizing influence  which  is  to 
affect national  character  must  bear  a  national 
stamp, and the ethnographical conditions of  the 
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national culture in Switzerland.  Swiss Teutonism 
is only a tiny twig of  the Teutonism whose proper 
home  is  in  the  German  Empire,  and  Swiss 
Gallicism is likewise nothing but a feebler offshoot 
of  the Gallicism of  France.  The marvel is that 
in  spite  of  these  unfavourable  ethnographical 
conditions  Switzerland  has  still  managed  to 
maintain  a  relatively  high  intellectual  level. 
French  Switzerland  is  the  Protestant  counter- 
weight to  France itself, just as German Switzerland 
is  the  Republican counterweight  to monarchic 
Germany. 
In spite of  this it is,  broadly  speaking,  true 
that the whole position of the Swiss State is more 
adapted to ensure a  moderate  share of  fortune, 
and  a  certain  measure  of  respectable  comfort 
for  industrious  people  than to produce  the fine 
flower  of  intellectual  culture,  and  the  future 
will make this increasingly apparent.  The highest 
aims  of  policy  are  either  shut  off  altogether, 
or  made  difficult  of  attainment,  and above  all 
a foreign policy  on the great scale is altogether 
impossible.  Hence  the  decree  of  neutrality, 
which is in fact self-mutilation for a State.  It is 
true that it is  no  longer unconditionally  recog- 
nized by treaty, but it is tacitly implied in every 
war,  for  were it to be  violated  the foundations 
upon which the Swiss State exists would crumble. 
All  its institutions are rooted  in  its neutrality, 
above all  the greatest  limitation of  its activity 
in a small and inexpensive Army. 
Old Switzerland used to be aristocratic through 
and  through.  There  were  certain  Democracies 
around the Lake of  Lucerne where as a matter of 
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fact there  was  no  government  at all,  but  even 
these  had  those  aristocratic  tendencies  which 
had been  developed in the large  Cantons in the 
plain  of  Switzerland,  and  individual  leading 
families of  peasant stock were the actual rulers of 
their  Cantons.  The classifications of  society in 
old Switzerland were likewise purely aristocratic. 
There  were  immigrants,  whose  only  political 
were  to protection,  but  there  were  also 
subjects who simply owed allegiance either to the 
Confederation  as  a  whole  or  to  one  or  more 
Cantons.  The French Revolution was what first 
put a radical complexion upon all these conditions, 
and we can trace during that period in Switzerland 
a decay  of  the old  aristocratic forms similar to 
what  took  place  simultaneously  in  Venice  and 
the  Netherlands.  The  internal  conditions  of 
existence  gradually  disappeared,  and  the  old 
Constitution  was  tossed  light-heartedly  aside. 
Then  came  the year  1798  with  its attempt at 
Helvetian  unification.  In 1803  Napoleon's  Act 
of  Mediation brought  into being  a  Constitution 
which  realized  the  idea  of  equality  for  every 
Canton.  A Confederation was formed consisting 
of  twenty-two  Cantons,  all  with  equal  rights. 
A brief  reaction followed, but the great principle 
of  equality endured. 
The  succeeding period  saw  the beginning  of 
disputes in the various Cantons regarding political 
forms.  It is extraordinary how  the old families 
had  decayed or  disappeared in so short a time, 
for  the  groundwork  of  a  really  aristocratic 
government  was  no  longer  forthcoming.  The 
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began  in  1815,  and the  first  great  blow  for  it 
was  struck  in  1830  when  several  of  the  larger 
Cantons introduced a purely democratic Constitu- 
tion.  The  Catholic  Cantons  were  vanquished 
in the "  Sonderbund " war,  and in  1848 a  new 
Constitution was  proclaimed for the whole  Con- 
federation.  Thenceforward none of  its members 
might have other than a democratic Constitution, 
be  it  either  direct  or  representative  in  form. 
The  Federal  State is  strongly  centralized,  and 
therefore  the  political  forms  of  its constituent 
elements must  be  approximately  the  same.  A 
new  radical  movement  began  in  the middle  of 
the  'sixties,  which  aimed  at direct government 
by the people.  Experience  had shown that the 
National  Assembly,  or  Grand  Council,  had  not 
always  given  full expression to the will  of  the 
nation itself, and that it had made alterations in 
the Constitution which were not properly in accord 
with  the wishes  of  the sovereign  people.  Thus 
arose  a  movement,  demagogic  in  form,  but 
justifiable  in  fact,  which  aimed  at combining 
direct government by the people with the repre- 
sentative  system.  This  vision  has  become  a 
reality in most of  the Swiss States to-day.  The 
nation has the right of  veto upon all constitutional 
changes,  which  have  to  be  laid  before  it  for 
decision  by  referendum.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
this  arrangement has  had  very  different  results 
from  what  were  expected  of  it.  The  masses 
show  their  suspicion  of  all  reforms  which  cost 
money,  and all which  require  a  certain  amount 
of  education to understand,  and to this must be 
added the mistrust of  the Government which  is 
one of  the features of  Democracy.  It was there- 
fore  quite  erroneous  to expect  the  referendum 
always to work in a radical direction, for in many 
cases its influence  has been strongly reactionary, as 
for example with the vaccination legislation.  The 
educated members of the central authority of the 
Confederation in Berne were unanimous as to the 
need for vaccination laws on the German pattern, 
but the proposal raised an absolute storm through- 
out the country.  The Bull of  Uri began to bellow, 
and  in  the  Grison compulsory  vaccination  was 
rejected  amid  acclamation  from  the  sovereign 
people,  and no one could understand how  "the 
Bismarck " of  Berne could propose such coercion 
of  the  free  citizens.  Thus  the  law  was  never 
passed, and the incident has been the cause why 
the  machinery  of  universal  referendum  is  now 
so  seldom  set  in  motion.  For  the  rest,  the 
Grand Council transacts current business through 
a few officials, who are simply and solely a Com- 
mittee ; and administration is everywhere carried 
on  by  means  of  these Boards,  and not  through 
individuals. 
The whole of this system originates in innumer- 
able  local  factions,  and  in  a  municipal  feeling 
more powerful than any foreigner can ever hope 
to understand.  So  loose  a  form  of  Democracy 
may  answer tolerably well  in these petty condi- 
tions, but it proves a great obstacle to the really 
important and civilizing enterprises of  the State. 
Army  administration  is  starved  by  it, and as a 
result foreign policy is hampered, and the whole 
nation is deprived  of  military  education and all 
its  incalculable  moral  benefits.  In its  soldiers 
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of  fortune old Switzerland possessed an excellent 
antidote to the dangers  of  neutrality,  although 
its methods were no doubt open to the attacks of 
doctrinairism,  and we  can understand the fierce 
objection  made  to them  by  Zwingli,  who  had 
himself  been  an army-pastor, and who regarded 
the  State solely  from the moral  point  of  view, 
for  there  is  no  doubt  that  these  mercenaries 
brought  many  vices  back  from  their  foreign 
service into the simple home-land.  Nevertheless, 
from the political  standpoint  these troops  were 
a benefit to the Swiss State.  It gained a magnifi- 
cently trained  body  of  men  in all the innumer- 
able  officers  who  had  been  in  the  Papal,  the 
Imperial, or the Bourbon service, and the military 
spirit was  strengthened  throughout  the  nation, 
so  that in  those  days  the  other  countries  of 
Europe thought twice before they meddled with 
Switzerland. 
To-day no trace of  this remains, and it is hard 
to  say  whether  the  militia  system  has  really 
succeeded  in  creating  a  widespread  military 
efficiency.  No  doubt  physical  efficiency is  still 
held  in high  esteem, but on the other hand we 
all know that Swiss manoeuvres have some very 
comic characteristics.  I once walked in the rain 
over the Pragel  Pass, along Suvaroff's old road, 
between  Schwyz and Glarus.  The weather was 
not  exactly  pleasant,  still  for an active walker 
it  was  perfectly  endurable.  When we  reached 
Glarus we  saw an Army order posted as a public 
placard.  It commanded a  review on the follow- 
ing  Sunday,  but  it  was  expressly stated that 
it was to be  only  weather permitting.  At  the 
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present  day  such  a  proviso  gives  food  for 
reflection, but still,  in the last  war,  during  the 
campaign  which  ended  in  Bourbaki's  defeat, 
the  Swiss  troops  did  well,  and  showed  good 
discipline.  Old tradition seems still operative  in 
a  thoroughly  warlike  people,  who  were  once 
considered the best soldiers in the world. 
There is no doubt that the administration of 
justice  is  much hampered  in Switzerland by the 
democratic Constitution.  The election of  judges 
is  in  itself  an obstacle,  and we  must add to it 
the  lack  of  a  national jurisprudence.  There  is 
no  Swiss law, but in Ziirich  and Berne  German 
jurisprudence is taught with  certain adaptations 
to Swiss conditions,  and in Neufchiitel, Geneva, 
and Lausanne it is French.  There are only a few 
ordinances  of  the  Confederation  in  the  nature 
of  Constitutional  law,  and  applicable  to  the 
whole  country.  Therefore  no  really  national 
jurisprudence  can  exist,  and  the  intellectual 
level of  the body of  judges is the lower in conse- 
quence. 
Not  in  these  directions  only,  but  also in  its 
more  directly  civilizing  mission,  is  the  State 
obliged  to limit  its  activity  on  account  of  its 
political  forms, for the Democracy  has  no taste 
for  education  beyond  the  elementary  and  the 
technical.  The aristocratic Switzerland of  Calvin 
and  Zwingli  stood  on  a  vastly  higher  level  of 
culture.  Who  could  have  believed  that  the 
country as we  see it to-day could have brought 
forth  so  rich  a  harvest  of  the  intellect.  Now 
We  see  money  catching the nation in its dismal 
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a  monopoly  of  the most  oppressive  kind.  We 
mark the early stages of  a corruption which will 
have to  grow much greater still before the sovereign 
people begin to feel it and to see it.  Yet, despite 
it all,  this  little  State must  be  regarded  as  a 
necessity for Europe ; it is an enrichment both 
of  French  and  German  life,  and we  cannot  by 
any means wish to see the suppression either of 
this  republican  development  of  the  German 
spirit, or  of  this  Protestant  offshoot  of  French 
civilization.  Nevertheless  it  is  clear  that  its 
prevailing  conditions  could  never  be  adopted 
by nations which form a single whole. 
Democracy  has never  played  a  great part in 
the life of  European  States, and in  Germany it 
has  never  had  the upper  hand  except in  a  few 
of  the Imperial Cities.  It is in the young Colonial 
States of  America  that it has  found  its second 
bloom.  These American Republics are essentially 
different from each other, according to the nature 
of  their inhabitants in north and south.  North 
America  is  dominated  by  dwellers  of  Teutonic 
stock,  while  Creoles  and  Spaniards  rule  the 
southern  continent,  and  here the  word  Liberty 
carries a different meaning to that which it bears 
in the north.  In the United  States each man's 
desire  is  elbow-room  for  himself,  but  in  the 
south  he  wishes  to impose  his  will  on  other 
people.  Hence  the  tranquil  conditions  which 
we  see prevailing in the north, and the unceasing 
series  of  revolutions  in  South  America,  where 
republican  government  is  merely  a  makeshift 
devised to supply the lack of  a native dynasty. 
Great  as  the  North  American  Republic  is, 
it  still  does  not  belie  the  universal  rule  that 
democratic government  is  only  suited  for  little 
States,  and in the last resort  the Union is  only 
a  Confederation  of  many  thousands  of  small 
Republics.  In forming  a  judgment  upon  them 
we  must  always  remember  that in  spite  of  all 
democratizing of  political  forms, certain institu- 
tions  belonging  to  their  previous  monarchical 
history  have  still  survived.  We  can  trace  its 
traditions to this day in the Constitution of  the 
State, even as we  can perceive how  the refugee- 
spirit  of  the political  malcontents,  who  saw the 
State  more  as  an enemy  than  as  a  protector, 
is  still  extant, and how  puritan  protestantism, 
with  its  defiant  note  of  independence,  has  in- 
fluenced even the forms of  the Catholic Church 
in America.  The monarchic institution of govern- 
ment  through  individual  officials  was  not  dis- 
carded.  Even  as  a  President  was  placed  over 
the whole,  so  there was  a  Governor  over  each 
State, whose  position  was  of  course  only  that 
of  an  executive  official  under  the  orders  of 
the  Democracy.  The  two-chamber  system  is 
another  monarchical  institution  which  has  sur- 
vived  in spite of  the difficulty of  constructing a 
Senate  differing  in  nature  from  the  House  of 
Representatives  in  a  State  whose  democratic 
complexion forbade  recognition  of  class  distinc- 
tions.  A  few  outward  divergences  were  made 
the  pretext  for  seizing  the  advantages  which 
accrue  from  the  counterbalancing  influences  of 
the two-chamber system. 
These  things  are  inheritances  from  the  old 
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aside,  the  nature  of  this  State is  marvellously 
adapted to  theconditions of a growing and  changing 
society.  Its institutions are so elastic that they 
seem  merely  to indicate  the  direction  that the 
development  should  follow  which  takes  place 
so  freely  within  the  cadres  they  provide.  At 
its origin the Union comprised thirteen States, and 
the increase of  its present  number of  thirty-nine 
has not required  any alteration of  the Constitu- 
tion.  Moreover, this same Union contains States 
like  Rhode  Island,  petty in  the  strictest  sense 
of  the word,  for it is no bigger than Brunswick, 
and others such as Texas, which is fully as large 
as Germany.  City-States  and  States  cut from 
the  primeval  forest  all  come  under  the  same 
Constitution.  The State of  New  York has more 
inhabitants  than  the  whole  of  Sweden,  while 
Nevada  contains  only about as many as Halle. 
The Americans themselves  do not  exactly know 
the number  of  their  population  at the  present 
time.  In this instance the sketchy construction 
which  is  characteristic  of  Democracies  and  so 
distasteful  to the instinct  of  the historian  has 
great advantages.  It is all as little thought out 
as it is possible to be, but its simplicity is the very 
reason why it can be so rapidly improvised wher- 
ever  necessity  requires,  and there is  something 
imposing in the spectacle of  this Union expanding 
as if by a process of  Nature itself.  Any territory 
which has gathered a population of  about 100,000 
has the right to constitute itself a  State and to 
ask  for  admittance  into  the  Union.  This  is 
accomplished in the simplest  possible  manner- 
the backwoodsmen, considering that the proper 
moment  has  arrived,  summon  an  Assembly, 
elect a provisional government, send a deputation 
to Washington,  and  the new  State comes  into 
existence in the twinkling of  an eye. 
The life-force of the Union is very really centred 
in thevision of an immeasurable future.  Americans 
forget that the earth is  round,  that the eternal 
call  of  the West,  which  all  their  poets  sing  of, 
will some day cease to sound, and that the problem 
of their future should far rather be how to create 
something upon their soil, which offers so many 
material  facilities  for  it,  which  can  be  called 
civilization as the  Old  World  understands  the 
word.  In spite of  their great material progress 
the Americans have hitherto failed to contribute 
anything  to the  great  ideal  possessions  of  the 
human race, and this failure is the more striking 
in  comparison  with  their  colossal  productivity 
in all technical spheres.  The mediocrity of  their 
literature  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  their 
wonderful  inventive  capacity.  The  number  of 
their outstanding poets could scarcely be smaller 
for  a  wealthy  country  possessing  a  developed 
language  throughout  a  century  of  unruffled 
peace. 
American  life  will  bear  the same  stamp for 
a long time to come, for all the signs of  the times 
point  to further decades  in  which  the material 
exploitation  of Nature will still be the chief pre- 
occupation  of  the people.  Washington  and his 
friends,  the Fathers of  the Union,  trusted that 
Art and Science might renew their glorious youth 
in this young world of  freedom, but hitherto their 
noble  hopes  have  been  nothing  more  than  a 328  THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
dream.  Washington  reiterated  his  expectation 
again  and again, but he  was  a  true son of  the 
unhistorical eighteenth century, and never realized 
how  deeply  a  civilization  must  strike  its roots 
into a  country's  soil  before  it will  bring  forth 
such  fruits.  The  obstacle  does  not  lie  in  the 
Democracy, but rather, as we  have already seen, 
in  the fact that America  is  a  colonial  country. 
Colonies  do  not  attain,  even  remotely,  to the 
level of  the mother-land's civilization, for a people 
which  has had no youth in the proper sense will 
never  show  creative  aesthetic  genius  unless  it 
remains  in  direct  connexion with  the cradle of 
its race. 
From  the political  conditions  of  America  at 
the stage they  have  already  reached,  we  Ger- 
mans can draw no  lesson for  ourselves, and the 
excellent  book  which  our compatriot Holst  has 
written  about the Union leaves us with  the im- 
pression that further study will profit nothing.  As 
wealth increases, and the inequalities within this 
Democracy grow with it, the deceits and dissension 
in the party life which is now thoroughly corrupt 
must come ever more into prominence.  What is 
the real meaning in the party cleavages in North 
America  to-day ?  Real divisions existed  before 
the Civil War, when the question of Emancipation 
was  a binding  or  a  sundering force,  but  where 
is now  the bond between the  parties  who  con- 
front  each  other  sometimes  as  Federalists  and 
Republicans,  and  then  again  as  Republicans 
and  Democrats ?  These  titles  themselves  are 
absolutely  meaningless,  and  on  both  sides  we 
see  nothing  but  ambitious  men  struggling  to 
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get to the top for the sake of  the spoil.  History 
has  lost  its  meaning,  and  for  the  student  of 
human nature it has resolved itself into a series of 
mere struggles for power, and since recent years 
have  given  money  so  tremendous  an influence, 
it is natural that political weapons should be used 
to further dirty money-grubbing interests. 
For  the  rest,  however,  the  foundations  for 
democratic  institutions  are  so  well  prepared  in 
America  that  it is  impossible  to imagine  how 
any other form of  State could exist there.  Once 
again we  have to recognize that history  cannot 
sum up  the value of  Democracy  by  emphasiz- 
ing  that  it  pursues an unattainable goal.  The 
Florentine  Democracy  of  the  Cinque  Cento 
rendered  unforgettable  service to mankind,  and 
in  the  economic  sphere  at all  events  America 
stands unsurpassed  to-day. PERSONAL  UNION  331 
STATE  CONFEDERATIONS  AND 
FEDERATED  STATES 
SINCE  the qualities of  Power, Unity, and Sove- 
reignty  compose the essence of  the State, it is 
evident that all associations of  States are artificial 
productions,  because they limit the sovereignty 
of  the individual  State in one  way  or  another, 
and for this reason history does not record very 
many of  them.  I need only refer briefly in this 
lecture  to the peculiar  associations  of  different 
States under one Head, which go by the name of 
Personal  Union  and  Real  Union.  The  former 
are usually defined as States whose bond of  union 
is  represented  by  an individual, and who  have 
nothing in common but their ruler and their foe. 
This  definition,  however,  does  not  cover  every 
case.  The union may be as firm as that which 
once  subsisted between  Austria  and the Crown 
of  Stephen, or it may  be  as loose as the bond 
between England and Hanover, in which Hanover 
concluded  her  independent  treaties,  and  the 
law did not even provide that the enemy of  the 
one  should  be  the  enemy  also  of  the  other. 
No doubt England  did invariably draw Hanover 
into her own colonial wars, because she found the 
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Hanoverian  forces such  a  priceless  treasure  for 
her military power. 
The association between Prussia and Neufchiitel 
affords us, side by side with this, an insignificant 
example of a  Personal  Union.  In this case the 
only Eommon bond was in fact the person of  the 
ruler.  Prussia  only  appointed  the  Governor, 
and the administration lay absolutely in the hands 
of  a  Swiss  Council  of  State ; and  this  Swiss 
Canton  had  nothing  whatever  to do  with  the 
Prussian  State.  The Neufchiitel Musketeers, as 
they were called, the  forerunners of our Musketeers 
of  the  Guard,  were  recruited  in  Switzerland, 
just as were the troops of  the Pope and the King 
of  Naples ; legally  they stood to our Crown  in 
the  same  relation  as  all  such  foreign  troops. 
During the Seven Years' War many of  the Neuf- 
chiitel  nobility  entered  the  French  Army  in 
accordance  with  ancient  custom,  and  a  great 
number  were  taken  prisoner  at Rossbach  and 
other  battles ; by  the orders  of  Frederick  the 
Great they were all treated with the honour due 
to prisoners of  war.  There was  no  question  of 
their having in any way  violated their duty as 
subjects,  for  the  Principality  had  no  concern 
with the King of  Prussia's  wars. 
Here we  have the loosest imaginable form of 
Personal Union, but one which may lead to the 
gravest  complications.  The  two  States  whose 
union is so purely formal must each go their own 
way,  especially  if  they  are  widely  separated 
geographically  into  the  bargain,  and  one  side 
is bound  to lose its fellow-feeling for the other. 
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Alpine province  is an ugly  page  of  her  history. 
All the well-born Swiss of the  place were touchingly 
royalist  in  their  sympathies,  and  clung  with 
enthusiasm to the Prussian  Crown,  but Prussia 
allowed  a  squalid  popular  rising  to wrest  the 
little country from her grasp, without making  a 
single serious effort to win  it back.  Neufchgtel 
would  mean  a great deal to us  to-day, for its 
possession would give us a standing in the Swiss 
Confederation.  Here  was  a  case  of  personal 
union turning to our disadvantage from its very 
flimsiness. 
A quite peculiar form of  Personal Union exists 
in  our  own  day between  Norway  and Sweden. 
Firstly,  the  two  are  under  the  same  dynasty 
for all time, which was not the case with England 
and Hanover,  which  had  a  different  law  of  in- 
heritance, while Norway and Sweden are always 
to be ruled by the same King.  They have cer- 
tain other institutions also in common, and are 
associated in their foreign policy, under an  arrange- 
ment whereby Sweden alone possesses a Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs.  It  follows  naturally  that 
if  the  case  arose  they  must  also  have  their 
enemies  in  common.  For  the  rest  they  each 
exercise  an extremely  wide  independence,  and 
there is scarcely any traceof fellow-feeling between 
the two.  The whole  family  of  Germanic races 
scarcely offers  any greater  contrast than exists 
between  these  two  nations,  whose  coinage  pro- 
claims them to be sisters.  A charming sisterhood 
in  sooth !  On  the  one  hand  we  see  Sweden, 
aristocratic in the best sense of  the word, with all 
the unique charm of  her social customs, and on 
the other stands Norway,  with  all  her  intoler- 
able churlishness, presenting a boorish version of 
English characteristics. 
Here  we  have two  nations  welded  together, 
whose  nature, history, and speech are all totally 
divergent.  There is  nothing natural  about the 
union beyond mere geographical position. 
The  relationships  on  the  Scandinavian Pen- 
insula  are  analogous  to those  of  Belgium  and 
Holland after 1815.  Nothing could have looked 
better  upon  the map  than  the  political  union 
of  these  two  countries,  and  yet  it was  in- 
tolerable  in  practice.  It  is  the same  to-day 
with  Norway  and  Sweden.  Norway  is  demo- 
cratizing, in the most perverse manner  possible, 
a  peasant  population,  in  which  every  churl  is 
a churl indeed, each man as coarse and unlovely 
as his neighbour, and on the basis of  this rough 
peasantry  is arising a city  life  in its extremest 
development.  The  ground  is  prepared  for  a 
corrupt  and  morbid  literature,  and  it is  little 
wonder  that minds  like  Ibsen's  thrive upon  it. 
Now  look  at Sweden  with  her  recollections  of 
days gone by when she was a great Power ;  look 
at her  soldiery, sturdy still, and compare them 
with  the  ridiculous  figures  strutting  about 
Christiania in their Bersaglieri head-dresses, and 
calling  themselves  soldiers.  The  sharpness  of 
the contrast is patent everywhere.  Nevertheless 
we  do  find  a  commercial  capacity  in  Norway 
which compels our admiration, and her merchant 
fleet is bigger than ours in Germany.  Of  course 
the coast-line is such that communication between 
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is small in comparison.  The modern Norwegian 
peasant  is  possessed  by  the  deep  democratic 
hatred of  his class against Sweden, and it seems 
as though an  attempt to separate the two countries 
will  soon be made. 
!l%ese  forms  of  State association  have  less 
importance for us than Federations in the proper 
sense.  We  have  already  seen  how  the  whole 
character of  the States of  antiquity made them 
incapable of  tolleratiiig an alien Power anywhere 
near them, and how ancient history consequently 
contains  few  instances  of  Conlederations,  and 
then usually in the form of  Empires.  They are 
usually transitioii stages in the complete subjuga- 
tion of  several States beneath one leading Power, 
which  is in process  of  devouring them entirely, 
for the State of  antiquity desired above all things 
to  conquer  and  to  rule,  and  not  to  acquire 
associates.  Thus the great Athenian Confedera- 
tion became nothing more than the subjugation 
of  the  island  world  under  the  leading  State, 
which demanded  nothing but soldiers, ships, and 
money  of  the  confederates,  who  were  justly 
called  crdppa~ob.  Athens  finally  came  to grief 
over her  policy  of  a  Greater  Greece,  while  the 
Latin  Confederation, on  the  other  hand,  only 
prepared the way for the complete incorporation 
of  the Latin  races  within  the leading  State of 
Rome.  It was only at  the end of  Grecian history, 
when  the living thought which  guided  Hellenic 
policy  had  begun  to weaken,  that the instinct 
of  self-preservation induced the Hellenes to form 
two  alliances  which  had  a  certain  amount  of 
strength ; one was the Aetolian Alliance, which 
has  less  interest  for  us  on  account  of  its half- 
barbarian  character,  and  the  other  was  the 
Achaian  Confederation.  This  held  the  States 
of the Peloponnesus together for a while, under 
the necessity  arising from the terrible  pressure 
of Macedonia  and of  Rome, but no one will seek 
for the bloom  of  Greek life in these conditions. 
~[t  shows us  clearly how  impossible a  free  Con- 
stitution of  allied  States was  for  the Ancients 
who had not yet developed the idea of  representa- 
tion.  This lack was decisive against any federate 
life in antiquity. 
The Middle Ages,  on the other hand,  were a 
very  arena  for  Confederations.  Sheer  instinct 
of self-maintenance called them into being.  When 
we  examine  the  subject  more  closely  we  are 
astonished to find that the Swiss Confederation 
is  the only  one of  all the multitude  which  has 
endured.  The reason is that all the others were 
on a class basis ;  towns joined hands with towns, 
as in the Hansa, the Swabian, and the Rhenish 
City Leagues, and excluded the peasants and the 
nobles.  Sometimes the latter joined  in defence 
of their own interests, as in the "  Lowenbund," 
or else the peasants made alliances among them- 
selves ; but  always  it was  one  class  trying to 
secure itself against others.  We know, however, 
that the very essence of  the State is universality, 
and  superiority  to the  ~A~oveEla  of  classes.  It 
is for this reason that a purely class corporation 
can never become a State, as we see in the striking 
example  of  the  Hansa  League.  This  alliance 
had become immensely powerful, and yet it could 
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patriotism  as could  the Lombard  City  League, 
which once seemed ready to subjugate the whole 
Italian  Peninsula.  The  little  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion was territorial from its very outset, it em- 
braced both town and country, and was therefore 
capable  of  developing  into  a  State.  In  the 
transition period between mediaeval and modern 
history  we  find  one Confederation in the grand 
style, bearing the stamp of  both periods, namely 
the  Netherlands  Republic,  and  finally  on  the 
threshold of  quite modern times the great Federa- 
tion of  the North American States arose.  Here 
it quickly  became  evident  that  the old  forms 
of  confederation  no  longer sufficed  for  modern 
political life, and thus America became the bridge 
between  State  Confederations  and  Federated 
States. 
A  Confederation  of  States,  as we  have  seen 
it in Switzerland up to 1848, in the Republic of 
the  United  Netherlands,  and  in  the  North 
American Union from 1778 to 1787, is recognized 
by international law as an association of  sovereign 
States,  who  have  bound  themselves  together, 
without resigning their independence,  to further 
certain  common  ends,  the chief  of  which  is  to 
provide  for defence against a  foreign enemy by 
means of  contributions levied from all members 
of  the association.  Since  all  these  retain  their 
sovereignty the central authority must be divided, 
both legally and actually, among the individual 
members of the Confederation, and this has always 
been  done.  A  Parliament  or  Federal  Diet 
assembles, a  Congress of  ambassadors, who  ex- 
press  no  will  of  their own,  but are merely the 
mouthpieces of their Governments, whose desires 
they have of  course helped to frame. 
A Confederation of this kind is distinguished 
from an international  alliance  pure  and simple 
chiefly by  its  long  continuance.  It  is  devised 
to last for ever in the human sense of  the word, 
and is founded either on a living consciousness of 
national comradeship, or upon common historical 
traditions.  The allied  States feel  their  need  of 
each other in war,  and they express it in their 
political  forms.  Thus arose  Switzerland,  which 
serves us as a general type of  confederate Federa- 
tions.  Its members  were  pledged  not  only  to 
mutual support against the foreign enemy, but 
also to bear  each  other's  burdens  at home  by 
consent  or  arbitration.  This  may  lead  on  to 
a  further  series  of  established  institutions,  but 
the  sovereignty  of  each  individual  State  is 
guaranteed through them all.  Consequently the 
members  of  a  Confederation  exercise  their 
natural liberum veto.  No sovereign can be called 
on to obey, and therefore each individual must 
be  given the right  to object  to the decision  of 
the majority.  This was the case in Switzerland, 
in the Dutch Republic, and in the German Con- 
federation  also.  Unanimity  was  required  for 
any modification of  the Act  of  Union,  and for 
all the so-called organic decrees which  engaged 
the associates to any fresh undertaking, and the 
Practical result of  this was generally to prevent 
the Federal  Diet  from  arriving at any decision 
on important matters, and to make it ever and 
always a Council of  Incompetence. 
It is easy to see  that the inner  flaw in  the 
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system  was  in  giving  equal  treatment  where 
equality was non-existent, for all the Confederates 
were upon the same footing, except upon certain 
points  of  precedence.  This enabled the weaker 
members to take a most unreasonable advantage. 
It  was  a  citizen  of  the  Dutch  State,  Spinoza 
himself,  who  once  pronounced  that  any  man 
who  demanded  equality  among  unequals  was 
asking  for  something  against  reason.  In  the 
German  Confederation  Diet,  Austria,  Prussia, 
Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover could theo- 
retically  be  overridden  by  the  smaller  States. 
In practice the thing was a  sheer impossibility, 
and the big  States were forced to exercise their 
power behind the scenes in order to  secure support 
in the Diet. 
Thus  within  a  Confederation  a  hegemony 
may be formed, either in practice or in forms of 
law, in order to give a  definite direction  to the 
confusion  of  so  many  sovereign  wills.  This 
happened  in  the  Netherlands  Republic.  No 
form of  Constitution could have been looser than 
that which  bound  this  Confederation  together, 
for,  as  we  know,  the  principle  of  the  liberum 
veto applied legally not only to  the Estates General 
of  the Seven Provinces, but also to  the Provincial 
Estates  from  which  these  received  their  com- 
mission.  In theory these conditions would seem 
almost unworkable, but they were made possible 
in  practice  by  two  strongly  centralizing  forces 
within  the  Confederation.  Holland  alone 
possessed  two-thirds  of  the total population  of 
the Seven Provinces, and about seven-eighths of 
the national  wealth,  and the centre of  gravity 
of  the  whole  Union  lay  in  her  and  her  great 
cities,  Amsterdam,  Harlem,  Leyden,  and  the 
Hague.  This  is  the  reason  why  in  colloquial 
speech the  whole  Republic  of  the Netherlands 
went  by  the name  of  this one Province,  which 
seemed identical with the whole.  The maritime 
interests which concerned Holland and Zealand in 
particular soon became far more important than 
the home politics of  the little inland Provinces. 
"  Hoch von  Mut,  klein von  Gut, ein Schwert 
in  der  Hand, das ist das Wappen von  Gelder- 
land " (" Courage and pride, nothing beside, but 
a  sword  in  the  hand,  these 'are the  arms  of 
Guelderland "),  as  the  old  saw truly runs,  but 
this little Guelderland was indeed a pigmy beside 
the  world-power  of  Holland.  The  next  step 
was  so  to organize  the  outward  forms  of  the 
government  of  the  Republic  that  the  will  of 
Holland  should  usually  prevail.  The  States 
General held  their sittings at the Hague in the 
same building  (the Binnenhof) as the Provincial 
Estates of  Holland.  If  any important question 
arose, the Provincial Estates assembled to discuss 
the proposals which  were  to be  laid before  the 
States  General,  and  their  decision  was  usually 
CG taken  over "  by  the  other  States  as  the 
phrase ran. 
In  this  way  the  actual  preponderance  of 
Holland introduced  a  certain strength of  unity 
into the liberum veto.  The living  link  between 
the leading Province  and the other members of 
the Union was supplied by the remarkable office 
of Grand Pensioner of  Holland, which served as 
a  model  for  the  institution  of  the  Imperial STATE CONFEDERATIONS  SWITZERLAND 
Chancellor in our own country.  In this connexion 
we  must remember that Bismarck when a young 
man  had  formed a  friendship with  Motley, the 
gifted  American  historian,  who  had  written 
a  book  upon  the  Dutch  Republic  in  which 
Bismarck had studied the theory of  Federalism. 
In the Netherlands  the connexion between  the 
first  official  of  the leading  State and the most 
powerful  offici.al  of  the  Union  had  been  very 
carefully thought out.  Although  it created the 
hegemony  of  the  Dutch  Republic  all  outward 
indications of  the fact were studiously avoided ; 
the Grand Pensioner sat unbonneted at the lower 
end  of  the  table  round  which  the  high  and 
mighty  members of  the States General debated 
as  sovereigns  with  covered  heads,  nor  had  he 
even a vote in their discussions.  Yet it was he 
who directed the commerce of  the Union, he was 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and all negotiations 
with other nations were carried on through him ; 
he was in fact the ruler, upon the principle that 
the responsible agent is so to be regarded. 
A second centripetal element entered into this 
hegemony of  a  single Province  in  the shape of 
that line of  leaders of  the House of  Orange which 
stood for a democratic-monarchical power as well 
as for an active home policy, and always worked 
ultima-tely towards  promoting  a firm centraliza- 
tion, although it was  often in conflict with the 
Republic.  Throughout  the eighty  years  of  the 
War  of  Liberation  its princes  were  always  the 
leaders of  the Army,  and in the continual wars 
of  later times they still held the Union and the 
Army together. 
~hus  it  came  about  that  the  centrifugal 
forces within  the Seven Provinces  were limited 
by  two  institutions  whose  nature was  nowhere 
defined on paper ; moreover, there was no shrink- 
ing from the use  of anarchical weapons  against 
the liberum veto of the Provincial Estates.  Threats 
were sometimes employed, or else a Delegation of 
Notables,  as  it was  called,  made  up  of  Stadt- 
holders,  or  other  influential  members  of  the 
States General, was despatched to the recalcitrant 
Provinces  of  the  minority.  This  embassage 
would  set forth to soften the hard hearts of  the 
men  of  Guelderland  or  Friesland,  generally  by 
filling their pockets. 
Switzerland  found  other  ways  out  of  the 
difficulty, and  a  study  of  them  is  as  instruc- 
tive as the rest of  her former  conditions are for 
the history  of  Confederations  in  general.  If  a 
unanimous  decision  was  not forthcoming, those 
Cantons who were in agreement with each other 
could  form a separate Union; these are the old 
rulesof the Swiss Confederation. They then carried 
for  themselves  the  measure  which  had  failed 
to win the approval of  the whole Confederation, 
in the hope that the others would in time follow 
their  example.  This  expedient  is  thoroughly 
characteristic of  Confederations, but also funda- 
mentally  anarchical.  It  is  simply  a  makeshift 
system which may be said to work  so long as it 
does not break down.  Sometimes the mere instinct 
of  self-preservation  turns  into  a  blessing  in an 
anarchy like this, and moral considerations also 
may  knit  a  Confederation  so  firmly  together 
that the legal weaknesses in its organization are 342  STATE CONFEDERATIONS  SWITZERLAND  343 
somewhat  mitigated.  This  is the secret of  the 
long  continuance  of  Confederated  Switzerland ; 
a moral bond of  an absolutely personal kind held 
every  individual  Swiss  fast  to the rest  of  the 
nation.  Again  and  again  has  strife  between 
two Cantons been appeased by a timely reminder 
of  their  ancient  brotherhood  and  the  sacred 
oath which all alike had sworn. 
We find various forms of  memberships existing 
in the Netherlands Confederation, and still more 
in  Switzerland.  To  the  Seven  Provinces  was 
added  the  neighbouring  territory  of  Drenthe, 
which had a right to protection, but no vote in 
the  Assembly.  Besides  this  there  was  yet  a 
third  way  of  belonging  to  the  Confederation, 
as shown by the northern parts of  Flanders and 
Brabant,  which  were  conquered  during  the 
Spanish War,  and held  by the Seven Provinces 
as  State-Flanders  and  State-Brabant.  These 
territories  reverted  to  Catholicism,  and  were 
consequently  excluded, both by the Constitution 
of  the Republic  and  the  colossal  prejudice  of 
the  Dutch nation,  from  receiving  equal  rights. 
They  became  subject  to  the United  Provinces 
and were taxed on their behalf  by decree of  the 
States General. 
Thus we find a confederation of  States existing 
in  the  Netherlands  in  a  threefold  form.  The 
same  phenomenon,  only  more  complicated  and 
more developed, confronts us in ancient Switzer- 
land.  There  the original  Cantons  were,  as  we 
have seen, aristocratic in their actual conditions ; 
in Zurich, Berne, and B81e the Plain of Switzerland 
also possessed  Constitutions with  the same ten- 
dency, and the transition to a  pure  democracy 
was not made until the nineteenth century, after 
the Revolution of  1830.  The Confederation was 
to harmonize  with this former aristo- 
cratic character,  and its laws were framed with 
all the variety and recognized distinctions which 
an aristocratic society demands.  The Confedera- 
tion  proper  was  made  up  of  thirteen  districts. 
Of  these the original eight had certain rights of 
precedence over the more newly joined members, 
but, upon  the whole,  all these thirteen were on 
an  equality.  Below  them,  with  the  inferior 
rights  of  Protectorates,  stood  the neighbouring 
territories which were only raised to the dignity 
of  Cantons  by the Helvetian  Republic  of  1798 
and the Act  of  Mediation  of  1803.  Miilhausen 
in  Sundgau had formerly  been  one of  them,  as 
well as the Swabian Rottweil, up to the time of 
the  Thirty  Years'  War.  Beneath  them  again 
came the ordinary bailiwicks (Vogteien), as much 
the spoil of the  sword as were the  subject territories 
of  the  Netherlands,  being  the  conquest  either 
of  the whole  Confederation or  of  one  or  more 
Cantons.  They were administered through Land 
Commissioners  (Land Vogte),  and  in  them  the 
will of their possessor reigned supreme. 
Johannes Muller, who has idealized the history 
of  Switzerland  in  most  unpardonable  fashion, 
nevertheless  admits  that  subjects  have  never 
been  so  enslaved  in  any  part  of  monarchical 
Europe  as in  the  Swiss  bailiwick.  The  Ticino 
was  in those days one of  the original Cantons ; 
to this day the standard with  the three Castles 
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by  the  garrisons  of  the  master,  floats  over 
Bellinzona.  The ill-treatment by  Berne  of  the 
beautiful  Pays  de Vaud  is  still more  a  matter 
of  common  knowledge, for  in  that district the 
deadly  hatred  of  the Bernese  curs  has  become 
absolutely traditional.  Even now,  although the 
Revolutions already referred  to have long since 
made the Pays  de  Vaud  a  Canton  with  equal 
rights to the others, the antagonism is so strong 
that  Berne  and  Vaud  scarcely  ever  vote  on 
the same side.  The domains which are now the 
Cantons  of  Aargau  and  Thnrgau  used  also  to 
be subject territories. 
Here then we again find the threefold  form of 
membership, which is in itself enough to explain 
the slow and cumbersome movement of  the whole 
national  machinery.  The government  of  Swit- 
zerland  under  that  system  would  have  been 
impossible  if  Berne  and  her  great  bailiwicks 
had not had so strong a preponderance.  In the 
seventeenth century she ruled  235 square miles, 
and the remaining  Cantons only  225.  As  most 
of  the  bailiwicks  were  in  her  hands  as  well 
she wielded a power which came very near being 
a hegemony to say the least of  it.  Zwingli, who 
had  something of  the kind in his  mind  for the 
larger Cantons, called Bern and Ziirich the two 
oxen who pulled the waggon along. 
The  distinctive  feature  in  the  relations  be- 
tween the Nation and the State in a Confedera- 
tion is that the former are not directly subject 
to the central authority, or, in other words, the 
central authority has no power to lay down the 
law.  A  Confederate Diet  can pass  decrees, but 
they can only be given legal force by the individual 
States  amongst  their  own  subjects.  Thus  did 
matters stand with  the German  Confederation. 
The nation as a whole was mediatized and stood 
in no direct relationship with its central authority ; 
,ay,  it had not  even  the right to acknowledge 
the supremacy of  that authority, for according to 
the  Constitution  there  were  no  Germans,  only 
Prussians,  Bavarians,  Schwartzburg-Sonderhau- 
sians, and so forth, and none of  these had any 
obligations towards the Confederate Diet unless 
it pleased their own  rulers to ratify  its decrees 
within their own territories.  As  a rule this was 
only done in the case of  the political laws against 
demagogues, and in many States of the Confedesa- 
tion  years  passed  without any of  the edicts of 
the Diet being proclaimed as the law of  the land. 
The difficulty, nay, the impossibility of  carry- 
ing  out  any  kind  of  consistent  foreign  policy 
under such conditions is evident, and the history 
of  the  North  American  Confederation  affords 
us  an  example,  if  one  were  needed.  These 
colonies had become dependent subject provinces ; 
they  summoned  a  Congress  which  declared  a 
rupture with the mother-country.  This was not 
accomplished by  the thirteen Colonies  as such, 
but by the Congress.  The nation was immature, 
and was united only by the Congress, so that the 
whole  existed  before the parts.  Then  followed 
the War of Independence with its mostly mythical 
legends  of  marvellous  self-sacrifice  and  heroic 
deeds  on  the  part  of  the  Americans.  Calm 
historical  research  reveals  only  a  very  small 
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and his  own  immediate  circle,  who  roused  the 
nation,  which  was  for  ever  relapsing  into  its 
Separatist grooves, to  fresh united effort.  During 
the course of  the war the thirteen colonies simply 
usurped for themselves a sovereignty which they 
had  never  previously  possessed,  and  to which 
they had no claim.  As a result, a Confederation 
of  sovereign States organized itself, and upon it 
followed the most disgraceful period of  American 
history, so contemptible that a short decade was 
enough to bring the nation to its senses.  Foreign 
policy was absolutely in abeyance.  Washington's 
correspondence brings home to us the misery of 
the time.  After the Peace,  one of  the English 
Ministers asked him : "  How is it possible to make 
treaties with you ?  You are one nation to-day, 
but to-morrow you may be thirteen."  With the 
exception  of  Prussia,  who  remained  true to an 
old  friendship,  no  State  would  contract  any 
agreements  with  this  Confederation.  Credit 
finally sank so low that a pair of  boots cost 400 
dollars, and conditions  had arisen  which  an in- 
dustrial nation could not possibly endure. 
Our German Confederation was equally lacking 
in any kind of  foreign policy.  Foreign Ambassa- 
dors in Frankfort of course there were, to add by 
their intrigues to the mad confusions of  German 
politics,  but the Confederation  itself  only  once 
sent the Freiherr  von  Beust  on  a  mission to a 
foreign  Court.  He was  despatched  to London 
in 1864 to do a  bit of  diplomatic jugglery, and 
put a  spoke in the wheel  of  victorious  Prussia. 
Further comment is superfluous. 
A11  Confederations known to history,  not ex- 
cepting those in the Netherlands and Switzerland, 
have shown themselves incapable of  permanently 
fulfilling the  great  civilizing  tasks.  Our  own 
was short-lived, and the sixty years of its existence 
is  one of  the darkest pages  in  our  history.  It 
is  the only  Confederation  of  Monarchies  which 
the world  has  ever  seen,  and it reminds  us  of 
the sick horse whose  every limb provided a dif- 
ferent disease for the budding veterinary surgeon 
to  study.  The  North  American  Confederation 
did not last ten years, and the Great Age of  the 
Republic of  the United  Netherlands  was  not  a 
long  one.  In  this  latter  case  the  centripetal 
tendencies were, as a matter of  fact, very strong, 
and the State developed on to monarchical lines, 
which was a decided advance, as far as form goes, 
yet  in spite of  it Holland  has dwindled in size 
and  importance,  because  the essence  of  power 
does not lie in forms.  The Swiss Confederation 
lasted much longer, but here too we find stagna- 
tion setting in with the eighteenth century, and 
after it there arose, after the pattern of  North 
America, a new and firmer kind of  bond, namely 
the Federal  State. 
Many theorists have tried to prove  that the 
difference  between  a  Confederation  of  States 
and a Federal State lies in the scope and power 
of  the central authority.  A  short examination 
shows  us  that we  must  seek  elsewhere for  the 
essence  of  the contrast. 
The nerveless Government of  the German Con- 
federation had  wider  powers  in many directions 
than the modern German Empire, for it meddled 
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leaves  to  be  settled  by  the  discretion  of  its 
members.  It  is  not  in  this  therefore  that we 
need seek for the fundamental distinction between 
the two forms of  federation, nor yet in the fact 
that in  a  Confederation  the  central  authority 
leaves the individual States to give effect to its 
decrees,  whereas  in  a  Federal  State it always 
carries  them  out  directly  through  the  medium 
of  its own servants. 
This theory,  fallacious as we  shall presently 
see, had its origin in America.  When the heavy 
years of  the war with England had brought the 
Union of  the thirteen sovereign States under the 
banner of  the stars and stripes  to such a  pass 
that they  could  not  even  liquidate  their  war 
loan from France and Holland, and their prestige 
was wholly gone, then the leading patriots took 
heart  and  called  the  Congress  of  Philadelphia, 
which,  sitting  behind  closed  doors,  took  the 
course  which  had  become  imperative,  and  de- 
stroyed the  sovereignty  of  the member  States. 
For this was what it came to in practice, although 
in  theory  American  statesmen  were  not  quite 
clear  about  the issue.  The  action  which  they 
took was prompted by that practical genius which 
has always characterized the Anglo-Saxon nations. 
Alexander Hamilton, the greatest American states- 
man  of  that  date,  started  a  periodical,  The 
Federalist, with the primary object of  persuading 
the sovereign  people  of  New  York  into  agree- 
ment.  This diplomatic intention suffices in itself 
to show that dealings were not quite above board, 
but we  must also allow for a confusion of  theory 
which  the  whole  age  shared,  which  concerned 
DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY  349 
the nature of  political  power,  and a  belief  that 
power should be divided.  This led to the Federal 
theory  which  held  that the sovereign members 
should  remain  sovereign  while  surrendering  a 
portion of their sovereignty to the Union, so that 
certain  parts  of  the political  whole,  the army, 
the taxes, the posts, and the coinage, should be 
cut out of the functions of  the individual States. 
Certain  spheres  of  activity  were  to  be  given 
over entirely to the Union, certain others to the 
States, and, properly  speaking, both  States and 
Union were to be equally sovereign. 
Thus ran the new doctrine.  It was of  immense 
practical benefit, because it gained the assent of 
the  people  of  New  York  by  glossing  over  the 
real facts of  the case.  The Swiss believed in it 
also, and in Germany all teachers of  constitutional 
law were set upon  the adoption  of  this doctrine 
of  Federalism, if  only to avoid having to tell the 
German  princes  openly  that we  had  the  kind 
intention  of  destroying  their  sovereignty  and 
dealing another blow  at the work of  our deadly 
enemy  Napoleon.  No  one  dared  to  proclaim 
this,  so  they  tried  to take refuge  behind  the 
American theory of  a division of  power.  Closer 
reflection reveals the inner flaw in the notion of 
a  divided  sovereignty,  and  shows  that  it is  a 
contradiction in terms to speak of  an over-highest 
and an under-highest authority.  Moreover, when 
we  apply an unprejudiced judgment to the letter 
and  the spirit of  the new  Constitution  of  the 
United  States, as it was  first  passed  and  as it 
exists  unto  this  day,  we  can  no  longer  doubt 
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United  States  collectively.  The  nation  wields 
the power, and the members of  the Union have 
only  to obey.  This becomes still plainer  when 
we  consider  how  that fair  division  of  political 
functions  which  theory  prescribed  is  both  im- 
possible and unnecessary in a Federal State.  The 
American  Congress can  please itself  whether  it 
will have its decrees executed by its own officials 
or by those of  the individual States.  If Switzer- 
land wishes to construct a mountain road she will 
either do so herself in the name of  the Confedera- 
tion, or require a  particular Canton to do it in 
accordance with plans given. 
Thus here,  too,  it is  not  division  but unity 
of  the  supreme  authority  which  appears.  Of 
course  the conception  of  sovereignty is  elastic, 
like all political conceptions which belong to the 
sphere  of  Will,  but we  have already seen  how 
it must have a  firm  centre.  There must be an 
ultimate  criterion  by  which  to  discover  the 
essence of  sovereignty.  Its fixed and inalienable 
property,  without which no State can call itself 
a  State, is the right of  arms, and the power to 
determine for itself the scope of  its own supreme 
autliority.  The very nature of  the State is its 
ability to impose its will  by physical  force.  If 
it can no longer claim the right to wage war, and 
allows  itself  to  be  protected  by  the  military 
strength of  a greater Power, it becomes a subject 
of  that greater Power.  The  first  decisive step 
which America took at  the  Congress of Philadelphia 
was to decree that henceforward  a  single Army 
should be placed under the orders of  the Union, 
and this example was followed by Switzerland. 
THE UNITED STATES  351 
It is clear, then, that since the so-called States 
of  the Union  are States no  longer,  the title is 
nothing  more  than  conventional.  Lincoln  did 
not  mince  matters  during  the  last  war,  but 
declared that the States had their status in the 
Union  and  none  other  whatever.  This  is  the 
fact ; they are subject territories,  and when the 
Southern  States revolted  against  the collective 
will  they  were  rebels.  Rebel  States they  were 
called, which  is, properly speaking, a contradictio 
in  adjecto,  for  only  subjects can rebel.  But in 
politics names go for very little ;  considerations of 
piety or prudence may often lead to the retention 
of  titles  whose  meaning  has  been  lost.  This 
happens  especially  often  in  Federations  where 
the vanity of  former sovereigns has to be spared. 
The American Colonies had broken away from the 
mother - country  so  -they could  call  themselves 
Colonies  no  longer,  and  serious  were  the  dis- 
cussions of  what their future  name  should  be. 
Finally, after the individual territories had seized 
upon sovereignty for themselves  in the anarchy 
of the War of  Independence, they were given the 
title of "  States," which was thoughtlessly adhered 
to even  after the former  States had  lost  their 
right to it in the Union.  Look at  the contrast with 
the Seven Provinces of  the United Netherlands. 
They had been provinces in the  greater  Netherlands 
who had owned obedience to the King of  Spain as 
their common sovereign.  After they had broken 
with him and had each achieved  sovereignty for 
themselves they still kept their title of Province. 
It  would have been folly to have abandoned it, 
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When  we  stick  to facts  it is  clear  that  in 
Federal  States  the  individual  members  have 
lost  the  right  of  arms, and  with  it  the right 
to define  their  own  supremacy.  Here  again 
America's  procedure  is  typical.  The  Constitu- 
tion of  the North American Union begins with the 
words  "  We,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  . . . give  and decree this  Constitution."  Here 
we  have a clear declaration of  who is sovereign ; 
it  is  none  of  the  individual  so-called States, 
but the people,  the collectivity  of  the "  United 
States."  It follows that this sovereign is at all 
times free to extend its supreme rights in con- 
stitutional form.  The power to do this is what 
the  teachers  of  constitutional  law  described 
in  their  jargon  during  the  early  years  of  the 
North German Confederation with the appalling 
phrase  "  Jurisdiction  over  Jurisdiction " (Com- 
petenz-Competenz).  The Constitution  of  every 
Federal  State permits  the Union to extend  its 
jurisdiction,  under  certain  forms,  at any  time, 
and  to transfer  to itself  certain  powers  which 
have hitherto been vested in its members.  Every- 
one of these must be prepared to  see itself deprived 
to-morrow of  some  supreme  right  which  it is 
exercising  to-day.  Thus  at the  beginning  of 
the War  of  Independence  an American  states- 
man  was justified  in saying that the individual 
States were  not really  sovereign, for they stood 
sub graviore  lege.  Under  President  Lincoln the 
Federal  Constitution was again remodelled, and 
it was  laid  down  that no  State might  tolerate 
slavery  within its boundaries.  When  the rebel 
States  had  been  defeated  they  were  first  put 
under military government, and later were allowed 
to  summon  constituent  Assemblies,  although 
their  Constitution  was  laid  down  for  them  by 
the Union.  Only those  States which  abolished 
forced labour were thus recognized, and the others 
continued to be under military law.  It was only 
through  the  Union  and its authority that the 
rebellious  States were reinstated, and they only 
existed  in  and through  it.  Here  we  have  the 
clearest possible lesson in constitutional law. 
We  find,  then,  that  the  radical  difference 
between  a  Confederation  and  a  Federal  State 
lies in the fact that in the former the members 
are  sovereign,  and  the  central  authority  is 
subject  to them.  The  central  power  can  only 
signify its will  by decrees,  and it is left to the 
individual members to give effect to these laws 
of  the Confederation, asthey are wrongly called, 
by making them the law of the land.  Since there 
is  no guarantee that this will  be done, anarchy 
often  rules.  In a  Federal  State,  on  the  other 
hand, sovereignty is withdrawn from the hitherto 
independent  members.  They cease to be States, 
even  though  courtesy  may  still give  them  the 
title,  and  sovereignty  is  vested  in  the  central 
authority.  Of  course this latter can only frame 
its decrees by sanction of  the members, for the 
Federal State  is distinguished from the mono-State 
(Einheits Staat) by  its members  being  directly 
concerned in the framing of  the will of  the whole. 
Here  again  the  practical  shrewdness  of  the 
Americans has hit upon an admirable plan.  The 
idea of  a two-chamber system was first outlined 
by  Sherman,  the  Connecticut  delegate,  at the 
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constituent  Congress  of  Philadelphia.  Beyond 
the  assembly  of  representatives  of  the  nation 
he  demanded  an Upper  Chamber  consisting  of 
Senators, to be nominated by the authorities of 
each State, the same number for each, be they 
large  or  small.  Thus  beside  the  Chamber  in 
which  the  whole  sovereign  people  of  America 
were  directly  represented  by  capitation,  there 
existed another superior assembly in which every 
State was represented as such, by an  equal number 
of  directly  commissioned  delegates.  This  com- 
bination  fulfilled  its  purpose  completely,  and 
Switzerland adapted it to its own condition in its 
National  Council  (National  Rat)  and  Council 
of  Delegates (Stande Rat), which were modelled 
upon  the House  of  Representation  and  Senate 
of  the United States. 
The  distinction  between  these  two  forms  of 
Federation  is then  one  which  strikes  down  to 
their very roots, and therefore it is not difficult 
to understand  why  the transition  from  a  Con- 
federation to a Federated State is generally only 
accomplished after severe struggle and upheaval. 
Although  the very existence  of  the State is  in 
the balance,  few  are found  to acknowledge it, 
and as a  rule  a  State stands on  the defensive 
and only consents to shift the basis of  sovereignty 
when the crisis is at its height.  Nothing brought 
America  to the step except  her  general loss  of 
credit, and a Civil War was needed to break the 
forces of  particularism in Switzerland. 
When we  look further into the political con- 
ditions  which  have  seemed  favourable  to the 
development of  Federal States, we  find that the 
two  which history has known hitherto, Switzerland 
and North America, have been Democracies and 
~~~~blics.  It is  obvious that under  this form 
of  government  no  one  is  an ultimate loser  by 
the transition  from a Confederation to Federal- 
ism ;  the  centre  of  gravity  is  moved,  but  no 
subject has his rights curtailed.  The inhabitant 
of  Uri  or  Lucerne  still possesses  all  the rights 
which were his under the old Confederation, only 
now  he exercises them not only  within his own 
Canton  but  in  the Assembly  which  represents 
the whole Federated Union.  In such a case the 
change  demands  no  sacrifice  of  the individual, 
but  in  a  monarchy  a  very  considerable  one  is 
required from the King ; it is in fact a contra- 
diction in terms to ask a sovereign to recognize 
a legal superior. 
The  second  and  equally  important  factor 
for  the  healthy  growth  of  even  the narrowest 
forms of  Federal life is the presence of  a  moral 
force which we  may call the instinct for Federal 
law.  A  nation  must  have  a  sdnse  of  respect 
for the boundaries  which  have  been  sacrificed, 
and a living consciousness that the old landmarks 
are still inviolable.  Tiny as the original Cantons 
were, they were the cradle of  modern Switzerland. 
It was  upon  the shores of  the Lake of  Lucerne 
that the half  mythical history of  the Confedera- 
tion was acted, and no other Canton would ever 
dream  of  annexing  this  little  community.  In 
North America the legal  sense is  very  weak  as 
regards  cc  the foreigner, and the phrase about the 
manifest destiny " of  the Union  seems to its 
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Mexico  and  other  neighbonring  States.  And 
yet within the Union this youthful nation, who 
have  not  yet  quite outgrown  fist-law, evince  a 
deep respect for the law of  the individual. States, 
so-called,  and  we  find  among  them  the living 
sense that the  State once  founded  may  not be 
infringed upon, but lives on as a product of  the 
people's  sovereign will.  A large State has never 
once even attempted to swallow up a small one, 
but, on the contrary, America, like Switzerland, 
has seen its existing States split up.  Maine and 
Vermont  were  originally  parts  of  other  States, 
and  after  the  Civil  War  Virginia  was  likewise 
divided.  Here, then, we see a very strong natural 
Federal instinct at work ; and in every State the 
people is as sovereign as it is in its neighbour. 
It is clear, furthermore, that a Federal State 
can only remain vigorous and healthy when there 
is an approximate equality of  power  among its 
members.  Switzerland  provides us with  a  very 
mine  of  illustrations  of  this.  It  is  astonishing 
to trace  the  working  of  the  natural  forces  of 
Federalism in Swiss history and to observe how, 
as  the  Confederation  became  more  and  more 
firmly knit, the excessive strength of  the large 
Cantons  diminished.  Berne,  which  had  more 
square miles in the seventeenth century than all 
the other Cantons put together, is now so much 
weakened by the.independent organization of  its 
Bailiwicks  (Vogteien)  that,  although  it is  still 
the biggest  Canton, it is no longer in a position 
to quarrel with the others or to swamp them in 
any way. 
The question  is naturally  one  of  a  relative, 
not of  a mathematical equality.  Since the whole 
system is built upon this relatively equal power 
of  the  members  of  the Union,  North  America 
has  no  natural  capital city.  There has been  a 
metropolis  of  New  York  since  the year  1787, 
but it was purposely not made a capital, but a 
Federal Capital ad  hoc  was constructed  instead. 
Columbia,  as being  a  small territory without  a 
vote,  was  selected  as the site for  this  Federal 
Capital.  In Switzerland,  of  course, the capital 
of  the Confederation  was  bound  to be  Berne ; 
there was no alternative, since Berne had led the 
victorious party in the war of  the Sonderbund. 
Before that the seat of  government had varied 
between  Berne,  Ziirich, and Lucerne.  The most 
careful precautions were taken to prevent Berne 
from gaining any preponderance  by this prefer- 
ence.  Thus  not  more  than  one  citizen  of  the 
same Canton is ever one of  the highest officials 
of  the  Confederation,  in order  that the idea at 
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XXII 
THE GERMAN  EMPIRE 
IN  order  to understand  the difference  between 
our own Empire and the republican  Federations 
which we have been considering in the foregoing 
chapters  we  must  retrace  the  history  of  the 
various developments of  these States, and doing 
so, we discover a contrast of  the sharpest possible 
kind.  We have seen how, in the case of  Switzer- 
land,  the  separate  provinces  were  gradually 
drawn more closely to each other by the common 
struggle for independence against their powerful 
neighbours,  and  how  this  military  alliance  in 
process of  time became a firmer federative bond. 
In  America we have seen the same kind of  military 
union  gradually  forging a link  between  colonies 
which  had  nothing  in  common  except  their 
origin,  and a  more  or less nominal  dependence 
upon the British  Crown ; it has been said that 
they  were  sisters  only  through  their  mother- 
country.  These processes are obvious and normal, 
but who  can discover any analogous federalistic 
development in the  history of our own Fatherland ? 
What has Germany been these thousand years ? 
Always  an  Empire,  always  a  Monarchy,  with 
the exception of  sixty years of  a shameful federal 
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anarchy, for which we  have Napoleon to thank. 
Is the history  of  ten centuries to be  estimated 
by this one exception to it ? 
Germany has been a monarchy since the Treaty 
of  Verdun, although  it was  feudally constituted 
and prone therefore to disruption.  Nevertheless 
the  power  of  the Crown  was  so  strong  in  the 
beginning  that all  the princes  were  merely  its 
vassals.  In the eleventh century we  were much 
nearer  achieving  unity  than  were  the  French, 
for at that time  their barons  were much  more 
powerful  than  the  German  feudatories.  Then 
came the union of  our national Kingdom with the 
Holy Roman Empire which falsified the essence 
of  our  monarchy,  and  the  State  was  led  into 
paths  which  ran  counter  to the nation's  inner 
life.  The  internal  cohesion  of  the Empire was 
bound  to be  destroyed by a  supreme authority 
whose  centre was sometimes in Germany, some- 
times  in  Italy,  and  which  hurled  its  decrees 
suddenly out of  the darkness.  Germany was the 
only  great  country  of  Europe  which  possessed 
no capital city, and the attempts to make one at 
Goslar  were  speedily  doomed  to failure.  Thus 
the power  of  the monarchy dwindled and indis- 
cipline  increased,  territorial  principalities  arose 
upon  the ruins  of  the national  Kingdom,  were 
formally  recognized  under  Frederick  II.,  and 
gradually absorbed all the vigour of  the nation. 
Finally we have the catastrophe of  the Empire 
bound up with the territorial rulers of a country 
which  was  not  under  its dominion.  When  the 
Imperial Crown passed to the House of Hapsburg 
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more,  and Germany lapsed unconsciously under 
a  disguised alien  rule.  The situation  was  first 
cleared in some measure by the Peace of  West- 
phalia ; Germany  had won  religious  freedom at 
the cost of  streams of  blood.  The great Peace 
did  not  extend  to Austria,  for  while  Germany 
celebrated it by rejoicings Austrian churches bore 
the Pope's  protest nailed upon their doors.  The 
territories  of  the Emperor  had no  share in  the 
freedom  and  toleration  which  were  the  sole 
possessions which all Germany held  in common. 
Thenceforward the gulf was fixed between Austria 
and ourselves, the spiritual life of the two countries 
ran in different channels, and we  may truly say 
that  all  the  real  strength  of  German  politics 
had  to lie  in  opposition  to Austria.  Germany 
could only shape herself anew in a struggle against 
a German Empire. 
Let us now  consider what the political forces 
have been which have struggled for and against 
each  other  in  more  recent  history.  We  still 
find the old monarchical ideas persisting, although 
mutilated  and  misinterpreted.  The  so - called 
'' Caesareans "  of the seventeenth century taught 
that Germany  was a monarchy,  and its princes 
subject  to  the  Emperor.  The  forms  of  the 
Constitution  taken  by  themselves  might  seem 
to bear this out, but a real political insight could , 
not  fail  to reveal  how  matters  actually  stood. 
No  doubt German princes still took the oath of 
allegiance  to the  Emperor  bareheaded  and  on 
bended  knee,  and appeared  as his  subjects,  as 
far as outward ceremonial went,  but the theory 
of  their vassalage was of the kind which leaves 
facts out of account.  Federalistic tendencies were 
always  existent in  Germany  side  by  side  with 
the monarchical, and we have seen that the whole 
Middle  Ages  were filled  with  abortive attempts 
to realize them.  The later Federations, through- 
out the period  of  the Wars of  Religion, became 
a  still greater menace to our  national develop- 
ment, for they were purely separatist in tendency. 
The  Schmalkalden  Alliance  was  certainly  no 
matter for special congratulation, any more than 
the League was later. 
The  only  real  force  which  was  capable  of 
surviving  this  chaos  lay  undoubtedly  in  the 
secular principalities.  Their particularism shone 
out as relatively the healthiest  influence in the 
welter  of  territories  held  by  Church  or  town, 
noble or princely Houses.  They had the vigour 
which the crumbling national monarchy had lost 
and  which  the Federalistic  tendencies  failed  to 
grip.  Nothing but the phrases of  German politics 
remained  to the Regensburg  Reichstag,  but  in 
Dresden and Munich there was real government. 
The die was cast in favour of  the German princes 
when  they earned,  in the days of  Luther, their 
undying honour as protectors of the Reformation, 
and showed that the territorial principalities  of 
Germany were destined to rise above the chaos. 
The  only  question  was  which  of  them  would 
succeed  in  establishing  a  government  strong 
and  noble  enough  to  make  his  province  the 
cradle of  a new movement for German unity, to 
fill the Imperial throne,  and thus re-create the 
monarchy from the heart of  the nation itself. 
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Saxony a really high-minded Protestant statesman 
with great ideas, daring enough to rebel against 
the Catholic  Emperor  for  the sake of  German 
unity, and to found a Protestant Empire, we see 
that Electoral Saxony might have filled the place 
that Prussia holds to-day.  It seemed for a time 
as if the gifted Palatine might build up some such 
State.  But  it came  to nought,  and  with  the 
Great  Elector  the race  of  Hohenzollern  began 
to rise,  greater and more fortunate than all its 
rivals,  in  Brandenburg - Prussia.  The  Hohen- 
zollerns thrust their State so far into the van of 
the national life that from the reign of  Frederick 
11.  it was  clear  that Prussia  must  either  rule 
Germany  or  perish.  Frederick  the  Great  did 
not  create  German  dualism,  for  it had  existed 
since the days of  Luther.  The huge  hypocrisy 
of  the "  Reichsrecht " had  become  absolutely 
ridiculous since Germany had become a Protestant 
country  to such  an extent  that  all  the most 
characteristic productions of our national intellect, 
and  the whole  of  our  art and  literature,  were 
Protestant through  and through.  Yet still the 
native land of  Luther remained politically Roman 
Catholic, ruled by an Emperor who was a Deacon 
of  the Church of  Rome, for he was chosen by an 
Electoral College where Catholic priests and their 
co-religionists held a majority.  A Catholic State 
and a Protestant peoplehere was the great lie 
in the Constitution of  the Empire, which Hegel 
called "  unreason legalized." 
The whole future of  Germany depended upon 
getting rid of  this Holy Empire and the States of 
the Church.  As  the only vigorous power in the 
land it became the part of  the territorial princes 
to appropriate the outworn  and corrupt  States 
of the ecclesiastical lords, as well as those of  the 
Imperial Orders and the little towns.  Their day 
was over, and it  is clear how mistaken the  patience 
had  been  which  arose  from the intense  feeling 
for justice  in  the Germans.  This  instinct  was 
so strong,  and pros  and cons  were  so carefully 
considered  in our  history, that vigour  of  action 
was  impaired.  Yet  despite  it  all  the  blessed 
sixteenth century brought salvation in the shape 
of  the first decisive step towards secularization, 
the  "  clearance "  (Heimramschung),  as  the 
true-hearted  German  people  called  it then.  In 
Prussia the Church lands were seized and turned 
into  a  secular  Duchy,  to the  lasting  benefit 
of  the world.  Unfortunately  the great idea  of 
doing  away  with  all  ecclesiastical estates came 
to nothing in 1525, and the second great clearance 
only  took place  after the Peace of  Westphalia. 
It marked the great cleavage between North and 
South  Germany.  In  the  north  the  political 
consequences  of  the  step  were  carried  pretty 
well  to their  logical  conclusion ;  Magdeburg, 
Halberstadt,  Kamin,  and  all  the  other  great 
ecclesiastical  foundations  were  secularized  and 
incorporated with the  domains of  the neighbour- 
ing  territorial  princes.  Broadly  speaking,  this 
was  the  beginning  of  modern  conditions  in 
northern Germany, while the South, the Empire 
Cb 
K~T'  Q[oXrjv " still  remained  burdened  by  the 
caricature of  German political life. 
Only  hypocrites  can  deny  that it had  now 
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by  her  own  exertions  the  necessary  and  life- 
giving process of  simplifying her territorial con- 
ditions.  Unfortunately this could not be accom- 
plished  without  the  intervention  of  a  foreign 
Power.  Frederick the Great had indeed opened 
serious  negotiations  with  Bavaria  during  the 
second  Silesian  war,  to  bring  about  a  fresh 
clearance,  and  had  thus  given  opportunity  for 
the rise of  a Prussian party.  If things had gone 
as Frederick hoped, the separation from Austria 
would have been accomplished then.  He created 
a  non-Austrian  Empire  for  the first  time,  and 
placed  the Bavarian  Elector  at its head  by  an 
election  in  proper  form.  This  Empire  was  in 
a certain sense his work, and it was  backed  by 
Prussian bayonets. 
Frederick, however, was not yet strong enough 
to carry  through  what  he  had  begun.  From 
this point of  view the second Silesian war turned 
to tragedy,  for it proved that Prussia  was  just 
strong enough to defend her captured province, 
but  not  to impose  Imperial  reform.  Then  a 
terrible  thing  befell  us,  through  the  power  of 
an  alien  State.  It  was  France  who  finally 
dissolved  the  chaos  of  ecclesiastical  States  in 
the revolutionary  wars.  Next  came the Act of 
the  Diet  which  dissolved  the Empire  (Reichs- 
deputationshauptschluss) in 1803, and crystallized 
the result of  all that had  gone before.  It  was 
a  revolution from above, than which a baser has 
been  seldom  seen.  No  glimmer  of  patriotism 
animated the politicians who  made  it, not  one 
of  them spared a thought for their great Father- 
land  out of  the greed  which  utterly  possessed 
them.  Nevertheless this revolution  was  a pure 
benefit politically, for it only accomplished what 
was  necessary  and  should  long  ago  have  been 
done.  With  one  stroke  it swept  away  all  the 
dirty little  States of  the Roman Church, which 
existed to give fat livings to the Catholic nobility. 
The year  1806 brought the downfall of  the Holy 
Roman Empire, and the last division of  territory 
was taken in hand.  Then the constructed States 
came into being, like the liberal model State of 
Baden, which was  able to contribute 95 men  to 
the  Imperial Army  when  its new  Grand  Duke 
mounted its throne. 
When we  call to mind the endless fluctuations 
of  frontier  which  conquests  and  secularizations 
have brought  about in Germany, we  are bound 
to admit that the respect for existing boundaries 
which  we  have  perceived  in the Federal  States 
of  Switzerland  and  North  America  has  been 
totally  lacking.  For  the  last  three  hundred 
years  ow history  has  recorded  an  unceasing 
series of  annexations,  which  have  made  it im- 
possible  for  any  German  to feel  the federative 
instinct  for law  which  rightly  characterizes the 
Swiss.  How  can  any  one  of  us  express  with 
sincerity  the  honour  and  respect  for  Saxon- 
Altenburg,  or  for  Schwarzburg  - Sondershausen, 
which a  Swiss feels for Schwyz or Uri ?  Every 
honest-minded man must admit that there is no 
reason  why  Schwarzburg and  Reuss  should  be 
spared, while Hohenlohe, Fiirstenberg,  Stolberg, 
etc., are mediatized.  We can hardly be expected 
to reverence the South German States who  owe 
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of  Heidelberg and the Electoral Palatinate, mind- 
ful of  their  long and glorious history,  still rate 
themselves too high to condescend upon a patriot- 
ism for the Grand Duchy of  Baden. 
It  has  therefore  been  impossible  for  us  to 
breathe  that  federalistic  atmosphere  which 
emanates from the political forms of  Switzerland 
and  America.  The  result  of  our  whirlpool  of 
contending forces has rather been to give promi- 
nence to the one among them all which was real 
and living-the  Prussian State.  No unprejudiced 
person can deny that the whole political history 
of  Germany  has  been  centred  in  Prussia  ever 
since the days of  the Great  Elector.  Through 
her was won  back every clod of  the land which 
the  sins  of  the  ancient  Empire  had  let  slip. 
Thenceforward  she  became  the  pivot  of  the 
political  strength  of  the  German  nation,  as 
surely as she had ignored and even repelled its 
intellectual  forces.  After  the  tumults  of  the 
war of  liberation the new  Germany was at first 
nothing but a  flimsy agglomeration  of  the little 
monarchical  States  which  had  survived  the 
gigantic  upheaval.  Once  again  Prussia  set  to 
work  upon  her  task  of  creation.  In her  were 
gathered  all  the  real  political  threads  of  the 
Confederation's  history.  Upon  her  soil  grew 
the nation  in  arms which  was  later to become 
the possession of all Germany, and with its growth 
her eight provinces were welded  into one whole. 
She was the living proof that a Government which 
could bind Treves and Tilsit in an  inward harmony 
could also unite all Germany under her protect- 
ing wing.  Already the Prussian Zollverein began 
to  the true frontier between Germany and 
the  world  beyond,  and  the  black  and  yellow 
boundary  posts,  with  their  profligate  Double 
Eagle  atop,  remained  beyond  the  pale.  For 
many centuries it had been our misfortune that 
Germany's limits had never been clearly defined. 
Now at  last came the triumph of the old Emperor's 
~ne-headed  eagle,  the insignia  to  which  East 
Prussia  alone  had  held  fast,  over  the  Double 
Eagle  which  had  wrought  us  so  much  injury 
and shame. 
In the march of these events we see the secret 
forces of  Nature themselves at  work, for Prussia's 
Crown was not always a willing agent.  Nothing 
lay further from the thoughts of Frederick William 
111. than that his Customs Union should pave the 
way  to separation  from Austria,  for in  dualism 
he  saw  only  benefit  to  his  Fatherland.  The 
final  result  was  brought  about  by  the  very 
nature of things, and it produced a real Germany, 
united  by  common  economic  interests,  while 
Frankfort, like  Regensburg  in earlier  days,  was 
ruled  by  the mere  phrases  of  politicians.  The 
Austrian leanings of Frederick  William IV. were 
even  more  pronounced  than  his  predecessor's, 
for he displayed  greater enthusiasm for Austria 
than for his own State, and yet, despite all this, 
the amalgamation of  Prussian interests went  on 
and could not be checked.  Although the Central 
States would have gladly destroyed Prussia after 
1851, not one of them dared disturb the Zollverein, 
which held them without possibility of  escape. 
At last the men of genius arose who were able 
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Bismarck, and Roon,  and the decisive struggle 
of  1866 began.  How  did it end ?  Against the 
will  of  all  Germany  the Prussian  State carved 
out with  its good  sword a  Constitution  which, 
even if couched in mild and friendly forms, could 
naturally be nothing but a complete subordina- 
tion of  the smaller  States, a submission  of  the 
vanquished to  the victor.  Here was no realization 
of the dream of  1848, of a German nation elevating 
Prussia  almost  against her  own  will  to become 
part  of  a  united  Germany.  Thus  did  1848 
envisage the situation ; Prussia  was a  so-called 
German State, and so was  Schwarzburg-sonders- 
hausen.  The future Empire of  Germany was to 
be the framework for  Prussia's  rise as much as 
of  Schwarzburg's  fall.  These  were  the visions 
which  inspired  the  makers  of  the  Frankfort 
Constitution.  But  Prussia  was  totally  unlike 
the other  States,  not  only  in  size  but  in  her 
nature  as  well.  She  was  a  living  entity,  not 
depending  for  her  existence  merely  upon  her 
share in the common life of  Germany, but boasting 
a glorious history of  her own.  1866 was to prove 
the  reality  of  her  individuality.  Prussia  was 
not  swallowed  up  in  Germany,  although  this 
phrase is sometimes used to this day in flat contra- 
diction  of  the  visible  facts.  Prussia  extended 
her own institutions over the rest of  Germany. 
There  is  a  theory  set forth in almost  every 
text  - book  of  German  constitutional law  which 
is  indeed  characteristic  of  the  infatuations  of 
German doctrinairism.  It would have us believe 
that Prussia  rewarded  herself  for  her  victories 
in  Bohemia  and  on  the  Main  by  committing 
political suicide and placing herself on the same 
level  as  the  States  which  she  had  conquered. 
Prussia,  so it is said, was  engulfed with all the 
other  individual  States  in  the  new  German 
Empire.  An  idea  so magnificently comic could 
not exist in any country of  the world but ours, 
which  is  so  often  drowned  beneath  a  flood  of 
theory.  There is  a  dream-world  of  the under- 
standing  of  which  our  nation  should  especially 
beware.  This region  of  unrealities is the home 
of all the superfine subtleties and system-seeking 
of the majority of our political science teachers, 
and from it come also the excuses which are so 
rife among  us  to-day ; a  thing  may  be  legally 
a  piece  of  sharp practice,  but  politically  it is 
justified.  Here is  a  testimonium paupertatis,  if 
ever there was  one !  What kind of  a  constitu- 
tional law can that be, which has to treat living 
truth as its enemy ? 
"  Germany must be ruled in German fashion." 
With these words the worthy John Jacob Moser 
swept aside,  a  hundred  years ago,  the effort of 
doctrinairism  to cramp German  State-construc- 
tion within the limits of  a ready-made catergory. 
He  then  proceeded  to draw  a  picture  of  the 
Empire  out  of  the  store - house  of  historical 
experience.  The doctrinaire of  to-day must be 
made  to realize  the same old  teaching,  for the 
new Empire is in this no different from the old. 
In the  forms  of  its Constitution  this  State is 
unique-its  counterpart is nowhere to be found. 
Ours is not the Constitution of a Federal State, 
it is  the  Constitution  of  the  German  Empire. 
Germany  is  a  monarchy  of  immemorial  age, 
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whose  parts  were  beginning  to  fall  asunder; 
then  came  a  period  of  confederated  anarchy 
which ran counter both to our traditions and to 
the whole  character  of  our  State, and brought 
us  nothing  but  shame  and  dishonour,  until, 
after sixty years of  ignominy, we  returned to a 
monarchy  under  federative  forms.  It  was  the 
monarchy  of  a  territory  which  was  fashioned 
out  of  German  particularism  in  its  strongest, 
noblest,  most  capable  form,  and  which  now 
extended its dominion either directly or indirectly 
over the whole of  Germany. 
It is easy to see that this new German Empire 
as  it  actually  stands,  resembles  republican 
Federated States in some, at any rate, of  its in- 
dividual institutions.  Firstly, there is a central 
authority  which  stands  above  the  members 
and  yet  derives  its political  will  directly  from 
the territorial powers working in concert.  Every 
State in  Germany has its direct share, through 
its  representation  in  the  Federal  Council 
(Bundesrat) in  making  up  the collective will  of 
the nation.  The Empire and the Federal  State 
both  alike  withhold  from  their  members  the 
essential prerogatives  of  sovereignty.  The right 
of  arms is not theirs, but belongs to the Empire 
alone.  The  Emperor  is the sole war-lord,  and 
no one of  the German States is in a position to 
impose its own will  in matters lying outside its 
own borders, but each is subordinate to the higher 
power of  the Empire.  Finally-and  this is also 
true  of  Switzerland  and  North  America- 
the sovereignty  of  formerly  independent  States 
has  been  destroyed  by  the  Empire  prescribing 
the compass of  their supreme jurisdiction,  and 
being  always  in  a  position  to  increase  or  to 
restrict that compass. 
A  widely  extended  sphere  of  autonomy  has 
been  left with  the States, but only  within  the 
limits set by the Imperial authority, and every 
State  must  be  prepared  to  see  the  sovereign 
powers which  it still possesses withdrawn in the 
future by Imperial decree.  We have an example 
in the civil law, which was not originally under 
the control of  the Empire,  but was  made so by 
an  alteration  in  the  Constitution,  with  which 
the former defendants of  particularism  are now 
in  agreement.  The United  States employ even 
more  officials  of  the Federal  Government  than 
Germany  does  Imperial  civil  servants,  and the 
reason for this is explained by the course of our 
history.  Like  America  and  Switzerland,  our 
Empire exercises its functions either through its 
own  servants  or  through  the  servants  of  the 
individual  territories,  according  to  circum- 
stances.  The  principle  that  Imperial  Law 
breaks Provincial Law makes the Empire indif- 
ferent as to whether its laws shall be carried out 
by its own officials or by those of  the provincial 
authority.  The history  of  the Zollverein  was  a 
training of  inestimable worth for Imperial policy, 
for  its  long  years  taught  the Prussian  official 
class, which was distinguished equally for its up- 
rightness  and for  its disagreeable  manners,  the 
necessity  of  establishing  friendly  relations  with 
their lesser associates, men  who  were free of  all 
evil  intention,  but  vainer  and  smaller-minded 
than themselves.  Their great weakness is intoler- THE GERMAN EMPIRE  PRUSSIA PARAMOUNT  373 
ance of  any strange official intruding upon their 
sacred  domain,  and every  attempt to establish 
one  Customs  Service  for  the  whole  Zollverein 
failed, for there was no agreement until the little 
States were  allowed to keep  their own  liveries. 
It was not realized at first how  much a cockade 
meant to the soul of  a petty State.  As  soon as 
this  was  understood, the astonishing  discovery 
followed  that  these States who  had  striven so 
ridiculously  against  the simple  proposal  to set 
up  a  common  Customs Service were  prepared, 
now that they had got their own way, to carry 
out  their  obligations  with  a  really  touching 
loyalty.  It has practically never happened that 
a State has swerved from its duties towards the 
Zollverein. 
We  see from this that the Empire has  good 
reasons  for setting a  limit upon the number  of 
its officials.  Experience has always shown that 
we  can  rely  upon  our  Confederates.  A  strong 
Imperial  Civil  Service need  only  concern  itself 
with  one  or  two  departments of  Government, 
such as posts  and telegraphs ; and for the rest 
the Empire contents itself with making laws and 
leaves the territorial authorities to  carry them into 
effect, and here the matter rests for  every one 
except the pedants of  formality.  No doubt there 
are elements of  the comic about the sentences of 
the High Court (Landgericht)  of  Jena, which begin 
in the name of  the prince, or of  the duke, or of 
the king, according to whether the accused be a 
subject of  a prince, a duke, or a king.  Nobody, 
unless indeed he be a petty prince, need trouble 
his head about whether people are made subject 
to these laws in the name of  the Empire, or of  a 
grand  duke,  and  it is a  matter  of  indifference 
&ether  the  cockade  they  wear  be  green  and 
white or black and white.  These are the reasons 
why the Empire keeps the number of  its direct 
&cials  as small as possible. 
All these are characteristics which our Empire 
has in common with both the Federal Republics, 
and they are enough for most teachers of  con- 
stitutional law;  but we  historians have to con- 
sider  the historical  foundations  and the  living 
spirit of  Imperial  politics,  and then it becomes 
clear as day that our Empire rests upon a prin- 
ciple  exactly  opposed  to that of  these Federal 
States.  !L'hey  are obliged to smooth over as far 
as possible the inequalities among their members, 
while  our Empire is founded upon this very in- 
equality,  and upon  the leadership of  one  State 
which has subordinated all the others to itself  in 
a Federal bond.  What would happen to Germany 
if  Prussia  should  cease  to be ?  There  could 
be no more German Empire.  Out of  this follows 
a  truth, unpleasant  to most  people, but which 
contains no  insult to a  non - Prussian -  namely 
that Prussia is the only one of  the former States 
within  the German  Empire who  has  preserved 
her  sovereignty.  She has not lost the right  of 
arms, nor is she compelled to make her supreme 
authority  conform  to the will  of  others.  The 
German Emperor is also King of  Prussia; he is 
the leader of  the nation in war, and it is only an 
empty quibble to imagine cases in which conflict 
might  arise  between  the Emperor  of  Germany 
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the silly joke  which  runs, " I would  not  advise 
the German Emperor to meddle with the Prussian 
King."  We may leave it to  theorizing professors 
to talk about the " war-lordship in peace time," 
which  our  lesser  kings  still  vaunt,  and  which 
foreigners  smile  at.  No  doubt  the  outward 
forms of  it are treated with all manner of  con- 
sideration.  Even the Prince of  Reuss may boast 
of  his army on paper, and a courtly myth main- 
tains that this  battalion  is  the Reussian  army. 
Indulgence  in  these  matters  has  been  pushed 
only too far, but the fact remains  that in spite 
of  political provisos neither the King of  Bavaria 
nor the King of  Saxony are able to set a single 
man in the field.  In war, the German Emperor 
is the war-lord; the right of  arms has passed to 
the Empire, and in the person of  its bearer  the 
Empire is identical with the State of  Prussia. 
Prussia, too, is the only German State which 
is secure from any diminution of  the limits of  its 
sovereignty.  The  Imperial  Constitution  pro- 
nounces  that all  constitutional  changes  are in- 
valid if  fourteen votes are recorded against them 
in  the  Federal  Council ;  therefore  Prussia's 
seventeen votes are themselves sufficient to  hinder 
any curtailment of  her sovereign rights.  Thirdly, 
-and  this  is  a  point  which  is  usually  treated 
with  a  curious  silence-the  German  Empire 
demands  as much  obedience from  its members 
as does any other State.  This is why our Imperial 
law has  for  its ultimate weapon a  bare  sword, 
which has never as yet been actually drawn, but 
only  once  or  twice  rattled  in  the  scabbard. 
Fortunately loyalty is so strong among the associ- 
ates  that  no  more  has  hitherto  been  needed. 
Nevertheless  the  weapon  exists,  and  a  con- 
tumacious State can be  compelled to submit to 
the Imperial  decree.  The  power  of  execution, 
however, lies with the Emperor, and he will  not 
be  likely  to chastise  the  King  of  Prussia,  for 
science does  not  contemplate  the possibility  of 
any person boxing his own ears. 
The  historical  and  political  foundations  of 
the whole Empire rest upon the actual and formal 
preponderance  of  Prussia,  or  upon  "  Prussia 
extended,"  as  the  Emperor  William  once  re- 
marked  to  Bismarck.  What  is  the  German 
army but  the army  of  Prussia,  constituted  in 
1814 as the nation in arms, and then expanded 
over  the  Empire.  The  Imperial  Posts  and 
Telegraphs  and the Imperial Bank  (Reichsbank) 
are all old Prussian institutions.  This is all as it 
should be.  Every Prussian will rejoice that the 
best  political institutions should be  spread over 
the rest of  Germany, and every reasonable non- 
Prussian must be glad that Prussia should bring 
honour to  the German name once more.  Matters 
are so arranged that the will of  the Empire, in 
the last resort,  cannot be anything but the will 
of Prussia. 
Besides the Imperial  Crown  there is  another 
formal link which identifies this leading State with 
the  Imperial  authority,  namely  the  office of 
Imperial  Chancellor.  I  have  already  referred 
to the analogy, by no means fortuitous, between 
this office  and the Grand  Pensioner  of  Holland 
in  the Republic  of  the United  Netherlands.  A 
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that the post of  Imperial  Chancellor can only be 
filled by the Prussian Prime Minister. 
When  Prince Bismarck retired after the war 
from the Presidency of  the Council of  Ministers, 
only  retaining  the  leadership  of  Imperial 
politics,  and  was  succeeded  by  Roon  in  the 
former position, it was soon discovered that the 
separation  of  the  two  offices  was  impossible. 
The right  to divide them was  retained  in spite 
of  this experience, with the resultant total con- 
fusion of  the present m0ment.l  We  must hope 
that the natural union of the two has only been 
dissolved for a very short period, a few  months 
at most ; it will undoubtedly be restored by the 
very  nature  of  things.  If  the  German  Empire 
is really to be led by Prussia, the leading states- 
men of  Prussia and of  Germany must be one and 
the  same  person.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  is 
the channel for the will of  the monarchy,  which 
is the will of  Empire and of  the Prussian  State 
united in one person. 
Here  we  have  a  great  contrast  with  earlier 
ages.  Under  the  Saxon  Emperors  the  Arch- 
bishop of  Mainz, who was  Lord  High Chancellor 
of  Germany,  did  indeed  support  the Emperor, 
and became an instrument  of  the King against 
the Princes  of  Germany.  Afterwards, however, 
his  position  gradually  altered  completely.  The 
Chancellor, who  was  himself  chief  among  the 
Princes  of  the Empire, and in whose hands lay 
the direction of  the business of  Imperial Parlia- 
ment  (Reichstag)  became  the  leader  of  the 
German Princes in that assembly, and the natural 
Lecture delivered in February 1893, 
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head  of  all  Federalistic  movements  within  the 
Empire.  If he was a man of  courage he repre- 
sented  the  interests  of  the  territorial  rulers 
against the Emperor.  Of this type was Berthold 
von Henneberg, who tried to reform the Empire 
on  Federalistic  lines.  We  have  him  to thank 
for  the  federated  "  Reichskammergericht "  in 
which one Imperial Judge sat together with twelve 
other  Judges representing the other Estates of 
the  realm  (Reichstdnde), and  him  also  for  the 
public  peace  of  the  country.  The  centre  of 
gravity here was  in  these  Estates and  not  in 
the  Emperor.  In  old  Germany  the  Imperial 
Chancellor filled  a  Federalistic office,  represent- 
ing  as  against  the  Emperor  the  territorial 
interests of  the high  nobility.  At  the present 
day  he  is  an  official  of  the  monarch,  and 
in  the final instance  his  will  must  conform  to 
the Emperor's.  The contrast between then and 
now  runs  through  everything ; the institutions 
of  the old Empire were outwardly more impres- 
sive, but the modern  Imperial power is greater. 
The Emperor is no longer the feudal lord of  his 
vassals,  but  he  has  much  more  real  dominion 
over the Princes of  Germany. 
The  acknowledged interests  of  particularism 
are represented  in  the  Empire  by  the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat), and in it we perceive clearly 
how complicated our German form of Federalism 
is.  The  Federal  Council  is  on  the  one  hand 
an Assembly  of  State representatives  like the 
American  Senate;  its function  is  to represent 
and  co-ordinate  the  particular  desires  of  the 
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successor  of  the  old  German  Imperial  Diet 
(Reichstag)  of  Ratisbon,  and  represents  those 
Estates of  the Realm  which  have survived  the 
catastrophes of  our history.  Secondly, however, 
it  is  undoubtedly  an  administrative  authority 
endowed  with  real  powers  of  control.  Thirdly, 
it is a State Council (Staatsrat) composed of  the 
most  important  members  of  the German  Civil 
Service, in which the laws of  a great nation are 
prepared.  It is an assemblage of  men  of  talent 
and great  practical  experience  from  every  pro- 
vince of  Germany, well fitted to frame legislation 
for a great Empire.  The Federal  Council exer- 
cises  all these functions together.  It is not, as 
was  first  feared  it would  be,  and as  Bismarck 
expected it to be,  a  partizan  representative of 
the particular  interests of  the German  Princes. 
The Princes  have  always  loyally  fulfilled  their 
obligations towards the Empire,  and they have 
accommodated  themselves  to  the  new  condi- 
tions better than the middle  class.  Against  all 
expectation  it  is  the  Reichstag  which  to-day 
represents particular, and the Bundesrat national, 
interests in Germany. 
Besides  this  complicated  institution  of  the 
Federal Council there is also a Council of  Princes 
(Fiirstenrat),  an invisible body which produces very 
visible results.  The tact which goes with political 
genius prompted Bismarck not to do away with 
Prussian ambassadors at  the small German Courts, 
and every decree of  the Federal  Council is first 
discussed  between  them  and the petty princes. 
The  voice  of  the  majority  among  the princes 
must be in agreement with  Imperial policy,  for 
the whole of  their common political  existence is 
founded upon loyalty and mutual consideration. 
In  this  way  a  Council  of  Princes  is  in  latent 
existence, as it were, and we  feel the effects of it 
every day.  It  is  an old  story how  the Grand 
Duke of  Weimar  once  said  to Bismarck  in the 
course  of  a  dispute, "  Remember  that you  are 
my  Imperial  Chancellor  too."  Ridiculous  as 
this may  sound, there is a  grain of  truth in it. 
It is part of  the special duty of  the Chancellor 
to  maintain  as  close  a  personal  relationship 
as  possible  between  himself  and  the  German 
Princes, and Bismarck was particularly successful 
in his management of  poor King Louis of Bavaria 
with  his  colossal  vanity.  This  institution  of 
Prussian  embassies at the other German  Courts 
is  the  reason  why  the right  of  embassage  has 
been retained by our little States.  The presence 
of  a  Bavarian minister  in  Paris, where  he  has 
nothing whatever to do, is in itself absurd, and 
it  is  only  permitted  upon  grounds  of  formal 
equality, because Prussia, as such, does not wish, 
in  the interests  of  Imperial  policy,  to give  up 
sending her  ambassadors  to the little  German 
Courts. 
This  piece  of  inconsistency,  permitted  for 
political reasons, which allows non-sovereign States 
to  retain  their  right  of  embassage,  has  been 
Partly responsible for certain misunderstandings 
of  actual  facts.  This  brings  us  to a  last  con- 
sideration,  which  has  been  a  great  stumbling- 
block  to teachers  of  constitutional law.  There 
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but  on  the other  hand  it has  been  personally 
retained by most of  their rulers.  Thus the King 
of  Saxony is personally in the peculiar  position 
of  a sovereign lord, acknowledged as such by all 
the Royal Houses of  Europe, and subject to no 
man, while the old  princes of  the Empire were 
subject  to the Emperor.  Our  modern  Empire 
has rightly been satisfied with giving the Emperor 
in  his  own  person  only  the position  of  primus 
inter  pares, and not that of  an over-lord. 
This has had an immeasurable effect in pro- 
moting  friendly  feeling  amongst  the  Princes. 
Taken all in all, it is evident that the petty kings 
and  grand  dukes  are  not  only  happier  than 
formerly,  but  that  they  also  possess  far  more 
political  weight.  How  much  was the war-lord- 
ship of  the King of  Saxony worth in times past ? 
His State had no influence whatever so long as it 
stood upon its own  feet, but now  he has much 
greater  power,  by  reason  of  his  voice  in  the 
conduct of  Imperial affairs.  In addition, he and 
the others  are far  more  fortunately  placed  as 
regards  material  things  than  they  were.  The 
Empire has relieved them of  all the odium attach- 
ing to their office ; it levies the heavy blood tax 
by its national Army, it levies the indirect taxes 
also,  and only the kindly and patriarchal func- 
tions  of  government  are left  to the individual 
rulers.  All this explains why the widely-spread 
and deeply-rooted  hatred  felt for  princely  rule 
before  1866 has  now  totally  disappeared.  The 
Princes  of  Germany  now  fill  a  very  gratifying 
place in popular  opinion as benefactors  of  their 
territories,  and their lot within the new  Empire 
may well be described as happy.  It is not to be 
denied that the Empire is somewhat provincial 
in  character,  and  that while  its organization is 
strong as regards the Army, the administration of 
law, and economics, it  is less so as regards the more 
intangible benefits of  the nation.  It is not to be 
desired that it shodd undertake much in the way 
of  scientific or artistic enterprise, for it has no 
Councils skilled in these subjects.  The Ministers 
of  Public  Worship  and Fine Arts  in  the indi- 
vidual States have far more knowledge of  these 
matters,  and  therefore  the Empire  has  rightly 
concerned  itself  but  little  with  intellectual  or 
aesthetic spheres, but has left these more delicate 
tasks of  popular government to the care of  the 
petty rulers. 
Thus conditions have arisen amongst us which 
are  obviously  quite different from  those  of  all 
Federal  Republics.  The  divergence  can  be 
traced  in  the  whole  spirit  of  our  legislation. 
Federal States are usually very averse to change 
in their law-giving, for nothing but a strict con- 
servatism  will  carry them  over  the  difficulties 
which beset them.  In a hundred years America 
has  only  made  one  quite  unimportant  change 
in  her  Constitution.  The  legislative  activity 
of  the  German  Empire,  on  the  contrary,  has 
become  almost  feverishly  great,  for  the  new 
Empire is a growing monarchy, even as the old 
Empire was a declining one.  Like a ball set upon 
a steep slope where  it must  roll  without  possi- 
bility of pause, our Empire is destined to travel 
more  and  more  towards  a  firm  centralization. 382  THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
Every step in this direction  is to the good.  It 
was a blessing even for the gallant officers them- 
selves when  we  reached  the point  of  abolishing 
the  Saxon  and  Wiirtemberg  Corps  of  officers, 
and when Bavaria also lost its exceptional posi- 
tion.  Until then a Saxon officer had practically 
no chance of  ever becoming a general in command, 
because there were  so many princes at hand to 
fill  the  post.  Moreover, the prospect  of  being 
always  stationed  somewhere  between  Zwickau 
and Zittan  cannot  have been  alluring.  It  was 
impossible  for  the average  man  to enlarge  his 
mind under conditions of  this sort. 
A real  capital  city  was  the first  demand  of 
the Empire's  need  of  centralization,  while the 
Federal  Republics, as we  have seen, display the 
very reverse of  this requirement.  Even although 
the Berliner is the most insupportable person in 
all Germany,  Berlin  must still grow larger, and 
draw  more  of  the  national  forces  into  itself. 
Before  1866  there  were  many  sturdy  patriots 
who  were sincerely in favour  of  German unity, 
but  whose  understandable  dislike  of  Berlin 
prompted  them to wish to make  Brunswick  or 
Nuremberg  or  Hildesheim  the  capital  of  the 
Empire.  Such  mistakes  seem  inexplicable 
nowadays,  but  at that  time  they  were  very 
firmly  rooted.  The  headquarters  of  Jewish 
journalism could certainly never become the centre 
of  the national life of  Germany, and, moreover, 
the atmosphere of  Berlin is too unaesthetic ever 
to allow the noblest artistic achievements of  the 
German  people to spring from there,  for it can 
be no home for any true artist.  It has always 
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been incomprehensible to me how  a man can be 
a poet and settle in Berlin.  Towns like Munich 
and  Dresden  will  always  offer  greater  stimulus 
to the artistic spirit than Berlin ever can.  This 
is one of  the reasons why the Empire has always 
&own  a  justifiable  particularism  in  matters 
aesthetic,  and  has  left them  in  charge  of  the 
individual States, thereby upon the whole bene- 
fiting art itself. 
For the rest it is evident that once the capital 
is  recognized  it  must  be  enriched  by  every 
possible intellectual force.  Federal policy  made 
a  grave mistake,  which,  unfortunately,  is now 
irreparable,  when  it  transferred  the  Supreme 
Court of  the Empire to Leipsig.  Every advocate 
pleading  in  that Court  feels  like  a  fish  out of 
water there.  In all truly single States the seat 
of  the supreme Court has always been  also the 
capital.  An  increasing  centralization  in  Berlin 
is  also unavoidable for  our  commercial life,  for 
it is obvious what power of  attraction is wielded 
by  the Reichsbank and the other Berlin banks. 
No  change is possible.  If  Germany is to become 
a true monarchy, the capital city of  its Emperor 
must also be the capital city of  the nation ; and 
this centralization is in the nature of  things. FOURTH  BOOK 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
STATE 
VOL.  I1 WE are using the word "  administration " in  a 
wider sense than that in which it is usually em- 
ployed, for by it we  mean the manifestation  of 
the will  of  the State towards living men, rulers 
as well  as subjects, that will  being codified and 
expressed in the decrees of  the Constitution. 
We  have  already  discussed  the  indefinite 
l~ature  of  the boundary between Constitution and 
Administration,  and  seen that the fundamental 
institutions of  the Army are properly t,he concern 
of the former.  The theorist must judge separately 
each of  the State's great institutions, and discover 
to  which of these two great domains it  most apper- 
tains ;  and with this approximate classification he 
must  rest  content, for  the world  of  actual fact 
does not always consent to  fall into the categories 
of theory. 
Taken in  this broad sense the subject of  ad- 
ministration  may be divided into the four head- 
ings which we  shall consider in this Book.  First 
comes the constitution of  the Army, for without 
an armed force the will  of  the State cannot be 
effectual; secondly comes  the administration of 
justice ;  thirdly we find in every State some form 
of  administration  of  revenue,  or  system  of 
economics,  which  is  existent  even  in  the most 
barbarous countries, which perhaps may not yet 
have  adopted  a  currency.  Finally  to  these 
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three  indispensable  activities  of  every  govern- 
ment we must add a fourth, which flows in many 
channels, and is not necessarily to be found ex- 
isting everywhere, although its presence is a sign 
that  a  nation  is  rising  to  a  civilized  level. 
This  is  administration  in  the  strict  sense, the 
whole  great  domain  of  the  Police,  as  it was 
formerly  called,  the care  of  the public  welfare 
and  safety,  as  well  as  the  superintendence  of 
education.  We dealt with the matter of  this last 
division  when  we  were  considering  the  social 
foundations  of  the State,  therefore  it only  re- 
mains for us hereafter to treat of  the technicalities 
of  the subject. 
XXIII 
THE  CONSTITUTION  OF THE ARMY 
THE old  political  science was mistaken  when  it 
regarded  the Army  as nothing but the servant 
of  diplomacy, and gave it only the subordinate 
place  in  its  political  system  of  being  a  means 
towards the ends of  foreign policy.  Such a con- 
ception of the functions of the Army has vanished 
from our age of  universal military service;  for 
we all feel nowadays that it is no mere aid towards 
a diplomatic goal, but that the very Constitution 
of  the State reposes upon the nation's  share in 
bearing arms.  It is the disciplined physical force 
of  the nation,  in other words the Army,  which 
supports the State.  If power, within and without, 
is the very essence of  the State, then the organiza- 
tion of  the Army must be one of  the first  cares 
of the Constitution.  The form which this organ- 
ization  will  assume  will  be  determined  by the 
real inward character of  the State, whether  it be 
universal  service,  a  territorial  militia,  or  con- 
scription with substitution. 
The conception  of  the Army  as the concen- 
trated physical force of the nation leads on further 
to its intimate association  with  the idea  of  the 
Oneness  of  the State.  We  may safely say that 
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an Army organized upon lines which truly express 
national  conditions  brings  home  to the simple 
man, more directly than any other institution can 
do, the realization that the State is one and that 
he himself  is part of  the whole.  Trade, art, and 
science are cosmopolitan, and lead their followers 
beyond the limits of  the nation.  The possession 
of  a  vote,  and  service  on  a  jury  or  upon  the 
magistrates  bench  does  indeed  strengthen  the 
feeling that the State is a community, but parlia- 
mentary life sunders the citizens by its unavoid- 
able  party hatreds  quite as much  as it unites 
them in joint political work.  An Army organized 
on a really national foundation is the sole political 
institution  which  binds  citizen  to  citizen,  for 
there alone  do all  sons  of  the Fatherland  feel 
themselves  united.  There  will  be  little  more 
conflict  of  opinion  upon  this  point  since  our 
experience  of  the new  German  Empire.  It  is 
not  the  German  parliament,  as  was  formerly 
hoped,  which has become the real and effective 
bond  of  national union,  but the German Army. 
We may rather say that our Imperial Parliament 
brought a renewal of  the  old hatreds and calumnia- 
tions, while the Army trained us to a  practical 
unity.  The King  is  the natural leader in war, 
therefore since the Army  embodies the idea  of 
national  solidarity  in  so  striking  a  form,  it is 
peculiarly  suited  to the  nature  of  monarchy. 
In a  Republic,  with  its  unavoidably  frequent 
changes in the personnel of the supreme authority, 
the relation  between  the civil  government  and 
the commander of  the Army is very much more 
complicated,  and  is  even  attended  by  various 
dangers.  We have seen how  easily a victorious 
general  may  himself  become  a  menace  to the 
stability of  the State, for the words of  the poet 
remain ever true, "  A King worthy  of  the name 
is mastered only by his peers." 
Even those persons who look upon  an Army 
as an evil,  must  still regard  it as  a  necessary 
misfortune.  If  the existence of  the State itself 
is  necessary  and  reasonable,  it follows  that  it 
has  to assert  itself  in  relation  to other States. 
We will prove further that a strong, well-equipped 
Army  is  also  the  foundation  of  all  political 
freedom, so that no State is to be pitied  which 
possesses  powerful  military  force.  The  weight 
of  facts has put vague theorizing to utter rout 
upon  this  very  matter.  The  whole  Liberal 
world  looks forward  to the disarmament of  all 
States as the ideal state of  things, but the history 
of  our century teaches us that the very opposite 
is  taking  place,  armaments  are  everywhere 
becoming  stronger  and more  formidable,  and a 
phenomenon which is apparent in every country 
without exception, cannot find its origin in mere 
accident.  There is, in fact, a radical error in the 
whole  Liberal  argument.  The  State  is  no 
Academy of  Arts, still less is it a Stock Exchange ; 
it is Power, and it would  be gainsaying its very 
nature if  it neglected its Army.  In this matter, 
as in others, the quite peculiar position of England 
has  led  Continental  theorists  into  error.  As 
regards military affairs the situation of  England 
is abnormal.  She can rely upon her fleet alone 
as the national weapon,  and need  only use her 
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learnt to renounce  a  policy  of  continental con- 
quest.  The  finest  and  most  glorious  Army 
England  has  ever  had  were  Oliver  Cromwell's 
God-fearing dragoons,  a  splendid  body  of  men 
both in efficiency and moral discipline, but these 
troops  were  adherents  of  a  particular  religious 
sect, and represented only a part of  the nation. 
The order which they enforced only received the 
assent  of  their  own  Republican party,  for  the 
country, as the Restoration was soon to prove, 
was  at that  time  still  monarchically  inclined. 
The English view of  the Army springs from their 
experience  of  this  Puritan  domination.  The 
ancient liberties of  the land were in very truth 
enslaved  and trampled  upon  by  the continual 
imposition  of  force,  and  England  lay  under 
the  heel  of  the  Army.  Cromwell  could  only 
govern through his major-generals, and the first 
task  of  the  Restoration  was  to  release  the 
country  from  the yoke  of  these psalm-singing 
regiments. 
Since that time the opinion has taken firm hold 
in England that the Army is the tool of  the State, 
capable of  being employed to thwart the will  of 
the nation,  and when  a  second  Revolution  in- 
stalled a shadow monarch  existing by favour of 
Parliament,  the  Mutiny  Act  was  introduced 
under  William  111.  Its provisions  were  some- 
what  as follows :  Whereas  the institution  of  a 
standing Army is against the law of  this land, but 
nevertheless the maintenance of  a certain number 
of  thousand men is required in view  of  the up- 
holding of  the balance of  power in Europe, and 
the controlling of  the Colonies, the Crown is em- 
powered  to call  out the requisite  number,  and 
the soldiers will  be  put  under  the Mutiny  Act 
and  outside the jurisdiction  of  civil law.  This 
shows us at once the ridiculous contrast between 
England and Germany.  With us the institution 
of the Army is the direct consequence of  the law. 
The Army Law of  1814, one of  the finest memories 
in  Prussian  history,  laid  the  foundation  for 
a  more  comprehensive  legislation.  Thus  our 
Army stands upon a basis of  law, and is not an 
anomaly  as  it  is  in  England.  These  English 
theories, particularly as presented by Macaulay's 
polished pen, have infected continental Liberals. 
Macaulay has a talent for narration such as few 
historians  can  equal,  but  the  thought  under- 
lying it is astonishingly deficient.  He is for ever 
dragging in the same few phrases, which, closely 
examined, resolve themselves into Liberal party 
prejudices.  He  displays  a  lack  of  philosophic 
training  which  is  absolutely  disconcerting  to 
Germans, and gives utterance to opinions which 
not one of  our students would  dare to express. 
With  a  most  polished  style,  a  noble dignity  of 
mind, and a real enthusiasm for the freedom and 
greatness  of  his  country,  he  combines  a  most 
evident  lack  of  real  intellectual  power.  When 
we  compare him with Ranke we  see at once the 
contrast  between  German  depth  and  English 
superficiality.  Macaulay's  leading  principle, 
which  he has  gathered  from  the experience  of 
England and tries to apply to the whole continent 
of  Europe,  is  that political  freedom  is  incom- 
patible  with  the  maintenance  of  a  standing 
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supposes without  more ado that the conditions 
in its own islands are a measure for other States. 
How about the Armies of  Rome and of  Athens ? 
In Rome every citizen bore arms.  How can we 
so humiliate  our  Fatherland  as to deplore  the 
advantage which a  strong, well-organized Army 
gives us over England ! 
The advantage which  a  nation  derives  from 
such  an Army is  not  only  in  possession  of  a 
means to serve the ends  of  foreign policy,  but 
further  because  a  noble  nation  with  a  heroic 
history  can  for  a  long time use  its Army  as a 
civilizing  instrument,  because  it  finds  in  it  a 
school  for  the real  manly  virtues which  are so 
easily  lost  in  an age  of  commerce and luxury. 
We  have  to  admit  that  certain  high -strung 
delicate  artist - natures  cannot  endure  military 
discipline,  and  from  them  a  distorted  view  of 
universal service often emanates.  The judgment 
of  exceptional  characters,  however,  ought  not 
to  be  accepted  upon  these  weighty  matters, 
where we  should  abide  by  the  old  rule,  mens 
sana  in  corpore  sano.  This  physical  strength 
is particularly important in times like our own. 
It is  a  deficiency in English  civilization that it 
knows  no  universal  service,  although  the lack 
is supplied  to some extent by the great size of 
the Navy, and also by the perpetually recurring 
small  wars  in  the  numberless  colonies,  which 
occupy and sustain the manly spirit of  the nation. 
It  is in great measure due to these colonial wars 
that a large amount of  physical energy still exists 
in  England.  More  closely  examined,  a  great 
deficiency  becomes  apparent.  The  want  of 
&ivalry  in the English character, which  strikes 
the  simple  fidelity  of  the  German  nature  so 
forcibly, is due to the fact that the English  do 
not take their exercise in the noble practice of 
arms, but in acquiring dexterity in boxing, swim- 
ming, and rowing.  These have their value also, 
but  it  is  obvious  that  this  whole  system  of 
athletic sport must  also  encourage  the athletic 
spirit  with  its  barbarism  and  its  instinct  for 
external things, which ever leads it to strive to 
carry off  the prize. 
It is then  the normal  and  reasonable  thing 
for  a  great nation  to embody and develop the 
essence of the State, which  is power, by organiz- 
ing  its physical  strength in  the constitution of 
the Army.  We live in a warlike age ; the over- 
sentimental  philanthropic  fashion  of  judging 
things has passed  into the background,  so that 
we  can  once more join  hands  with  Clausewitz 
in calling war the forceful continuation of politics. 
All the peacemakers in the world will never make 
the political  powers  all of  one  mind,  and until 
they  are,  the sword  will  be  the  only  arbiter. 
We have learned to perceive the moral majesty 
of  war through the very processes which to the 
superficial  observer  seem  brutal  and  inhuman. 
The greatness of  war  is just  what at first sight 
seems to be its horror-that  for the sake of their 
country men  will  overcome the natural feelings 
of  humanity,  that  they  will  slaughter  their 
fellow-men who  have done them no injury, nay, 
whom  they  perhaps  respect  as chivalrous  foes. 
Man will not only sacrifice his life, but the natural 
and justified  instincts of  his soul ; his very self 396  CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY  WAR  AND POLITICS 
he must offer up for the sake of  patriotism ; here 
we  have the sublimity of  war.  When we  pursue 
this thought further we  see how war, with all its 
brutality and sternness,  weaves  a bond  of  love 
between  man  and  man,  linking  them  together 
to face death,  and causing all class distinctions 
to  disappear.  He  who  knows  history  knows 
also that to banish war from the world would be 
to mutilate human nature.  There could  be no 
freedom  without  military power ready to sacri- 
fice itself for freedom's sake.  It is ever necessary 
to repeat that when scholars pronounce upon these 
matters they always have in their minds the idea 
that the State is designed only to be an Academy 
of  Arts and Science.  This it should be also, but 
it is  not its primary  function.  A  State which 
neglects its physical strength and only cultivates 
its intellectual powers perishes. 
We  must,  above all, recognize that greatness 
depends  far  more  upon  character  than  upon 
culture,  and that the driving forces in  history 
are to be sought in those circles where character 
is  developed.  Only  brave  nations  have  a  real 
history.  In the great crises of  the life of  nations 
we see how the warlike virtues have weighed the 
balance.  Rightly does an old saying call war the 
examen rigorosum of  States, for in it they show 
what they are capable of,  not only  in the way 
of  physical strength, but also in moral force and 
to some extent in intelligence.  There is a kernel 
of  truth in the well-known  colloquialism which 
has it that the Prussian  schoolmasters won  the 
battle  of  Koniggratz.  War  brings  to light  the 
achievements of  the people in peace.  The Army 
is not always upon active service, but the silent 
labour  of  its  preparation  never  ceases.  The 
world never realized what the reign of  Frederick 
William I. had done for Prussia  until  suddenly 
the  gigantic  force  which  had  been  patiently 
accumulated burst forth in the days of  Frederick 
the Great.  The same applies to the year 1866. 
For the reason that war is politics in terms of 
force, it is never decided upon military  grounds 
alone, but by the policy which guides it.  Highly 
significant of  this is the history of  1848 and 1849 
when Wrangel and Prittwitz could quite well have 
made an end of  the Danes,  but  the King hesi- 
tated, from a certain repugnance to the step, and 
also from  a dread of  Russia.  But no Army can 
fight for compromises.  Every war is by nature 
radical,  and  staunchness  in  the  troops  can 
seldom  prevail  against  vacillation  and  aimless- 
ness  in  the policy  which  directs  them.  Think 
of  the campaign  in  Champagne  in  1792, when 
the Prussian and Austrian tro~ps  still possessed 
tremendous  superiority over  the  Sans-culottes, 
so  that  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mannheim  a 
single  battalion  of  the  Wedell  Regiment  once 
held the passage of  the Rhine against two French 
Divisions for a whole day.  Yet, politically, the 
result was a great defeat for the coalition.  The 
Allies were disunited ; here was a policy without 
a  certain  aim,  a  campaign  whose  purpose  had 
disappeared.  Political  considerations  are  very 
apt to hamper the wars  which coalitions under- 
take,  and  history  has  many  times  proved  the 
truth  of  the  poet's  words,  "the  strong  are 
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campaigns of  the Allies in 1813 and 1814 it was 
the unskilful  Russian  generals  who  sided  with 
the  brilliant  leaders  of  the  Prussian  Army  in 
fighting the war to its bitter end, while the more 
gifted Austrians  remained  lukewarm, by reason 
of  their  own  unstable  policy.  Their  indecision 
could have found no better Commander-in-Chief 
than Schwarzenberg.  Many a war is lost before 
it is  begun,  because  it proceeds  from a  policy 
which does not know its own mind. 
It follows that a really great general is always 
a  statesman as well.  Moltke's  letters show us 
the depth of  his understanding  of  great political 
questions,  and  we  perceive  the same  qualities 
in Blucher, that gifted child of  nature.  Blucher 
was  a  political  genius,  at whose  capacities  we 
never cease to marvel.  His forte  may not have 
been  orthography,  but  he  always  saw  things 
exactly  as  they  were.  He  could  see  his  way 
clear  through  the most  complicated  conditions. 
His demeanour at the beginning of  the war  of 
1815 has become classical.  Everybody believed 
that another dragging, boring war was beginning, 
in  the  style  of  the  Schwarzenberg  coalition 
campaigns,  and Blucher  alone  held  a  different 
opinion.  "  We shall make short work of  it this 
time,"  he wrote.  "  I have the French in front 
of  me,  glory behind  me, and the guns will soon 
begin their music, for the Bonaparte has nothing." 
Napoleon was at the head  of  what was perhaps 
the best  Army  he  ever  commanded,  as  far as 
quality went,  but it was  too small, because his 
rule  extended  over  France  alone.  It  seems  to 
us so easy to perceive this fact, but at  that time 
nobody realized it except Blucher.  He had the 
quality  which  is  essential  to  a  great  military 
leader,  political  genius,  which  means  seeing  a 
situation as it really  is,  and then  constructing 
from it,  with  creative imagination,  a  vision  of 
the developments to come. 
If  the Army is the organized political Power of 
the State, it can be nothing but Power, and may 
possess no will of its own, since its function is to 
carry out the will of  the State's supreme authority 
with unconditional obedience.  We cannot deny 
that this subjection of  the will to the decree of 
the Head of  the State is a  very hard condition 
to impose.  All  the radical  chatterers  decry  it 
as reactionary, but it is in reality the very corner- 
stone of  a  nation's  political  freedom.  Give the 
Army  a  will  of  its  own,  and  you  destroy  all 
political security.  The fate of  Spain is a terrible 
example of  what a scourge an Army can become 
if  it argues and splits up into parties.  It is im- 
possible to say what the country suffered at the 
hands of  its soldiers who always took sides, first 
supporting Carlos, and then the virtuous Isabella. 
A stern military discipline is the only protection 
against these political perils. 
The  duty  of  unconditional  obedience  leads 
to  the  further  necessity  for  a  single  oath  of 
allegiance, setting forth with unmistakable  clear- 
ness  to  whom  that  obedience  is  due.  There 
must  be  no  reservations  when  a  man  pledges 
himself to sacrifice his life.  It is sheer madness 
to make youths, who are mostly drawn from the 
lower  classes,  promise  to obey  not  only  their 
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pressly  setting  before  them  the  alternative  of 
doing one or the other in a given case.  It would 
be the end of  all discipline to make the soldier 
the judge of  when the Constitution is infringed. 
The danger of  this theory  is recognized to-day, 
but in  1848 it had  a  great  vogue,  and it was 
everywhere demanded that the Army should take 
the oath to the Constitution. 
When we  thus discuss the obligations under- 
taken by mankind we  must not be blasphemous 
enough to forget that none of  them are absolute. 
Nor should they be, for conscience sets a limit to 
every human duty.  No mortal man can offer an 
unqualified submission, and our soldiers must not 
be treated as if  they were bound  to strike their 
parents dead at  their officers' command.  Are the 
men of  a standing Army to be levelled with the 
infant  - murdering  mercenaries  of  Herod ?  Our 
beloved  Professor Dahlmann  taught us this, as 
students, at  Bonn University.  No thinking being 
can offer  up his conscience,  therefore it  may happen 
that for conscience' sake the individual may be 
driven to disobey the oath of  allegiance.  This 
must not, however, be set forth in the oath itself. 
The cases in which a soldier may disobey should 
no more be defined beforehand than the possible 
causes  for  divorce  should  be  embodied  in  the 
marriage contract.  The oath must be clear and 
comprehensible, and make  no  provision  for  ex- 
ceptional cases. 
The honour  of  the soldier is bound  up with 
this  energy  and  certainty  of  obedience.  For 
this reason the unconditional  submission, which 
we  have developed almost to the point of  hard- 
ness, has become the glory and the token of  the 
efficiency of  our  Army.  The  contempt,  which 
is  so  often  expressed  in radical  circles for  this 
dog-like obedience, proves itself a sheer illusion. 
Military  training  develops character as nothing 
else can do.  Capable old Army officers are often 
superior in this respect to the average scholars, 
because  men  of  learning have much less oppor- 
tunity of strengthening their character.  Goethe's 
immortal  words  in  Tasso  express  this  exactly. 
The habit of  silent obedience to superiors, joined 
to a  firm  command  of  inferiors,  calls  forth an 
independence of  character which is highly to be 
prized.  Our Prussian generals have never  been 
other than frank, free-hearted men. 
All  this  is  so  obvious  that our  amazement 
grows  at the  obstinacy  of  the  doctrine  which 
maintains  that  an  Army  sworn  to  uncon- 
ditional obedience is an instrument of  slavery ; 
far  more  is  it an  instrument  of  liberty.  The 
man  is ignorant of  history  who  believes that a 
national Army bound  by its oath can be made 
to serve every reactionary end.  Was Cromwell's 
Army,  that  bugbear  of  Macaulay,  the  finest 
Army that England ever had, able to hinder the 
Restoration  of  the ancient Monarchy ?  Charles 
11.  returned  unaccompanied  by  troops,  but he 
was able to gain a moral victory over the Army, 
because he had the nation at his back.  Certain 
of the old generals of  the Republic were indeed 
bought over and entered into relations with the 
Royalists,  but  the  great  majority  were  God- 
fearing  Republicans,  and  yet  these  thousands 
of fine soldiers, firm-willed as they were, offered 
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no  resistance,  and  the  regiments  simply  laid 
down  their  glorious  standards  and  disbanded. 
Thus the physical  strength of  the Army  is far 
less  powerful  against the expressed  will  of  the 
nation  than  the  doctrinaires  would  have  us 
believe.  The web  of  history is not so  coarsely 
woven as to allow fist-law to decide everything. 
Look at the great coups  d'Etat in France, when 
the  Army  was  always  an  instrument  of  the 
nation's  will.  The  French  troops  who  obeyed 
Napoleon's  call  on  the  18th  Brumaire  owed 
allegiance to the Republic, not to him ; therefore 
they broke their faith.  But behind them stood 
the  nation,  and  for  it there  was  no  political 
idealism left but military glory and the fame of 
the Tricolor.  In this mood an able and powerful 
Dictator  was  welcomed  as a  deliverer.  In like 
manner,  in  1851, when  France  was  wearied  to 
death by the eternal strife of  parties, the people 
were  content  to be  enslaved  once more;  their 
feelings  were  expressed in  the name  they gave 
to Napoleon 111.-"  saviour of  society."  Only 
the French  lack  of  conscience  could  persist  in 
denying this fact.  It is foolish to assert that the 
King  of  Prussia  could  upset  the  Constitution 
with the aid of  an Army which dare not refuse 
him  its obedience.  It is,  on  the contrary,  im- 
possible to rule for long against the will  of the 
nation  in  a  country  where  universal  military 
service  is  established.  The  blind  obedience  of 
the  Army,  then,  is  not  dangerous  to  a  well- 
ordered  State ;  it  is  infinitely  more  perilous 
when it displays a will of  its own.  A submission 
so  absolute  might indeed  bring  about a slavish 
unworthy  of  free  men,  if  there  were 
not  in  every  soundly  constituted  Army  the 
counterbalancing  force  of  a  strong  feeling  of 
chivalrous personal honour.  It was present with 
the miles Romanus  of  the Legion, it ran through 
the chivalry of  the Middle Ages,  and we  find it 
dso in the proud military instinct of  the modern 
Army, not as a personal prejudice, but bound up 
with  its  essence.  This  instinct  is  a  blessing 
with which we  cannot dispense ; a valiant man 
who has pledged himself  to unconditional obedi- 
ence  would  feel  humbled  in his  own  eyes if  he 
could not say to himself, " I am ready to sacrifice 
my  life upon  the instant, and therefore I must 
keep  the  shield  of  honour  unstained."  The 
sceptic in these matters is depriving the soldier 
of  the only  self  which  is  still his  own,  for  by 
casting doubt he is violating the inner sanctuary 
of  the soul of  man. 
For this reason  the military sense of  honour 
is  sometimes  too  prone  to take  offence.  The 
feeling is wholesome in itself, althougl the abuse 
of  it should  not  be  condoned.  The practice  of 
duelling  still  goes  on,  even  in  civilian  circles. 
It  is  in  fact  the  last  barrier  in  a  democratic 
society  against  an  absolute  degeneration  of 
manners.  Men are restrained to a certain extent 
by  the  knowledge  that they  must  stake their 
lives for the sake of an insult, and it  is better that a 
Promising life should be sacrificed now  and then 
than that the morals of  the whole nation should 
mn  wild.  The great moral vigour, which is one 
of  the  Army's  greatest strengths,  is  bound  up 
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fall  in  the  estimation  of  their  subordinates  if 
they did not evince a refinement of  manners in a 
sensitive sense of honour.  Brutality of  manners 
has  increased  in  the  English  Army  since  the 
abolition of  duelling in that country, and officers 
have  even  been  known  to come  to blows  with 
each other in a  railway  carriage,  in presence of 
their  wives.  It is  not difficult to see how  the 
prestige of  the officer must be lowered in the eyes 
of  his  men  by such behaviour.  Nothing  could 
be  more  untrue  than the democrat's  idea  that 
the  lower  orders  will  obey  their  equals  more 
readily than they will those in a higher station. 
Respect  is  still paid  to a  real  gentleman  more 
readily  th&n to one of  the old  corporals.  The 
last war proved this to be the fact ; the French 
officers had not the needful authority over their 
men. 
War  is nothing but foreign policy  expressed 
in terms of  force.  From this it follows that the 
lines  on  which  the Army  is  constituted  reflect 
accurately  the form  of  the State Constitution, 
and  further  that  the  nature  of  the  military 
organization  decides the method  by  which  war 
shall be waged.  Because the Middle Ages  were 
aristocratic,  their  battles  were  fought  by  the 
mounted arm, which has always been the weapon 
of an aristocracy.  The principle continues to pre- 
vail in our own times.  A strong preponderance 
of  cavalry is always  a  sign  that the  economic 
circumstances  of  a  nation  are  still  immature, 
and that the aristocracy  has  too  much  power 
in  the  State.  All  highly  civilized  peoples  are 
obliged  to limit  the number  of  their  mounted 
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troops,  for they lack space to develop this arm 
in a cultivated country.  Technical arms on the 
other  hand  have  always  appertained  to  the 
middle  classes ;  and  commercial  nations,  by 
reason of  their capital and their  technical  skill, 
have always produced the best military machines. 
The  Carthaginians  were the foremost  nation  of 
ancient history in the superiority of  their weapons 
of  offence,  but Rome  was  the victor  neverthe- 
less,  not  indeed  because  of  the genius  of  her 
generals,  but  because  of  the  moral  strength 
which united her national Army. 
The  advantage  in  technical  skill and appli- 
ances, important as it is, is not the primary factor 
in deciding the issue of  a war.  An Army cannot 
be  judged  from the economic standpoint of  the 
perfection of  its engines of  war,  nor  according 
to the principles of  division of  labour, although 
the commercial  States which  give  their  prefer- 
ence to professional Armies look at them in this 
light.  In  war  the  ultimate  decision  is  not 
reached by a technical superiority but rather by 
the superiority  of  morals  and morale.  On  the 
physical  side,  the  English  soldiery  are  very 
efficient, they  are  trained  in  boxing,  and  ex- 
tremely  well  nourished.  But even  in  England 
people  are  beginning  to  be  aware  that  their 
Army lacks something in comparison to a national 
Army, because it excludes the moral strength of 
the  nation.  The  world  is  not  so  materialistic 
as Wellington thought it when he declared that 
enthusiasm  was  useless  to  an Army,  and  only 
Wrought  havoc  and  confusion.  In  England, 
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and whatever the country possesses of  true war- 
like enthusiasm (and there is much more of  this 
than is  generally  supposed upon  the Continent, 
because the idea of  Great Britain's  dominion of 
the world is very widespread among her people) 
must be sought for upon  its warships.  In con- 
sidering these matters, therefore, we must always 
uphold  the purely moral standards of  valuation 
for  military  institutions  in  opposition  to  the 
purely  economic.  It  is  necessary  to be  quite 
clear  about  the  justification  for  the  eternal 
complaints of  the great cost of  the Army.  With- 
out doubt the blood-tax of  the military  burden 
is the greatest which can be laid upon a nation, 
but here again it must never  be forgotten that 
there  are certain  things  whose  worth  is  above 
all  price.  Moral  treasures  are  among  them, 
therefore  it is  unreasonable  to apply  a  money 
standard  to  such  conceptions  as  honour  and 
power.  Gold cannot pay for what we lost when 
the flower of  our youth fell upon the battle-fields 
of  France.  It is unworthy to measure the moral 
by the material.  It is  the normal and reason- 
able  condition  when  a  great  nation  embodies 
and develops the essence of  the State, which is 
in fact power, in the organization of  the Army. 
It is further to be remembered that without an 
Army  trade  and  commerce  could  not  flourish. 
The standing Army of  a nation with  a glorious 
history behind it can guarantee a  long period of 
peace, but it is  madness to begrudge the sinews 
of  war  during  such  a  period,  and  there  is  no 
greater  extravagance  than  undue  economy  in 
Army expenditure. 
When the conditions in a State are primitive 
the right to bear arms is always looked upon as 
the privilege of the free man.  The Romans only 
introduced  the  mercenary  system  in  the  very 
latest stages of  their history.  With the excep- 
tion of  the officers, this soldiery was drawn from 
the dregs of  society, hence the notion that military 
,service carries a stigma, and its consequence, the 
desire  of  the  free  citizen  to  escape  it.  The 
centuries to come were hag-ridden by this bogy 
of  the hireling  Army,  which  has come  harshly 
to  light  in  our  own  day,  in  the  creation  of 
the Citizen  and National  Guard,  the most  un- 
reasonable  and  unmoral  of  all  military inven- 
tions.  Citizens of  the State supposed themselves 
to be above bearing arms against their country's 
foes, but they were not averse from a little parade 
at  home, and desired moreover to be in a position 
to defend their money-bags from attack.  Hence 
the  truly  abominable  invention  of  a  National 
Guard, set up with the preposterous legal proviso 
that in the case of  civil disturbance the blessed 
rabble were to be dealt with first of  all by this 
Civilian  Guard,  and  the  military  only  to  be 
summoned when matters became serious.  Here 
we  have a total misunderstanding of  the moral 
grandeur of  military service.  The right to bear 
arms will always be an  honourable privilege of the 
free.  Noble-minded men have always felt this, 
more or less clearly.  "  The God  who gave men 
iron  did not will  them to be slaves"  (Der Gott 
der Eisen wachsen liess, der  wollte keine Knechte). 
It is the task of  any policy guided  by reason to 
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It is obvious from all the foregoing that the 
study of  the development  of  Army  systems is 
as  important  for  the  historian  as it is for the 
politician.  It  is  remarkable  how  the  progress 
of  military  technique  among  the  Greeks  went 
hand in hand  with  their  political  development. 
First of  all we see individual kinds of weapon each 
confined to a particular tribe.  Then as the tribal 
history became merged in the national history, the 
use of  the weapons was united also, and we  find 
the chariot fighters of  Homeric times, the nimble 
Thessalian  horsemen,  the  heavy-armed  Doric 
infantry, and  the light-armed mariners  of  the 
Ionic triremes all brought  together into a  conz- 
plicated  Army system.  In Alexander, the great 
organizer of  Hellenic military power, the apothe- 
osis  of  the long development  was  reached ; the 
rough  valour  of  his  mountain  ancestry  stood 
him  in  good  stead  for  the  disciplining of  the 
Greeks. 
We  see  the  principle  that  bearing  of  arms 
is a privilege of  free-born men running through 
the Roman Army also, for when  Rome's  power 
was  at its zenith  the proletariat  was  excluded 
from  the  Legions.  The  great  military  superi- 
ority  of  these  troops  arose  from  their  social 
solidarity.  The Emperors created the mercenary 
system which improves the efficiency of  Armies, 
but  injures  their  spirit.  The  real  strength  of 
Roman armies was always their infantry ;  cavalry 
never held  more than a  subordinate position  of 
trifling  tactical  importance,  although  it  was 
composed  of  Patricians  and  wealthy  citizens. 
Not  until  they  were  brought  in  contact  with 
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foreign countries who possessed more technically 
trained forces did the Romans develop their own 
upon  the same lines.  They learned  much from 
Pyrrhus and more from the Carthaginians,  who 
brought  against  them  no  national  Armies,  but 
well-organized  and  well-drilled  hireling  troops. 
The use of elephants by her enemies first taught 
Rome  how  to employ  large  bodies  of  artillery. 
Elephants  undoubtedly  took  the  place  of  our 
modern  guns,  whose  function  is  to  crush  the 
enemy  by  mass.  These  arts were  adopted  by 
the Romans, and further developed by their use 
of  throwing  engines.  They  possessed  a  very 
elaborate  system  of  siege  warfare.  Our  little 
town  of  Boppard  was  their  central  artillery 
depot for the provinces of  Germany and Eastern 
Gaul. 
Even  at this late period,  however, the main 
force of Roman Armies was concentrated  in the 
foot soldiery, whose favourite weapon  remained 
the short sword, so deadly in its use, and requiring 
so much courage and physical strength to wield 
it aright.  Even  as  their  early  wars  were,  as 
Livy  describes them, duella  non  bella,  so,  later, 
they  still  held  to  the  theory  that long-range 
fighting should always be brief, and that no time 
should  be  lost  in  coming  to close  quarters and 
beginning  the  hand-to-hand  struggle.  A  keen 
Sense  of  honour  animated  the  Legions,  hence 
the relatively  humane  treatment of  the troops, 
the rarity of  corporal punishments, and the gener- 
ally high consideration enjoyed  by the soldiery. 
The  Roman  Army  had  but few  officers  in  our 
Sense of the word, for we  should only apply the 410  CONSTITUTION  OF THE ARMY  MERCENARIES  411 
term  to the  legate  and  tribuni  militum,  as  the 
Centurion was, socially, on the level of  our non- 
commissioned  officer.  The fact  that the  social 
line of  demarcation was drawn so high, combined 
with the respect  felt by the people for the rank 
and file, bred a noble spirit of  independence even 
in the common soldier. 
In the Middle Ages  we  find at first the levy 
en  masse,  that mighty  national  summons  to a 
free  peasantry,  but  it soon  gave  place  to the 
unnatural form of  Army which arose out of  the 
aristocratic influences which warped the national 
life.  We have already dealt with its evil results 
in  respect  of  political  institutions,  and  seen 
that a  Monarchy  limited  by Estates,  or,  more 
correctly,  a  polyarchy,  is  simply  an organized 
disorder.  Its harmful effect is still more visible 
when  it touches  the constitution  of  the Army. 
The valiant German nations were fettered by the 
feudal  system which  placed  such  unnatural re- 
strictions upon  the number  of  those who  were 
entitled  to  bear  arms,  that  the  armies  were 
virtually composed of  the nobility.  The flower 
of  the  crusading  Armies  were  the  mail - clad 
knights upon their war-horses panoplied in steel. 
The great cost of  this equipment prohibited the 
mass of  the population  from sharing any longer 
in  the  old  delight  of  the  sword;  they  were 
warriors no more. 
In the fourteenth century we  see the rise of 
the  mercenary  system  as  a  natural  reaction 
against  this  distorted  order  of  things.  As  the 
towns became  rich,  and began  to be  conscious 
of  their power, material interests gained such an 
ascendancy that it came as a happy thought to 
the  citizens  that  they  might  buy  themselves 
,soldiers.  The Italian  Communes were  the first 
to  raise  a  force  of  well-drilled  infantry,  who 
encountered  the aristocratic cavalry  with  ever- 
increasing success.  These troops were as utterly 
plebeian in origin as the mediaeval Armies were 
aristocratic.  Their  technical  superiority  in 
weapons over the latter soon began to tell after 
the introduction of  gunpowder.  In the days of 
Richard Cceur-de-Lion wars were still only com- 
bats of  the knighthood,  but the end of  the four- 
teenth and the beginning of  the fifteenth century 
is  rich  in  record  of  battles  where  peasant  and 
citizen armies overcame the nobles who opposed 
them.  A  memorial  still stands in  the market- 
place  of  Ghent  to the  Flemish  burghers  who 
vanquished the chivalry of  France and Brabant 
with  their  heavy  artillery ; then  we  have  the 
battles fought by the Ditmarsch peasantry against 
the Danish  nobility, the Hussite wars,  and yet 
another catastrophe, peculiarly  characteristic of 
the  age,  the  battle  of  Tannenberg,  where  the 
knightly  orders,  the flower of  the German aris- 
tocracy, were defeated by the peasant  levies  of 
Cossacks and Hannaks from the east.  All these 
were  the  decisive  combats  which  sounded  the 
death-knell of  the old forces of  feudalism. 
As  the power of  the burghers increased they 
hired  mercenary  soldiers,  and a  military  class 
arose  whose  sole  profession  was  arms,  and in 
which all the drifting elements in society sought 
refuge.  Military service became a trade, and con- 
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a fixed corporate form upon every craft, it soon 
produced the pious  Guild  of  the  Orders  of  the 
Landsknechts.  These, with  usages and jurisdic- 
tion peculiar to themselves, were a natural check 
upon  the  demoralization which  could  so easily 
gain ground among a professional soldiery.  Thus 
the honour  of  the Landsknecht  demanded  that 
he  should  be  tried  only  by  his  equals,  and, if 
condemned,  should  expiate  his  guilt  with  his 
own  weapon.  When any member  of  the Order 
was  accused, the standard  was  furled, and the 
Court, consisting only of  Companions, assembled 
beneath  it to try the offender  at a  drum-head 
court-martial.  If  he was  acquitted the Ensign 
shook out over him the folds of  the banner.  All 
these honourable  and chivalrous customs contri- 
buted to  restrain the license of the homeless horde. 
Their adventurous existence contained a  wealth 
of  romance, and German bards have seldom sung 
more glorious lays than in the days of  the pious 
Landsknechts.  There was a Titan-like strain of 
heroism in these wild  companions-in-arms whose 
trade was  slaughter.  It was  not the men  who 
composed  the  fighting  force  in  its magnificent 
development in the sixteenth century under the 
House  of  Austria,  who  made  these Armies  the 
scourge of  the country, but the dissolute horde 
of  camp-followers  who followed in their wake.  The 
rabble of  women  managed the Commissariat by 
plundering the houses as they passed.  The scum 
of  the  community  flocked  to  the  mercenary 
armies, but at the same time the unquenchable 
love  of  war  in the martial  German  race  drove 
even  men  of  illustrious  birth  to  join  their 
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ranks as officers, as the nobility began to realize 
that honour  was  no longer to be  sought in the 
heavy feudal cavalry, whose day was past.  The 
lofty idea of serving their native land could have 
no  hold  upon  such  a  nondescript  host;  rather 
they held themselves at  liberty to sell their skins 
to  the  highest  bidder.  An  entirely  distorted 
notion of  the proper composition of  armies gained 
ground.  It  did  not  exclude  great  personal 
courage,  which  was  abundant  in  the  fighting 
forces of  that time, but the holocaust which the 
Thirty Years'  War made of  German civilization 
shows  to what  an appalling  extent  the ethical 
standards of  such Armies become vitiated. 
The undeveloped  finance of  the period  made 
this  hireling  system  excessively  costly.  It  is 
estimated  that Charles V.  paid rather more per 
head,  reckoned  in  our  money,  for  his  common 
soldiery  than  we  do  to-day,  officers  included. 
When  we  remember  the vast  difference in  the 
value of  money, and the smallness of  the taxes 
which  could be imposed in those days, it is easy 
to see  why  armies  were  not  large  (more than 
10,000 men were seldom united under one leader- 
ship) and to understand the need for disbanding 
them the moment peace was concluded.  This is 
to a great extent the cause why so many States 
perished in the fifteenth century. 
The  flower  of  these  troops  of  Landsknechts 
Was composed of a well-drilled infantry, armed with 
muskets of doubtful accuracy.  The Army marched 
in  a  solid body, preceded  by  an advance guard 
Partly  composed  of  pit-men  (Bergleute), corre- 
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it was to clear away the difficulties of  the terrain. 
In Napoleon's  armies  we  still find  the pioneers 
marching  in  front  of  the  drums.  Then  came 
the main  body,  and the rearguard behind,  and 
the march went forward in a direct line.  When 
about to give battle the two forces took up the 
simplest  possible  positions  facing  one  another, 
some cavalry were disposed upon the flanks, and 
the fight  began.  There  was  no  idea  as yet  of 
any  dramatic  developments;  the  opponents 
sprang at each  other, hewed  and trampled  the 
foe,  or  were  hewed  and  trampled  themselves. 
The numbers engaged were still so small that the 
great Landsknecht leaders liked  to place them- 
selves  on  raised  ground  in  the  midst  of  their 
troops, in a position whence they could overlook 
the entire field.  George Frundsberg always thus 
made himself the living centre-point of  his Army. 
These  were  the  simple  little  battles  of  the 
sixteenth century.  It is very interesting to trace 
how  the Thirty  Years'  War  (here Germany  is 
once more  the great school of  war  in  Europe) 
in  some  ways  strengthened  the  Landsknecht 
system,  while  destroying it in  other  directions. 
It  was  evident  that  the  Orders  of  the  pious 
Landsknechts  could no longer uphold  their free 
proud existence and their peculiar forms of  class 
honour against the universal degeneration of  the 
age.  The dissolute  mob  which  now  had  to be 
driven  into the ranks  could  no  longer  form  a 
respected  guild  imbued  with  a  pride  of  class. 
We  perceive  a  sharp  distinction  being  made 
between  officers  and  men,  of  which  there  was 
no  trace  in  the  previous  century,  when  the 
division between leaders and followers was much 
less marked.  The whole Landsknecht organiza- 
tion  had  hitherto  had  a  defiantly  democratic 
tendency,  even  duels  between  a  captain  and a 
common soldier were not infrequent.  All this was 
now  changed ; the lowest classes of  the people 
were  incorporated  in  the  Army  in  larger  and 
larger numbers.  In fact, from the social point of 
view, we  may look upon the Thirty Years'  War 
as an elevation of  the Fourth Estate.  The long 
down-trodden peasant now rubbed shoulders with 
the well - born  gentleman.  The  peasantry  com- 
posed  the great mass of  the new  soldiery,  who 
were  thus  separated  from  their  officers  by  an 
ever-increasing gap,  which  we  can  measure  by 
the introduction of corporal punishments at this 
period,  which would  have been  an impossibility 
in the sixteenth century. 
We  see this social decline of  the old  system 
in some directions, but in others we observe great 
technical advances.  Gustavus Adolphus was the 
genius  who  directed  military  science  into  new 
paths.  He  was  the first to introduce a regular 
system  of  fire - control.  He abolished  the  old 
arquebuses, whose adjustment, by itself, took so 
much  time,  and armed  his  troops  with  lighter 
muskets.  Instead  of  wooden  cartridges he gave 
them paper  ones,  which  could  be  carried  in  a 
pouch, and so greatly facilitated  rapidity of  fire 
that they made volleys by whole battalions pos- 
sible.  Gustaws Adolphus was also the pioneer 
of the three-rank position for infantry.  The first 
rank  fired  kneeling, the second  standing, while 
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manaeuvring capacity of  troops to a standard of 
mobility which greatly exceeded  that of  the stiff 
formations of  earlier  days.  To  us  there seems 
nothing  very  extraordinary  in  the  manceuvre 
by which he moved the Swedes from the centre 
of  his  line  to  out-flank  the  enemy  who  had 
beaten the Saxons on his left wing at the battle 
of  Breitenfeld,  but  in  his  own  day  this  was 
regarded  as  a  marvel  of  tactical  skill,  for  an 
evolution of  this kind during the progress of  the 
combat  had  never  been  seen  before.  In these 
wars cavalry once more became a very important 
arm.  The  difficulties  of  the ground  decreased 
with  the increasing  devastation of  the country, 
until large bodies  of  horse could sweep from the 
Danube  to the  Baltic.  This  altered  the whole 
character of the war. 
In these ways the Thirty Years' War brought 
great  advances  in  military  science.  In  the 
Netherlands  another  great school for the art of 
war was also offered upon German soil.  Here the 
eighty years of  struggle against Spain produced a 
long succession of  great military engineers.  The 
whole of  the technical resources of  the period could 
be brought into play during the sieges of  Ostend, 
Antwerp,  Breda,  etc.  The Low  Countries were 
the classic home of  the art of  fortress construc- 
tion ; they became the teachers of  the whole of 
Europe.  A  further  development  of  military 
science followed under Louis XIV.  The Thirty 
Years'  War  had already shown campaigns upon 
a  large  scale,  for  at the  battle  of  Nordlingen, 
which  was  the greatest of  its time,  two  of  the 
Imperial  Armies  were united  and made  a  total 
of  50,000  men  on  one  side.  Louis,  however, 
raised  an army of  about 120,000 men, in which 
the  best  troops  were  those  of  Bernhard  von 
Weimar.  Thus the French  applied  the lessons 
they  had  learned  from  Germans,  with German 
soldiers  against  German  soil.  This  mighty 
Army  of  Louis  compelled  the  other  Bowers 
to  keep  larger  forces on  a  war  footing  them- 
selves;  and  it  became  a  universal  problem 
how  to  reconcile  the  necessity  for  these large 
bodies  of  troops  with  the  limited  financial 
resources  of  the various  States.  It  is  easy  to 
understand  why  there  was  so much  discussion 
of  systems  of  national  armaments  during  this 
period.  It is well known that the first advocate 
of the idea of  a people in arms in modern times 
was  Machiavelli.  His  writings  have,  however, 
always  left  me  with  the  impression  that  he 
thought of  it more in the light of  a reminiscence 
of  antiquity than as an idea which he desired to 
see realized immediately.  In his books Dell' arte 
della  guerra  he  describes the vigour  of  the old 
Romans, in order to inspire his contemporaries to 
recover  the courage  and determination of  their 
forefathers.  In  this  way  it  is  more  a  piece 
of  historical  imagination  than  of  practical 
politics.  We  may  say  the  same  of  Baruch 
Spinoza, a quite unmilitary thinker who reverted 
to the same subject in the time of  Louis XIV. 
He  was  a  bookworm  if  ever  there  was  one. 
Neither his education nor training had given him 
knowledge of  warfare, for he was an adherent of 
the commercial peace-party in the Netherlands, 
but  he  cherished  an enthusiasm  for  antiquity. 
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In his  case also the notion  of  universal  service 
is nothing but a harking back to classical times. 
Practical statesmen there were, however, Vauban 
in particular,  who  took the question  into more 
practical consideration. 
The whole period was busied with the problem, 
but they were still far from a solution of  it.  By 
means  of  a  tumultuous  compulsory  recruiting 
in the country the ranks of  the hired foreigners 
were  completed.  When  gaps  appeared  in  the 
French  Army  the Intendants of  the  Provinces 
were ordered to fill them up, and the dregs of  the 
people  were  gathered  from  the  highways,  and 
taken  from  the  houses  of  correction,  for  this 
purpose.  These generally sufficed, because there 
were  always  so  many  German  vagabonds  who 
took  service in the French  Army.  With these 
elements  to deal  with, discipline  was  bound  to 
become increasingly hard and cruel.  The practice 
of  running the gauntlet was introduced, because 
only  such  frightful  barbarities  could  preserve 
order among bands of  men as depraved as these. 
Small  wonder  that  military  service  was  again 
looked upon as a  disgrace.  It is to the honour 
of  Prussia  that she was  the means  of  bringing 
Europe back to a more natural and more moral 
point  of  view.  History  must  remember  that 
Gustavus  Adolphus  tried  to  create  an  Army 
which could fight for its faith and its Fatherland, 
but when the mighty hero of  the North was no 
more  his  work  fell  to pieces.  King  Frederick 
William I. was  the first to re-embody the idea 
of  universal service as a political principle, when 
in the opening paragraphs of  his District Regula- 
tions he sets forth that "  every Prussian subject 
is born  to bear arms."  He upheld  the duty of 
military  service as the honour  of  every citizen. 
The country was divided into cantons, and each 
canton apportioned as a recruiting district for a 
particular  regiment.  The  young  men  were 
chosen  out  betimes, decked  with  the red scarf 
of  the cantonists,  and  were  eligible  for  service 
when  called  upon.  The  nobility  had  legal 
exemption,  which,  however, was  not practically 
applied,  for  they  fulfilled  their  military  service 
still  more  completely  than  the  peasant  class 
by furnishing the Army with officers.  The Royal 
Princes also were all in the Army.  The colleges 
for cadets were the training-ground for the non- 
commissioned  ranks.  The  only  other  exemp- 
tions were for possessors of  a  fortune of  10,000 
thalers,  and  such  fortunate  millionaires  were 
rare  in  Prussia  in  those  days.  Certain  urban 
districts were  occasionally excused  if  the  King 
considered  that their  inhabitants  would  be  of 
more use to the State by continying to ply their 
trades  than  by  carrying  the  musket.  Thus 
Berlin  was  always  freed  from military  service, 
and it caused a great deal of  trouble after 1806 
before this privilege, the wisdom of which was very 
doubtful, could be withdrawn and universal service 
introduced there.  Exemptions in Prussia were all 
founded  upon  the  monarchical  organization  of 
labour,  the ancient  suum  cuique  of  the Hohen- 
zollerns, which prescribed for every class its share 
in the collective activity of  the nation.  We may 
take  pride  in  the  knowledge  that  the  base 
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France under  Napoleon, was never carried on in 
Prussia. 
The  number  of  these  legal  exemptions  was 
still small in the reign  of  Frederick William I., 
but there was  great passive  resistance  to com- 
pulsory service, for the people met it with a real 
revolutionary  spirit.  Even the King's  iron will 
never availed to bring up the number of  his troops 
to anywhere near the total for which he strove. 
At one time the sons of  the soil did compose two- 
thirds of  the Army, but as a rule they only pro- 
vided half, and the remainder had to be recruited 
in foreign lands.  As  a result the Prussian forces 
were  made up of  two completely  heterogeneous 
bodies of  men, one being of  natives of the country, 
who were compelled to serve, and who gradually 
attained to a  certain level of  patriotic emotion, 
the other  was  of  the old  professional  soldiery, 
who were encouraged to marry as soon as possible, 
in  order to keep them longer with  the colours. 
Colonies of  them  were started,  in  little villages 
like Nowawes near Potsdam,  where  they  might 
settle  with  their  wives  and  children  and  ply 
civilian callings in the intervals of  military duty. 
These composed one element of  the Army ; the 
cantonists, who formed  the  other, had to serve 
for twenty years, but were called up for so short 
a time each year that each man's  whole  period 
of  service barely came to two years. 
It is obvious that the system was  still in its 
infancy,  and that in Prussia  as elsewhere in the 
eighteenth century the military organization still 
followed the forms of the old mercenary Armies. 
It is true that it was no longer a disgrace to wear 
the King's coat, but it was still looked upon as a 
misfortune.  There was not much  improvement 
under  Frederick  the  Great.  It  sounds  like  a 
but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that 
Frederick's  mind  had  a  less commanding  grasp 
of  the  ethics  of  compulsory  service  than  his 
father had had.  He wished  to see the number 
of  professional  soldiers  increased,  on  grounds 
of  national  economics.  In  his  opinion  "  the 
~eaceful  citizen should not be disturbed when the 
nation  goes  to war,"  and  it never  struck him 
that the peaceful  citizen  himself  is  part of  the 
nation.  As an organizer the great King was not 
the equal of  his rough  old  father.  Exemptions 
were multiplied in his reign, and whole districts, 
such as East Friesland,  were  excused  from the 
cantonal  service.  Finally,  two - thirds  of  the 
Army were once more hirelings, and in the Seven 
Years' War the mercenary system was not yet a 
thing of  the past.  It is curious to observe how 
the element of  the foreign soldiery forced a  cer- 
tain prudence of  tactics upon the commanders of 
these Armies also, which we have already observed 
wherever mercenary troops were employed.  The 
first principle of  war was once more to spare and 
preserve  the  Army  as  much  as  possible,  on 
account  of  the difficulty  of  refilling  the ranks. 
It was most important for every leader to hinder 
desertion by every means in his power, and troops 
could  never  be  billeted  but  were  always  kept 
under  canvas.  After  every  lost  battle  whole 
bodies  of  them  made  off  at once.  An  Army 
could  not  move  more  than  ten  miles from  its 
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along with  it.  The issue of  a  whole  campaign 
might turn upon the arrival or non-arrival of  a 
convoy of  provisions.  In the year  1758, during 
the Seven Years' War, the investment of  Olmiitz 
failed, because Laudon and his  Croatians inter- 
cepted a Prussian provision column.  The  King 
was  obliged  to raise  the siege,  and  the spring 
campaign ended in failure.  All this led naturally 
to very slow methods of  warfare.  We have no 
longer  any  idea  of  the  importance which  was 
attached in those days to mere manoeuvring for 
position.  The War of  the Polish Succession is a 
case in point.  It occupied nearly  the whole  of 
Europe for five years, and yet there was not one 
real battle in the whole  course of  the war.  In 
spite  of  this  it had  tremendous  consequences. 
fiance secured  Lorraine,  and Austria  Tuscany, 
while the Saxon dynasty was  once more  estab- 
lished  in  Poland.  The  Italian  frontier  was 
altered  by  it in  a  way  which  has  influenced 
history,  for  the  Bourbons  were  set  upon  the 
throne  of  Naples  and  the  Piedmontese  came 
from Sicily to Sardinia.  All these changes were 
results of the five years of so-called war. 
The  proverb,  "  Genius  breaks  all  rules,"  is 
nowhere truer than in war.  Frederick the Great 
set rules aside as far as any mortal man can disre- 
gard  the limitations  of  the period  in  which  he 
lives.  His Silesian campaigns were still marked 
by the slowness  which  the composition  of  his 
Army dictated, when we compare them with the 
wars of  our  own century, but even in them the 
daring  of  the  royal  commander  stands  out  in 
the marvellous  battle of  Hohenfriedberg,  where 
his genius showed itself  for the first time in its 
maturity.  The Prussian Army has won  most of 
its victories in taking the offensive, which is the 
most  suited to its character,  and was  also  the 
most  expressive  of  the innermost  nature  of  its 
great King.  In his own favourite phrase, "  We 
must  preserve  the proud  privilege of  the initia- 
tive."  Yet  even  he  was  still hampered  by the 
conditions of  the armies of  his date.  The Seven 
Years' War was relatively rich in pitched battles, 
yet from beginning to end only twenty-two were 
fought.  Compare with  that the  number  of  de- 
cisive conflicts in the year 1870 ! 
Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  we  are  compelled  to 
admire the genius with  which  Frederick led  his 
cumbrous  army to battle whenever  any oppor- 
tunity  presented  itself.  This  was  what  made 
him so incomprehensible to the average military 
leaders  of  his  day.  "  My  brother  could  do 
nothing  but give battle,"  as Prince  Henry dis- 
dainfully  remarked  about  him,  unconsciously 
pointing  out the very  quality which  gave him 
his renown.  We  feel that in Frederick  we  are 
witnessing the dawn  of  a  new  era,  for  already 
he regarded  the destruction of  the enemy as the 
first aim in war.  In the second campaign of  the 
Seven  Years'  War  the King's  intention was  to 
deal a blow at the heart of  the foe, but not to 
follow the spirit of  his  age  by  occupying  more 
and  more  Bohemian  territory  until  he  forced 
the Empress-Queen  to come  to terms of  peace. 
Then  followed  his  reverse,  the  fatal  battle  of 
Kollin,  and from  that time  onwards  Frederick 
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natural audacity.  The same year, 1757, contained 
the two battles of  Rossbach and Leuthen, but in 
them the King did violence to his most  inward 
inclinations  by  assuming  the  defensive.  We 
must  not  discount  the tremendous  importance 
of  money in the conduct  of  military operations 
in those days.  The exhaustion of  his resources 
was  an  additional  reason  why  Frederick  was 
forced to carry on the war with more caution in 
the later  years.  He said himself, "  The victory 
will  lie  with  the  possessor  of  the last  thaler." 
This  observation  would  be  less  true  at  the 
present  day.  Bernhardi  has  discerned the root 
principle of  the Frederician strategy correctly in 
his book upon Frederick the Great as a military 
leader.  The historical facts are these.  Frederick 
exemplified the axiom that genius is beyond  all 
rules,  as hardly  any other  man  has  ever  done. 
In contrast to the great King, his brother Henry 
was a General absolutely in the spirit of  his age, 
and for this reason he did his best work during 
the last  years  of  the long  struggle.  We  must 
look at these events in the cold light of  science. 
To  modern  ideas  it seems  absurd  that Prince 
Henry should have been able to hold all Saxony 
right down to the south, year after year for the 
last three years of the War, with his little Army, 
which he disposed in an inordinately long cordon 
all round the country.  A modern  Army would 
naturally have cut this thin line at some point 
or another.  Did the Austrians ever attempt to 
do so ?  The question must be negatived,  for it 
never  occurred  to  them  to try.  Daun  was  as 
much one  of  the anxiously methodical Generals 
FREDERICK'S METHODS  425 
of  the old school as was  Prince Henry himself, 
and  the  credit remains  with  the latter,  as  his 
great  brother  always  acknowledged, for  having 
defended Saxony for three years against the foe. 
No part of it was lost, except Dresden itself, the 
rest of the  country remained as a source of revenue, 
which the King could draw upon at will. 
Duke Leopold  I., the "  alte Dessauer,"  had 
already introduced a few technical improvements 
into the Prussian Army.  The unreliable wooden 
ramrods  had  been  replaced  by  iron,  and  the 
bayonets bent outwards, so that  the muskets could 
be used for thrusting as well as shooting.  Thus 
more mobility had been attained, and the tactics 
of  Frederick's day show the dawn of  a new  era. 
Dispositions  were  still  substantially  dominated 
by  the  old  line  tactics,  and  armies  advanced 
straight against one another so that the course 
of  the  battle  was  simplicity  itself.  Here,  too, 
Frederick was an innovator.  He had as yet no 
reserves  in  the modern  sense,  for  although  he 
placed  his  troops  in  two  lines  they  were  both 
very  early  engaged.  He  tried  to  supply  the 
place of  a reserve by refusing with one wing  at 
the beginning of  operations, in order to give the 
decisive blow  at the end  with  their husbanded 
strength.  This  was  the  famous  oblique  order 
which  so  many  bunglers  tried  to  copy.  It  is 
well  known  what  great  success  attended  this 
refusal of  the wing at Leuthen, and how, on the 
other hand, it led to the King's defeat at Kollin. 
Already  we  can  mark  the  transition  to  the 
dramatic development of  modern battles. 
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in  the  Prussian  Army,  a  passionate  and  truly 
national enthusiasm  in  which  we  can  discern  a 
forecast  of  the  Wars  of  Liberation.  Upon  its 
heels followed the great upheaval of  the French 
Revolutionary period, which transformed at one 
blow  the entire existing system  of  warfare.  It 
brought the approximate realization of  the idea 
of  universal  service,  which  Prussia  had  long 
possessed  on  paper,  although  the resistance  of 
the populace had prevented it being fully carried 
out in the then existing economic conditions.  In 
France,  however,  the  fearful  disorder  of  the 
Revolution  had  so  shattered  the old  Bourbon 
A~my  that it had to be constituted entirely anew. 
Every man was forced to join the levke  en masse 
against the invading enemy, under the threat of 
terrible penalties, and the looming shadow of  the 
guillotine.  These  terrorizing  methods  brought 
together huge masses of  men, the worst military 
material which it is possible to imagine, but who 
were still hundreds of  thousands of  human beings 
through which the enemy must hack his way. 
The Prussian  and  even  the  Austrian  armies 
were immeasurably superior to the Sansculottes ; 
the Prussian  soldiers carried  away an immense 
contempt  for the "  Katzenkoppe,"  whom  they 
always defeated when it came to fighting.  What, 
then, is the explanation of  the loss of the Rhine 
campaign ?  One  cause  was  the  faulty  policy 
behind all the military operations, which did not 
fix its gaze primarily upon the conquest of France, 
but had an eye to a possible enrichment through 
a  slice of  Poland  or  Bavaria.  Above  all,  how- 
ever, it was the alteration in the conduct of  the 
war  by  France  which  made  a  decisive victory 
impossible  for  the  Allies.  Even  Goethe,  than 
whom  no man  was  ever less a  strategist, recog- 
nized with the eye of  genius the critical import- 
ance of Valmy for the history of the world.  Truly 
upon that day a new world stood opposed to the 
old.  How many troops had the Duke of  Bruns- 
wick ?  Forty thousand  men.  Even  if  he  had 
attacked  and  beaten  the French  at Valmy he 
would certainly have been reduced to 25,000 men 
before  he  reached  Paris.  To - day the idea  of 
taking and holding Paris with a force of  that size 
is  ludicrous.  The conquest  of  that vast crater 
of  the wildest  passions  with  such  a  tiny body 
of  troops  would  be a senseless notion.  Thus it 
happened that the seasoned troops with all their 
technical  superiority were  beaten  in  policy  by 
the hordes  of  Sansculottes,  who,  in those early 
days, were still very awkward and unserviceable. 
As  time went  on,  however,  we  can  trace in 
them the dawn of  a  very remarkable  improve- 
ment.  Carnot  arose  as  the  organisateur  de  la 
victoire,  and did  for France what King William 
and Roon did later for Prussia.  Up to now the 
fundamentally demoralized regiments  of  the old 
Royal Army,  wearing the white uniform  of  the 
House of  Bourbon, had fought side by side with 
the  new  National  Guard  of  the  Revolution. 
Carnot realized that these two differing elements 
must be amalgamated.  He combined them both 
in the half-brigade system,  and so founded the 
popular Army, a democratic host, with the under- 
lying principle that with good luck any one might 
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individual talent, as Hoche, for instance, actually 
did.  Later,  under  the  Directory,  the  leading 
characteristics  of  the  new  Army  Constitution 
were  crystallized,  and the manner  in which the 
idea of  universal service was limited and falsified 
is  significant  of  the  French  bourgeoisie.  The 
new  law  of  conscription  laid  down  that every 
Frenchman was liable to serve, but that he was 
permitted to buy himself  free from this duty by 
means  of  a  rernpla~ant  or  substitute.  Oriental 
fellow-citizens organized this commerce in human 
flesh, and formed the honourable guild of  "  soul 
merchants,"  as they were dubbed in our Alsace. 
It is easy to imagine the disastrous reaction 
of  such a system upon the character of  the nation 
and the Army.  It is better  adapted than any 
other to  serve a policy of  conquest and rapine, and 
Napoleon realized when he became Dictator that 
no  instrument could  better serve  his  ends.  It 
placed him in a position to make good his losses 
continually, for a popular host of  this kind can 
never  be destroyed,  but on the other hand  the 
moral qualities of  a truly national army, recruited 
by means of  a really effective compulsory service, 
must  always  be  lacking  in  such  a  force.  All 
were  not  required  to serve,  for  the well-to-do 
could buy themselves  out,  and the bulk  of  the 
Army  was  drawn  from  the humbler  folk,  and 
those classes of  society who create public opinion 
in the Press were represented only by the corps 
of  officers.  Hence it comes that the Napoleonic 
period  was  the time when  the educated  classes 
were Chauvinists as a matter of  course, and the 
military enthusiasm of  the Parisians reached the 
pitch  of  exaltation.  They listened with delight 
to the accounts of  the poor  devils  in the field 
who were being  slain for the sake of  Paris and 
gloire,  and they were treated from time to time 
to a triumph after the manner of  ancient Rome, 
and saw the long procession of  prisoners of  war 
trail  past  the  Vend8me  Column.  It  is  small 
wonder that Paris could never satisfy its appetite 
for war,  while  it looked upon  it as an  end  in 
itself, rather than as a  means towards the ends 
of a well-considered policy.  We can already see 
clearly the effects of  a  really universal military 
service  in  altering  the  temper  of  the  French 
nation.  In words they swagger no less than of 
old,  but  deeds  do  not  bear  out  the  outcry. 
Frenchmen  are  less  greedy  for  war  now  that 
each of them has but one son, and war nowadays 
means  peril  for  the  mother's  darling.  It  was 
otherwise  when  the  substitute system  secured 
Napoleon  against  the  risk  of  public  opinion 
proving  any  hindrance  to his  yearnings  after 
conquests. 
He kept equally faithful to the other funda- 
mental  principle  of  the  Revolutionary  Armies 
by allowing no obstacles to be placed in the way 
of promotions, so that every drummer boy might 
feel  that  he  carried  a  Marshal's  baton  in  his 
knapsack.  No  Army can exist without a differ- 
ence being made between the men who serve in 
the ranks and the men  who exercise command, 
and the cleavage is, in fact, very marked socially ; 
but it  is in the exact point at  which this necessary 
dividing  line  is drawn  that we  can discern the 
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that in the Roman Armies it was placed, accord- 
ing to our notions, extremely high.  The officers 
proper were a very small number of  individuals 
belonging  to  the  ruling  families.  Everybody 
under  the  rank  of  Captain  belonged  to  the 
common herd, and the Centurion had no prospect 
of  being promoted to high command.  In Armies 
at later periods the nobility generally filled the 
posts  of  officers.  The French Revolution, how- 
ever,  proclaimed  the principle  of  perfectly  free 
promotion  throughout  its  Armies,  thereby 
weakening the sense of  comradeship and chival- 
rous honour in the ranks, but awakening on the 
other hand a devouring ambition ; and the chief 
need  of  these  condottieri  was  a  commander  of 
genius,  who  would  be  never  weary  of  making 
war.  In practice,  however,  the constitution of 
the French Army drew the frontier between the 
officers and the men at  a very high grade of  rank. 
It became a rule that the junior  officers should 
be  taken  from  two  widely  different  classes  of 
persons.  Some, who were officers in our German 
sense of  the word, were drawn from the military 
colleges, the institutions for  the higher  military 
instruction, but  the  remainder  had  risen  from 
the ranks.  The system continues in France unto 
this day, and is bound to work havoc with com- 
radeship, for  a  spirit of  restless  envy arises be- 
tween the old officers who have worked their way 
up, and their well-born young comrades.  These 
feelings are not soothed by the fact that as a rule 
the younger officers, who have received a scientific 
military  training, are the only ones who attain 
to Staff  rank.  Thus the dividing line  is drawn 
in quite the wrong place, because it is only from 
the Staff-officer upwards that all the officers are 
gentlemen. 
For  a  character like  Napoleon,  however,  all 
these  conditions  were  the  best  possible.  He 
could be absolutely certain that there would  be 
no  public  opposition  to his  lust  for  conquest. 
His genius could venture upon gigantic military 
operations which could never have been contem- 
plated  with the old  Armies  and  the  difficulties 
which  attended the replacement of  their losses. 
He knew himself  to be able always to set fresh 
Armies in the field, and therefore he could display 
a marvellous audacity in his conduct of the first 
Italian campaign of  1796.  Think of  the way in 
which he turned the enemy in those operations. 
He  marched  along  the  Riviera,  crossed  the 
Apennines at their junction  with  the Maritime 
Alps, and placed himself  eastwards of  the Pied- 
montese  and  the Austrians.  A  defeat  in  that 
position would have meant the loss of  his Army ; 
he  fought, in  the language of  Clausewitz,  with 
reversed front.  Later on he entered Milan, still 
approaching  from  the  east,  although  he  had 
started  from  the  west.  His  circumstances 
warranted  such  daring,  which  had  indeed  been 
seen before, but only as a rare exception, as when 
Prince Eugene of  Savoy defeated the Lombards 
in similar fashion, with reversed front. 
Boldness of  this kind is possible with national 
Armies, from whom  so  much  may be expected. 
Napoleon always aimed at  the heart of  his enemy, 
the capital of  his country.  Under him, too, the 
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complicated  and  more  dramatic.  He liked  to 
begin with a stubborn volley fire, then  as soon 
as he had discovered a weak point in the enemy's 
line  he  directed  a  heavy  massed  artillery  fire 
upon it, and under this protection sent forward 
his reserves, usually composed of  the Old Guard, 
carefully held back until this moment.  The with- 
holding of  the reserve for a  decisive blow was a 
tactical manoeuvre which Frederick  had already 
employed occasionally in his own brilliant manner ; 
Napoleon used it always.  Under him the course 
of the battle was  more forcible and more com- 
plex.  Napoleonic  methods  of  warfare  reacted 
upon  his  enemie~  both  as  a  stimulus  and  for 
instruction.  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau  were 
both  his  disciples.  Gneisenau's  dispute  with 
Schwarzenberg in 1814 is indicative of  the man, 
and marks the contrast between the new  school 
and  the  old.  Schwarzenberg  wished  to  make 
nothing more than a demonstration against Paris, 
in the hope of  frightening the enemy into making 
terms  of  peace.  Hence  the  elaborate  advance 
through Switzerland, a turning movement which 
was  expected  to  perform  wonders,  although 
it  actually  only  prolonged  the  campaign. 
Gneisenau,  however,  pointed  with  outstretched 
arm towards the enemy's  capital ; in Paris only 
could peace be concluded.  He recognized aright 
the spirit of  a national Army, as Scharnhorst had 
created it. 
Scharnhorst,  too,  had  learned  much  from 
Napoleon, but he had at  the same time developed 
Napoleon's  ideas  along  noble  lines.  When  the 
battle  of  Jena  taught  the  Prussian  State the 
bitter  lesson  that henceforward  the  old  forms 
must  be  discarded,  and  totally  new  ones  take 
their  place,  ninety-nine  men  out of  a  hundred 
would have adopted the French system without 
modification, even as the Armies of  Europe were 
modelled  upon  those  of  Germany  after  1871 
Prussia  had  been  beaten by the French  Army, 
whose  superiority  could  not  be  denied.  But 
Scharnhorst was a military genius, and in conse- 
quence an originator.  He had first seen service in a 
small mercenary Army, in the English-Hanoverian 
employ, later he had fought against the levke  en 
masse and the troops of  the French Empire, and 
finally in the service of  Prussia he had had to do 
with  an Army  which  was  partly  national  and 
partly of  hired troops.  This was his practical ex- 
perience, though he adopted none of  the types for 
his pattern, but going back to the almost forgotten 
District  Regulations of  Frederick William I. he 
at once  brought  forward  the idea  of  universal 
service  without  any  exceptions.  He asserted, 
besides,  the necessity  of  cadres  for  the  Army, 
which  should  apply not only  to troops  of  the 
line, but also to the reserve of  time-expired men 
(Landwehr).  These were Scharnhorst's proposals, 
which  he  put  forward  first  immediately  after 
1808, but they could not then be put in practice, 
because  Napoleon  had  forbidden  the  Prussian 
Army to exceed 42,000 men. 
Scharnhorst had instantly perceived that the 
substitute system was fundamentally antagonistic 
to  the  Prussian  spirit.  Economic  considera- 
tions had compelled us to grant exceptions from 
the rule of  universal service, but our nation had 
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never  contemplated  that any individual should 
buy himself  off  from his  bounden  duty, and it 
is significant that in all the long discussions no 
Prussian  officer  of note ever recommended that 
we should imitate this French expedient.  Another 
institution  which  Scharnhorst  knew  would  go 
against  the grain  of  our good  German  customs 
was a  corps of  officers  upon the French model. 
The Prussian  Army had no use for the soldiers 
of  fortune who  rose  to prominence  in France. 
Nor wa3s  it desirable to allow the corps of  officers 
to be divided into the young educated gentlemen 
on the one hand, and the old ex-non-commissioned 
officers  upon  the  other.  The  mixture  of  old 
Captains and young Staff-officers, which Napoleon 
liked  so much, left but little room for the spirit 
of  comradeship and esprit de corps.  Scharnhorst 
himself was of  humble origin, the son of  a peasant, 
but  he  had  the  aristocratic  temper  which  no 
genuine  military leader  can  dispense  with,  and 
he well knew that there must be a line of  social 
demarcation  between  officers  and  men;  he 
thought, like Washington,  that only  gentlemen 
should hold commissions, and while he discarded 
their  monopoly  by  the  nobility,  he  wished  to 
create a corps of  officers which should be inwardly 
united by common social standards.  This reveals 
his  profound  insight  into  German  character. 
In what  do Germans consider that class differ- 
ences consist ?  Somewhat prejudiced  as we  are 
in the direction of  idealism, we instinctively seek 
them in culture, and every man amongst us can 
tell the difference between those who are educated 
and those who  are not.  Our  Civil  Service has 
long been organized on these lines, and the intel- 
lectual test of  examinations divides the superior 
officials from  their  uncertificated  subordinates. 
Even  admission  to  the  corps  of  officers  must 
depend  on  proof  of  positive  attainments  being 
given,  and the rule  should  only  be  relaxed  in 
favour  of  quite exceptional  services  in  action. 
In time of peace Scharnhorst was  inexorable in 
requiring  a  barrier  between  officers  and  men, 
in the shape of  intellectual tests.  Another even 
more important feature of  his  scheme was  that 
the various  corps  of  officers should  have voice 
in  the selection  of  candidates  for  admission  .to 
their midst.  This  made  a  very  marked  excep- 
tion to the rule of  unconditional obedience which 
otherwise prevails throughout the Army, but in 
this way the body of  officers was protected from 
the  unwholesome  elements  always  present  in 
periods where social conditions are in a state of 
perpetual flux. 
It  is  clear,  however,  that the responsibility 
of  military  commands  requires  not  only  intel- 
lectual  training,  but  also  a  certain  amount  of 
social  education.  Scharnhorst was  not  able  to 
foresee all the consequences of  his  fundamental 
principle.  We must always  admire him  for his 
introduction  of  the  intellectual  tests,  and  the 
moral standards alongside of  them through the 
medium  of  the  officers  themselves.  A  united 
military  aristocracy was thereby created,  which 
at the same time was  as democratic as it was 
possible to be.  The subaltern is an officer like 
any  other,  in  spite  of  the  modest  position  he 
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With the years 1813 and 1814 came the great 
time of  trial when the instrument thus created was 
put to the proof.  The old plans for the Landwehr 
had  never  been  able to materialize,  and we  all 
know how a Landwehr was improvised, of  a kind 
of  which Scharnhorst himself had never dreamed. 
It was  made up of  all  the material which  had 
found no place in the first line, old men and boys 
were flung together impetuously into the troops 
of  this second line, and an improvised  corps of 
officers  arose  entirely  upon  its  own  initiative. 
It became the rule for the landed proprietor, who 
exercised  a  control  in  the district in  virtue  of 
his  social  position,  to take  a  commission  and 
continue to exercise a military command over the 
same individuals as before.  Thus was the valiant 
Landwehr  of  1813 constructed.  It  had  all the 
defects  which  arose from the hurry in which  it 
was  brought  together;  for  although  it lacked 
nothing in courage or in devotion, it was too weak 
to withstand  the fatigues  which  are attendant 
upon  the iron  discipline of  a  trained Army  on 
the march, and Bliicher's force, which was called 
upon to make such terrific exertions, lost so many 
of  these  second-line troops that only  one-third 
of  them  were  still  with  York's  Corps  at the 
battle  of  Mockern.  The  line  regiments  were 
still, as ever, the backbone of  our Army ; all the 
leaders were with them ;  nor could this be other- 
wise than it was. 
The  Landwehr  had  originally  only  been  in- 
tended for service at  home, and for the conquest 
and  occupation  of  fortresses  taken  from  the 
enemy.  To Gneisenau the credit belongs for the 
insertion into the new regulations for these troops 
of  a  modest  clause, providing  for their employ- 
ment  beyond  the frontier in  exceptional  cases. 
It  soon  was  evident  that  the  exception  must 
become the rule.  Gneisenau had  organized the 
Silesian Landwehr  upon  a  footing which  would 
enable them to take the field, but the war had 
lasted from May until August before the Landwehr 
regiments  took  part  in  the  campaign.  The 
final result  was  much  influenced by  the fact of 
these fresh  troops  being  there  to back  up  the 
Northern  Army under  Biilow.  They took part 
in  a  comparatively large  number  of  skirmishes 
and  battles,  but then  they had not been  worn 
down  by  the terrible wet - weather  marches  of 
the summer of  1813 as the armies of  Silesia and 
Bohemia  had  been.  Afterwards Biilow's  Corps 
was taken to Belgium for the comfortable winter 
campaign, and it did not join  Bliicher in France 
until later. 
The  valiant  Northern  Army  had  thus  been 
the luckiest in escaping the fatigues of  the cam- 
paign, and it was here that the Landwehr showed 
itself  to most  advantage.  This  had  a  decisive 
effect, for the Chief  of  the General Staff  of  this 
Corps was presently appointed War Minister for 
Prussia,  and from  these  favourable  experiences 
he formed his sanguine opinion of  the efficiency 
of  the  Landwehr  troops.  However,  an  inno- 
vator ought to be optimistic, and it was fortunate 
in the long run that Boyen did over-estimate the 
qualities  of  the Landwehr.  Thus within  a  few 
weeks,  in  September  1814,  the  new  Prussian 
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Landwehr as a reserve force which was to consist 
of  time-expired  soldiers of  the line.  The fault 
of  the new organization lay in rating the number 
of  first-line troops at far too low a figure.  The 
line was so weak that it had to be made up from 
the  Landwehr  every  time  it was  put  upon  a 
war-footing.  In 1819  the Army was rearranged 
so that a brigade of  regular troops corresponded 
to a brigade of  Landwehr,  and the latter troops 
were made liable to be called up in times of  peace 
if required for a diplomatic demonstration.  This 
was  not  an arrangement  which  could  continue 
very long, if  only  on account of  the difficulties 
which  arose  regarding  officers,  for  how  was  it 
possible to allow a corps of  Landwehr officers to 
organize  itself  in  peace  time,  as  Boyen  had 
intended ?  The  veterans  of  the war  died  off, 
and the question of  the supply of  officers became 
more and more embarrassing. 
The achievements  of  the  Army,  despite  its 
deficiencies of  organization, and the loyalty with 
which it confronted  the trials of  the year  1848 
are astonishing,  and worthy  of  all  admiration. 
Nevertheless  his  experience of  the mobilization 
during  the  Olmiitz  episode  gave  the Prince  of 
Prussia much food for thought.  The Army had 
suffered much  through  the prevalent  desire  for 
peace.  In 1833 a period of  two years had been 
fixed for military service, a measure from which 
the  Prince  had  early  learnt  to  withhold  his 
approval.  In 1852 the three years' service was 
legally restored,  and through it the stimulus of 
ambition could be brought to bear upon the rank 
and file ; for it held out to every individual the 
hope  of  gaining  an earlier discharge  by  his  de- 
serving conduct.  A moral force, for which there 
is no other equivalent, was thus infused into the 
Army.  The Prince was obliged to postpone the 
introduction  of  all  the other reforms  which  he 
had at  heart until he succeeded to the throne.  It 
was  then  that  universal  military  service  was 
really  instituted for the first time.  The organ- 
ization of  the Prussian  Army in the year  1860 
bears a striking resemblance to Carnot's reforms. 
Its aim was to link the first and the second line 
of  defence firmly to one another.  The number 
of  line  regiments  was  increased,  and  the three 
youngest  Landwehr  classes were  transferred  to 
the first reserve  of  the line,  which  was  thereby 
so strengthened that it was no longer necessary 
to deplete the senior classes of  the Landwehr the 
moment that the regular Army had to be made 
up  to  strength.  This  brought  about  a  great 
lightening of  economic burdens, which more than 
made up for increased Army Estimates.  Thence- 
forward  the  Landwehr  filled  the  subordinate 
part for  which  it was  designed.  Its task  and 
position should not be so interpreted as to impair 
the technical efficiency of  the Army,  or to dis- 
organize the corps  of  officers.  The reintroduc- 
tion of  the untested two years'  system, with all 
the  increased  difficulties  and  requirements  of 
to-day, would  be  an  experiment  all  the more 
fateful because harder to retract.  In 1852 the 
King  could vary the time of  service merely by 
legal decree, but it must be apparent to any one 
who  is  acquainted  with  the psychology  of  our 
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difficult position, for it would be impossible now 
to revert without more ado to a previous system 
on the failure of  such an experiment. 
There can be no question that the example of 
the German national Army has had its effect upon 
the rest of  Europe.  The gibes formerly hurled at 
it have all proved fallacious.  It used to be the 
fashion abroad to dismiss the Prussian Landwehr 
and the Prussian schoolboy army with a contempt- 
uous  shrug.  Now  it is far otherwise.  Practical 
experience  has  demonstrated  that  in  war  the 
moral  qualities  of  the  troops  outweigh  their 
technical training, and that increased  efficiency 
in  this  respect  goes  hand  in  hand  with  moral 
deterioration of  barrack life.  The elderly French 
sergeants did not,  as the French had expected, 
give their troops a superiority over the Germans. 
We  may safely say that Germany has been  the 
first country to grapple seriously with the problem 
of  drawing forth the resources of  the nation  by 
means  of  universal  military  training,  and  of 
giving them  efficient value  in war.  Our  Army 
furnishes us with a peculiar and logical extension 
of  our school system.  There are many for whom 
it is  the  best  education  conceivable,  and  who 
could  ill  afford  to dispense  with  the drill,  the 
enforced  cleanliness,  and  the  stern  and  virile 
discipline  both  moral  and  physical,  especially 
in a time like ours when other restraints are so 
relaxed.  Carlyle  prophesied  that the  Prussian 
idea  of  universal  military  service  would  per- 
meate the world.  Almost every great continental 
Power has tried to copy it since the organization 
of  the Prussian  Army  stood its trial so trium- 
phantly in 1866 and 187'0.  It was not, however, 
so easy to imitate as foreign nations assumed. 
The  Prussian  Army  system  is  the nation in 
arms, and to that extent it is the embodiment of 
national characteristics and virtues.  Three con- 
ditions are necessary to  its success-a  modicum of 
political  freedom,  satisfaction with  the Govern- 
ment, and considerable latitude in social adminis- 
tration.  Furthermore, an instinctive respect for 
culture is required, without which the institution 
of the one-year volunteer would be unthinkable. 
This  is  designed to make  service  in  the ranks 
morally and economically endurable for the edu- 
cated classes.  In France the craving for an ex- 
ternal dgalitd has barred the way to  this volunteer 
system,  but  in  Germany  we  could  hardly  do 
without  it, because,  quite apart from  the fact 
that the number  of  our  regular  officers  is  not 
nearly enough for a war, the young men of  educa- 
tion  who  take commissions in the Reserve  and 
Landwehr at  the end of  their one year of  voluntary 
service are in many ways more in touch with the 
people than the corps of  professional officers can 
be, and they form the natural link between these 
latter and the rank and file. 
The  heavy  burden  of  universal  service  can 
be  further  eased  by  a  certain  amount  of  de- 
centralization,  which  enables  each  individual, 
broadly  speaking,  to put  in  his  service  in  his 
native  province.  Our  provincial  Army  Corps 
have as a rule given a very good account of  them- 
selves, and must continue to compose the bulk 
of  the  Army,  while  the Guard  furnishes  their 
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the length and breadth of  the kingdom, forming 
a body of  picked troops to act as a spur upon the 
remainder.  Our  system  of  provincial  Army 
Corps  does not  exist  in the strictly centralized 
French organization where Gascon and Norman 
stand shoulder to shoulder in the same regiment. 
We, on the contrary, rightly regard local feeling 
as a  strong cement to bind  the comrades in a 
regiment together.  A certain degree of  national 
sentiment  is  naturally presupposed  by the idea 
of  universal service if  it is to have a consolidat- 
ing effect.  Small  individual  districts  inhabited 
by alien nationalities are of  no great importance, 
and can be dealt with  by a few simple precau- 
tionary  measures.  Austria  is  worse  off  in  this 
respect,  for  there  the  Reserve  officers  are  the 
weak point of  the Army.  They are good Czechs, 
good Germans, good Magyars, everything except 
good Austrians, and for this the future may hold 
a  bitter retribution. 
Until a short time ago we were ahead of  other 
nations in all these matters concerning military 
organization, but of  late the neighbouring States 
have so overstrained their military preparations 
that Germany  has seen herself  compelled to go 
yet further, and this time she is following in the 
footsteps of  foreign nations.  By the nature  of 
things this cannot go on indefinitely, but in this 
respect  the  immense  vitality  of  the  Teutonic 
race  will  ensure its predominance  over  the less 
prolific nations.  The French are already danger- 
ously  near  their  limit,  but  the  Germans  have 
still a  much  greater  latitude in the number  of 
men they can call to the colours. 
Once more let it be clearly understood what 
effect these  new  military  formations  will  have 
upon  the  future  conduct  of  war.  Generally 
speaking, their tendency is towards peace, for a 
whole nation in arms is far more difficult to rouse 
from its civil avocations to engage in a frivolous 
war  than  a  conscript  Army  would  be.  Wars 
will  become rarer and shorter, but at the same 
time far more sanguinary.  The longing to return 
home will act as a strong incentive to advance. 
The feeling which the Prussian soldiery expressed 
in  the  summer  of  1866-let  us  press  forward 
quickly to the Danube so that we  come home the 
sooner-is  the normal  attitude of  a  brave  but 
peace-loving Army, and the daring tactics which 
aim  straight  at the  heart  of  the  enemy  have 
become  a  commonplace of  modern strategy.  It 
is not too much to say that when a  people can 
look back upon a glorious military past, nothing 
is impossible for such a national Army.  This is 
borne  out by the experience  of  our  two  most 
recent wars,  especially by the battles of  Konig- 
gratz  and  Mars  la  Tour.  At  Sadowa  we  saw 
fourteen  Prussian  battalions  holding  their  own 
against  forty-two  Austrian  battalions,  and  the 
French  war  shows a  succession  of  battles  on  a 
reversed front, where defeat would  have driven 
us  back into the heart of  the enemy's  country. 
Under the national system the problem of sparing 
the  Army is  of  quite secondary importance in 
comparison with  the much  weightier  considera- 
tion  of  annihilating the enemy.  Here  there is 
no danger from desertion, and the troops can be 
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Even Montecuculi's well-known saying, which 
was  still endorsed by Frederick  the Great, that 
war requires money, more money, and still more 
money,  is  now  completely antiquated.  Doubt- 
less the preparations for modern war entail vast 
financial  means,  but  during  the war  itself  the 
invader at least can do without money.  He has 
merely  to  tap  the  resources  of  the  occupied 
country, and can even leave his troops tempor- 
arily  without  pay.  When  Bliicher  wrote  an 
order  in  France  for  a  great  war  contribution 
towards  the needs  of  his  famishing  soldiers,  a 
counter-order arrived from the Gng, forbidding 
him to embitter the French too much, and pro- 
mising that the pay should be sent from Prussia. 
Bliicher  replied, "  Your  Majesty's  Army is  not 
a  mercenary  Army,  and  if  I  am  not  to take 
money from the enemy, at least let us not be an 
unnecessary  burden  upon  our  own  country." 
It is well known that Napoleon began the cam- 
paign of  1806 with a war-chest of  40,000 francs, 
and our straits in 1813 were much worse, for at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  we  had  only  2000 
florins in  cash, but we  forthwith converted  the 
wealth of  Saxony into ready money, and so were 
able to proceed. 
A certain independence of  action in the sub- 
ordinate commands is another essential of  national 
Armies, in view of  the vast masses of  men involved. 
General  Manteuffel  once  told  me  that  on  the 
foggy morning preceding the battle of  Noisseville 
he was only able to give quite vague instructions, 
and for the rest was obliged to rely entirely upon 
the  independence  and  trustworthiness  of  his 
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Generals.  The evolution of  strategy on  s basis 
of  universal  service  is  still  incomplete,  for  the 
world has not yet seen a  struggle between  two 
national  Armies.  The  last  great  war  was  the 
struggle of a truly national Army, first against a 
 ons script Army and later against an improvised 
militia.  The spectacle of  the clash between two 
really  highly trained national Armies is  still to 
come.  It  will  be  Titanic,  and  the  world  will 
then behold losses and successes on a giant scale. 
If we  also take into account the quantity of  new 
mechanical appliances for war provided by recent 
invention, it becomes obvious that future cam- 
paigns  hold  many  more  surprises in  store even 
than the last war between France and Germany. 
Modern methods of  transport have so import- 
ant a  bearing  upon  military  operations  that a 
State  can  never  possess  too  large  a  railway 
system from this point of  view.  The rapid occu- 
pation of  the enemy's  territory is of  paramount 
importance,  for  it paralyses  his  means  of  con- 
centration.  Napoleon 111. made a grave mistake 
in 1870 in not occupying at least a part of  the 
left bank  of  the Rhine.  In the first  place  we 
could  not  have  prevented  it,  as is  openly  ad- 
mitted in the Introduction to the official history 
of the General Staff, which was probably written 
by  Moltke himself.  The movement would have 
deprived our Field Army of  two army-corps. 
Therefore the more  railway  lines  leading to 
the frontier the  better; but  here, as  elsewhere, 
We  must  repeat  that everything must  have  its 
natural  limitations,  for  though  railroads  do 
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frontier at the outbreak of  war, they are of  less 
value during the progress of  the campaign,  and 
it is easy for a single flying column to make one 
of  them useless for a long period of  time.  More- 
over the effectivity of  a railway is not unbounded, 
and only a certain number of  troops and muni- 
tions  of  war  can  be  transported  daily  by  its 
means.  Our  General  Staff  calculates  that  an 
army of 60,000 men can cover a distance of  thirty 
miles as fast on foot as by train, and it is often 
more  practical  for  the  troops  to  employ  the 
requisite  time  in  marching.  Hence  it is  clear 
that the railway can only be used to advantage 
by troops  over  long  distances,  and not always 
then.  If  an advance is to be kept secret it must 
be  made on  foot,  as was  shown by  Bourbaki's 
unfortunate move  on  southern  Alsace.  He as- 
sembled his army on the railway, and attempted 
to carry it thus to the Vosges.  It is the opinion 
of  all our officers that, if  the troops had marched, 
the  German  outposts  would  not  have  noticed 
the little bodies of  men on the western spurs of 
the range of  hills in time.  As it was, our vedettes 
of  Uhlans on the heights were able to report a 
remarkable  activity  on  the railway  line  in the 
valley, and General Werder gained time to place 
his troops in defensive order.  The old view, that 
much depends upon the marching capacity of  the 
infantry, still applies in modern warfare. 
On the other hand, opinions have greatly altered 
regarding the value of  fortified places.  The days 
are long past in which every town was a fortress, 
and when a prolonged war in the enemy's country 
resolved itself into siege operations.  The ques- 
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tion  has  already  been  raised  whether  fortifica- 
tions are of  any real value at all, and German 
opinion is far more  open  to conviction  on  this 
point  than  the  French.  France  erected  an 
immense wall of  forts from Sedan to Belfort, and 
thought thus to sever herself  from Germany as 
if by  the great Wall  of  China.  Over  a  line so 
extended,  however,  the engineer  was  bound  to 
leave  some  gap  which  the  Germans  could  not 
fail to find.  There is  besides  another  and still 
more important consideration.  Walls do not de- 
fend themselves, and for the effective protection 
of  great fortresses  a  powerful body of  troops  is 
required, who have to be withdrawn from service 
in the open field.  German  opinion holds that, 
as things  are, the little Sperr-forts (forts d'arrbt, 
so called), are still required, and may be turned 
to good  account.  A little fortress of  this kind, 
situated  in a  mountain pass, can, under certain 
conditions, bar a  whole  line of  advance against 
the  enemy.  Take,  for  instance,  Kijnigstein  in 
Saxony.  Impregnable it is not, but it cannot be 
quickly reduced, and in 1866 the important line 
of rail from Dresden to  Prague was destroyed, and 
rendered useless to Prussia for the whole of  the 
fourteen days,  because it could not be repaired 
under the artillery  fire from the fortress.  The 
Prussian  advance  into  Bohemia  was  greatly 
hampered  in  consequence.  The  fortress  of 
Bitsch in the Vosges  played  a similar part, and 
it appears that these small hill fortifications will 
continue to have their value. 
Large  fortresses  are nevertheless  essential  as 
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enabling a beaten host to shelter and recuperate. 
Strassburg and Metz  serve this purpose,  but all 
our officers agree that the number of  such places 
should not become too large.  Many deny their 
usefulness  altogether,  for  in  war  the  decision 
always lies in the open field, and there are great 
drawbacks  to  every  military  system  which 
diminishes our strength in that sphere.  Fortresses 
of  this size require a great number of  troops to 
garrison  them,  even when there is no enemy in 
the  neighbourhood.  Everything  leads  us  back 
to the same conclusion, that national Armies are 
so  vitalized  by  moral  force  that they  can be 
more relied  upon than any  others for  a  daring 
offensive. 
I will, in conclusion, only refer briefly to the 
Fleet, and to its increasing importance,  not for 
European  war  properly  speaking-because  no 
one  now  believes that a  struggle  between  two 
great Powers can be decided by naval battles- 
but for the protection of  colonies and commerce. 
The  domination  of  Transatlantic  territory  is 
becoming the first task of  the Navies of  modern 
Europe, for since the goal of  human civilization 
will be the establishment of  the aristocracy of  the 
white races over the whole globe, the importance 
of  each  nation  will  ultimately depend upon  its 
share  in  that  Transatlantic  domination.  This 
is the reason why the Navy has grown in import- 
ance in our own times. 
XXIV 
THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF JUSTICE 
THE administration  of  justice  is the second  of 
the  State's  great  executive  functions,  and  to 
every  State the scales  are as necessary  as the 
sword.  It is obviously idle to attempt to estab- 
lish  this  necessity  upon  grounds  of  national 
economics,  as modern  materialists  now  seek  to 
do.  It is a self-contradiction  to assert that the 
State  must  have  an  organized  system  of  law 
because the State is the only protector of  money 
and the value of  money.  This is a 6crrepov TP~T~POV, 
beca'use  it is  paradoxical  to talk  of  money,  or 
money-value, without presupposing  a  system of 
law.  Law  is not the supplement  of  money, or 
devised to protect it, for it is only upon a basis 
of  law  that property  can  be  held  or trafficked 
with  at all.  The  exercise  of  jurisdiction  is  a 
supreme prerogative of  the State, by virtue of the 
State being in its essence the people legally united. 
The right appertains to the State alone, and it 
cannot  renounce it without renouncing itself  at 
the same time. 
For  this  reason,  all  healthy  States  whose 
development is rapid  have early centralized  the 
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enactment and  administration  of  law, and the 
ordering  and  maintenance  of  justice.  In  this 
respect  England  is  the  classical  and  enviable 
model.  The  troubled  history  of  our  own 
Fatherland,  on  the  contrary,  has  experienced 
the divided jurisdiction of  many petty lords, and 
has  suffered  much  thereby.  Wherever  we  find 
the  patrimonial  system  of  law  existing  in  a 
State, it is a sign that the State idea is still un- 
developed.  In the  same  way  the despatch  of 
legal  documents  to  foreign  faculties  of  law 
in order to obtain their opinion was  a token of 
lack  of  political  maturity,  and  Frederick  the 
Great  knew  well  enough  what  he  was  about 
when he forbade his judges to consult other than 
Prussian  Universities  on  these  matters.  All 
administration  of  justice  belongs  to the sphere 
of  politics.  The  verdict  of  the judge  must be 
in  harmony with  the history  and  the spirit of 
the State to which he belongs ; we should never 
see in practice  an abstract law  of  the schools, 
resting upon clouds, and having no firm grdund 
beneath  its feet.  Judicial  activities  should  be 
more in touch than any others with the develop- 
ments  of  knowledge,  but  they  must  remain 
practical also, and in kinship with the institutions 
of  their native country. 
The State's administration of  justice comprises 
three divisions.  Firstly, there is the supremacy 
of  law,  which  everywhere belongs  to the State 
and to the highest authority in the State.  This 
supremacy is most  natural when  vested  in the 
monarch.  In a monarchy justice is administered in 
the King's name, the judge is usually appointed by 
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him, or at all events the Minister of  Justice is the 
instrument of  the Crown in its judicial capacity, 
for superintending the trial of causes, and in his 
name  likewise  the  law - officers  of  the  Crown 
prosecute  offences  against  public  order.  Thus 
all justice  emanates from the King, who, by his 
of  pardon, is further able to mitigate 
the conflict  between the stern requirements  of 
abstract  justice  and  the  condoning  circum- 
stances  of  the  concrete  case.  The  supreme 
legal  function  must  not  be  confused  with  the 
actual enforcement  of  the law  as embodied  in 
the office of  judge.  By the nature of  things the 
magisterial  functions  should  only  appertain  to 
officials, or to such unsalaried citizens as are in- 
vested by the State with judicial responsibilities. 
The third  se~tion  of  the State's  jurisdiction  is 
the pronouncing of  sentence.  We shall examine 
later how far it is possible and advisa,ble to admit 
inexpert opinion in finding the verdict ; but the 
magisterial office should never appertain to any 
but persons of  standing. 
We come next to the consideration of  some of 
the leading principles of  legal policy, and we find 
the first fundamental maxim of  jurisprudence to 
be  that no  one should  be  withdrawn from  the 
jurisdiction  of  his natural judge.  In an age of 
class  divisions  a  man's  equals  are  his  natural 
judges-in  the old  German law  every man  was 
tried  per  pares  suos;  in  an  egalitarian  age 
jurisdiction can only be vested in the competent 
Courts.  The  enduring  principle  is  always 
equality before the law, but it was infringed by 
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Commission  which  our  Kings  were  empowered 
to appoint up to the year 1848, and which, at  an 
earlier  date,  were  customary  in  Germany  for 
trying political causes.  There is no violation of 
principle, however, in the appointment of  special 
tribunals  to deal  with  the  cases  of  particular 
professions, for  reasons  of  technical  expediency. 
Thus we  have Courts set apart for dealing with 
commercial  questions  requiring  a  closer  know- 
ledge  of  mercantile  conditions  for  their  settle- 
ment,  and  upon  grounds  of  discipline  special 
military Courts have also been established, which 
are composed of  officers, with  the collaboration 
of  a military assessor.  These exceptions cannot 
be  regarded  as  fundamentally  contradictory  of 
the  axiom  that  the  universal  rules  of  justice 
apply to all men alike. 
The second principle upon which a system of 
legal administration must  be based is that of  a 
publicity of  action which will enable every man 
who  is really  interested  to trace the connection 
between the sentence and the guilt of  the accused, 
so that he may understand the verdict as a moral 
necessity.  For this reason the Courts of  Justice 
must be open to the public;  but here, unfortu- 
nately, the misbehaviour of  the press works much 
harm.  This is the greater pity because the news- 
papers  are nowadays  the principal  medium  for 
the publicity  of  justice.  In the Court  itself  a 
few  hundred  persons  at most  can  follow  the 
proceedings,  but the press  reports  are read  by 
millions.  Therefore, in spite of  the scandalous 
exploitation  of  law-cases in the newspapers, we 
are forced to admit that the advantages of  the 
system  compensate  for  its drawbacks,  but the 
president of  the Court must have the courage to 
exclude the public-and  with them the reporters- 
from the hearing of  indecent cases. 
Once  the idea  of  public  trials is  introduced 
the demand for them spreads with the irresisti- 
bility of  a force of  nature.  Suspicion will always 
however  undeservedly,  to the  conduct 
of  all cases heard .in  camera, so that the State 
will be gradually obliged to suppress the practice 
altogether.  This  applies  equally  to  military 
jurisdiction.  I  personally  have  no  doubt  that 
in  this  sphere  the interests  of  justice  are con- 
sulted.  The  aggrieved  soldier  will  speak  much 
less frankly in open Court than if the proceedings 
are  conducted  behind  closed  doors,  where  he 
will  more readily find courage to make his con- 
fession to some officer in whom he has personal 
confidence.  It is undeniable, however, that once 
the rule  of  the public  administration  of  justice 
is established, exceptions raise universal mistrust, 
SO  that finally the reputation  of  secret Courts 
suffers directly.  It is  of  no use to try to resist 
the tendency to publicity, but there must be no 
tampering with the power of  the military tribunal 
to insist upon secrecy if the interests of  discipline 
demand it.  Every Army would be ruined with- 
out this  provision.  Think,  for  instance,  of  the 
trial of Marshal Bazaine ; if  the dirty linen of a 
whole  campaign is to be washed before the eyes 
of the world, the spirit of  the Army must suffer 
accordingly.  We  Germans  must  always  re- 
pudiate the idea that our institutions should ever 
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therefore  the right must  be  retained  for  court- 
martials to suppress publicity in any given case. 
Apart from this exception, however, the necessity 
for  the public  administration  of  justice  is  un- 
doubted and unconditional. 
The perfect certainty of  obtaining justice is by 
no means sufficiently secured by the two demands 
we  have  named-viz.  that  no  one  should  be 
withdrawn from his natural judge,  and that the 
rule  of  publicity  should  be  established  for  the 
hearing of  cases ; but its most effective bulwark 
should be the type of  men chosen to fill the office 
of  judge.  Justice can only be  dispensed aright 
by a body of  men who are both learned and inde- 
pendent.  The value of  a man's political opinions 
can be best  measured  by his opinion about the 
class  of  men  who  should  be  called  to perform 
this service to the State.  None of  our monarchs 
have shown more understanding  in this matter 
than  Frederick  the  Great,  who  was  the  great 
jurist  among the Hohenzollerns.  In the corre- 
spondence called forth by Catherine 11.'~  desire 
for reform in her Empire of  Russia, he wrote to 
her that everything depended upon the possession 
of  a good  class of  judges,  who  sliould be  incor- 
ruptible  and  really  learned.  He  directed  his 
efforts in his own country to the same end.  He 
created  for  this  purpose  a  respected  body, 
educated by a gradual system of  promotion, who 
should  themselves  have  the  training  of  their 
younger  colleagues  on  the  bench,  an arrange- 
ment  which  has  become  so  important  for  the 
consideration  enjoyed  by  the  whole  body  of 
judges.  Their salaries under Frederick the Great 
were very much higher than they are at present, 
that  their  material  position  was  relatively 
very independent, and they were men of  learning, 
whose activities in the scientific sphere of  their 
profession  were  much  favoured  and  furthered 
by  those  in  high  places.  Much  must  always 
depend  upon  such  encouragement,  for  as  the 
magistracy  is  the living  personification  of  the 
law, it must try to keep pace with the develop- 
ment  of  knowledge,  with  which,  in  a  civilized 
nation, the development of  law goes hand in hand. 
Sound administration of  justice depends far more 
upon the thoroughness of  the previous training of 
the judicial body than upon the letter of  the law. 
No  precautions taken to procure learned and 
upright  judges  can,  however,  be  an  absolute 
guarantee for the just  dispensation of  law.  All 
law is form, and is liable to be ensnared by its 
own  forms, which  may  become hurtful  to  the 
sense  of  justice.  No  legal  constitution  can  be 
protection  enough  against  the  summum  jus, 
summa injuria.  It is  a  sign of  political  sound- 
ness, and a support for the energetic administra- 
tion of  law, when a nation exhibits a living sense 
of justice, and a jealous  regard  for law without 
being dragged into frivolous litigation.  The ex- 
aggeration which he loves so well has led Ihering 
into  grave  errors  concerning  this  latter  point, 
in  his  Struggle for  Justice.  In life, as he repre- 
sents it, our principal occupation would have to 
be  a  perpetual  disputing  with  our  neighbours, 
and he waxes enthusiastic over the Englishman 
who  stayed a  whole  month  stuck in Heidelberg 
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pence.  I could  show  him  greater  ideals  than 
this abortive prank of  an English tourist.  Even 
in Greek and Roman times heavy penalties had 
been  introduced  for  frivolous  lawsuits.  There 
is  quite as much  need  for  a  social forbearance 
which will prevent men from being petty enough 
to go to law for every little annoyance as there is 
for the struggle for justice. 
Finally, there is another clear demand, namely, 
that the benefits of  the law should be accessible 
to every one, in practice as well as in theory.  In 
this  England  is  as much  behind  the Continent 
as she is in advance of  us in other respects.  A 
civil  suit  is  so  expensive there that it is  only 
within reach of  the rich ; the small tenant cannot 
bring an action against his landlord, because its 
costs  are  prohibitive.  This  aristocratic  distor- 
tion of  life is a fundamental flaw in the organi- 
zation of  the English State, for it is evident that 
such  conditions  are  radically  wrong,  and  that 
where they exist the State will be  compelled to 
intervene to enable the poor  to have access to 
legal  proceedings.  Justice  cannot  be  healthily 
administered where access to it is not free to all. 
The function  of  the State in the administra- 
tion  of  justice  is  twofold : it seeks first  of  all 
to uphold  the  law  by  penalizing  the dolus  of 
the  wrong-doer,  and  the  culpa  of  the  well- 
intentioned.  -In  the  second  place  the  State 
interposes  its  judicial  decision  to  assert  the 
stability of  law in cases where doubt and dispute 
arise  between  the  citizens  regarding  the inter- 
pretation  thereof.  Here  we  have  the age-long 
difference  between  criminal  and  civil  law.  It 
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is  not  possible  to  define  it  scientifically  and 
unconditionally,  and  all  attempt  to  do  so  is 
simply a theoretical word-spinning.  Between the 
domain  of  penal  law  and  the  law  of  persons 
properly speaking there lies  a  wide  border-land 
of  actions  for  the  recovery  of  damage,  known 
to  the  general  public  by  the  collective  name 
of  fraud  or  "tort."  Trade  is  unfortunately 
never  separable  from quackery and deceit,  but 
the  question  is at what point  do these become 
punishable ?  Is the limit reached by the posters 
of  certain  advertising  agencies which  announce 
some  manifest  new  lie  daily ?  It  is  fraud, 
morally,  if  a  man  recommends  me  some  vin 
ordinaire  as  a  first-rate  vintage,  but  is  it 
fraud  in  the  legal  sense ?  Theory  must  be 
content  to  leave  such  decisions  to  practical 
legislation, for it is not possible to draw a fixed 
line  which  shall  apply  universally  and  for  all 
time.  In considering  these  questions  we  must 
take  the  historian's  standpoint, and remember 
that it is the business of  the State to keep  in 
harmony  with  the  nation's  conscience,  and  to 
exercise an educative influence upon  it.  In a 
time  like our own,  when  swindling of  all kinds 
has increased to so tremendous an extent, trans- 
gressions of  this kind are particularly harmful to 
the common weal, and the penalization  of  fraud 
has not been extended without good reason.  The 
business relationships and moral conditions exist- 
ing in  the nation  must  be  the lawgiver's  final 
guide in his practical consideration of the question 
of  what  is  to be  regarded  as  fraudulent  and 
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It is plain,  however,  that the penal code and 
criminal prosecution belong tothe domain of  public 
law, and are not the affair of  individuals.  Civil 
actions  are rightly  placed  by  all jurists  within 
the same public  sphere.  The question  whether 
this house belongs legally to me or to some one 
else is a private affair, but whether in the present 
state of  the law I am able to prove my right in 
Court,  or  whether  difficulties  are placed  in  my 
way, is a question of  the greatest public import- 
ance.  This is the reason why the whole practical 
application of  the theory of  jurisprudence in civil 
and criminal procedure belongs to the domain of 
public law. 
The penal code has the most importance for 
the  politician.  In  criminal  law  the  national 
conscience  speaks  with  its  most  certain  voice, 
and the lawgiver is obliged  so to mete out his 
penalties  as  to  some  extent  to  satisfy  these 
moral  susceptibilities.  Naturally  this  does  not 
imply that they are to be slavishly followed, for 
if  we lay down the rule that only those acts shall 
be  punished  which  the  national  morality  con- 
demns, we do not thereby forbid the State under: 
certain  circumstances  to go  in  advance  of  the 
nation  in  moral  development.  Take  the  case 
of  Corsica,  for  instance,  where  it is  the  clear 
duty of  France to call the vendetta methods by 
their  proper  name of  murder,  unheeding  of  the 
opinion of  the population upon the moral aspect 
of  the  question.  In a  great  civilized  country, 
however, that penal code will be so closely bound 
up with the nation's  views of  morality that we 
may call it a crime against nationality if  varying 
forms of  the law  are permitted  to exist within 
one  frontier.  Nothing  is  so  apt to confuse  a 
people's  conception  of  justice  as  an  unequal 
treatment for criminals.  We can realise what a 
curse particularism  was  amongst us only a  few 
decades  ago,  when  we  consider  the fury  with 
which our  Rhinelanders struggled until  1848 to 
keep the privilege of  their harsh and cruel  code 
ptnal.  They  had  no  feeling  of  shame that an 
alien law should rule on German soil, and equally 
little did they  reck  that in Barmen  a  criminal 
should  be  punished  who  would  have  gone  free 
in  Westphalia,  a  couple of  miles  farther east. 
Uniformity  is indispensable  to a nation's  penal 
code if all sense of justice or injustice is not to be 
obscured amongst the people. 
Let us first consider the nature of  punishment. 
It is clearly not to be regarded as revenge.  The 
wrong-doer is not punished in order that he may 
suffer, but he has to suffer in order that he may 
be punished.  The transgression of  an individual 
cannot affect the majesty of  the State, therefore 
there  can  be  no  question  of  the  State taking 
revenge for it.  The idea is too foolish to be any 
longer entertained by anybody.  Another  senti- 
mental point of  view endows the State with the 
Christian idea that it is wrong to harm our neigh- 
bour  even  if  he  is harmful,  and concludes that 
punishment  is  the  State's  means  of  defending 
itself against attacks upon human society.  This 
effeminate  notion  was  the  foundation  of  our 
modern  penal  code,  promoted  especially  by 
Lash,  who supported it with eloquence worthy 
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What is self-defence ?  Self-defence presupposes 
a  condition  of  pressure  from  without  which 
justifies  the  person  threatened  in  committing 
an  action  unallowable  in  itself.  How  can  we 
suppose the majesty of  the State placed in such 
a position ?  Is fear of  the criminal to force it to 
do something which it has no right to do, and to 
perpetrate an injustice by cutting off  his head ? 
Here is a confusion of  ideas indeed !  What has 
become  of  the  majesty  and  moral  sanctity  of 
justice  ?  This  is  where  philanthropy  leads  us 
when it forsakes solid ground, but we  need  not 
launch  serious  arguments against  such  an idea 
as this. 
There  is not  much  more to be  said for  two 
other theories, which are equally flattering to the 
sentimentality  and  false  philanthropy  of  the 
present  day.  The fundamental  principle  of  all 
punishment by the State lies in its obligation to 
provide for the security of  society.  The question 
to be  decided is, what does it aim at in its in- 
dividual  penalties ?  Many  will  answer  with 
Holtzendorff, "  the improvement of  the criminal," 
as  if  the  State held  a  cure  of  souls,  and  was 
bound  to search  the hearts of  its citizens.  By 
its very nature the law is a protection only to  the 
visible  order  of  the common life of  men.  The 
State is content with an outward obedience from 
its subjects ; it may not inquire into the temper 
with  which  this obedience is rendered.  If  this 
is so, we  must not ask it to concern itself  with 
bringing about the reform of  all its black sheep. 
Besides, it is obvious that some punishments are 
not designed for this purpose ;  the death penalty 
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certainly is not, and it would be hard indeed to 
harmonize it with  efforts for the criminal's  im- 
provement.  The State is indeed acting in accord- 
ance with the ideas of  Christianity when it uses 
its prisons as an opportunity for missionaries to 
influence hardened  hearts, but it is senseless to 
make the reform of  the criminal the real object 
of all punishment, although it may, under certain 
circumstances, be a side issue. 
It is easier to defend the other theory which 
holds that the aim of  punishment  is deterrence 
from crime, although this effect of  it will always 
remain uncertain.  We all know that some are not 
deterred, but appear before the judge  guilty of 
the same transgression for which others have been 
punished.  But who can tell how many thousands 
have  strangled  a  criminal  thought  purely  out 
of  terror of  prison ?  It is certain that there are 
many  men  so  brutish  that  only  this  fear  can 
restrain  them.  Undoubtedly  punishment  can 
have  this  deterrent  effect,  but  its  working  is 
problematical, and therefore cannot be the thing 
principally  aimed  at.  Moreover  the  State  is 
bound  to carry out its sentence,  even  if  quite 
aware that it will not act as a deterrent. 
This leads to the conclusion that the absolute 
theory  of  punishment,  now  regarded  by  all 
enlightened people with such sovereign contempt, 
is in fact the only right one.  Here Hegel hit the 
right nail on the head,  and the idea  was recog- 
nized  long ago in our  German expression which 
tells the plain man that "  punishment must be." 
Its necessity  proceeds directly  from  the nature 
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lawful  organization  of  the people,  is  bound  to 
thrust out crime, and to repair  and expiate by 
means  of  punishment  the  disturbance  which 
crime has caused to order guarded by law.  The 
criminal must be compelled, even against his will, 
to recognize  the  moral  majesty  of  the  State. 
Ihering has tried to dismiss this view of the nature 
of  punishment as a pedantic shibboleth, but the 
idea  within  the words "  punishment  must  be " 
finds an echo in every human conscience, while 
the deterrence doctrine is nothing but a bloodless 
theory.  Punishment is an end in itself: it is the 
expiation of  insult offered to the law.  Incident- 
ally it may act as a deterrent, or as an instrument 
of reform, and the more it does so the better for 
the State, but certainly it cannot and may not 
do so always. 
The public conscience has a direct bearing upon 
the organization of  a  State's  system of  punish- 
ments.  The  taxes,  the  penal  code,  and  the 
management  of  schools are the topics  of  every 
ale house, for every man thinks himself  entitled 
to his say on these subjects.  Most people have 
children  at school, and take a  vital interest  in 
their treatment, while questions of  criminal law 
stir  the depths  of  the national  conscience.  A 
penal  code  must  form  itself  upon  the  living 
instinct for justice  in the people, therefore the 
public have a right to inquire whether the exist- 
ing  penalties  and  their  application  express the 
national ideals of  what is right and fair.  When 
punishments are too harsh human nature takes 
its revenge by many unjust acquittals, wherever 
trial by jury  prevails,  and  the general instinct 
for justice  becomes  incredibly  confused.  This 
was  experienced in  England  in  the days  when 
common theft was there punished by the gallows ; 
juries  felt that the penalty was too  severe, and 
they often solved the difficulty by acquitting the 
offender  even when his guilt was clear as the day. 
On  the  other hand,  when  punishments  are too 
light the masses degenerate visibly. 
Thus the adjustment of  the penal code stands 
in  a  constant  though  invisible  relation  to the 
sentiments  of  the people.  The  security  of  the 
State,  however,  must  always  be  the chief  aim 
of  all  punishment,  and  therefore  its  primary 
standard  of  measure.  There  are  such  things 
as moral epidemics, which contain a great national 
peril  and require  the strongest suppression.  A 
frivolous  and  optimistic  theory  held  almost 
undisputed  sway  among  intelligent  people 
about the middle  of  the nineteenth century, to 
the  effect  that crimes  of  violence  decreased  in 
civilized periods, and that crimes of  fraud alone 
gained ground.  This seemed to be the case until 
the beginning of  the 'sixties, when  the habit  of 
stabbing  began.  Workmen  suddenly  took  to 
carrying  knives,  and the brutal  assaults,  under 
which we  still suffer, grew and increased.  Taste 
for blood  is a terribly infectious thing ; it is an 
epidemic  which  the  State  must  guard  itself 
against by special measures, and the same applies 
to the shocking increase  of  shameless crime  in 
our midst to-day.  Thus the injury done to the 
common weal must be the touchstone of  the penal 
legislation  of  the  State;  for  since  it is  not  a 
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ments according  to the moral  estimates  of  the 
theologian.  It  is neither  possible nor  desirable 
for the two to be always at one upon this matter. 
False  coining  is  rightly  punished  with  great 
severity by every State, and yet from the purely 
moral standpoint the coiner is rather better than 
other forgers, because he does not aim at injuring 
any one  person in  particular,  but  at the same 
time his penalty  is made particularly hard, and 
with justice, because his crime is so harmful to 
the common  good.  In this case punishment  is 
measured  by  purely  practical  economic  con- 
siderations. 
In common with all else that is human, every 
penal  code must have a  final limit, a  non  plus 
ultra  which  cannot  be  overstepped.  Capital 
punishment  is  thus  shown  to be  necessary  on 
purely  theoretic  grounds ; as being  the utmost 
earthly  penalty  it  becomes  the  indispensable 
keystone of  every organized penal system.  None 
of  the objections  brought  against  it can  with- 
stand serious criticism.  We blush when we  hear 
it asserted that the State is  committing an in- 
justice  when  it lays hands upon  the life of  the 
criminal.  The  State,  which  has  the  right  to 
sacrifice  the  flower  of  its  youth  for  its  own 
protection,  is  to hold  the  life  of  a  murderer 
in  such  tender  veneration !  Far  rather  must 
power  be  assigned  to  it  to  do  away  with 
individuals  obnoxious  to  the  common  weal. 
Remember also how the death penalty has to be 
admitted for the Army in time of  war, even by 
the persons  who  would  fain  dismiss  it with  a 
phrase under normal circumstances.  War would 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  465 
be  impossible if  a  deserter  could  not  be  shot 
forthwith,  and  yet  the  deserting  soldier  may 
have many moral excuses for his conduct which 
do not apply to a common assassin. 
The  Bible  saying that authority must  wield 
the sword is deeply rooted  in the conviction  of 
the simple man, and it is a transgression against 
the straightforward moral instincts of  the nation 
to try to make this truth disappear  out of  the 
world.  The final problems of  morality are solved 
in  the domain  of  practice,  not of  theory.  The 
conscience of  every serious human being demands 
the expiation of  bloodshed by blood ;  and if  this 
highest  and  ultimate  penalty  be  not  exacted, 
the plain  man  will  simply  fail to recognize the 
existence of  justice  in the world.  Imagine the 
case of  a  murderer, say after the fashion of  Jack 
the Ripper, who has murder in the blood,  con- 
demned  to imprisonment for  life.  He escapes, 
begins his butcheries again, and returns satiated 
to the  same  prison,  because  the  State has  no 
power to sentence him to any other punishment. 
IVould  not  such  a  State be  doing  violence  to 
every sentiment  of  morality ?  By its inability 
to put an end to the criminal's  career it would 
be  making  itself  ridiculous  and  contemptible. 
Mercy and indulgence, as well as law, must have 
their final limit, and a point be reached at which 
the State declares that humanity is possible no 
longer.  An  ultimate  penalty  must  be  forth- 
coming, and we  find it in capital punishment. 
Every  argument  brought  against  the  death 
sentence is sheer sophistry, including the famous 
axiom  that the State, the source of  all  justice, 
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must  not  be  faced  with  the terrible  possibility 
of  committing murder in justice's  name, and of 
slaying  an  innocent  man  in  solemn  form.  It 
would destroy all instinct for justice in the nation 
if  it were taught that the State was hereby com- 
mitting  an irremediable transgression,  and  ex- 
posing  itself to peculiar disgrace.  It is obvious 
that this objection takes far too much for granted, 
and at the same time proves nothing at all.  Of 
course human frailty makes such a  grave error 
thinkable, but the same argument may be urged 
against every penalty which the State can impose. 
Heavy punishments will sometimes fall upon the 
innocent  so long as divine wisdom is, denied to 
the human  race,  nor  will  it ever  be possible to 
banish  injustice from the world.  Are we  there- 
fore to argue that there should be no punishments 
at all ?  This  monstrous  conclusion is  the only 
one possible to draw from Holtzendorff's theories. 
Thus  we  come  into  the  cloudland  of  legal 
phrase - mongers, wherein  all  the  opponents  of 
capital  punishment  have  their  being.  They 
advocate a feeble philanthropy, out of  harmony 
with  the healthy  moral  instincts of  courageous 
nations.  Assuming punishment to be necessary, 
is it really more humane to imprison a murderer 
for life than to execute him ?  No human being 
has ever  endured solitary confinement for more 
than fifteen years without going out of  his mind. 
How is it kinder to kill him by inches than simply 
to put him to death and leave the rest to God ? 
We  are  here  dealing  with  matters  which  are 
inseparable from ideas of religion, but even persons 
who  are  persuaded  of  the  absolute  mortality 
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of human existence are still able to perceive the 
of  capital  punishment  for  the  State. 
HOW  much more,  then, should  those who  know 
that our life does not  end here be  prepared  to 
concede to the State what is its own, and commit 
the rest  to God ?  We  men  cannot  take  upon 
ourselves to be the judge of  all; but the task of 
the State is always the protection of  its members, 
and  here  the  full  significance  of  punishment 
comes in. 
If  capital  punishment  is  recognized  as  a 
necessity, it is obvious that it must be inflicted 
for  the  gravest  of  all  political  crimes.  More- 
over  it is  false sentimentality to treat political 
criminals with  special leniency.  The man  who 
jeopardizes  the whole  State by high  treason  is 
as dangerous to human  society as the ordinary 
murderer.  We  shall not  forget  to give  to the 
noble  and  unfortunate  Emperor  Frederick  111. 
the  honour  of  having  been  the means  of  re- 
instating the practical  application  of  the death 
penalty.  Except in two States whose sovereigns 
had strong nerves, it had nearly disappeared, and 
for a long time no decapitation had taken place. 
Then came the attempt at  assassination by Hodel 
and Nobiling.  The then Crown  Prince,  despite 
the  gentleness  of  his  natural sentiments which 
inclined  him  the  other  way,  showed  firmness 
during his  short regency and allowed  Hodel to 
be executed.  The step was necessary on account 
of the moral sentiments of  the masses. 
This popular sentiment perceived in its naivetk 
what  was  right.  No  institution  which  general 
feeling  condemns  as  barbarous  is  ever  reintro- 468  THE ADMINISTRATION  OF JUSTICE 
duced.  No  one  thinks  of  restoring  the  rack, 
for the public conscience spoke once and for all 
when  the  torture  was  abolished.  The  death 
penalty, on the other hand, has suffered its pleasing 
vicissitudes  because  its abolition  has  been  de- 
manded only by the vapourings of philanthropists, 
and by no moral necessity.  The majesty of  the 
State is more clearly recognized in great nations 
than in  the smaller  weaker  countries, and it is 
highly significant that Germany is the only one 
of  the great powers where the necessity of  capital 
punishment  has  been  disputed.  The  French 
are  as  aware  of  its indispensability  as are the 
English, and a  witty Frenchman once observed 
that it  would be easy to  abolish the death sentence 
if  the murderers  would  lead  the way.  In any 
case, the right of  pardon  is not intended to do 
away with existing punishments wholesale. 
Our  penal  system  has  been  too  exclusively 
limited to terms of  imprisonment, and this is a 
matter  for  serious  consideration,  because  our 
economic  conditions  cannot  fail  to  make  the 
deprivation  of  liberty  desirable  in  the eyes  of 
certain individuals.  The State must board and 
lodge its convicts healthily and sufficiently ;  but 
in every civilized  State there are unfortunately 
thousands  of  honest  people  who  are unable  to 
provide themselves either with a healthy dwelling 
or  sufficient wholesome  food,  and thus we  find 
the injurious and distorted point of  view, which 
makes  that which  was  intended  for  a  punish- 
ment  appear  to many  as an object  of  desire. 
Imprisonment  as  the  sole  method  of  punish- 
ment  is  therefore  dangerously  one-sided,  and 
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the system  should  be  employed  in  conjunction 
with  others,  as,  for  example,  heavy  money 
which  exercise a  far more restraining 
influence  upon  many  fraudulent  persons  than 
a  few weeks  of  captivity.  Punishment  by dis- 
grace has unfortunately  been  entirely abolished 
under our modern system.  I can see no reason 
why  a  swindling  stockbroker  should  not  be 
placed in the pillory, and in fact the sole objec- 
tion  to  doing  so  arises  from  the  particular 
affection in which  the Stock  Exchange  is  held 
by a certain section of  our Press.  There are cases 
in which flogging is a necessity, for some natures 
are too coarsened to be impressed  by anything 
except physical pain.  In the 'seventies the crime 
of  garrotting  suddenly  became  prevalent  in 
England.  In the thick  fog  wayfarers  were  set 
upon,  strangled,  and  robbed.  The  cat-0'-nine- 
tails had a  truly magical  effect upon  this class 
of  crime,  which  stopped  altogether  after  the 
penalty  had been  inflicted in  four  cases.  Thus 
it appears that corporal punishment  is  the only 
really  effective  way  of  limiting  some  sorts  of 
misdemeanour. 
As  regards  the prosecution  of  the criminal, 
the self-evident and primitive  principle,  quisque 
praesumitur  bolzus, must  not be  called  in ques- 
tion ; every  accused person is to be treated as 
innocent  until his  guilt  is  proved,  and no  one 
may be compelled to give evidence against him- 
self.  The old  inquisition system which  forbade 
the judge to condemn the criminal until he had 
confessed his  guilt  has  rightly been  done away 
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the accused person persisted  in obstinate denial 
the only resource was to subject him to the rack. 
The whole  practice  was  consequently  given up, 
and convictions were obtained instead by calling 
witnesses and adducing proofs  of  guilt, while at 
the same time the criminal was  granted by the 
State every facility for his  own  defence.  Only 
once has this principle been infringed, and it has 
been reserved for the French Revolution to add 
the violation of  it to its list of  crimes.  It was 
Danton who  declared,  amid the noisy  acclama- 
tions of  those who thought as he did, that when 
society believes its existence threatened, or when 
the rights  of  man  are attacked, the State has 
the right to sacrifice innocent blood, lest other- 
wise the danger should arise of the guilty escaping 
the  punishment  they  deserve.  The  results  of 
this  axiom  are shown  in  the judicial  murders 
and the ghastly  butcheries,  which  to this  day 
find some admirers upon German soil. 
It is clear, from the very nature of  the State, 
that the indictment for crime must be prosecuted 
as a  rule  by  the State and  the agents  of  the 
State.  This  right  of  accusation,  nevertheless, 
requires  limitation  in  one direction  and  exten- 
sion upon the other-limitation  when considera- 
tion for the feelings and sanctity of  family life 
demand that action  should only be taken upon 
the motion of  the injured party ;  these are what 
are called  private  prosecutions.  Every  one  to 
whom  the privacy  of  home  is  still  sacred  will 
agree that a theft committed within the family 
should  not be dragged  before a  public  tribunal 
if  the father prefers to exercise his right of  dis- 
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,-iplining  his  son  himself.  Parents should  only 
have  recourse  to the State's  intervention when 
they feel that the gravity of  the offence requires 
it.  At the present day the only difficulty lies in 
determining  accurately  where  the family  ends. 
In former times it was held to include the whole 
household,  but  the  relations  between  servants 
and  their  employers, particularly in the towns, 
have now  so completely assumed the shape of  a 
mere  business contract,  that any mention  of  a 
bond  of  moral  piety  subsisting  between  them 
appears  out  of  place.  Evil  consequences  may 
ensue if  the State is forbidden to prosecute for 
any kind  of  domestic theft unless at the desire 
of  the injured person.  Some time ago an officer 
died in a Pomeranian fortress ; during his illness 
he  had been  robbed  by his  servant, and at the 
auction  the thief  bought  in  his  master's  effects 
with the money he had stolen from him.  Every 
one was aware of  it, but the State was powerless 
to prevent the scandal, because at that time the 
man could only have been  prosecuted  upon  the 
demand of his employer, now deceased. 
It will  never  be  easy  to  define  legally  the 
limits of  the family.  There can be no doubt of 
the rightness of  the principle that the State may 
not intrude without necessity into the privacy of 
the  home.  Therefore  breach  of  the  marriage 
VOW cannot be punished except upon the motion 
of  the husband.  The law  used  l~kewise  to put 
offences against  the  modesty  of  women  in  the 
same  category  of  private  prosecutions,  so  that 
the  perpetrator  of  the  outrage  could  only  be 
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victim.  This was done with humane intention, 
but its consequences were terrible, for the victim 
of  bestial  lust  might  simply  be  paid  to keep 
silence.  For this reason  these over-sentimental 
usages were discontinued.  It is not right to give 
too  much  consideration  to the natural feelings 
of  a  young  girl.  Terribly  hard  as it is  for  an 
unfortunate creature to be compelled to acknow- 
ledge  her  disgrace  in  open  court,  it  is  more 
endurable  than that these vile  briberies  should 
be  permitted  to take place. in private,  and the 
law be thereby made a mockery by the criminal. 
The  conception  of  private  prosecutions  is 
thus  extremely  difficult  to define,  and  it is  a 
matter  in  which  the  State  must  adapt  itself 
to the changing  conditions  of  the national life. 
It is still harder to determine how much elasticity 
is  required  for  the rule  which  limits  criminal 
prosecution  to the  State and its functionaries. 
In England, until lately, it was the law that any 
accidental witness of  a crime could be compelled 
to bring an indictment.  This practice originated 
before  England  possessed  any organized  police, 
and it is evidence of  the firm and lofty sense of 
equality  which  has  ever  animated  the English 
within  their  own  borders.  But  such  usages 
belong to a more primitive society, and even in 
England  public  prosecutors  have  lately  been 
appointed to act as plaintiff  in certain cases on 
behalf of  the Crown.  With us, on the other hand, 
complaints have been raised in the Radical camp 
against the so-called monopolizing of  the right of 
indictment by the law officers of  the Crown, and 
it is claimed that, in view  of  the possibility  of 
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partisan  prosecution,  any private  individual 
should  have  the  right  to  appear  as  accuser. 
This view took shape in the years which followed 
1848,  the golden  age  of  public  informers.  So 
many wrongs had been perpetrated at that time 
that the public  prosecutor  became  the tool  of 
numberless private animosities.  A  typical  case 
was the trial of  Waldeck, who was,  as a matter 
of fact, quite innocent. 
Therefore  the  demand  which  arose  at that 
time for an unrestricted right of  indictment was 
prompted  by  sincerity  and  easily  defensible. 
Nevertheless  its drawbacks  must  not  be  over- 
looked.  The Romans had placed no check upon 
indictments,  and an odious  system  of  delation 
was  the  result.  In England,  in  the  reign  of 
James 11.  [sic],  the professional informer, Titus 
Oates,  brought  thousands  of  persons  to ruin. 
In  our  own  country  the  so - called  "  revolver 
Press " has wrought untold mischief.  If  a crime 
is  attributed  to  any  individual  a  newspaper 
article is hurriedly  composed,  and a  proof  sent 
to the incriminated  person,  who  is  then  com- 
pelled  to purchase  its suppression.  There have 
been  Viennese  journals  which  subsisted on  the 
proceeds of this traffic only.  Therefore terrible 
abuses may  arise if the right of  public  accusa- 
tion is accorded to each and all, and the only way 
out of  the dilemma is to adhere to the rule that a 
charge can only be  brought  by the public  pro- 
secutor.  If the right is indefinitely extended to 
the public the result  might  be disastrous.  We 
cannot  go  further  than  to say that in  certain 
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concurrently  with  the  State,  but  only  under 
strict limitations, as the danger of  abuse is too 
great  to be  run.  A  severe  penalty  must  be 
imposed  upon  frivolous  prosecutions,  as  the 
mere bringing of  a charge carries with it  a certain 
amount of  injury to the accused person.  Upon 
the whole  our  public  prosecutors  may  be  said 
to be  only too unwilling to follow  up political 
offences. 
The further  question then arises  of  how  the 
proceedings  against  the  accused  may  best  be 
conducted so as to bring his guilt vividly  home 
to the  moral  consciousness  of  the community, 
so that the sentence may not fall like a bolt from 
the blue.  For this is required not only publicity 
of  criminal proceedings, but also the collaboration 
of  unprofessional opinion in finding the verdict. 
The introduction of  juries into legal proceedings 
is a concession of  the modern State in order to 
assure to the Courts the confidence of  the public. 
The  German  magistracy  has  ever  been  distin- 
guished by the devoted  zeal  with  which  it has 
discharged the responsibilities of  its office, but it 
has  sometimes  been  conspicuously  lacking  in 
adaptability.  It is also remarkable that trial by 
jury,  once regarded  as the palladium  of  liberty, 
has in recent times  become  unpopular,  particu- 
larly in  North  Germany.  It  has  found  more 
favour in the bureaucratic  south than amongst 
the liberty -loving people  of  the north.  That 
fact, that our  southern  States  have  a  blunter 
sense  of  freedom,  belongs  to  the  category  of 
truths  which  ring  in  the  ears  of  our  average 
hand-to-mouth  politicians  like  the  ravings  of 
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lunatics.  Bavaria  has  no  local  government  at 
all,  but  instead  of  it a  modified  form  of  the 
Prefecture  system,  differing radically  from  our 
prussian  administration.  Individual freedom is 
given  much  greater  scope  in  North  Germany 
than  in  the  south,  where  Napoleonic  methods 
struck deeper roots. 
If we inquire into the history of  trial by jury, 
we find that the practice originated in England, 
although it does not go back to  the ancient Anglo- 
Saxon times.  It used to be supposed that "  the 
good and just laws of  King Edward "  provided not 
only for the jurisdiction  of  the Communal areas, 
but for trial by jury as well.  According to the 
researches of  my friend Brunner, however, juries 
were  introduced  into England  from Normandy, 
and  would  therefore  seem  to  be  of  Frankish 
rather than of  Anglo-Saxon derivation.  Our old 
German  procedure  is  purely  conventional  in 
type, for it does not aim at the definite establish- 
ment  of  concrete  facts,  but  is  content  with 
producing  a  specified  number  of  witnesses. 
The  etymology  of  our  word  for  conviction 
(~berxeugung) is  evidence  of  this  point  of 
view.  In England, juries were primarily a body 
of  twelve reasonable freemen, equal in standing 
to the plaintiff, who pronounced a sworn opinion 
upon  the  evidence  laid  before  them.  This 
System  was  subsequently  incorporated  into 
criminal procedure.  To-day, juries are admitted 
by common consent to be  either useless or even 
harmful in civil proceedings, but it is an histori- 
cal fact  that they were first of  all employed in cases 
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until the thirteenth century.  This development 
was hastened by the Latin Council of  1215, which 
prohibited  the appeal to divine arbitrament by 
means  of  single  combat.  This  latter  was  also 
a Germanic form which provided that God Hirn- 
self  should  adjudicate if  a  sufficient number  of 
reasonable  men  were  not  forthcoming.  The 
conciliar  prohibition  abolished  this  old  method 
of  allocating guilt,  and it became  all the more 
convenient to adapt to criminal proceedings the 
methods of  proof till then peculiar to civil courts. 
Ever  since  the  thirteenth  century  trial  by 
jury has had a magnificent development in Eng- 
land, where it is closely bound  up with  popular 
ideals, and regarded as a pillar of  English freedom. 
Two circumstances  have powerfully contributed 
to  this  result.  Firstly,  the unique  social  and 
economic position of  the judges.  Judges of  the 
highest grade are few in number, but they enjoy 
an  almost  princely  consideration,  and  travel 
about the country holding Courts of  Assize.  The 
exposition  of  the  law  involved  in  the  judge's 
charge  to  the  jury  has  a  powerful  influence. 
Their  powers  are extremely great,  and a  judge 
may send back a jury to reconsider their verdict 
if  in  his  opinion it is unreasonable.  Secondly, 
English judges are obliged to observe a reticence 
which  is well  suited to enhance the dignity  of 
the Bench, while French judges take up a hostile 
attitude towards the accused  and endeavour to 
elicit  a  confession  of  guilt,  thereby  running 
counter to all judicial impartiality. 
To  these  extensive  powers  of  the  presiding 
judge  England alone adds the further feature of 
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the jury's  unanimity, for which the French, who 
adopted and mutilated the English jury  system 
at the Revolution, have substituted the verdict 
of  the  majority.  The  English  practice  is  un- 
doubtedly the only right one ; majorities are as 
incompetent  to decide  judicial  as  religious  or 
problems.  The  question  whether  A 
has murdered B cannot after all be settled by the 
weight  of  numbers.  In  spite  of  its harshness 
the  demand  for  unanimity  is  sound,  for  in  it 
~trength  of  character finds scope.  It constantly 
happens  that  an  individual  juryman  decides 
the  waverers  by  force  of  his  own  personal 
conviction.  Englishmen  have  clung  to  this 
principle  till  this  day  with  a  tenacity  which 
does them honour.  We, on the other hand, have 
much too great a regard for that kind of  moral 
cowardice  to  which  the  jury  system  gives  so 
much  opportunity.  It  is  far  too  pleasant,  to 
many  people,  to allow  themselves  to be  over- 
ruled, and such characters may be found every- 
where,  but most of  all amongat the very people 
who  pride  themselves  upon  their  independence 
of  mind.  The  temptation  to say "  no,"  with 
the secret  hope  of  being  outvoted,  is  a  moral 
danger to which jurymen  are especially exposed. 
Therefore the stern English rule of  unanimity is 
thoroughly justifiable. 
This maxim, then, together with the powerful 
influence exercised on  lay  opinion  by  a  highly 
esteemed body of  judges,  are the two causes of 
the historic  respect  paid  to the jury  system in 
England.  For  our  misfortune  we  in  Germany 
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but imported a distorted copy from France.  We 
have laboured to adapt it to some extent to our 
own conditions, and are now beginning to deviate 
from French models, and to strike out a course 
for  ourselves  in  criminal  procedure  which  is 
nearer  to the  English  conceptions.  Thus  we 
also have come to perceive that in these matters 
political  freedom is not the point  at issue, and 
men of  integrity can only remember with shame 
that German Liberals of  the older type attributed 
to juries the right of  abrogating the laws. 
The only question is, whether the co-operation 
of  laymen is needful to the course of  justice,  or 
whether it merely does harm.  The points in its 
favour are obvious at once ; average men believe 
that a verdict will be more reasonable when non- 
professional opinion has been consulted, and that 
the expert often lacks the experience of  practical 
life  which  is  important  in  coming  to  a  just 
conclusion.  These  are undeniable  advantages, 
balanced,  alas ! by grave drawbacks, one being 
that jurymen are very apt to be swayed by sheer 
sentiment, and another  the danger which always 
threatens the amateur.  With regard to  the former 
of  these points, it is not correct to say that juries 
are  always  more  prone  to acquit than trained 
judges.  The majority of  cases does support this 
contention,  but  there  will  always  be  trials  in 
which  juries  will  bring  in  too  harsh  a  verdict 
because they feel that their own social order is 
threatened.  Social - democrats,  for  instance, 
would  run great risk  of  such treatment, as was 
shown by the notorious  Leipzig  Socialist trial of 
1870, when  the social-democrat  was  condemned 
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upon  evidence which  was  really insufficient.  A 
bench of  competent  judges  would  hardly  have 
done such a thing, but ordinary men, trembling 
for  their  property,  cannot  fail  to be  partisan 
when  confronted with such a party. 
Generally speaking, the inclination of  laymen 
is to give weight, not only to legal considerations, 
but also to a number of  others which appeal more 
specially  to  sentiment.  A  judge  is  therefore 
often  placed  in  the  awkward  and  humiliating 
~osition  of  pronouncing  a  sentence from  which 
he  ~ersonally  dissents.  It  is  always  difficult 
for the untrained mind  to grasp the distinction 
between  objective law  and subjective morality, 
and to perceive that a legal crime may be con- 
doned  by conscience.  Amongst many examples 
let us choose one which is typical of the mentality 
of  juries.  When Louis Napoleon played his first 
prank  at Strassburg,  and  tried  to  suborn  the 
garrison,  the  conspirators  were  caught  red- 
handed.  The thing was patent, although Louis- 
Philippe  thought  it politic  to pardon  the ring- 
leader.  His  accomplices  were  tried  before  a 
jury  who  were  sworn  to speak  the truth,  and 
yet  pronounced  them all innocent  because they 
thought it unjust to convict the accessories when 
the principal  had been  excused.  That was  not 
their affair at all, but such is the logic of  laymen. 
We  have still to deal  with the second draw- 
back-amateurishness.  It  is  no  more  than  an 
empty phrase  to say that questions of  fact  are 
for the jury,  and questions of  law for the judge. 
The guilt is not so easily separated from the act. 
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questions : Was  the  act  committed ?  Was  it 
committed  by  the  accused ?  Thirdly,  was  it 
committed by him in a criminal manner ?  This 
third  point  involves  a  whole  group  of  legal 
problems, even when the issue is of  the simplest. 
Let us suppose that some one has signed a  pub- 
lication by an assumed name.  It  may only be 
a bad joke, it may belong to the vast category of 
offences described as nuisances, but it may also 
amount  to falsification  of  a  document,  and to 
determine  this  point  it is  necessary  to  settle 
what constitutes a document, which only a lawyer 
can do. 
The penal code risks most at  the hands of  the 
amateur.  It is an advantage for any science to 
possess  a  technical  terminology  quite  different 
from  that  of  ordinary  speech.  Chemists  and 
astronomers share this enviable privilege ; they 
employ  terms  of  art unfamiliar  to the general 
public-"  chlorine,"  "  br~mide,"  etc.,  are words 
with which the layman dare not meddle.  On the 
other hand, such words as "intention,"  "purpose," 
"  responsibility,"  "  negligence " have a  distinct 
significance in penal law, and compose L scientific 
vocabulary  in the true sense, but are also con- 
stantly used in daily life in a general and collo- 
quial sense.  The layman fancies he understands 
their meaning when he really does not, and half- 
knowledge has always been the worst enemy of 
truth  in  every  depadment  of  intellect.  Its 
dangers  are  well  known  to  those  who  have 
studied or written the history of  modern Germany, 
and nowhere has the amateur played  a  greater 
part than in the jury system. 
FAULTS  OF JURY SYSTEM  481 
The last factor which must be reckoned with 
is  class  prejudice.  The  prosecution  has  justly 
been  given  the  same  right  as  the  accused,  of 
rejecting individual jurymen  whose impartiality 
they  have  reason  to doubt.  Significant  is  the 
opinion of  an old and learned counsel, who once 
said  to  me,  "  I always  strike  all  doctors  and 
lawyers  and  shopkeepers  off  the  list,  but  old 
soldiers suit me exactly."  Lawyers always think 
they know better than the Court, doctors assume 
that all crime is due to insanity, and shopkeepers 
generally have an elastic conscience  over  ques- 
tions of  mine and thine, whereas an old half-pay 
colonel can  keep  a  whole  bench  of  jurymen  in 
order with a look of  command when  they begin 
to waver. 
Taken all in all,  we  must recognize that the 
modern form of  lay co-operation in criminal pro- 
cedure is  not  very  successful.  It  is either  too 
much  or  too little.  The jury  alone  decide the 
so-called questions of  fact and guilt, but they have 
nothing  to do with  the degree  of  the penalty, 
which  is determined by the learned judge  only. 
Thus proceedings which should be one connected 
whole  arc divided  into two  parts.  This  draw- 
back  is  overcome in  practice  by  the presiding 
judge's  wide powers of  instructing the jury, and 
a certain degree of  influence is thereby ensured to 
him  in  questions  of  fact  and guilt.  None  the 
less it remains true that the share of laymen in 
criminal  trials  goes  either  too  far  or  not  far 
enough.  Broadly  speaking,  it is  evident  that 
Our  modern criminal practice is quite indefensible, 
and that it lives from  hand  to mouth  without 
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any guiding principle whatever.  These questions 
were  only  half  hatched  when  the  rules  which 
are still binding were laid down.  These are the 
result  of  innumerable  parliamentary  compro- 
mises, of which the Lasker motions are instance 
enough.  We  only  employ  juries  to try  grave 
offences, and the mass of  petty offences are tried 
at the County Court (Landgericht)  before experts, 
without,  any  forn,  of  lay  co-operation.  The 
most trivial  offences of  all are dealt with  by a 
single  magistrate,  and,  in  order  to  prevent 
tyranny, he is surrounded by a whole crowd of 
Assessors  (Schoffen).  This  is  pure  makeshift. 
There can be no reason why the mass of  medium 
offences should be tried without juries,  while the 
gravest  and  the pettiest  crimes  are tried  with 
them. 
We shall probably sooner or later adopt some 
form  of  trial  by  Assessors  (Schoffengericht) by 
which the technical knowledge of  the judge  will 
be called in to influence the decision on points of 
fact  and  guilt,  while  lay  opinion  will  also  be 
consulted  in  the  fixing  of  the  sentence.  We 
need  not  fear  that  these  Assessors  will  allow 
themselves  to  be  intimidated  by  the  judge, 
for experience shows that a  wholesome,  strong, 
sometimes  even  too  strong,  self-reliance is the 
rule  among  them.  If  they  were  called  to sit 
with  judges  in  a  Court  of  Justice  they  would 
find their proper level.  They would take counsel 
with the judges  upon an equal footing, and not 
as rival forces, and there would be an interchange 
of mutual advantages, the learning and technical 
knowledge of  the judge and the worldly experi- 
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ence and practical ability of  the non-professional 
element  would  both  contribute  towards  an 
equitable  sentence.  Consultation  would  infall- 
ibly reveal the superiority of  the expert, even if 
the lay element were allowed a slight preponder- 
ance in these Courts (Schoffengerichte). 
In civil procedure  the State only  intervenes 
to restore,  by  judicial  pronouncement,  a  right 
violated by one or other of the litigants, and only 
concerns itself with doubts or difficulties concern- 
ing  the  interpretation  of  law.  In this  sphere, 
therefore,  lay  co-operation  is  of  such  doubtful 
advantage that it may  be  called positively  per- 
nicious in a well-ordered State where the magis- 
tracy  commands  the confidence of  the  public. 
Even in England this co-operation is very much 
restricted.  Without  a  legal  training  it is  im- 
possible to judge questions of  civil law, and be- 
sides  this,  the  practice  of  the  Courts  in  these 
questions has altered so much,  and the law has 
become so complex, that the taking of lay opinion 
in civil suits can only lead to mistakes. 
In dealing  with  the  momentous  subject  of 
civil procedure it is of  vital importance to under- 
stand  correctly the place  assigned to advocacy 
by  the  law.  Prussian  legislation  used  to be 
imbued  with  suspicion  and  dread  of  the legal 
profession.  This  was  prejudice,  no  doubt,  but 
prejudice which we  honour our  Kzngs  Frederick 
William I. and Frederick 11.  for having shared. 
It led  to the strictest supervision  of  the whole 
body  of  lawyers,  who  were  regarded  as  State 
functionaries, and only allowed to practise their 
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Taken all in all, it must be admitted that this 
old  system was  much  better than the so-called 
freedom  of  practice  allowed  to-day.  Strange 
indeed  have  been  the results  of  this  vaunted 
free  competition.  Free  competition  in  the 
domain of  intellect has always been a  delusion. 
It may be valuable as a stimulus in the market- 
place, but it is a more dubious advantage to the 
stage.  Our  drama was  better  served  in  Berlin 
when  we  had  only  one  Opera-House  and  one 
Play-House, and a couple more theatres besides. 
Remove the restrictions upon the right to open 
private schools to-day, and there is no saying who 
might not venture to undertake the education of 
the young.  One cannot help smiling grimly  at 
' 
the thought of  all the Socialist scum who would 
immediately open schools.  No  thoughtful  man 
could seriously welcome such developments.  In 
like manner the  legal profession must be restrained 
from  using  their  technical  skill  to fleece  the 
public,  and  must  be  made  to conform  to the 
exigencies  of  public  policy.  Contemporary 
effort  is  directed  with  more  or  less  success  to 
correcting former errors, and it is very gratifying 
to see the Assessors'  Courts  of  Honour  (Ehren- 
kammer  der  Anwalte)  doing  their  utmost  to 
restrict the worst  abuses.  When  we  remember 
the Heinze trial (1891) we realize that our bygone 
kings had good  reasons for keeping a tight hold 
over lawyers. 
This  view,  though  right  in itself,  very  soon 
caused the advocate to be regarded,  under  the 
older  procedure,  as a  fifth  wheel to the coach. 
Upon the whole the tendency in the eighteenth 
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century was to regard civil suits with disfavour, 
and prevent  them as much  as possible.  Hence 
the  voluminous  casuistry  of  Prussian  Pro- 
vincial Law (Landrecht) to which Savigny rightly 
objected  that pregnant  brevity  should  be  the 
first requisite for every  code.  The functions of 
counsel were so confined under  the old law that 
in every case the judge had to adopt the stand- 
point of  either litigant in turn.  This old method 
was too complicated, especially under the system 
of  written pleadings, and finally proved  to be a 
physical impossibility.  The demand made upon 
the judge  at that period was beyond  the power 
of  man  to fulfil,  for  every  advocate  who  has 
pleaded  a  cause  for  a  certain  length  of  time 
undergoes  a  real  change  of  sentiments,  and at 
last becomes  so identified with  it that he is no 
longer  capable  of  - impartiality.  Modern  pro- 
cedure is  quite different.  The judge  now  lets 
counsel  speak  or  write  without  hindrance,  and 
only settles the order in which evidence shall be 
taken.  His  function  is  therefore  of  a  purely 
formal nature, and the parties themselves decide 
how  their  case  shall  be  conducted,  while  he 
remains to form an independent  opinion.  This 
change marks a distinct advance upon previous 
conditions. DUTY OF CITIZENS 
PUBLIC ECONOMY 
WE know already that it is foolish to  speak of  the 
State as absolutely  unproductive  economically, 
because without it and its law, trade and c3m- 
merce could not exist at all ; but, on the other 
hand, the work done by the State is not of  a kind 
to  be  measured  by  economic  standards.  The 
ideal  blessings  brought  by  law  and  order,  the 
tokens of  the visible power of  the State, cannot 
be valued by their money's worth.  It is impos- 
sible to compute in these terms the benefit which 
it is to be a Prussian and to live under the pro- 
tection  of  the  Prussian  State.  The  favourite 
saying, that the State creates unembodied wealth, 
makes no difference to this truth, for it is only 
degrading to spiritual and intellectual labour to 
describe its result in these words.  It would  be 
admitted  by  most  people  that Goethe's  Tasso 
cannot fairly be so described.  Where do we find 
the  unembodied  wealth  which  an unfortunate 
but inevitable  war  brings to the State ?  What 
were  the abstract  values  gained  by  France  in 
1870 and 1871 ?  No more than a certain amount 
of  self-knowledge, at the most.  Therefore it is 
quite wrong to apply the same standards to the 
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State  as  we  apply  to  private  property.  The 
individual  tax-payer,  thinking  only  of  himself 
and his private  budget,  is justified  in reckoning 
the taxes he pays among his costs of  production 
and in opining that the fewer taxes there are the 
better ; but the politician who surveys the State 
as a whole can by no means share this view ;  for 
him  the question  is not of  how  much  does the 
State do for each of  its citizens, and how  much 
has each one of  them to pay back in proportion, 
because this would  lead to the conclusion that 
the pauper  in the workhouse should  contribute 
the  most  because  he  owes  the  whole  of  his 
physical  existence to the State.  The person  of 
private means, on the other hand, who only cuts 
the coupons off  his foreign bonds, receives very 
little from the State, and would consequently be 
expected to pay very little. 
This way of  reckoning is absolutely false.  It 
is  wrong to start with the idea that the citizen 
shall  repay  the  State,  through  the  taxes,  for 
benefits  he  has  received;  the  proper  way  of 
looking  at it rather is that it is the duty of all 
citizens to contribute, according to their means, 
towards  the collective  costs  of  administration. 
Because the State is  the people legally  united, 
it becomes both its right and its duty to draw 
upon  the resources of  its members  for  its own 
maintenance.  In the last resort  the wealth  of 
the nation  is  identical  with  the wealth  of  the 
State, and when two States are engaged in a life- 
and - death  struggle  the  national  assets  decide 
Practically  which  of  the two  can  hold  out the 
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Here once more, however, it is impossible to 
lay  down  clear  scientific  rules.  Questions  of 
taxation may undeniably present such contrasts 
between the financial resources of  the people and 
those  of  the  State  that  the  expenditure  and 
undertakings of  the latter may rise very markedly 
during a  period when the income of  the nation 
is  sinking ;  this  happens  during  every  war. 
Therefore no  rational relation  between  the two 
can be fixed, although the rule will always stand 
that the State must demand of  its subjects upon 
compulsion the revenue required for its activities 
which are above all price.  The modern doctrine 
of  finance is right  to  this extent  when  it calls 
the State an economic tyrant, but the expression 
is  dangerous,  because it leads  so  easily  to the 
conception of  the State as concerned only  with 
economics.  The State is  not what so many  of 
the teachers  of  political  theory  would  make it 
appear, the collective  profit-sharing  association 
of  individual  private  associations.  The  State, 
as such, is not a  money-making concern, but it 
encourages its subjects to make fortunes.  It is 
a  corporation,  which  as a  rule resorts  to com- 
pulsion  for  the  satisfaction  of  its  economic 
requirements, because it is not in a position to 
offer  a specific return to the individual citizens. 
The revenue of  the State differs from all private 
finance by reason of  the law which obliges it to 
regulate its income by its expenditure,  and not 
vice  versa.  The proverb  which  bids  us  cut our 
coats according to our cloth can never apply to 
the State, and for it the first question must be, 
How much is required to maintain its established 
position  in  the world,  with  due  regard  to the 
claims  of  its Constitution  and  its civilization ? 
~t is  only  after the outgoings  have  been  thus 
determined that it becomes possible to consider 
regulation  of  the intakings, and to decide what 
of  raising the indispensable sum will  do 
least  harm  to  the  economic  activities  of  the 
nation.  The English  are not nearly  so  thrifty 
as the French, or even the Italians, but they do 
understand the art of  producing more than they 
spend.  We must not start from the assumption 
that the State should only  embark  upon  abso- 
lutely necessary expenditure,  for very  often  its 
scruples  over  needful  expenses  are  quite  as 
foolish  as  extravagance  could  be.  Prussia  was 
plunged into dire catastrophes as a consequence 
of her false economy before the year 1806. 
The  attitude  taken  by  any  average  man 
towards  the  administration  of  revenue  by  the 
State is the test of  his  political  understanding. 
Let us recall the years after 1815.  It was quite 
a new  light to the inhabitants of  the miserable 
little States who had had the good luck to become 
Prussian  that  the  State  could  make  serious 
inroads upon their purses.  This was  the cause 
of  the universal outcry among the good Swedes 
of  Pomerania  and the good  Frenchmen  on  the 
Rhine.  Political literature of  that date is abso- 
lutely  astounding in  its ignorant dilettanteism ; 
the only exception was  the Rhinelander Benzen- 
berg,  the  friend  of  Hardenberg.  He  defended 
the Prussian  Customs Law  of  1818 in his  book 
upon  Prussia's  Finance  and  New  System  of 
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Steuersystem),  in which he was the first to raise the 
question,  What  does  our  State  really  require? 
He took  the intelligent  point  of  view,  but  his 
contemporaries  thought  his  ideas  servile,  and 
talked  at random  themselves,  although  there 
were  shrewd  and  prudent  men  among  their 
cumber.  A  true  Prussian  patriot  like  David 
Hanseman,  leader  of  the  Rhenish  Liberals,  a 
first-rate financier,  and  afterwards the founder 
of  our Discount Company, tried in his book  on 
Prussia  and  France,  published  as late as 1833, 
to prove the ridiculous statement that France is 
more  cheaply governed  than Prussia;  then  he 
simply struck out one-third of  the administrative 
expenses and declared that the process must be 
carried further. 
We  start then  from  the  principle  that  the 
revenue of  the State must be in conformity with 
the needful expenditure, and it now remains for 
us to consider what the sources of  its income are. 
The outgoings  in  every  State depend  upon  its 
aims and desires, consequently  its income must 
be  here  our  chief  concern.  Clearly  it cannot 
hope to supplement it to any great degree by its 
own  direct economic activities.  No  doubt it is 
an advantage for  Germany  that her  State still 
holds a fairly large extent of  territory, while the 
large States of  Western Europe have lost their 
Crown  lands  through  the  extravagance  of  the 
monarchs and the ensuing civil wars.  In Spain, 
France,  and  England  these  lands  have  totally 
disappeared,  but  Germany  has  always  kept  a 
Crown property, which is still very considerable, 
and although infinitely too little even approxim- 
ately  to cover  the costs  of  the State, is  great 
somewhat to lighten the burden  on the 
tax-pa  yer. 
The  more  the  old  methods  of  barter  were 
replaced  by  dealings  in  money,  the  less  the 
importance of the old Crown lands became, and 
the  more  necessary  did  a  system  of  taxation 
show  itself  to  be.  The  government  of  these 
territories  also  required  reforming  as  popula- 
tion increased, for the local government through 
territorial  officials  became  harmful  from  the 
moment  that  speculation  in  agricultural  land 
began  and  the officials  came into conflict with 
the direct interests of private owners.  An attempt 
was  first  of  all made  under  the  Great  Elector 
to  bring about some arrangement  between  the 
Government and the lease-holders of  the domains. 
By it the officials were given a personal interest 
in the prosperity of  the Crown estates, and this 
led  directly  towards  the new  plan,  universally 
in force to-day, of  farming out the land. 
This led to the belief,  which  was undisputed 
in my youth, that the final consequence of  these 
events would be the sale of  the domains, because 
in no department of  agriculture could the State 
compete to advantage with  the private  person. 
This  conclusion is  as false  as the other  which 
makes  men  suppose  that because  wars  become 
shorter and rarer with the increase of  civilization 
they  will  soon  cease  altogether.  When  it is  a 
question  of  some bold  speculation,  or the rapid 
seizing  of  a  favourable  opportunity,  the  State 
official  who has no personal interest in the matter 
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profits are at stake.  On the other hand, where 
punctuality and order are the chief consideration, 
the State will always be a  better administrator 
than the individual.  No objections can be raised 
on grounds of  national economy to the plan  of 
a  sound system of  leasing,  provided  a  part of 
the  domains,  particularly  in the less cultivated 
provinces,  is  turned  into  model  farms.  The 
farming of  large  areas under  one  management, 
as  is  done  in  our  north-eastern  provinces,  is 
unquestionably an abuse, and could be amelior- 
ated by the State breaking  up its large estates 
and  leasing  the land  to small  settlers.  There 
is no reason at all to recommend the sale of  the 
Crown  lands,  since they are a  nest-egg  for the 
State  and  a  saving  to  the  tax-payer.  The 
growing energy of  the State-idea within the last 
decade has displayed itself with regard to them, 
for in the 'sixties the demand for the sale of  the 
domains was always being brought forward in the 
Chamber, while nowadays it is never referred to. 
There is one great department  of  agriculture 
in which the technical  superiority  of  the State 
is evident ; namely, in forestry. 
Since  forest  land  is  always  more  backward 
than  arable  in  its  economic  development,  it 
follows that it must also lag behind in the forms 
of its administration,  which may continue to be 
suitable to it  long after they have been discarded 
for  agricultural  land.  Intensive  cultivation  is 
only possible on relatively rich soil ; forest land, 
on the other hand, is intended by nature for ex- 
tensive cultivation, therefore the management on 
a large scale by the State in forestry is necessary 
and  usual.  The  long  period  needed  for  the 
growth  of  high  forest,  sometimes  as  much  as 
eighty years, constitutes another reason for State 
ownership,  since  the private  individual  cannot 
undertake  this  most  productive  kind  of  forest- 
cultivation  unless  he  is  unusually  rich.  It  is 
suited  to the  undying  State,  but  the  private 
owner will  always be tempted to cut down  his 
forests in times of  temporary financial embarrass- 
ment,  and to resort to the cultivation of  under- 
wood,  which  is  too  frequently  harmful.  Even 
communities are worse  administrators than the 
State in this respect.  There are woods  on the 
left bank of  the Rhine which, to be sure, are still 
very  extensive  under  this  kind  of  ownership ; 
they consist, however, of  underwood intended for 
the purpose of  having its bark stripped and used 
in  tanneries.  These  woods  are now  being  well 
administered  by  the  communities  which  own 
them, but only under the State's supervision. 
Our  beautiful left Rhine bank has been  the 
very means of  showing us what may be the fate 
of  forests  left to unskilful  hands.  The  French 
are  like  all  the Latins,  without  understanding 
either of the beauty or the management of  woods ; 
they have always been bad foresters, and on the 
Rhine  they  demolished  wholesale  the  glorious 
woods  on the heights of  the Hunsriick and the 
Eifel, which  once  deforested  cannot so  speedily 
be  replanted.  To  this  day we  are still  forced 
to work hard to repair the damage done.  I have 
already spoken of how the peasants of  the Moselle 
valley have still to suffer from the heights above 
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forest soil which absorbs sudden falls of  rain or 
snow.  Thus it comes about that the prosperity 
of  whole districts depends  upon  the administra- 
tion  of  forests,  and we  may  lay down the rule 
that the State alone is  capable of  safeguarding 
their  future, and of  training a  body  of  reliable 
and technically instructed officials.  In this way 
it can  also  indirectly  protect  the  interests  of 
privately owned forests. 
There  are  other  trades  besides  which  belie 
the  doctrine  formerly  laid  down  by  the Man- 
Chester school of  the State's  incapacity to con- 
duct business of  any kind.  The manufacture of 
the  coinage  is  one  great  industry  which  pre- 
supposes  an  unquestioning  confidence  on  the 
part of  the public and of  other countries.  It is 
not necessary to demonstrate that the Mint must 
be  under  the control  of  the State.  The  same 
applies  to  Posts  and  Telegraphs,  and  State 
railways  may  also  become  a  necessity  in  the 
public  interests.  The  postal  conditions  in 
Thurn and Taxis under the old German Empire, 
and up to the time of  the German Confederation, 
show  us  what  may  happen  if  this  department 
is left to private enterprise.  These Counts, who 
had  "  torn  and taxed"  Germany  for  so  long, 
looked  upon the Post-Office merely as a  milch- 
cow,  but the State thinks less of  financial gain 
than  of  facilitating  intercourse.  State  - owned 
railways make the encouragement of  communica- 
tion and the opening up of  whole districts their 
primary object, and money profits have to take 
the  second  place.  We  have  ourselves  had  an 
instructive experience in the matter of  the postal 
system.  The North German legislature removed 
the  strict  monopoly  of  former  days,  but  the 
Imperial  Post-Office  committed  the mistake  of 
making the postal rates in urban districts much 
too  expensive,  so  that  rival  companies  arose, 
who carried letters much more cheaply, but were 
never able to  train their employ& to  the standards 
of honesty and punctuality kept by the officials 
of the State.  The whole arrangement was a make- 
shift, not a  benefit, and only arose because the 
rich  State Department of  Posts was  too  stingy 
to meet  the public  half-way  in  their  perfectly 
justified  demands. 
We  see  then  that  the.  State  should  have 
relatively  little  direct  participation  in  trading 
concerns, outside of  those  which it keeps in  its 
own  hands,  and that the modern  State-finance 
is at bottom State-taxation. 
Here  we  open  a  subject  which  cannot  be 
approached  without  depression, for in no other 
do the limitations of  the human mind strike us 
with  more  overwhelming force.  Let us  admit, 
once  and for  all, that a  really  good  tax is  an 
Utopian  dream ; all  taxes  are  evils  from  the 
standpoint  of  the private  exchequer,  and  evils 
they  must  remain.  Nevertheless,  as  we  are 
none of  us private individuals and nothing more, 
we  must all sacrifice something for the common 
good.  On  paper  no tax is  good,  and the only 
thing to be done is so to arrange the fiscal system 
as  to make  it as little  oppressive  as  may  be. 
There  are  doctrinaires  who  would  set  higher 
aims  for  it, by trying to use  it to adjust the 
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relatively  poorer,  and  the poor  richer,  but  all 
this  is  purest  moonshine.  Frederick the Great 
found  the idea  attractive at one  time, but  he 
was far too wise to put it into practice.  Human 
imperfections  bar  the  way  at  once,  and  the 
State must rest content when  it has  approxim- 
ately succeeded in distributing taxation so that 
no individual  is  poorer  in  comparison  with  his 
neighbour  than  he  was  before.  It  is  vain  to 
strive after a redistribution of  property by these 
means. 
We  have seen that the taxes are not to be 
regarded from the standpoint  of  the do  ut  des, 
and that they must  not  be  looked upon  as re- 
muneration  for services rendered  by  the State. 
The means by which the State chooses to cover 
the cost  of  any public  undertaking are a  mere 
question of  expediency, and not at  all of  law.  If 
it constructs a road it is at liberty to pay for it 
either out of  its own resources or from a special 
highway  rate.  It  is the same  with  education, 
for this is a matter which concerns us all equally 
as  citizens.  Special  fees,  however,  should  be 
collected  from  persons  who  receive  direct  indi- 
vidual  benefits from the State.  Lawsuits are a 
case in point,  if only  to avoid  the unnecessary 
multiplication of  them, but in every instance the 
State reserves to itself the choice of  extracting 
the costs from the defeated party, or of  bearing 
them itself.  The whole  system of  stamp-duties 
constitutes an exception within the fiscal system. 
The  payment  of  taxes,  politically  speaking,  is 
part of the common obligations  of  all members 
of the State, therefore the taxable capacity of  the 
citizens must be the sole standard for the guid- 
ance of  the State in this  matter.  The greater 
the capacity of  the individual, the greater should 
his share of  the burden be. 
It is at this early stage of  the argument that 
the factor of  human frailty comes in.  How  is 
the taxable capacity of  the individual to be dis- 
cerned accurately through the labyrinth of  men's 
lives ?  The economic  circumstances  of  persons 
living in apparently similar conditions may vary 
very  much ; two officials may  be  living in the 
same town upon the same salary and yet not be 
upon the same footing, for one may be a bachelor, 
and the other the father of  ten  children.  We 
have to deal with  a  variety  of  individual  con- 
ditions, in face of  which any fiscal system must 
always seem too rigid.  It would be folly there- 
fore for the State to seek to standardize taxation, 
for nothing could bring the natural injustice of 
every  scale  more  clearly  into view.  The  State 
must not be like the vegetarian who offers only 
one  kind  of  food  to the  human  body  which 
requires nourishment of  many sorts. 
In every civilized  nation there is far greater 
need  for  a  complicated  system  of  taxation. 
There must be different kinds of  imposts, because 
no one of them can distribute the burden justly 
by itself.  On  paper it seems unreasonable that 
one person should pay income-tax and property- 
tax,  and land-tax and tax on  his  business,  all 
at once, but nevertheless in practice this is per- 
fectly right,  for  they  thus collectively counter- 
balance  their  respective  imperfections  that the 
one-sidedness of  them all can to some extent be 
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modified.  It  is  impossible  to devise  any  tax 
which  has  not  some  moral  or  economic imper- 
fection.  Taxation,  direct  or  indirect,  must 
measure the capacity of  the citizen by two prin- 
cipal standards, the one being the amount of his 
possessions and his annual income, and the other 
the  sum  of  his  expenditure.  The  two  taken 
together constitute an approximate valuation of 
his taxable capacity. 
No  just  estimate can  be  formed  either from 
a  man's  income  or his  fortune taken by them- 
selves.  The  financial  position  of  individuals 
depends upon the size of their families, the wealth 
of  their relations,  and so forth, but the State is 
neither able nor willing to inquire into all these 
circumstances.  Taxes  are  already  an  evil  in 
themselves, and if  they were to carry with them 
too searching an inquisition into a man's  private 
affairs they would  become  so distasteful to the 
nation  that the  bonds  of  obedience  would  be 
snapped.  The English,  acting upon  an impulse 
which  we  cannot  blame, took  off  these  direct 
taxes a few years ago ; they preferred  a higher 
indirect taxation to having the privacy of  their 
homes invaded by the State.  We are now in the 
act  of  reforming  our  financial  system.l  Our 
Finance  Minister  is,  regarded  from  the  purely 
intellectual standpoint, the most efficient member 
of  the present  Government ; the income-tax is 
as well adjusted as it is humanly possible for it 
to be.  Nevertheless the State can never make it 
a single tax, for if  the rate per  cent were to be 
raised  the unavoidable  injustice  would  become 
* Lecture delivered in February 1893. 
so  glaring  that it would  not  be  tolerated.  In 
these  matters  nothing  is  more  dangerous  than 
doctrinairism,  whose theories  are always proved 
false and often ridiculous.  For years the Radi- 
cals  maintained  that  a  progressive  income-tax 
was the only true tax, and that it, and it only, 
ought  to be  introduced.  The  experiment  was 
tried in the Canton of  Zurich, as far as the Swiss 
fiscal system admitted of  it.  The result was the 
driving out of capital which had been thus intoler- 
ably over-burdened.  This would be the universal 
and inevitable consequence. 
If this  is  admitted, the need  for  a  complex 
system  of  taxation  must  be  admitted  also. 
Taxable  capacity  must  be  estimated  first  and 
foremost  by the expenditure of  the individual, 
and it is clear this is a much juster  standard by 
which to measure than the standard of  income. 
It  will  always  be  the case  that the burden  of 
all  direct  taxation,  without  exception,  can  be 
shaken off  by those on whom it is meant to fall, 
but cannot be evaded by all tax-payers, and not in 
proportions accurately ascertainable by the State. 
We all know that every good man of business 
reckons his taxes as part of  his costs of  produc- 
tion,  and  repays  them  to himself  out  of  his 
customers'  pockets.  In  the  case  of  indirect 
taxation this will be the rule, though here again 
it is  not  invariable.  It  is  undeniable  that at 
least  a  part  of  a  properly  adjusted  protective 
tariff is paid by the foreign producer and not by 
the native  consumer.  The  producer  abroad  is 
compelled  to reduce  his  prices  and  to content 
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There  are  endless  ways  of  shifting  fiscal 
burdens, and no human intelligence can foresee 
what taxes will lay themselves most open to the 
process.  It is only  possible to point to certain 
classes of  persons  who  are not in a  position to 
evade  their  taxes.  We  who  are  officials  and 
men of  science are among the number.  I should 
be puzzled to show how I could avoid my fiscal 
obligations, but it can be done by any one, even 
the ordinary  workman,  who  has  wares  of  any 
kind to offer in the material traffic of  the world. 
It is  quite undeniable that in the long run the 
taxes on  necessaries of  life will  be  paid  by the 
employers of  labour,  and therefore the working 
classes  can  eventually,  even  if  only  gradually, 
shift a portion of  their taxation from themselves. 
The position  of  the working class in those dis- 
tricts of  England where economic conditions are 
healthy  is  an  instance of  this.  Colossal  sums 
are paid  in indirect taxes, but they are covered 
by  the  price  of  labour.  This  much  is  clear. 
Some  taxes  are  evaded,  but  not  all,  nor  any 
completely,  and not in a  manner  which  can be 
guarded against beforehand. 
This  is the reason  for  the perfectly  natural 
advantage of  old imposts over new  ones, which 
makes  a  conservative  tendency  so  wholesome 
in the levying of  taxation.  People have become 
accustomed  to the existing  system,  prices  and 
conditions  have adjusted  themselves  to it, and 
the distribution  of  its burdens  is  usually  com- 
pleted.  Thus the old taxes become so tolerable 
that reforms may have a bad effect in practice, 
even if  they  appear correct  in theory,  and the 
legislator  himself  is  often  uncertain  what  their 
will  be.  Remember  the  duty  formerly 
levied  on  our  meal  and meat,  and the typical 
of  its  abolition.  Theoretically  it  was 
hard to defend, for it seemed quite irrational to 
tax the primary necessaries of  life in the towns. 
It was accordingly removed, and what happened 
in consequence ?  The shortage in the municipal 
budgets  had to be covered by new  taxation and 
the direct communal imposts had to be increased ; 
but  there was  no  essential  fall  in the price  of 
bread  and  meat.  Wages  in  these  towns  had 
gradually risen to a height  which took the cost 
of these commodities into account, so that they 
had  almost  ceased  to  be  a  burden  on  the 
working classes, and the bakers  and middlemen 
were  the  only  people  who  benefited  by  their 
repeal. 
The principle of free competition can only be 
fully applied to  international trade.  The absolute 
necessaries  of  life are few  in number,  therefore 
only a  small number  of  producers  share in the 
profits.  Our  bakers  perceived  that they would 
do better by combining to keep prices up to a 
certain  level  than  by  underselling  each  other. 
It would be more difficult to do this in the world 
market, although we have seen such rings formed 
even there.  In a town, however, such a corner 
is  really  very  easily  organized.  In this  case, 
therefore, the old tax, because it  was old, was more 
beneficial in  its working than the new  reform. 
The  same  truth  is  even  more  patent  in  the 
matter of  land-tax which is assessed on the sale 
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or  modification of  the duty is apt to be an in- 
justice  or a  gift  to the  landowner.  These  are 
subjects  where  radical  theories  avail  less  than 
anywhere,  and fact remains that a complex and 
widespread system of  taxation is more just  and 
less oppressive than the imposition of  any single 
general tax could be. 
Let us  first  examine  the difference between 
direct and  indirect taxes,  and  we  see  that the 
latter have the advantage, because the payment 
of  them is approximately voluntary, since every- 
body can deny themselves many of  the luxuries 
which  are  indirectly  taxed,  and  also  because 
they are levied in small sums which pass almost 
unnoticed  in the household  budget.  There  are 
many illusions current upon this head no doubt, 
but the man who underrates the power of  illusion 
in matters of  finance has little knowledge of  his 
subject.  The mood of  the tax-payer is of  infinite 
importance to the State, and it is a  very good 
thing that the plain man should pull at his pipe 
with  unruffled  brow  and forget  that the  State 
has  shared  his  fill  of  tobacco.  Therefore  we 
must not fall in with the Radicals' favourite abuse 
of  indirect taxes, nor call them the special burden 
on the poor, for their introduction was in reality 
the  dawn  of  common  law.  The  smaller  land- 
owners were not in a  position  to impose direct 
taxation upon the nobility,  for the Diets would 
never  have  sanctioned  the  measure.  It  was 
a  fixed  principle  that only  copyholders  should 
pay taxes, and the upper classes were first made 
to share the common  burden  by means  of  the 
indirect  duties.  Here  in  Brandenburg  it  was 
done by the beer tax, which nobody could evade, 
and the noble toper least of  all. 
Nowadays  to be  sure,  since the system  has 
become  so  immensely  complex  and  so  widely 
developed, the doctrinaire is ready with his query 
whether  the millionaire  can  drink  his  hundred 
cups  of  coffee  to the poor  man's  one.  This  is 
the sheerest  sophistry,  to which  we  reply  that 
the rich  man does not himself  drink a hundred 
times  as much  coffee  as his  neighbour,  but he 
keeps house, entertains, and maintains a number 
of servants ; in addition to the necessaries which 
he thus consumes he has to  pay duty on a quantity 
of luxuries which never come the poor man's way 
at all-in  short, when everything is summed up it 
will perhaps appear that the poor are hit some- 
what harder than the rich, but that there is no 
glaring  injustice,  especially when  we  take  into 
consideration  the direct  taxes  which  fall  more 
heavily upon the owner of  property. 
Indirect taxes have the great primary advant- 
age of  sheltering the poor from the danger of  an 
execution  on  their  goods,  that  most  palpable 
example  of  the evils  attendant upon  taxation. 
Let us imagine the situation of  some worthy man 
who  is unable to meet his taxes when they fall 
due.  This is no easy matter for a person without 
financial resources, and I had been  married for 
several years before I was able to say that my 
taxes had ceased  to worry  me.  The lower you 
go  in the social  scale the harder  it is to have 
the  required  money  ready  on  the  given  day, 
and it is quite possible for  a good  honest man 
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happens ?  The State proceeds  to distrain, and 
thereby  produces  an effect  quite the reverse  of 
what it desires, for by seizing furniture and the 
like it lays hands on capital and not on income. 
This  is  what  makes  a  recovery  of  taxes so un- 
speakably odious ; it is only  necessary to have 
some experience of the misery which the collection 
of  them sometimes causes to the poor. 
If  the levying of  these imposts can be made 
more indirect and less painful, it must be a blessing 
for the sake of  public peace.  It is not well  for 
the State to appear to the lower classes always 
in the guise of  a tax-collector ; it is  far better 
that the common man should scarcely be aware 
that he also bears his part of  the common burden. 
People are very fond of  defending direct taxation 
for small householders on the ground that every 
individual  ought  to be  made  conscious  of  his 
financial obligations towards the State.  Univer- 
sal  military  service,  education,  and  taxation 
are the advantages  of  the  Prussian  State, and 
it is asserted that they  must be  brought home 
to  the  consciousness  of  the  humble  citizen. 
Personally I cannot  follow  the reasoning.  No 
danger threatens these three great political duties, 
and it is not necessary to thrust them under the 
nose  of  every  individual  until  he  has  acknow- 
ledged the truth of  them in words : "  I am a tax- 
payer." 
Politically there is a further difference between 
the two classes of  taxes, inasmuch as it is only 
direct taxation which can be raised  in times of 
war or of  distress with any hope of  result.  With 
indirect duties it is otherwise ; up to a certain 
point they will be paid voluntarily.  I can deny 
myself a luxury, and thus refrain from paying a 
tax, for instance, on  tobacco,  which at another 
time I would have paid.  In bad times, however, 
self-denial in these ways is practised  on a large 
,qcale, therefore good results do not follow on the 
heightening  of  indirect  taxation.  Only  direct 
imposts remain for the State to fall back upon in 
time of  need, and consequently any State whose 
position in the world may engage it in war has 
to treat its nest-egg with some consideration.  It 
does not  do to put direct taxation  too high  in 
time of  peace, lest the screw should fail to turn 
tighter when war breaks out. 
The whole  political  complexion of  a  govern- 
ment can be judged of  by the nature of its fiscal 
system.  As  an usurper  Napoleon had  to spare 
the limitless  egotism  of  the wealthy  classes  in 
France,  but  his  foreign  policy  was  what  gave 
the  keynote  to his  taxation.  A  conqueror  he 
was, a conqueror he wished to be, and most con- 
scientiously did he keep his oft-reiterated promise 
of  making  continuous war.  Therefore he made 
indirect  taxation  the pivot  of  French  finance. 
Under his government direct imposts were kept 
very light, as they continue to be in France to 
this day.  His was the policy of  the conqueror, 
reserving the power  of  increasing them heavily 
should  need  arise.  Let  us  compare  with  this 
the  policy  of  Frederick  William  111.  after the 
Wars of Liberation.  The reforms carried out in 
1820,  which  were  truty  marvellous  considering 
their  date,  were  framed  by  a  State  believing 
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they embodied at the same time the eminently 
peace-loving  character  of  the  King.  Here  we 
find the stress laid so heavily upon direct taxation 
that it is hard to say whether further increase in 
this direction would have been possible in time of 
war.  This  by  itself  made it necessary to raise 
the  level  of  indirect  taxation  in  the  German 
Empire, in order that the bolder and freer spirit 
which guided Bismarckian policy might to some 
extent remove the disproportion existing between 
the two classes of  imposts. 
If a fiscal system is to be uniform throughout 
a  country, it is  clear that the State must keep 
the ultimate  actual  direction  of  it in  its own 
hands.  It cannot permit the Commune to  impose 
taxes at will, but it must prescribe by law which 
duties  may  be thus levied and which  not.  In- 
direct taxes should not be imposed both by the 
State and  by  the  local  authority.  It  is  self- 
evident that the State cannot allow these bodies 
to retain the power which it has itself assumed. 
Neither should the Commune be left a free hand 
in the matter of  direct taxation, or  be  allowed 
to make additions to the burdens laid on by the 
State, without question asked, for this would be 
destructive to the whole fiscal framework of the 
State.  Every  one  who  knows  anything of  life 
is aware that the economic strength of  the nation 
suffers if real income is burdened higher than 4 
per cent, but the whole system would be falsified 
if  the  local  authorities  could  impose  as  much 
more as they liked at the discretion of  the city- 
fathers.  There is no hardship for any one if his 
actual payments  do not exceed  the 3 per  cent 
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laid down by the reformed income-tax, but con- 
ditions  would  become impossible if  it were  left 
within the power  of  the Communes to add five- 
fold to the taxes levied by the State.  No  one 
can pay  18 per  cent in hard  cash to the State 
and the Commune, and some legal definition is 
required  of  the imposts which may be levied by 
the latter without detriment to the fiscal system 
of the State. 
This  leads  us  on  to  examine  the  relation 
between  certain direct  taxes  and various  forms 
of  economic production  which  have to be  con- 
sidered  by  the  legislator.  Some  taxes  restore 
the  original  outlay  automatically.  Communal 
imposts  upon  owners  of  houses  or  established 
industries repay themselves by services rendered. 
The contribution levied upon a town for the 
laying on  of  its gas or water gives a direct  and 
adequate return to the owners of  the land and 
the  independent  tradesmen.  If  a  man  builds 
a house in the outskirts of  Berlin its value rises 
as soon  as gas and water are brought into the 
street  where  it  stands.  The  ground  landlord 
and  the  merchant  look  upon  their  Communal 
taxes as the equivalents  of  the benefits offered 
them by the municipality, and have no cause to 
complain  of  them  as  burdensome.  But  what 
do  we  officials  get  in  return  for  the doubtful 
privilege  of  living  in  the capital  of  liberty  of 
opinion ?  Materially  speaking,  Berlin  brings 
us  nothing  but charges ; we  could  live  within 
our incomes far better in Marburg  or in Bonn. 
The  extremity  of  unfairness  is  reached  when 
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life of  the metropolis are included in its dispro- 
portionately high taxation.  Officials stand every- 
where in the same relation to men  who are en- 
gaged  in  industries.  When  a  district  builds  a 
new  road every landowner can calculate by  his 
waggon-loads  how  much  profit  he  is  receiving 
from  the improvement.  The country  pastor  is 
much less benefited by it, and it would be unfair 
to make him share an equal part of  its expense. 
When the reforms in our fiscal system are com- 
plete this class of  taxes must be given over, as 
far as possible,  to the local authorities,  and in 
return they must yield up to the State income- 
tax  the  right  of  levying  general  additional 
taxation. 
This  simple  principle  of  justice  is  strongly 
enforced in  England.  There the "  local  visible 
profitable property "  l is subject to local rates. 
Inexperience  led  Prussian  legislation  into 
grave  faults  of  omission  in  this  respect.  The 
first attempt at framing these laws in 1820 had 
been  preceded  a  few  years  before  by  the new 
urban regulations. 
No  one  had  realized  as yet  how  expensive 
local government would prove ; in fact, the pre- 
vailing  idea  was  that liberty  was  cheap.  The 
same old delusion was cherished about the Con- 
stitutional forms of  German unity, and it proved 
as  erroneous  there  as  it did  when  applied  to 
municipal  government.  Nobody  foresaw  how 
much  more  rapidly  and  impetuously  public 
opinion would make itself felt through these new 
channels,  nor  the  irresistible  force  of  the new 
Note--English  in the text. 
demand for better lighting,  improvement in the 
of  the poor, and so forth.  In  addition 
there were the new direct taxes, from which our 
income  - tax  originated  later  on.  These  were 
still  unpopular.  In the Rhine district, 
which had hitherto only paid ecclesiastical dues, 
the right  of  the State to levy imposts was  not 
admitted, and more outcry was made over it in 
this the wealthiest  province than anywhere else. 
Thus  the  State  had  a  great  body  of  passive 
resistance  to contend  against,  and it was  glad 
when  the Communes availed themselves of  their 
right to supply their needs by making their own 
additions to the class-taxes. 
Thus  it came about that this  kind  of  Com- 
munal taxation attained ever greater dimensions. 
The well-meaning city-fathers, themselves for the 
most  part  owners  of  house  property  or  estab- 
lished  tradesmen,  found  it convenient  to shift 
most of  the burden on to the shoulders of  those 
who  were  actually  under  least  obligation  to 
carry it.  Here lies the weak spot of the Prussian 
fiscal system.  Officials, work - people,  all those 
who  derive least direct  benefit  from the under- 
takings of  the Commune, have to pay a dispro- 
portionately large share of  the cost, while house- 
owners and tradespeople,  who profit directly by 
the administration  of  the town,  contribute  too 
little towards it.  The State, however, demanded 
too  much  for  itself  from  the tax on land  and 
buildings, so that scarcely anything was left over 
for the Commune.  We have now perceived that 
the tax on income is the due of  the State, and 
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local authorities, but it is hard to say whether 
this  necessary  reform  can  be  carried  through. 
A great deal of  moral courage is required by the 
man who would stir up this hornets' nest. 
Nevertheless  the  imposition  by  the  Com- 
munes  of  taxes  other  than  those  on  land  and 
houses should be forbidden outright by the State, 
and none more absolutely than the duty on rent, 
which it is the melancholy privilege of  our worthy 
metropolis to pay.l 
It penalizes residence in a  sanitary house, it 
penalizes marriage, in short, it is one of  the most 
disgraceful  taxes  conceivable.  There  is  some- 
thing to be said in defence of  a tax on bachelors, 
but a  duty on rent is a  crying injustice.  It is 
naturally  very  convenient  for  a  municipality, 
because  every  well - organized  Commune  has 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  rent  paid  for  the 
various  houses,  and  as  these  statements  are 
rarely  erroneous,  the  advantage  for  the  local 
authorities is obvious.  But when we  remember 
how  disproportionately  high  the rents  of  little 
dwellings  in  big  towns  are,  and  must  be,  on 
account of  the great demand, we say at once that 
it is inhuman to lay a further big tax upon them. 
The rent duty cannot be too harshly condemned 
by any one who knows the moral value of  a good 
house which keeps a man at  home with his family 
in the evening instead of  driving him to the gin- 
palace.  The  abolition  of  this  utterly  harmful 
tax is  an unqualified necessity.  The State,  as 
we know, is not a schoolmaster, but nevertheless 
within certain limits it does aim, and rightly aim, 
* Lecture delivered in February  1893. 
at moral ends in its fiscal legislation.  Very high 
duties  are purposely  laid upon  articles  of  con- 
sumption such as spirits, which are a temptation 
and a danger to the mass of  the people, in order 
to  place  a  restraint  upon  the  lower  classes. 
Our  brandy-tax  was  necessary on this account, 
for a, reform was certainly required when a man 
could drink himself under the table for twopence. 
This whole  subject bristles  with  difficulties,  for 
which  theory  can  only  prescribe  a  few  general 
principles and leave the rest to practice. 
Imposition of  taxes, however, is not the only 
way in which the State can attract private capital 
for its undertakings ; it is justified,  and in fact 
bound, to use its credit for its financial ends ; it 
concerns  us  to be  clear  on  the subject  of  the 
justification  of  the national debt.  Even as the 
modern State was compelled to follow the great 
revolution in national economics in the sixteenth 
century,  and to substitute money  for exchange 
in kind,  so to-day  it sees  itself  obliged  to re- 
constitute  its  financial  arrangements,  and  to 
proceed  from  a  currency  to a  credit basis.  It 
is  well  known  that  before  the  Revolutionary 
wars  France  and England  were  the  countries 
most  able to contract a large national debt, as 
their economic  civilization was more developed. 
During  the  Seven  Years'  War  Frederick  the 
Great was obliged to  have recourse to depreciating 
the currency, because he was  unable to raise  a 
loan.  During  the  war  the  public  had  to  be 
content  with this bad  coin, which  was restored 
afterwards to the former standard.  This was a 
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treasure  which  Frederick  accumulated  during 
the ensuing years of  peace was quickly exhausted 
during  the  Revolutionary  wars,  and  Frederick 
William 11.  had  no  means  of  renewing it by  a 
war loan. 
Everything  was  altered  by  the  tre~nendous 
upheavals  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  and  every 
State was  compelled  to raise  war  loans.  They 
all emerged from the gigantic struggle burdened 
with heavy debts, and in Germany the opinion 
naturally arose that this condition  was  as un- 
desirable  for  the State as for the private indi- 
vidual.  It was thought that Governments should 
pursue a frugal policy in peace time, and gradu- 
ally  pay  off  all  debts  contracted  during  war. 
This  view  finds  its  theoretical  expression  in 
Nebenius'  classic  work  on  Public Credit  (1820). 
Here the astutest brain  among  the  Baden  fin- 
anciers of  his date asserts that the nation's  debt 
is the worm gnawing at the root of  the political 
tree,  and that  it must  be  liquidated  gradually 
and as soon as possible. 
This  Philistine  doctrine  was  echoed  by  the 
honest  thrifty  Prussian  officialdom  of  the  old 
school,  and our legislation  of  1820 with  regard 
to the national  debt  started from the hope  of 
paying off  all the liabilities of  the State by 1860, 
and the liquidation proceeded upon the lines laid 
down.  Now,  however,  it became  evident  that 
States like France and England, whose debt was 
far  larger  than  Prussia's,  were  increasing  in 
prosperity faster than she.  England had a bigger 
debt  than  any  country  in  Europe,  and  yet, 
though little of  it was liquidated, her prosperity 
grew  and  waxed  immeasurably.  Consequently, 
after the cancelling of  Prussia's debt had gone on 
for a number of  years, the old  Minister Rother 
himself  grew  startled.  In  1843 he  drew  up  a 
memorandum in which he submitted to Frederick 
William IV. that it was not advisable to continue 
too long with the paying off  of  the national debt. 
By the year 1852 the amount would  only stand 
at 100,000,000 florins, and should not be allowed 
to sink lower.  There were capitalists in Prussia, 
he  said,  desirous  of  finding  a  safe  security  for 
their money, who would place it abroad if oppor- 
tunities were denied to them at home.  Experi- 
ence  had  taught  this  representative of  the old 
Prussian  official  school  of  thought  the hollow- 
ness  of  every theory.  Nevertheless  he  did  not 
yet  perceive  that  the  national  debt  stood  in 
need  of  a  large increase, for this point  of  view 
was too far ahead of  the ideas of  his time. 
In  contrast  to  these  theories  held  by  the 
German official world,  we  find England  and her 
allies developing an audacious and magnificently 
frivolous attitude towards their national liabilities 
during the Napoleonic wars.  Their ideas found 
a very adroit champion in Germany, in the person 
of  Frederick Gentz, who undertook the justifica- 
tion of  the English theory.  He was the mouth- 
piece of  English policy against Napoleon, and not 
being  scrupulous  in  his  choice  of  methods  he 
accordingly  included  a  defence  of  the  English 
national debt, treating the subject with his usual 
genius,  but  also  with  an  unmistakable  levity. 
The English theory was as follows : the national 
debt is  not to be regarded  as a  burden  on the 
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present,  but rather  as a  means  of  shifting the 
present burden on to the shoulders of  the future. 
This  was  the principle,  and in stepped  Doctor 
Price, the well-known Radical and the champion 
of  North  America,  with  his  discovery  of  the 
sinking-fund  which  was  to reveal  the secret  of 
how to make a debt liquidate itself automatically. 
It was  a  theory which  proved  only  one  thing, 
namely, that mathematical  truths may be  non- 
sense in practice.  What Price said was this :  Let 
a State raise a loan of  a hundred million pounds 
and put four millions of  it aside to form a sinking- 
fund ; allow  this  fund  to go on  increasing  by 
interest  and compound interest, and in a  given 
number of  years it will have become large enough 
to pay  off  the debt.  It is exactly the same as 
the  well-known  exercise  in  arithmetic  which 
many  of  you  will  remember.  Supposing  that 
Adam  had lived  6000 years  before  Christ,  and 
had  invested  one penny  at 6  per  cent interest 
and compound interest, that penny would to-day 
have produced a heap of  gold as big as the globe. 
This is quite correct as a sum in pure arithmetic, 
but pure arithmetic does not as yet regulate the 
world;  and  what  would  the actual  process  be 
by  which  the penny  so  multiplies  itself ?  Are 
children born to it, for instance ?  The cause of 
its huge  increase is to be found in the fact that 
Adam's  successors, their children, and children's 
children  have had to save and save in an ever 
rising progression in order to pay back the penny 
and the interest thereon.  Labour and thrift are 
the two forces of  production  which  have oper- 
ated here.  Precisely the  same applies to a sinking- 
fund.  If  I keep  back  four  million,  out of  an 
issue of  a hundred million Treasury bills, and put 
them in the safe, I might just as well burn them. 
Their  presence  there  with  an official  watching 
over them has no effect at  all ;  the actual liquida- 
tion  of  the debt will  not be effected through a 
secret magic of its own, but through the efforts 
of the tax-payers. 
In  considering  the  other  assertion  that the 
burden  of  the present can be transferred to the 
future,  we  have  to remember  the  simple  fact 
that, in the real world of  history, miracles do not 
occur.  Before  Pitt  raised  the  first  great  war 
loan in 1801 England possessed the capital which 
was  thus  appropriated  and  turned  into  muni- 
tions of  war, soldiers' pay, cannon, powder, and 
shot. 
Then when the war was over these equivalents 
for the money had disappeared, and the amount 
of  the loan had  really  been  consumed.  There- 
fore it is clear that the national prosperity of  the 
generation then alive was diminished, and more- 
over that their descendants had still to bear the 
burden  of  the interest  due.  Thus we  see that 
there  is  no  justification  for  the  fundamental 
principles on which this frivolous theory is based, 
and yet no person endowed with political insight 
can  fail to perceive that Gentz  and his  school 
had a much less fettered conception of what the 
State should  be,  and a  truer  political  instinct 
than the upright,  narrow-minded  official world 
of  Germany,  whose  only recipe  was  an eternal 
round of cutting down expenses. 
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credit system  of  a  State we  must first  consider 
the  various  purposes  for  which  the  money  is 
borrowed.  All State loans are a means of  draw- 
ing private capital into public undertakings, but 
the character of  the loans differ.  We may divide 
them into three principal  heads.  First, we have 
the  debts  which  the  State  contracts  by  bad 
management, and these we  may look at  from the 
standpoint of  civil law and pronounce that they 
had better not have existed, for it is clear that 
the affairs of  the State should be as well ordered 
and thought out as those of  any private person. 
Liabilities which it incurs through pure extrava- 
gance and negligence  do  as much  harm to  its 
finance  as  they  would  do  to  any  individual 
budget.  Austria  has  transgressed  unspeakably 
in  this  respect,  because  she  was  too  lazy  and 
thoughtless to provide herself  with new  sources 
of  revenue at  the proper time, and also by reason 
of  the  general  corruptibility  of  her  officials. 
Debts  such  as  these,  which  arise  from  extra- 
wagance  in  management,  are  an absolute  evil. 
Therefore it is important that the floating debt, 
which no State can be without, should not become 
too  large.  It  is  absolutely  impossible  for  any 
State always  to meet  its  current  expenses  by 
cash  payments,  and  it must  therefore  have  a 
floating debt, in the same way that every business 
man has his credit at some Bank ; but it must 
not be too big, nor stand out of  proportion with 
the State's resources. 
To this extent then the principles of  private 
thrift apply  also to the State.  Now,  however, 
in  the  second  place,  we  have  a  form  of  loan 
which the State may raise, in order to turn the 
private capital of  its citizens  into fixed  capital, 
which  shall  serve  some  great  purpose  for  the 
common good.  This can hardly be called a debt 
in the strict sense of  the word, inasmuch as that 
the  State  gives  the  individual  a  proprietary 
interest in the equivalent for his capital.  A State 
railway loan  is so arranged  that the holders  of 
consols  become  co - proprietors  of  the  State- 
owned railway.  The real point, as we have seen, 
is  not  primarily  the financial  one,  it is  rather 
in the question-Do  the conditions of  intercourse 
in  this  State call for a  State railway  system ? 
Political  considerations,  and questions  of  com- 
munications are the deciding factors, and if  the 
answer  be  in the affirmative the contracting of 
the  debt  need  not  be  considered  financially, 
always supposing that everything is carried out 
in the proper  way.  The property  of  the State 
remains  ultimately  identical  with  the property 
of  the  nation,  and  the  question  can  only  be 
whether a disproportionately high price is being 
paid ; nothing is lost, for the fixed capital of  the 
State railroad represents in pounds, shillings, and 
pence the full value of  the loan.  For the State 
the  question  is  as purely  one  of  political  and 
administrative  expediency  as  if  a  large  land- 
owner  were  debating whether  he should  under- 
take extensive improvements upon his estates by 
means of  a loan, the interest of  which should be 
paid by the increased value of  the soil, or whether 
he should do it with ready money, or not at all. 
The issue of  such  a loan is for him,  as for the 
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debts of  this sort may even be advantageous for 
a nation. 
The real difficulty only manifests itself when 
we  come  to consider  the third  class  of  debts : 
those  which  are contracted  by  a  State under 
circumstances  of  exceptional  pressure,  particu- 
larly in time of  war.  The State has in this case to 
decide whether it will meet  its unusual require- 
ments by an increase of  taxation, or by the use 
of  its credit.  From the commercial point of  view 
it would  be cheaper to defray costs by taxation 
rather than by borrowhg money, but the State 
has to consider the economic life of  the nation as 
a whole, and must ask itself where it can most 
easily  find  available  capital.  For  the  State, 
taxation and loans are both methods of  attracting 
private  capital  to serve public  ends,  but there 
is an immeasurable difference,  which has to be 
reckoned with, between invested and free capital. 
For it is clear that a loan only attracts the avail- 
able capital which the public can dispense with, 
and war  is the very time when  a  great deal of 
capital  is available.  A  State which  enjoys the 
public confidence will find enough capital volun- 
tarily put at its disposal.  These are matters in 
which  very many moral  and political  influences 
are at work.  The energy  of  the national pride 
is of  the first importance, and everything depends 
further upon the kind of  people who control the 
national capital.  The contrast between  France 
and Germany in this respect still remains morti- 
fying to our self-esteem.  The very modest war 
loan raised by the North German Confederation 
for the last war was not once fully underwritten by 
our wealthy  Stock Exchanges, while the French 
loan was  taken up ten times  over,  and to this 
day our Exchanges still reserve their enthusiasm 
for  Argentine  investments.  We  may  seek  the 
explanation in two causes : firstly, our instinct of 
national  pride  is  not  yet  enough  developed, 
despite the valour of  Germany upon the battle- 
field; and  secondly,  our  Stock  Markets  are so 
peopled  with representatives of  the Jewish race, 
whose  sympathies  are  by  nature  international 
and not national. 
In contrast  to the war  loan  which  draws  in 
nothing  but capital  voluntarily subscribed, war 
taxation takes it by force, regardless of  whether 
it is uninvested or of  whether it may be yielding 
a  10  per  cent  return.  Thus  we  arrive  at the 
conclusion that a reasonable employment of  the 
national credit is economically more correct than 
the cheaper method of  raising taxation.  When 
we  consider  the  circumstances  under  which 
England  contracted her  gigantic  national debt, 
we  realize that at that time even England could 
not  have  supported  the  pressure  of  taxation 
which  had  become  needful.  The  policy  was 
undoubtedly  correct,  although the details  were 
occasionally mismanaged, when in the Napoleonic 
wars credit was  made to take the place of  the 
capital  which  was  left  undisturbed  to yield  a 
better  interest  in  private  investments.  Thus 
is  explained  the growing  wealth  of  England  in 
spite of the colossal increase in her national'  debt. 
we can only laugh when it is argued that these 
war  loans have been  unproductive, even if  only 
in the strictest economic sense.  It was a queer FRANCE AND  PRUSSIA 
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kind  of  unproductiveness  which  brought  the 
Cape of  Good  Hope, and who knows how  much 
else,  into  England's  capacious  pocket.  Her 
war  policy  gave her the richest spots upon the 
earth. 
We  are further led to perceive how  a  whole 
class  of  capitalists  arises  with  the  economic 
growth of  a nation, and that it becomes a vital 
question  for  the State how  best  to bind  these 
capitalists  to itself.  For  if  it relinquishes  the 
use  of  its credit  it drives  them  to place  their 
money  abroad  or  in  all sorts  of  private  enter- 
prises, many of  which are fraudulent.  Thus the 
astonishing truth  appears that the interests of 
public order and solidarity  compel the State to 
have  a  large  debt.  We  may  go  further  still. 
My  old  friend  Karl Mathy  used  always  to say, 
"  I wish nothing better for Germany than a good 
big  Imperial debt, for there could be no firmer 
bond  of  union."  It  is  impossible to deny the 
truth of  these  words,  but we  recognized  it far 
too late.  No  one who remembers 1866 can for- 
get how South Germany was affected by the fact 
that all South German  capitalists held Austrian 
bonds. 
France has much cause to be grateful to her 
national  debt.  Her  fine  national  spirit,  which 
we  can  never  admire  too  much,  has  led  every 
Frenchman  who  saves  (and  what  Frenchman 
does  not ?) .to  place  his  capital  in the  3 per 
cent  consols,  and  only  to  withhold  a  specified 
sum  for  speculative  investments.  This  is  an 
invaluable bond  of  national unity, and, together 
with  many  moral  causes,  has  been  the obvious 
reason  why the State has always been 
so  quickly  on  its  legs  again  after  its  count- 
less  convulsions.  The  idea  which,  ever  since 
the rise of  "  young  Germany,"  we  have formed 
of France is totally incorrect.  The  French are 
closer  reckoners,  more  thrifty,  more  niggardly 
than the Germans.  The German nature has not 
only a heroic daring, but also a heroic careless- 
ness  of  consequence, which is less visible in the 
shrewd and prudent Latin.  For the economical 
Frenchman,  Government  stock  is  a  link  which 
binds him very closely to his State ;  its welfare is 
his own. 
Thus calm inquiry shows that in an age where 
credit is universally  employed, the State is  not 
only justified  in turning its own to useful ends, 
but is even acting wrongly when it neglects to  use 
the inwardly uniting forces of the national credit to 
establish a living political sense among its citizens. 
It follows that an unnecessary liquidation of  debt 
may be a serious political mistake at the present 
day.  Prussia was instantly proved  to be wrong 
when  she put aside part of  the windfall  of  the 
French milliards  for  paying  off  old  debt.  The 
capital thusliberated, which had hitherto lain quite 
secure in Prussian  Government bonds, was  now 
flung into all manner of  speculative investments 
at home  and abroad.  What was  really  gained 
by  the  liquidation ?  The  burden  of  taxation 
was  diminished  by  a  scarcely  noticeable  mini- 
mum,  which  was  instantly  swallowed  up  by 
fresh  undertakings  on  the  part  of  the  State. 
No  one now  denies that the five milliards ought 
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network  of  railways  which  were  begun  some 
years later  under  circumstances  essentially less 
favourable. 
We may say with certainty that the modern 
State requires a permanent national debt, and it 
follows naturally that this should take the form 
of  a  funded debt, or Government stock.  Since 
the State, humanly speaking, is eternal, its nature 
is  expressed  by a  consolidated  debt, not  by  a 
loan  contracted  for  a  specified  time.  As  a 
logical outcome of  this system the debt is simply 
entered in the ledger of  the nation, and the State 
undertakes  no  general  obligation  to repay  the 
principal  but  only  binds  itself  to produce  the 
interest.  The creditors cannot call in their money 
directly  from the State itself,  but they can sell 
their stock.  This is  a familiar operation  in our 
modern  Stock  Exchanges,  and  consols are  the 
best  stock,  because  they  represent  capital  in- 
vested  in  a  safe  security  and  not  subject  to 
essential alteration. 
Thus has the lapse of  time conquered the old 
theory  based  on  the  economy  of  the  private 
individual,  and  solved  the  riddle  of  the  most 
debt-burdened of  European nations being at the 
same time the wealthiest.  So far as we ourselves 
are  concerned,  the  German  States  are  in  no 
danger of  any serious indebtedness, because the 
vast  majority  of  German  liabilities  consist  of 
railway loans, so that they have their equivalent 
at  hand in the form of  fixed capital. 
XXVI 
ADMINISTRATION  IN PRACTICE 
THE main  part of the subjects with which this 
chapter  deals,  such  as the protection  and  pro- 
motion of  national welfare and education, which 
political science formerly regarded as its outlying 
provinces,  have  been  discussed  earlier,  in  our 
section on the Social Foundations of  the State. 
We shall now treat only of  the technical side 
of  administration,  of  the  co-ordination  of  the 
authorities empowered  to carry out the will  of 
the State, of  the Civil Service and its substructure, 
and of  Communal self-government. 
We  have  seen  how  the  Roman  Empire  in- 
fluenced future ages  by  the organization of  its 
official system.  It borrowed from the Byzantine 
Church the outward forms of  its hierarchy,  even 
as the Church of  Rome in the Middle Ages  also 
served as a  model  for the modern  State in the 
arrangement and distribution of  its offices, until 
the time came when  every nation  took its own 
line.  The  mediaeval  State  had absolutely  no 
organized  Civil  Service, and  it was  left to the 
modern  world  to develop  and systematize  one 
as the weight  and importance of  political  aims 
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continued to increase.  The place at which the 
line is  drawn  between  subordinate  and higher 
officials is of  particular importance for the char- 
acter of  the Civil Service ;  it is of  no less moment 
than the nature of  the division between officers 
and men  has been  proved  to be  for the Army. 
The various forms which the organization assumes 
in the three countries reflect for us  plainly  the 
tendencies  of  aristocratic England, bureaucratic 
France,  and  scholarly  Germany,  standing  as it 
were between the two. 
In England  the line between  officials  proper 
and "  clerks " so called  is drawn,  according  to 
our ideas, extremely high.  At the most favour- 
able  estimate  there  are  not  more  than  eighty 
officials,  in  our  sense of  the word,  all  the rest 
being clerks, who  merely carry out instructions 
without attaining to the higher positions in the 
Service.  The English official class is not held in 
the  same  universal  esteem  as  our  own,  and 
"  clerks " who  come of  good  family  are chiefly 
to be found in India.  Rowland  Hill was never 
actually  Minister  nor  independent  Director  of 
the English  Post-Office, but he always held the 
position of  Head Clerk in the Department.  This 
dependent  position  held  by  Civil  Servants  in 
England-"  subaltern "  in the worst sense of  the 
word-is,  as we have seen, part and parcel of  the 
whole character of  the old English  State, which 
was aristocratic through and through.  In France 
also  the boundary  is  drawn  high  between  the 
small  number  of  jonctionnaires  and  the  vast 
majority of  employds, who are liable to be  dis- 
missed  without pension,  and with as little con- 
sideration  as  an ordinary  clerk  in  a  counting- 
house.  In this  case,  however,  the system  was 
not formed to protect the aristocracy of  Parlia- 
ment, but was  designed in  order  that the tem- 
porary head of the State should be able to control 
the great mass of  the officials, so that a  whole 
crowd of  them might be swept out at  any moment, 
ad nutum principis. 
In  accordance  with  its  eminently  scientific 
character,  Germany  tries  its Civil  Servants  by 
intellectual  tests.  The  notion  that  a  certain 
level  of  education carries with it a capacity for 
government  is  thoroughly  German  and  deep- 
rooted in the somewhat theoretic idealism of  our 
race.  On  the  whole,  however,  it has  proved 
itself  to  be  true.  In  Germany  the  division 
between  real  officials and subordinates is to be 
found  at the point  where  university  ducation 
ceases.  It is only recently that the magnificent 
development of  technical training has produced 
fresh types of  official, who  may be placed  on a 
level with those who have studied at our univer- 
sities.  The cleavage is far deeper with us than 
either  in  France  or  in  England.  It  is  carried 
down  into the lowest ranks of  the Service, and 
from  it  the  whole  German  official  hierarchy 
receives  that  character which  is  democratic  in 
the good sense of  the word.  This trait notwith- 
standing,  the  official  class  have  developed  a 
whole  series  of  ideas  of  honour  peculiar  to 
themselves, and unshared by any foreign nation. 
A grave misfortune  for  us at present  is the 
disproportionately  large  number  of  persons 
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small  to ensure  independence  of  action.  The 
disadvantages are both moral and material, for, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  higher  grades,  already 
bearing more than their share of  the burden of  the 
whole Service, are still more unfairly overtaxed, 
while  on  the  other  the  worst  kind  of  com- 
petition may easily be aroused.  Apart from this, 
a  certain  amount  of  independence  has  always 
been  secured  to our  officials.  Restraints  were 
first imposed by modern Constitutional Govern- 
ment ; Regierungsrate (Government Councillors) 
and  Landrate  (Provincial  Councillors)  found 
their  former  powers  curtailed,  and  themselves 
made  liable to be  deposed  for  Service reasons. 
Upon the whole, however, the rule which forbids 
a man to be removed from office applies through- 
out  Germany,  although  not  unconditionally. 
Only thus can a Civil Service develop the char- 
acteristics  of  trustworthiness  and  honour.  In 
no country is the pension system better organized 
than in our own, even though it still leaves much 
to be  desired.  Taken  all  in  all,  the  German 
Civil  Service may  safely  be  called  the best  in 
Europe. 
In Prussia,  which  became the model for the 
rest of Germany, the system upon which authority 
was  delegated  arose gradually  in  the course of 
history.  It was the Elector  Joachim  Frederick 
who created in  1604 the Privy Council (Geheim 
Ruth).  At that date the Hohenzollerns had had 
accessions of  territory both in the east and west, 
and this new  central authority was  at first the 
only one possessed in common by the scattered 
domains.  This  body,  however,  became  larger, 
and more and more unwieldy, until at length its 
subdivisions  were  past  all  counting.  Then 
Frederick  William I.  stepped  in as reformer  of 
the administration,  and brought  into being  the 
General  Direktorium,  or  central  administrative 
authority, which has been the germ of  all future 
developments. 
Our  nation  was  extremely  slow  in  adopting 
a currency in place of  the old system of  exchange 
in  kind,  but finally the State could  subsist  no 
longer upon the revenues of the old Crown lands, 
and in the time of the great Elector the collection 
of taxes became the rule in Brandenburg, instead 
of, as formerly, the exception.  Thus an admini- 
stration of  taxes arose side by side with the old 
patriarchal administration of  the Crown Estates, 
which till then had been controlled by the Crown 
Estates  Office  (Domanen-Kammer) ;  the  War 
Commissions (Kriegscommissariat)  were appointed, 
so  called  because  the  permanent  taxes  were 
appropriated  to  military  uses.  Thus  did  the 
mediaeval  State  stand  side  by  side  with  the 
modern,  pursuing  a  system  of  dual  control, 
whose  respective  parts bore no  defined relation 
to each other, the Crown Estates Office (Domanen- 
Kammer) representing tribute in  kind,  and the 
War Commissions (Kriegscommissariat)  represent- 
ing  tribute in  money.  It  is  to the honour  of 
Frederick  William I.  that he  amalgamated  the 
two  groups  of  officials  and  created  the  War 
Department  and  the  Royal  Domains  Depart- 
ment  (Kriegs-  und  Domanen-Kammenz) which 
together  controlled  the  whole  fiscal  system. 
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title  of  Kriegsrat  (War  Councillor)  given  at 
that time in  Prussia  to the Government  Coun- 
cillors  (Regierungsrat) as  they  are  now  called. 
These new intermediate posts were placed by the 
King  under  the  control  of  the  General  Direk- 
torium,  the  terms  of  whose  commission  were 
drafted  with  his  own  unsurpassed  practical 
ability. 
At  first the work  even of  that authority was 
not logically subdivided according to the subjects 
with  which  it had  to deal,  and  the provincial 
Department  was  mixed  with  the  Department 
which  administered  the  State as a whole  in  a 
marvellous medley.  The Minister for the Province 
of  Magdeburg was also Minister of  Mines for the 
whole monarchy,  because nearly  all  the  State's 
mines happened to be in the Province of  Magde- 
burg.  The Minister for East Prussia and Lithu- 
ania superintended the drainage and cultivation 
of  the  whole  kingdom  for  the  same  reason. 
Silesia, which  at the time  it was  acquired was 
about a third of  the monarchy, lay quite outside 
the administration  of  the  General  Direktorium 
and was directly under the King in person. 
Inconsistent as all this was, it represented the 
immature and  growing  conditions  of  the State. 
The eaglet still carried the fragments of  the shell 
upon its head, and even in 1806 some officials of 
the old school still spoke of  Pnrssia as a Federal 
State.  Only  the reforms of  Stein and Harden- 
berg reduced  this chaos to order.  Stein copied 
from France what was worth copying, that is to 
say, the creation of  special Departments for special 
business.  Thenceforward  every  Minister  of  the 
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Crown  had  his  own  Department,  It  is  char- 
acteristic  of  the  Prussian  Bureaucracy  that  it 
employed  only  a  relatively  small  nkmber  of 
independent  officials, and  generally  preferred  a 
Board.  If  despatch  was  thus somewhat  sacri- 
ficed, the individual citizen was compensated by 
greater  security  for  his  rights.  The reputation 
for equity enjoyed by Prussian Civil Servants was 
well deserved.  After the catastrophe of  Jena our 
Civil Service was  recast, although with  caution, 
and  the  old  Boards  were  retained  with  some 
modifications. 
In France,  on  the  other  hand,  bureaucratic 
administration remained as Napoleon I. had left 
it.  It had always lain in the hands of  individual 
officials.  Under  the  old  rdgime  the  Provinces 
were  governed  by  thirty  Intendants,  whose 
functions  were  never  strictly  defined.  A  con- 
tinual  struggle  raged  between  them  and  the 
aristocratic owners  of  the soil.  The Intendants 
derived  their  strength  from  above,  and  could 
always  count  upon  the  King's  support,  but 
they had no independence whatever.  They were 
always drawn from the tiers dtat, and fought the 
battles  of  the bureaucracy against  the agrarian 
nobility with a marked class prejudice.  France 
had  become identified with  this state of  things, 
and when Napoleon reorganized the administra- 
tion of the country by the law of  28 Pluvi6se of 
the year VIII. he had only to develop the existing 
System of centralization more logically and com- 
pletely.  Local  institutions  were  all  made  to 
to the central pattern with a mechanical 
regularity, and officials were given definite powers. 
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They were omnipotent as regards their subordin- 
ates,  but  as  dependent  as  ever  upon  their 
superiors.  The  apex  of  the  system  was  the 
Council  of  State.  From  it  alone  the  Prefect 
received his  orders,  and was  protected  from  all 
intervention on the part of  the Courts. 
A centralized  bureaucracy, however, is never 
entirely  adequate  to  the  needs  of  a  cultured 
people,  and  it must  be  supplemented  by  local 
self-government.  To  understand  this  properly 
it  must  be  realized  that  the  Commune  (Ge- 
meinde), representing  the interests  of  the local 
corporation, stands half-way between  the State 
and the individual.  Most political writers place 
the Commune amongst the social institutions of 
the State.  This is not  an error but an irrele- 
vancy.  Strictly  speaking,  the  Commune  is  a 
division whose character is mainly political.  Both 
State and  Commune  are on  a  territorial  basis, 
and  share  the  further  characteristic  of  being 
paramount within their respective spheres.  The 
Commune is a microcosm of  the State, it  embraces 
all  classes  and  callings,  and  is  to that extent 
universal in character.  This must not be taken 
too literally, since the limited area of  the Com- 
mune  prevents  the  co-existence  of  every  type 
within it, although great cities do actually include 
all  classes  of  the  nation.  There  is  another 
respect  in  which  the  Commune  appears  less 
perfect  in contrast  to the genuine  universality 
of  the  State,  for  the  preponderance  of  certain 
industries must markedly  modify its conditions, 
and the contrast between town and country may 
be softened  but never  abolished.  The intrinsic 
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of  Commune  and  State,  and  the 
rather than social nature of  the former, 
is  made  plain  by  the fact  that if  a  Commune 
could be isolated it would  form a State, and, in- 
versely, that if a City-State is subjected to  a higher 
authority it would decline into a mere Commune. 
This cannot be said sf other purely social com- 
munities,  because  they  lack  the material attri- 
butes  of  independence.  A  totally  independent 
Church  is  a  chimera,  for  it can only  become  a 
State by being sole possessor of  definite territories. 
The Commune, on the other hand, is homogeneous 
with the State, and differs only in being smaller 
and more one-sided. 
We  Germans have always felt the claims  of 
local  rights  too  strongly,  but  there  are  some 
nations, especially those who were herded under 
the  hierarchy  of  Rome,  to  whom  strict  con- 
sistency  and  practical  efficiency  of  administra- 
tion  (which  are  both  better  realized  under  a 
centralized  system) seem  more  important  than 
the  unhampered  expansion  of  local  life.  We 
may  say,  however,  that wherever  this ideal of 
logical order is strongly felt, true political freedom 
will  be  slow to develop.  When a people is un- 
equal to managing the most ordinary and trivial 
affairs for  itself  it will  still less  be  capable  of 
solving the greater political problems by its own 
independent  judgment.  It is  of  the essence of 
political freedom that the will of  the State should 
assert  itself  not  only  through  its  authorized 
officials but also through the machinery  of  local 
government. 
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government " (Selbstverwaltung) exactly  means. 
Autonomy  will  not  express  its  full  content, 
rather the contrary, for  legislative  power  must 
remain  in  the hands  of  the  central  authority, 
and  we  find  that Communal liberties  are only 
possible  when  this  centralization  has  existed 
for  a  long time past.  England is the best  ex- 
ample.  There  all  local  government  is  founded 
upon  the central legislature,  and has therefore 
been  able  to mature without  detriment to the 
Common Law.  French Communes, and German 
towns, on the other hand, enjoyed only too long 
the dangerous privileges of  autonomy.  For this 
reason the French State in particular was com- 
pelled  to crush  this independent  spirit,  and to 
subdue and shepherd  Communal life too much. 
Legislative  authority must  not be  conceded  to 
Communes,  which  should  only  have  power  to 
issue local regulations under the approval of  the 
State,  like  the  by-laws  of  the  English  local 
authorities.  Otherwise the consistency of national 
legislation will be marred by the interference of 
local bodies.  Nor  is the essence of  self-govern- 
ment  contained  in the election rather than the 
appointment  of  officials  to  unsalaried  posts. 
Both these methods are possible,  but not indis- 
pensable.  To take the most illustrious example 
-for  no  less  than five  hundred  years  English 
Justices  of  the Peace  have  been  appointed  by 
the Crown,  and  yet  nobody  doubts that their 
offices  are  in  the  nature  of  self-government. 
Furthermore, every one feels that our own salaried 
Town - Councillors  (Stadtrate) and Burgomasters 
are officers of  the local, and not of  the central, 
government.  In  the  United  States  all  local 
officials are paid,  while  in  Germany  we  have a 
complicated system of  stipends. 
It is not then in such outward forms as elective 
or  honorary  posts  that  the  essence  of  local 
government is to be  found.  Local government 
is first and foremost the exechtive of  the State's 
sovereign will, imposed not through the officials 
of the State, but through local bodies  who  are 
empowered  to  conduct  affairs  with  a  legal, 
though  relative,  independence,  either  through 
their own members or agents of their own appoint- 
ing.  The functions of  these governing corpora- 
tions are not exhausted when they have carried 
out the will of  the State within the narrow circle 
of  urban  areas,  for  the management  of  purely 
local  matters,  with  special  reference  to  local 
taxation, also falls within their scope.  Here lies 
the reason why so many political thinkers have 
maintained  that Communes only  exist for  pur- 
poses  of  finance.  The laying on  of  water  and 
the lighting and cleaning of  streets are important 
parts of  urban administration, and in the country 
districts it is even more apparent that the chief 
function  of  Communal  government  lies  in  the 
sphere of  economics.  In the old days of  forced 
labour the details of  agriculture were settled by 
the  Communal  authorities,  and,  although  this 
system  is  now  discontinued,  the attention of  a 
peasant  community  is  still  chiefly engaged  by 
the  economic  side  of  existence.  Nevertheless 
the village Syndic is at  the same time the servant 
of the State, responsible for the custody of  vaga- 
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is never  absent from Communal administration. 
The aim  of  healthy  political  life  is to combine 
the independence  of  Communes and Communal 
Unions with a really vigorous central authority. 
By the nature of  things all local government 
is aristocratic in character.  It is quite impossible 
to entrust  the  first  comer  with  offices  which 
landlord and citizen administer side by side, and 
therefore  it is  perfectly  just  and  normal  that 
such  appointments  should  be  given  to  men 
of  property  and  standing.  In our  country  of 
course the limit is placed very low, but, even so, 
local government  can never  lose its aristocratic 
nature,  and  here  we  have  the reason  why  it 
commends  itself  so little to any radical  party, 
and why universal suffrage must be absurd when 
applied  to Communal  elections.  By  it power 
would pass out of  the hands of  the classes who 
wield it to-day. 
If  such a system is wrong for the Communes 
it cannot be right for the State.  It is the great 
merit of  self-government that it diffuses through 
a wide circle the sense of  personal responsibility 
and a certain measure of  political experience.  In 
countries  like  France,  where it does not really 
exist, the citizen  is merely a critic of  the State. 
Honest peasants and townsfolk, who co-operate 
in  government,  acquire  some  idea  of  its  diffi- 
culties  and  responsibilities,  and  men  who  are 
not  State  officials  usually  get  their  political 
training only through this practical  school. 
The seamy side of  the system is that it appeals 
directly  to the  selfish  social  ambition  of  the 
governing  classes.  There  is  danger  of  social 
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injustice and  of  too  much  favour  being  shown 
to the interests of the classes who do the political 
work.  No doubt the average official often suffers 
from an imperfect sense of  proportion, but he is 
not  concerned to vindicate  the interests of  his 
own class against the great forces of  society ; his 
object is to safeguard the authority of the Govern- 
ment  with  which  he  feels  himself  identified. 
Moreover  our  German  Civil  Service is recruited 
from  such  various  sources,  and  presents  such 
different types  of  education  that generally  we 
may  safely  expect  social  justice  at the hands 
of  this  monarchical  bureaucracy.  Our  officials 
could have no object  in  preferring  a  nobleman 
before a peasant.  Local government, on the other 
hand,  is  administered  by  the  local  land-  and 
property-owning classes, hence it is natural that 
the simple man has less confidence in the local 
magistrate  (Amtsvorsteher)  than  in  the  Pro- 
vincial Councillor appointed by the King (Konig- 
liche Landrat).  Here lies the danger of all self- 
government, and the rock upon which even the 
time-honoured  English  institution  of  Justices 
of the Peace  finally foundered.  It had become 
too exclusively  aristocratic,  and  the poor  man 
no longer relied upon  receiving his  rights  when 
they clashed with those of  the gentry.  Thus in 
England the old office has become almost nominal. 
A  further  defect  in  local  government  is  its 
amateurishness.  While  some  theoretic  know- 
ledge  at least  may  be  expected  from  a  State 
official, the  representatives  of  self-government 
are always prone  to a  crude  and light-hearted 
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persons who everywhere look only on the material 
side of  things are so hostile to the system.  The 
genuine  disciple  of  the Manchester  school  who 
believes  that buying  cheap  and  selling  dear  is 
the goal of all existence is perfectly correct from 
this point  of  view  in  arguing that a  scientific 
classification of  Government  work  would  serve 
local  interests  better  than  the system  of  local 
government  itself  can  do.  Technically  there is 
much to be said for this.  It cannot be denied 
that a  bureaucrat  like  Baron  Haussmann  can 
achieve great practical  results,  and that a  man 
of  his energy could organize town-planning with 
a  dexterity and speed which  was  quite beyond 
the contentious  City  Council  of  Paris,  but the 
real question is politico-moral, and concerns the 
political  education  of  the  people.  For  the 
Teutonic  nations at any rate there is  no doubt 
that daily contact with the business of  govern- 
ment has had  a  highly  educative  influence.  A 
certain  training  in  theory  is  indispensable  to 
parliamentary  usefulness,  but  in  our  case  the 
real political  strength of  the nation  has  always 
been found among those men who have learned 
the practical art of  government in the towns and 
in the country. 
The  particular  organization  of  local  govern- 
ment  is  a  matter  of  the  greatest  moment  to 
every  State.  In England  the county  and  not 
the parish  has  always  been  the administrative 
unit,  and the country has never  possessed  that 
natural  basis  for  rural  self-government  on  de- 
mocratic  lines,  a  Landgemeindeordnurng.  Even 
urban administration fell into decay at an early 
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date, and is far from being a inodel at  the present 
day.  The  country  districts  are  comparatively 
thinly populated, and the villages have not suffi- 
cient  vigour  to  assert  themselves.  Th'e  more 
independent elements among the country people 
have  been  drifting  for  centuries  to the  towns 
or the colonies.  Peasant proprietors have  only 
survived in the extreme north-east of  the island, 
and in all other districts they have been bought 
out by the gentry.  The whole country is broken 
up into some thousands of  large estates, which 
are again  subdivided  and handed  over  to the 
tender mercies of  tenant farmers.  Briefly stated, 
the social conditions of  English country life have 
been  distorted  by  aristocratic  influence.  Ger- 
many  has  the advantage of  possessing  millions 
of  free peasant owners, but this yeoman class is 
totally extinct in England, and its absence gives 
a servile tone to country life.  Social conditions 
such as these naturally left the gentry an over- 
whelming  preponderance,  and  so  long  as  they 
were  unchanged  the cumbrous aristocratic form 
of local government remained intact. 
The  administrative  areas  are  the  counties, 
immemorial  historical  units,  reaching  back  to 
Saxon times.  Their  average size is  about that 
of our Altmark, and, relatively at any rate, they 
have  a  stronger  individuality than  the French 
Departments.  Above  all,  each  of  them  has a 
long history of  its own, filled with popular heroes 
like Robin Hood of  Lincolnshire, who are closely 
bound  up  with  national  tradition.  Here  we 
have the provincial spirit in the best sense of the 
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possible leaders of  local affairs in these counties. 
The middle  class lack both the leisure and the 
means to undertake the task,  and consequently 
the chief  office of  English local government, the 
Commission  of  the  Peace,  has  been,  from  its 
institution  in  the  fourteenth  century  (1360), 
exclusively in  the hands of  the great landlords. 
Justices of  the Peace were intended to deal with 
petty  offences  in  rural  districts.  Every  young 
gentleman of  good county family who had finished 
his studies and made the grand tour was put on 
the list  of  magistrates  when  he  came  home to 
pursue sport and enter Parliament.  Professional 
men  who  had  made  their  money  in  the towns 
and had then retired  to the country  were  also 
eligible, but otherwise only scions of  the gentry 
were as a rule enrolled. 
In 1850 this system was still flourishing, and 
in  that  year  the  total  number  of  landowners 
amounted  only  to about  17,000  (so  abnormal 
had the conditions  of  land tenure become), and 
of  these  nearly  8000  were  magistrates  and 
most  of  them  actually  exercising  their  func- 
tions.  They were  appointed without regard  to 
political party, and all the J.P.'s  of  the county, 
or  later of  the county division, had concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Illogical  as this plan  was,  it had 
good  results, for, although  the method was  un- 
scientific, it provided a safeguard against political 
partizanship.  So long  as industrialism  had not 
invaded the rural districts the average country 
gentleman was  quite capable of  grappling with 
the simple problems of the locality.  Technically 
speaking, not much was to be expected of  such 
a system.  Vade-mecums of  every kind, arranged 
alphabetically  or  otherwise,  were  provided  to 
guide the perplexed  J.P. through  the intricacies 
of  law and punishment.  Quarter Sessions forms 
a Court of  Appeal from these inferior 'tribunals, 
where  all  the "  usually  attending " Justices  of 
the  Peace  assemble.  Erroneous  judgments  of 
individual magistrates are here reversed, and the 
gentry are thus made to sit in judgment on them- 
selves,  which  is a  solace to their pride.  There 
is  a  touch  of  the grand manner  about all this, 
which is eminently aristocratic.  It goes without 
saying  that  J.P.'s  are  irremovable  so  long  as 
they commit no penal offence.  In  order to  under- 
stand  the English  system  completely  we  must 
bear  in  mind  the  tremendous  burdens  which 
self-government laid upon  the landowning class, 
and it was regarded as a point of  honour to defray 
the expenses of  their office themselves.  In this 
way the English aristocracy continued to renew 
its social influence. 
This state of  things was clearly incompatible 
with the increase of  available capital and the rise 
of  the middle  class.  The old  methods  of  local 
government no longer admitted of genuine social 
justice ; they were harshly aristocratic and were 
therefore  doomed.  Conditions  first  became 
intolerable in the towns, and it was soon evident 
that great cities  could  not  be  administered  by 
Justices of  the type we have described.  In 1830 
Sir  Robert  Peel  created  a  salaried  police  force 
for London,  which  like its continental counter- 
part was placed under the direct control of  the 
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phasized  by  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832,  which 
brought some professional and popular elements 
into Parliament.  We  see in the collapse of  the 
aristocratic forms of  local  government  the first 
symptom  of  that democratic  movement  which 
broke  out in  1830, and within two years led to 
Parliamentary Reform. 
The next step was to mend the crying scandal 
of  the Poor Law.  The Act  of  Queen Elizabeth 
in  1601 was  still in force,  and in spite of  great 
outlay  of  money  very  little  was  actually done 
for the lower classes.  The influence of  the new 
middle-class elements in the House of  Commons 
led  to the establishment  of  a  new  Poor  Law 
authority in  1835, a  highly  centralized bureau- 
cratic body,  consisting, however, of  well-trained 
experts.  The whole  kingdom  was  divided  into 
large  Poor  Law  areas,  which  are  administered 
by new methods of  local government, much less 
aristocratic, but also less free than the old.  The 
landowners  elect  a  Commit-tee, which  does  not 
itself carry out details, but appoints subordinate 
salaried officials, called Poor Law officers, whose 
function it is to administer the Poor Law under 
the direction of  the Committee.  Thus in dealing 
with pauperism, a more democratic and bureau- 
cratic  system,  which  governs  by  proxy,  arose 
alongside  of  the old  aristocratic system, which 
acted without intermediary.  Subsequent reforms 
were on the same lines.  In 1848 a much-needed 
Act for dealing with Public Health was passed, 
and a Board set up in London to enforce it.  The 
need  for the reform  was  glaring,  but neverthe- 
less the destruction of  the old  self-government 
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was thereby continued, and this sphere of  it also 
was invaded by subordinate officials acting under 
the control of  a Committee. 
Finally, towards the end of  the year 1886 the 
agitation for a  change in county administration 
began.  J.P.'s  were  not  entirely abolished,  but 
their  powers  were  made  almost  nominal,  and 
since that time their functions have been  little 
more  than  an  honourable  sinecure.  It  is  still 
thought the proper thing to be a J.P., in the same 
way that the most prominent of  the great landed 
aristocracy  still  aspire  to  become  Lord-Lieu- 
tenants,  although  the  most  onerous  duties  of 
this  office  now  consist  in  giving  expensive 
dinner-parties.  Thus the office of  Justice of  the 
Peace  has  sunk  into  one  of  ceremonial  only, 
and  the  centre  of  gravity  has  shifted  to the 
County  Councils, which  are Committees  chosen 
by  the  county  ratepayers  on  a  fairly  liberal 
electoral basis,  which includes women  who own 
property.  But  even  the  County  Councils  do 
not  govern  directly, like  our  local  magistrates 
(Amtsvorsteher) ;  they appoint paid officials, who 
carry on business on bureaucratic lines. 
Such a Committee has no real vigour, and it 
marks the beginning of  a new era in which English 
public life became  much  more  democratic,  but 
also much less free.  A government which does 
not govern directly is not worthy of the name, 
and thus  England,  in  spite  of  her  magnificent 
national history, may at last fall into the same 
bureaucratic  groove  as  France.  It  is  still  too 
early to pronounce, but it is safe to say that the 
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the Reform Bill of  1832, took a great step forward 
with the establishment of  County Councils, and 
given the narrowness of  English Radicalism it is 
impossible to foretell what the future may have 
in store.  These phenomena are more instructive 
than encouraging,  for  they  prove  that Democ- 
racy  and  Liberty  are not  always  synonymous, 
but often contradictory terms. 
It is obvious that England has been influenced 
in these respects by French example.  In other 
spheres  her  history  is  thoroughly  insulary but 
since the middle of  the nineteenth century there 
have  been  developments  in  which  continental, 
and  particularly  French  influences  have  made 
themselves felt.  Just as the Reform Bill would 
certainly never have passed without the Revolu- 
tion of  July, so certain bureaucratic  ideas have 
been  imported  from  France  into  England. 
France has a  system  of  self-government, which 
according to our ideas is not worthy of  the name. 
This can best be explained by saying that here 
again Germany stands half-way between France 
and England.  Formerly, in England, officialdom 
kept  quite  in  the background  and  only  made 
itself felt at  headquarters ; France has its bureau- 
cracy  disguised  as  self-government,  while  Ger- 
many  displays a  combination of  Royal officials 
and self-government,  which  corresponds  to our 
conditions, and has been justified  in practice. 
I have already explained how the indiscipline 
and  turbulence  of  the  aristocracy  compelled 
the  old  French  monarchy  to  centralize  the 
Government  wherever  possible.  Thus  in  the 
Middle Ages  the lungs sent their "  baillis " with 
indefinite powers to keep what order they codd 
the chaos of contending aristocratic forces 
in  the  Provinces.  This  method  was  developed 
more  and more, and under Richelieu centraliza- 
tion  almost  reached  its  zenith.  The  despotic 
rule  of  his  Intendants and  sub -Delegates was 
only restricted  by expediency.  All  this was  in 
the nature of  things.  It is undeniable that the 
old  French nobility  showed an anarchical spirit 
which  had  to be  repressed,  but  all  Communal 
liberty perished in the process.  When Napoleon 
I. reconstituted  the Administration  he took his 
stand on historical precedent and completed the 
work of  previous centuries by instituting bureau- 
cracy pure and simple. 
The  Revolution  had  abolished  the  ancient 
Provinces  of  France.  What  a  contrast  to 
England with its immemorial county boundaries, 
and to Prussia with its Provinces, new indeed in 
form,  but  rooted  in  history.  The  Revolution 
broke the chain of  tradition so completely that 
everything which happened before the storming 
of  the Bastille has been wiped from the people's 
memory.  The Breton, the Norman, or the Gascon 
may indeed still be distinguished by their manners 
or their speech, and some small districts show a 
marked  individuality,  but,  politically  speaking, 
the Revolution has swept the old divisions away 
for ever,  for it scented danger in the old  inde- 
pendence of  rural life.  Everything that smacked 
of local independence was denounced as Federal- 
ism by the National Assembly and the Conven- 
tion, and thus the Girondins fell most unjustly 
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Suffice it  to  say that the old territorial divisions 
were  wiped  out,  and the country divided  upon 
the  map  into  Departments,  originally  eighty- 
three in number,  which  were  too small ever to 
give the central authorities a quaver of  anxiety. 
Siiybs, who drew up the Constitution, even recom- 
mended  that  they  should  not  be  named,  but 
merely numbered.  This proposal was even then 
considered too foolish, but the alternative actu- 
ally adopted of  calling the new units after moun- 
tains  and  rivers  is  really  quite  as  ridiculous. 
Who could feel loyalty to a  Department  which 
is named after a liver ?  A man may be  proud 
to call himself  a  Norman  or  a  Provenpl,  but 
how  can  he wax  enthusiastic  over  the Depart- 
ment of  Seine Infkrieure, or Bouches du Rh8ne ? 
Obviously  such  latter-day administrative  areas 
can have no real political  life.  Their geographi- 
cal area is diabolically planned.  If  the Provin- 
cial  Governments  (Regierungsbexirke) in  Prussia 
were the biggest administrative units,  they also 
would  be too small to have a life of  their own. 
Nature  always  finds  an outlet, even under  un- 
natural conditions, and it  is true that some French 
Departments already have their history.  Efforts 
are made to arouse a  feeling for history  in un- 
historical  conditions,  because  the  instinct  to 
link the past with the present  is ineradicable in 
human nature.  Broadly speaking, however, the 
object has been  attained, and the old historical 
provincial life has gone. 
The  elimination  of  all  distinction  between 
town and country is also typical of the unhistorical 
spirit which animates the system,  and this in a 
country  where  the  majority  of  the  Provinces 
show a  very marked  contrast between the two. 
Many  of  the  country  villages  are  made  up  of 
dens hardly fit for human habitation, while hard 
by lie towns noted for their wealth and beauty. 
The  law  ignores  this difference, and recognizes 
nothing  but  the  municipality,  which  applies 
equally  to urban  and  rural  districts.  All  dis- 
tinction  between  the  two  has  been  abolished, 
and the whole country has 40,080 municipalities, 
constituted alike, with Paris alone excepted. 
By  a  fundamental  principle  of  all  French 
government,  initiative  and  responsibility  are 
both kept solely in the hands of  the Civil Service. 
The present  method of  dividing the country has 
fostered  a  firmly  centralized  bureaucratic  ad- 
ministration, ably served by the inexorable logic 
of  a  masterly  system.  At  the  head  of  each 
Department is placed  a Prefect, who is irremov- 
able, entirely dependent as regards his superiors, 
and  well-nigh  omnipotent  as  regards  his  sub- 
ordinates.  Next  to  him  comes  a  sub-prefect 
for each  arrondissement,  and then a  Mayor  for 
each  municipality.  Formerly  the  State  ap- 
pointed  even the Mayor;  he is now  elected by 
the Parish Council (Gemeinderat), but experience 
has shown that there is  no  practical  difference. 
The  Mayor is,  as he  always  was,  a  notable  of 
the district, who  has  to exercise  his  authority 
in  the name of  the  State, and, in  spite of  his 
title, he is more an official of  the State than of 
the local administration. 
This system knows no parochial or Communal 
areas  &th  independent-  corporations  in  our 
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German  sense.  A  controlling  and  criticizing 
body  does  indeed  exist  beside  the  Prefect,  a 
general  Council,  elected  from  the highest-rated 
inhabitants  of  the  Department.  Its  function 
is  to  communicate  its  advice  and  opinion, 
and  to  bring  forward  gravamina  against  the 
Administration ; in short, it bears  no  responsi- 
bility.  A  body  which  is  not  called  upon  to 
answer for what it does or advises can have no 
authority,  politically  speaking,  for  in  politics 
responsibility is inseparable from power.  In the 
same  way  the  sub-prefect  is  flanked  by  an 
arrondissement  Council,  and  the  Mayor  by  a 
municipal  Council.  The  fiscal  system  affords 
an example of  how little weight Communal self- 
government  carries  in  France.  Communal 
burdens  are  covered  simply  by  supplementing 
the State taxes,  by  means  of  the "  additional 
centime."  The amount of  these supplements is 
characteristic.  In Berlin  we  are satisfied if  we 
are let off  with a supplementary rate amounting 
to 100  per  cent  of  the Imperial taxes.  Towns 
in industrial districts are often in a much worse 
plight, and pay five times as much to the Munici- 
pality as to the State, for our local government 
has many tasks allotted to it.  In France, on the 
other  hand,  the "  additional centime " usually 
amounts to one, or, in  rare cases, to 3 per cent 
of  the State taxes. 
These figures illustrate  the contrast between 
French local government and our own.  France 
is divided  into the governors and the governed, 
into omnipotent  officials  on  the one  hand,  and 
submissive subjects on the other, who retain the 
right  of  criticism without responsibility.  These 
are the actual facts, and they reflect the national 
character.  The  drawback  to  this  mechanical 
and  inanimate  but  business-like  system  is  the 
secret log-rolling and jobbery  amongst so-called 
notables  which  plays  such  a  sinister  part  in 
French  life,  and  whose  evil  influences  we  have 
experienced  in  Alsace.  No  capable  nation  is 
content  to  let  itself  be  administered  without 
sooner or later claiming a share in the manage- 
ment  of  its affairs, and if  that is denied it will 
seek  an  outlet  in  bribery  and  intrigue.  The 
notables  try to gain  their  ends  by  backstairs 
influence at the Prefecture.  It is a point of view 
which we cannot understand, but which we must 
accept as the eccentricity of  a great people.  It 
has taken us a long time to wean our population 
on the left bank of  the Rhine from its fondness 
for  these  French  practices.  Until  1848,  the 
Rhinelanders,  with  David  Hansemann  at their 
head, were filled with an enthusiastic respect for 
the glorious  French  system  of  Prefects.  They 
reckoned  on  their  fingers that a  Prussian  Pro- 
vincial  Government  involved  so  and  so  many 
Councils, while the Prefect was content with one. 
Therefore, they argued, the French system must 
be  cheaper-a  conclusion which  was  not  borne 
out by a comparison of  the achievements of  the 
two  systems.  The  first  result  of  the  French 
method  is  to enslave  the spirit  of  the people, 
and to prove how  unfit the French are for real 
political liberty. 
A  relative  ability  for  self-government  dis- 
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Latin peoples,  who  were so thoroughly  impreg- 
nated  with  the spirit  of  Ancient  Rome  that a 
hierarchy in things temporal as well as spiritual 
seemed  quite  natural  to  them.  But  Italians 
have  so  much  Teutonic  blood  in  their  veins, 
and  in  the  Middle  Ages  their  municipal  life 
flourished so proudly that we can trace its effects 
amongst them to this day, although they proved 
themselves  to be  true Latins after all in  1861, 
when  the  kingdom  of  Italy  came  into  being. 
The problem then was the reconstruction of  the 
Provinces.  Piedmont  had  been  divided  into 
Departments on the French plan,-Turin,  Genoa, 
etc.,-which  formed obvious units in so small  a 
State, but the transference of  this organization 
to Italy would have led to the adoption  of  the 
whole French system.  The project was opposed 
by distinguished men who demanded the forma- 
tion  of  Provinces  on  the  German  pattern, 
"  Regions,"  as Minghetti,  then Minister  of  the 
Interior,  wished  to call  them.  Italy possessed 
great  areas  with  a  long-standing  history,  such 
as  Tuscany,  Lombardy,  or  Venice,  and  why 
should  they  not  be  organized  on  independent 
lines ?  Minghetti  wished  to  reproduce  the 
Prussian arrangement in his own country.  Italy 
would  then  have  had  twelve "  Regions,"  each 
with its own traditions, and a certain measure of 
independence  in  its relations  with  the capital. 
The measure met with insurmountable obstacles. 
Firstly, French influence was  so strong that the 
Prefect  system  seemed  the  only  solution,  and 
secondly, there was  a  dread of  separatist tend- 
encies.  To avoid  this rock,  it was  decided  to 
have only  little Departments  (for the so-called 
Provinces are in reality nothing else), which have 
no historical roots and no prospect of  developing 
a healthy independence  from  central authority. 
At  the head  of  each  is  a  Prefect, only  slightly 
controlled by a Prefectural Council. 
Happily  the sub-structure  is  healthier  than 
in France, for the sturdy old municipalities were 
not  so  easily  brought  under  the  bureaucratic 
~oke.  The media~eval  history  of  Italy is  civic, 
the  whole  character  of  the nation  has  become 
urban,  the nobility  have  everywhere  emigrated 
to the towns,  so that a gentry in the true sense 
scarcely exists.  To - day  it is  the  ambition  of 
the  dukes  and  princes  to become  Syndics  of 
the great cities-Rome,  Milan, and the like.  In 
addition there is the gradual depopulation of the 
rural districts by the great towns.  Every town 
is  surrounded  by  suburbs  planned  on  urban 
lines,  so that villages  are  only  to be  found in 
the remote districts.  The old Roman axiom still 
holds good, "  the child of the village is child also 
of the Mother City of  the village."  The traveller 
arriving in  Genoa  cannot distinguish where  the 
suburbs end and the town begins.  This belt  of 
hamlets  encircling  the  town  proper  is  very 
ancient,  and  gives  to the  first  administrative 
grade its peculiar character all over the country. 
Communes,  presided  over  by  men  of  standing, 
and taking a healthy pride in their independent 
administration,  very nearly  balance the central- 
ized Prefectural system. 
Germans  may  truly  claim  that  no  other 
country has grasped the idea of  self-government 550  ADMINISTRATION IN PRACTICE  STEIN'S  REFORMS  551 
so fully as our own.  In the Middle Ages we  per- 
mitted  civic  freedom  to grow  even  to excess, 
and  a  great  number  of  our  cities  received  the 
freedom  of  the  Empire  and  exercised  all  the 
functions of  sovereignty within their own  walls. 
German city life attained a wonderful bloom in 
consequence.  It  is  an  open  question  whether 
the splendid  development  of  Municipal  govern- 
ment at the close of  the Middle Ages  should be 
regarded as the apotheosis of the mediaeval Com- 
mune or as the germ of  the modern State.  There 
is  much  to be  said  for  both  views.  The  con-  ! 
sciousness of  ethical duties began to dawn upon 
the authorities in the small autonomous munici- 
palities,  and led  them  into  manifold  activities 
which had lain far beyond the reach of  all States 
in  their  period  of  primitive  economics.  The 
inevitable  reaction  followed,  and  the  Imperial 
cities  fulfilled  the old  French  saying,  of  which 
France had already felt the force : "  the search 
for  too  much  freedom  leads  to slavery."  The 
growing power of  the central authority could not 
tolerate  such  autonomous  communities.  Their 
subjugation began, and in the eighteenth century 
the once  flourishing  towns  were  stagnant  and 
decaying.  The  miserable  condition  of  the 
Imperial cities and of  their leading families only 
finds a parallel in England. 
Once again, it was  Frederick  William I.  who 
laid the foundations of  a  new  Prussian freedom 
which he neither guessed at  nor desired.  Nothing 
was  further from  his  thoughts  than  to confer 
fresh liberties upon his Prussian towns, in restor- 
ing the order which was his chief concern.  He ap- 
pointed Royal Commissioners to purge municipal 
finance and to sweep nepotism  away,  and these 
"  regulated " towns of  the Monarchy were those 
who entered most willingly into the subsequent 
Edict  for  the  government  of  towns  (Stadte- 
ordnung), because  in  them  the sense  of  justice 
and outward order at any rate had been restored. 
This new Prussian Town Edict was the creation 
of  the Freiherr von Stein, that great man whom 
my  master  Dahlmann  called  the  founder  of 
German  civic life in  a  deeper  sense than King 
Henry.  The  splendid  expansion  of  German 
cities in the nineteenth  century is essentially  a 
product  of  freedom  combined  with  an effective 
self-government  under  monarchical  guidance. 
It is characteristic of  the practical genius of Stein 
that he saw at  once where to find the fulcrum for 
the lever.  It  was  impossible  at that moment 
to reconstruct  the  rural  Communes  and  Dis- 
tricts, because the emancipation of  the peasantry 
had only just  been begun.  The newly-liberated 
vassals  were  so suspicious of  their former lords 
that co-operation between the two could hardly 
have been  brought  about at that time.  Social 
cleavage was less marked in the towns, but even 
there the hard lessons of  the War of  Liberation 
were needed before the idea of  the collaboration 
of  the middle classes in the Administration could 
be  realized.  During  the  war  whole  Districts 
were  left without any Royal  officials at all,  for 
they were  all serving  with the colours, and the 
Communes had to look  after their own  govern- 
ment.  Taken all in all, Stein so exactly hit on 
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either  directly  or  indirectly,  as  a  model  for 
German  Communal  government  ever  since. 
Before 1848 self-government had become a  sort 
of  fetish  amongst  us,  and  in  the 'thirties  the 
Sttidteordnung  was  called  "  Brussia's  political 
Bible."  A  generous rivalry  arose amongst  the 
great towns as to which  of  them should be best 
administered. 
Stein's  work  was  thoroughly original, for his 
experience was limited to his own county of  the 
Mark.  The  fundamental  characteristics  of  the 
Edict  of  November  1808  are  of  the  simplest 
nature.  It  starts from  the  principle  that the 
town  should  control its own  finance as well  as 
public safety in the fullest sense, and that these 
functions  should  be  exercised  jointly  by  the 
Chief  Official  (Magistrat)  and  elected  repre- 
sentatives of  the city.  Town Councillors (Stadt- 
rdte) and  Corporations  (Stadtverordnete) have  a 
direct  share  in  city  government  through  their 
Committees and Corporations, and are not merely 
a  body intended to supervise the Burgomaster. 
It was a particularly happy thought to compose 
the Municipal Council partly of  paid  and partly 
of  unpaid  members,  and  this  combination  has 
proved eminently useful, for the conditions in the 
greater Communes are so complex that they re- 
quire permanent expert officials to manage them. 
One consequence of this legislation was unforeseen 
by  its author himself.  The general  freedom to 
settle, and the increased facilities of  communica- 
tion which are characteristic of  modern life could 
not fail to produce a sort of  nomad bureaucracy 
of which Stein could never have dreamt.  Look 
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at our  own  municipal  magnates ;  Herr  von 
Forckenbeck  was  Burgomaster  first  at Elbing, 
then in Breslau,  and finally in Berlin, and he is 
no exception  to the rule.  Tahng recent events 
into account we  find that not even this shifting 
bureaucracy  has  been  able to break  the whole- 
some  spirit  aroused  by  the  Stddteordnung. 
Every Commune still keeps its special character- 
istics,  even  though  it may  have called into its 
administration  many  men  who  were  not  born 
within its boundaries. 
The  problem  of  incorporating  the  country- 
side  completely  in  the system  of  local  govern- 
ment  was  far more  difficult  than  re-organising 
the towns.  The  first  obstacle  was  the natural 
resistance  of  the old  territorial gentry,  who  till 
then had policed the district, and as landowners 
had wielded a patrimonial jurisdiction,  and since 
they  had  incurred  considerable  expense  in  the 
exercise  of  a  right  which  they  looked  upon 
as  bound  up  with  the  honour  of  their  class, 
they were not inclined to exchange their feudal 
prerogative  for  a  Communal  duty.  In  1810 
Nardenberg laboured in vain at  his Rural Edicts. 
The extension of  the kingdom after the War of 
Liberation  gave  rise  to a  second  difficulty,  in 
the shape of  the vast contrasts in the local life of 
east  and  west.  If  we  go  back  to 1815 we  do 
indeed find among the 25,000 Communes of  the 
eastern  Provinces  a  number  of  big,  town-like 
villages,  especially in the rich  industrial valleys 
of the Riesen Gebirge,  but in the north-east we 
still  find  predominant  the  little,  old  village 
colony nestling round  its manor-house.  In the 554  ADMINISTRATION  IN PRACTICE 
west this connexion between the hamlet and the 
hall  had  almost  entirely  disappeared,  and  left 
only  the big  ancient  villages which  had sprung 
from  the powerful  border  communities  (Mark- 
genossenschajten) of  old  Germany.  In the busy 
Rhineland  the  distinction  between  rural  and 
urban life had become so faint that the inhabitants 
clamoured for a uniform administration of  town 
and country.  It was  on this question that the 
projected  Prussian  Constitution  of  1821  was 
wrecked ; the failure  to agree upon  Communal 
organization made it impossible to proceed with 
the  superstructure.  It  is  only  quite  recently 
that any general scheme of  Communal adminis- 
tration  has  been  created  for  our  seven western 
Provinces. 
Beyond the Commune came the administrative 
District (Kreis), which was at first controlled by 
the  nobility  alone.  The  Provincial  Councillor 
(Landrat), in his capacity of  Lord of  the Manor 
(Rittergutsbesitxer),  was both in the confidence of 
the District and in the service of  the King.  This 
dual r6le was amply justified  by results, because 
the towns were withdrawn from the jurisdiction 
of  the Provincial  Councillor,  and  placed  under 
the immediate control of the Crown-communities 
of  peasant  proprietors  were  the exception,  the 
countryside  was  made  up of  large estates,  and 
the  normal  thing  was  for  the  District  to  be 
represented by one of  its ruling class.  This, too, 
had to  change with the extension of the monarchy. 
The western Provinces, which lacked the material 
for  Provincial  Councillors  forthcoming  in  the 
east, were now divided, as the others had been, 
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into  administrative  Districts,  which,  however, 
were from the beginning of  a different type.  In 
them the Provincial Councillor  (Landrat) was  a 
Royal official out and out, and the whole system 
was  manipulated  in  a  far  more  bureaucratic 
spirit than in the east, where the Councillor really 
was  a native of the district which entrusted its 
affairs to his keeping. 
The  local  government  legislation  of  1872 
attempted to re-organize District administration. 
The rural police, which had been in the hands of 
the landed gentry, was transferred to the charge 
of  the Amtsvorsteher.  These men  selected from 
the District Committee (Kreisausschuss), are con- 
fidential  officials  to an extent which  the land- 
owners  never  were.  The  District  Councillor 
(Landrat) was  originally  primus inter pares, and 
even  at the  present  day  he  is  still  generally 
a  native of  his  own  District.  He is nominated 
by the local assembly (Kreistag) and his appoint- 
ment is confirmed by the King.  He collaborates 
with the local assembly, and polices the District 
jointly  with  the  Communal  officials (Gemeinde- 
vorsteher). 
It is very interesting to trace how the system 
of  Provinces,  or  superior  local  bodies,  standing 
above the Districts, was created in Prussia.  In 
1815 we were confronted with the task of  organiz- 
ing  many  newly-acquired  dominions,  and  as 
these  were  a  veritable  chaos  of  formerly  inde- 
pendent  territories  it  seemed  an  obvious  ex- 
pedient  to divide the whole  country into equal 
Departments  of  moderate  size,  modelled  upon 
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clined  towards  the  French  Prefectural  system, 
and he  had  seen  his  ideal  realized  in  the new 
Kingdom  of  Westphalia.  This  was  the  great 
difference  between  him  and  Stein.  Stein  was 
a  reformer  along  the lines  of  aristocratic  self- 
government,  Hardenberg  along  those  of  an 
enlightened  bureaucracy.  Stein  was  the  first 
to  see  the  necessity  for  large  administrative 
areas, like those which a long process of  develop- 
ment had made normal in the Eastern Provinces, 
and  Frederick  William  111.  had  the  historic 
insight to perceive that his Minister was right. 
Thus, despite the outcry in the Rhineland, and 
in face of  Hardenberg's opposition, 1815 saw that 
admirable division of  the country into provinces, 
which is still in being, and still holds the happy 
balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces. 
It was no more than an official endorsement of 
actual  facts,  to recognize  the  fidelity  of  East 
Prussia  by making  it a  province  on  the same 
footing as West  Brussia, and on the same prin- 
ciple  which  prompted  the  reamalgamation  of 
Pomerania  into one  whole.  The  same is  true 
of  Silesia, Brandenburg, and Westphalia.  There 
is  definite  meaning  as  well  as  gratification  in 
calling oneself a Pomeranian, a Westphalian, or a 
Brandenburger.  These  are as a  matter of  fact 
historical provinces, which have had traditions in 
common, and are bound together by racial char- 
acteristics, and community of  economic interests. 
The  only badly constructed province is Saxony, 
but  here  the  responsibility  does  not  lie  with 
Prussian  statesmen,  but  with  the  wiseacres  at 
the Congress of  Vienna, who left Meissen and the 
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heart of the country in the possession of  the old 
dynasty.  Hence  compromise  was  inevitable, 
because  the  whole  District  was  not  available. 
This apart, the division has been most successful, 
and an acute historical instinct merely established 
what history itself had dready created. 
By means of the old Provincial Diets and new 
Provincial Committees,  a  form  of  local govern- 
ment  has  been  created  which,  though  modest 
in  scope,  carries  on  without  ostentation  an in- 
valuable work in town-planning, care of the poor, 
and institutions for the deaf,  dumb,  and blind. 
The transformation of  the Provinces from mere 
administrative areas into social bodies  set up a 
concurrent jurisdiction of rural District Directors 
(Landesdirektoren)  and  Provincial  Presidents 
(Oberprasidenten) which does no doubt sometimes 
lead to friction.  The Governmental sub-divi,ions 
within  the  Provinces  did  not  require  to  be 
erected into self-governing bodies,  for they only 
serve to facilitate the State administration.  This 
administration, however,  became rather cumbrous, 
because it was confided to Boards whose lengthy 
deliberations  delayed  the  course  of  business. 
Generally speaking, it is the defect of  our system 
that it multiplies Committees, but this will right 
itself in course of  time. 
The  fundamental  idea  of  these  Boards  was 
sound, because it contained a  certain guarantee 
for constitutional rights.  Their proceedings re- 
sembled those of a Court of  Justice, and all the 
probabilities pointed to an unbiased decision in 
doubtful cases.  Time,  however, proved  that it 
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sub-divisions in enjoyment of  their former inde- 
pendence.  A  Minister  who  is  responsible  to 
Parliament for action taken by his  Department 
must  be  able  to  rely  upon  his  subordinates. 
These  Boards  therefore  ceased  to be  Courts of 
Equity, and gave place to more stringent admini- 
strative methods. 
At  the  same  period  Ministers  with  expert 
knowledge (Fachminister) attained a quite undue 
influence in Civil Service Courts.  This led to a 
pressing demand that once for all a regular Civil 
Service Code  should  confer the right  of  appeal 
upon the members of  that Service, and since 1875 
we  have had a  whole gradation of  Civil Service 
Courts,  specially  created  for  the  purpose  of 
settling  all  disputes  relating  to administrative 
questions. 
Provincial  local  government  can  therefore 
show a respectable record of  public service, but 
even  to-day  the  centre  of  gravity  of  German 
self-government lies in the Communes, and this 
is  consonant  with  the democratic tendencies  of 
modern social life.  Although it is true that local 
government  is  essentially  aristocratic  owing  to 
the inability of  the lower classes to share in it, 
then the effect of  this is bound to be much modi- 
fied  in the smaller communities where even the 
humblest artisans may fill posts under the local 
authorities.  Germans display a  great readiness 
for self-sacrifice, and  aptitude for  local govern- 
ment when opportunity is given them, and all our 
experiments  in this direction have been  amply 
justified. 
FIFTH  BOOK 
THE  STATE IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONSHIP XXVII 
HISTORY  OF THE  COMITY  OF 
NATIONS 
THE history  of  the  comity  of  nations  is  an 
enchanting subject, well worthy of  the attention 
of  a  great historian, for in few  other regions of 
historical  research  is  the  general  improvement 
of  mankind so traceable, or the influence of  free 
moral forces upon history so clearly to be seen. 
Religion,  science,  and  commerce  bind  the 
nations to each other, and, although  each State 
is the supreme power within its own sphere, these 
forces lead it beyond  itself  to take its place  in 
the international mosaic.  In the antique world 
this  tendency  was  repressed  by  the  intensive 
strength of  the national idea.  Every people  of 
antiquity looked upon itself  as the chosen race, 
and all were equally sunk in the fathomless ignor- 
.ante which accompanies such an arrogance.  The 
differences in the various State religions formed 
the first  stumbling-block in the way of  a comity 
of  States,  and war  was  the  normal  condition, 
for the ancient State was  incapable  of  tolerat- 
ing  any  neighbour  who  was  not  either  an 
enemy, or an absolutely subordinate Confederate. 
The  saying  of  Euripides,  pappkpov  'Ehhrlvap 
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dPx~v  shc6~  is  spoken  from  the  depths  of  the 
Hellenic  soul.  With  them  all  international 
law  was positive  law, in the narrowest sense  of 
the  word.  The  individual  Greek  tribes  to be 
sure,  whose  hostility  to  the  barbarian  made 
them  feel  akin  to  one  another,  were  united 
by the Amphictyonic Confederation,  which  was 
originally a purely religious bond, and also by a 
few political axioms held in common, a Hellenic 
KOLV~~  V~~OF.  Here  already  we  find  certain 
conditions  set forth, like the one  which  forbids 
the destruction  of  an Arnphictionic town,  which 
dimly foreshadow the possibility of  a law which 
shall go beyond the law of  the individual State, 
and be  a  link  between  nation  and nation.  In 
actual practice, however, the international policy 
of  the Hellenes continued to be extremely harsh. 
After  the  conquest  of  Platea  during  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war  the Spartans destroyed the town 
itself,  after putting  all  its male  inhabitants  to 
death ;  Mitylene  was  once  totally  annihilated 
by the Athenians in the same way.  Policy was 
dictated by reasons of  State, pure and simple, and 
Thucydides himself, perhaps the most independ- 
ent  mind  that  Hellas  ever  produced,  was  able 
to declare that, for the State, utility was justice. 
Increasing commerce inevitably  brought  with  it 
commercial treaties,  and a distinction was made 
between  2va.rrov80~  and  f"~u~ov8or.  The  most 
arbitrary dealings were  still held  permissible to- 
wards persons outside the scope of  the treaties. 
Foreign merchants desirous of  transacting business 
under cover of  the treaty had to be represented 
by a citizen of  the country. 
It was a long time before the Greeks enlarged 
the narrowness  of  their  mental  horizon,  which, 
as far as Europe was concerned, was practically 
limited to the Balkan Peninsula, and it was not 
until  the  period  of  national  decay  had  set  in 
that Hellenism  widened  into a  Hellenic cosmo- 
politanism in the States of  the Diadochi, as they 
are called, which were bound to each other by a 
common speech, and common forms of  worship. 
These States arrest the attention of  the political 
student, because in them we  can trace the first 
feeble attempt to maintain a kind of  balance of 
power between the sovereign States.  Macedonia, 
Syria, and Egypt were  rivals for the mastery of 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  The  arrangement 
was that one of the three, generally Egypt, should 
remain neutral, and try to restrain the other two. 
This is already a step forward in political history, 
for the appearance of  the idea of  the balance of 
power shows that mankind was beginning to see 
that States do not exist for the purpose of  mutual 
destruction, but rather  in order  to co - operate 
towards the progress of  civilization. 
The  history  of  Rome,  however,  proves  how 
little this idea  had  penetrated  the general  con- 
sciousness of  those  times.  Rome  did  not  belie 
the  innermost  characteristics  of  the  antique 
State.  It  was  against  her  real  wish  that  she 
was  dragged  into  a  policy  of  world  conquest, 
but it was in accord with the politics of antiquity 
which led a State, after every fresh conquest, to 
enter into a new contest with its new neighbour, 
and  thus  gradually  to  extend  upon  all  sides. 
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scripti,  had  none  of  the width  of  vision  which 
guided the conquering policy  of  Alexander, but, 
according  to the  ancient  point  of  view,  every 
nation which  was  not the friend  of  the Roman 
people was bound to be  their enemy.  This was 
the guiding principle from the time of  the Twelve 
Tables until the reign of  Justinian, and it forced 
the Roman  Senate  into conquering  the world ; 
under  the  dominion  of  Rome  all  the Mediter- 
ranean  States  fell  into  a  kind  of  perpetual 
state of  siege (Belagerung-Zustand). 
Like  every  other  aristocracy,  that of  Rome 
sought  the  sympathy  of  the  ruling  classes  in 
other  countries.  In  spite  of  their  rapacious 
policy  the  Romans,  in  their jus fetiale  were 
the first people to develop the forms of  an inter- 
national  law,  although  these  institutions  were 
still imperfect in many ways.  After the Mediter- 
ranean  races  had  been  incorporated  within  the 
Empire,  the truly magnificent characteristics  of 
Rome's  political  development  began  to display 
themselves  under  her  monarchical  rule,  and 
Roman  jurists  attempted to interpret  the  idea 
of  the fus gentium  as being positive public law, 
embracing the whole Empire. 
The tendency  to expansion  gave way  before 
considerations of  stability and security upon the 
frontiers.  Under  the  Emperors,  the  legal  in- 
equalities  between  subjects  were  levelled  more 
and  more.  Even  in  Cicero7s day  several  pro- 
vincials had taken their seats in the Senate, and 
in the time of  Caracalla every man received the 
rights  of  Roman  citizenship.  By this time the 
jus  gentium  had  become  more  than  a  mere 
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phrase,  and side by side with  the conception of 
it we  find the idea of  a natural right which was 
thought of  as beyond and above all positive law, 
Nevertheless the Romans  wavered  in regard  to 
their definition of  natural law.  Some held  that 
it was a right which Nature had bestowed upon 
the  human  race,  while  others  spoke  of  it  as 
common  to all  living  creatures  (proprium  om- 
nium  animalium).  This  latter  opinion  found 
advocate in a  jurist  of  great distinction.  Great 
as was  the legal acumen  of  the  Roman  people, 
they had not  yet  attained  to  a  firm grasp of 
the philosophical idea of  law. 
When the dying Empire began to fall asunder, 
and political power passed more and more away 
from the decrepit  centre  to the fresh vigour  of 
the  provinces,  the  orbis  terrarum  was  gradu- 
ally romanized.  The Germans, into whose hands 
Rome's  heritage  now  fell,  brought  two  new 
political forces into the development of  history- 
a  real  monarchy  and the germ of  a  representa- 
tive assembly.  But even though they added to 
those many other of  the qualities of  mind which 
go  to the up-building of  an international code, 
and  although  they  yielded  a  na'ive  admiration 
to the superior  civilization  of  Rome,  they  still 
had  not the strength to amalgamate politically 
such  a  variety  of  national elements.  In many 
of  the German  States  which  arose  out  of  the 
ashes of the Roman Empire, a system of  personal 
rights  prevailed;  that  is  to  say,  the  ruling 
Germans  were  tried  by  German  law,  and  the 
subjugated  Romans  or  provincials  by  the  law 
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were,  however,  as  favourable  to  the  peaceful 
intercourse of  nationalities as they were destruc- 
tive to the idea of  political unity. 
Next came the mighty influence of  Christianity, 
with  its  belief  in a universal brotherhood, and 
in  this  Christian  conception  lay  the  real  force 
which  brought  a  law of  nations into the world. 
The cosmopolitan tendencies of  our religion were 
clearly  shown  in  the  Pope's  claim  to all  un- 
apportioned  heathen  territory,  in  virtue  of  his 
position as the ideal ruler of  Christendom. Thus 
did the German Knightly Orders receive the land 
of  Prussia  from  the  Pope.  This  legal  axiom 
retained its practical application until the end of 
the Middle  Ages;  in  1494  Alexander  VI.  had 
just  completed  that  great  partitioning  of  the 
seas  which  had  led  to so  many  contests,  and 
which  dragged  to light  so  many  errors  in  the 
geographical knowledge of  the infallible Pontiff. 
Thus did  Christianity  early  prove  to be  one  of 
the strongest bonds to draw the nations together. 
The young community of European States reposed 
thenceforward  upon three foundations : upon a 
common  faith ; upon  that  Roman  civilization 
which they all had profited by, and from which 
had  proceeded  the Roman  law  which  had  had 
a  restraining  influence upon  all  of  them  alike ; 
and, thirdly, upon the kinship by blood between 
the  German  state - building  races.  When  we 
remember  how  the feudal  system, in particular, 
assumed a nearly similar form in every country, 
we  can  understand  how  intimate  the  national 
relationships  must  have  been,  in  spite  of  all 
barbarisms of  manners. 
From  the twelfth  century  onwards  we  have 
in addition the struggle of  the Latin races to win 
the Holy Sepulchre.  It is impossible to express 
how  great  was  the  uniting  influence  of  the 
Crusades upon  the Western  nations.  Nor  was 
it only  among themselves that an international 
code of  gallantry and chivalry arose, but a kind 
of  international  intercourse  came  into  being 
between  Crusader  and  Musulman  as  well ;  a 
knightly  opponent  like  Saladin  could  only  be 
treated  in knightly  fashion.  The idea  asserted 
itself  nevertheless  that  an  international  code 
could only apply between Christian nations.  No 
bond  could  be  entered  into  with  any  heathen 
State, if  only for the reason that every such bond 
was always sworn upon the Host.  The sanctity 
of  the law of  nations was therefore not yet sought 
for in the thing itself, but subsisted  in religion. 
It was an important step in the progress of  inter- 
national  intercourse  in  the  Middle  Ages  when 
the Pope first instituted the custom of  permanent 
Ambassadors.  His  example  was  followed  by 
the theocratic State of  the German Orders, which 
sent a Procurator to represent it in Rome.  This 
was  the beginning of  a  settled diplomacy.  The 
other  Powers,  however,  as yet felt no necessity 
for anything of  the kind ;  nobody troubled about 
his  neighbour  unless  there  was  some  dispute 
regarding a frontier to be fought out.  Although 
the  mediaeval  Christian  world  possessed  the 
vision  of  an  ideal  unity,  the  interests  of  the 
different  States  were  in  actual fact severed  by 
difficulties of  communication  and backwardness 
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system of  States, were still undeveloped.  A war 
might  go on for  a  hundred  years between  Ger- 
mans  and  Italians,  quite  distinct  from  a  con- 
temporaneous  struggle  between  English  and 
French,  without  the  remaining  Powers  having 
any idea of  intervening.  The idea of  a practical 
comity of  States had not yet penetrated into the 
flesh and blood of  the nations. 
In  the  sixteenth  century  the  Reformation 
brought a great forward stride in this direction. 
It  contributed  towards  forging  closer  the links 
between  nations,  by  emphasizing community of 
faith  more  than  community  of  race.  Thence- 
forward German Princes have often sinned against 
German unity, by allying their arms with foreign 
Powers  of  like  religion  to  their  own.  In the 
Thirty  Years'  War  German  and  Swedish  Pro- 
testants stood side by  side against  German and 
Spanish  Catholics.  Even  the  French  Catholic 
feels himself  nearer  to his  Spanish co-religionist 
than  he  does  to the  French  Protestant.  Thus 
the Reformation created a cleavage of  religions on 
the one hand, and on the other drew the different 
nations  together  under  the banner  of  the same 
faith,  and  in  the  sixteenth - century  religious 
loyalties  attained a  power  which  overshadowed 
nationalities entirely.  The contentious faith  of 
Calvin  exercised  a  particularly cosmopolitan in- 
fluence, which could not entirely disappear when 
the religious antagonisms were modified in later 
times.  We  must  not forget,  however,  that the 
Reformation  was  the  very  means  of  breaking 
the nation-uniting power of  the Papacy. 
The discovery of  the New World had the effects 
of  tightening  the  bonds  which  connected  the 
peoples of  Europe.  It is true that the founding 
of  colonies  beyond  the  seas  gave  occasion  for 
many  conflicts,  but  it had  a  unifying  effect  as 
weU ; the  feeling  of  fellowship  was  quickened 
among the European States when the Caucasian 
race  began  to form  a  great  aristocracy  for  the 
subjugation  of  the savage peoples.  The efforts 
of the House of  Hapsburg to form a single State 
were  a  further factor in  the development  of  a 
comity of  nations. 
Terror  of  the world-power  of  the Hapsburgs 
led the sixteenth century into the most unheard- 
of  alliances, which even included the power of  the 
Turk.  France's  most Christian King sought the 
friendship  of  the  unbelieving  Sultan.  On  all 
sides the Holy Roman Empire began to crumble, 
and the unreason  which  prompts every attempt 
at universal  monarchy  was  revenged in the re- 
vival of  the inextinguishable idea of  nationality, 
which,  with  a  certain  one-sidedness,  now  took 
possession of  each individual State. 
From the sixteenth century onwards we  find 
States  maintaining  permanent  Embassies.  The 
Venetians improved upon the example set them 
by the Pope,  and became  masters in the diplo- 
matic art.  Thus in the seventeenth century the 
Congress of  the Peace of  Westphalia  offered the 
astonishing spectacle of  a Conference of  Ambas- 
sadors from every State, laying down the frontiers 
for the individual countries.  This Peace of  West- 
phalia came to be looked upon like a ratio scripta 
of  international law ; every one uttered thanks- 
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established.  People  began  to  feel  themselves 
part of  an organized  European  society,  and all 
the sovereign States began, as  it were, to form 
one great family.  Then, just  as every  member 
of  a well-ordered household must have his allotted 
place,  so the different  countries  disputed  about 
theirs,  often  in  a  most  ridiculous  fashion.  No 
one  dared  as  yet  to contest  the theoretic  pre- 
cedence  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Pope.  After 
them came all the States which ranked as Kings, 
Venice among them,  as being  Queen of  Cyprus, 
then  followed  the  Netherlands  Republic,  and 
finally the cloud of  petty German Princes. 
We are now  entering  upon the period  of  the 
so-called "  reasons of  State,"  which followed the 
teaching of  Machiavelli, and held everything right 
and justifiable  which  the interests of  the State 
dictated.  This theory was entertained by every 
Government, and led finally to the notion of  the 
balance of  power in Europe.  The system was not 
quite new ; it  had existed in the  fifteenth century, 
on a small scale, among the States of  Italy, when 
five Powers-Naples,  the Pope, Tuscany, Venice, 
and  Milan-had  tried  to hold  the  balance  of 
power between them.  This idea spread through- 
out Europe, and became a doctrine, as mechanical 
as it was the fashion of  that age to make it, which 
is often represented  in pictures by the image of 
Europe as a great pair of  scales, whose poise had 
to be  carefully  preserved.  The  whole  idea  is 
crude, and as thoroughly unpolitical as the notion 
of  an eternal peace, for, as we have already seen, 
the frontiers of  States must be continually liable 
to fluctuation, and may not be thrust into narrow 
fetters.  Nevertheless  the  point  of  view  was 
wholesome  for  that period,  for  it acted  as the 
only check upon the encroachments of  some one 
powerful  State,  which  were  otherwise  unre- 
strained.  The  theory  persisted  still  in  the 
eighteenth century, and the three great partitions 
of Poland are the last evidences of  its influence. 
The  disappearance  of  elective  monarchies  in 
favour  of  hereditary  States  was  advantageous 
to political development, for the reason that the 
local  conditions  prevailing  in the former  easily 
led  to wars  and  interference  from  without,  for 
which there were far fewer opportunities in here- 
ditary Monarchies and well-established Republics. 
All the larger States began to be permeated by the 
principles of  primogeniture  and indivisibility  of 
territory.  Thus there  were  not  so  many  occa- 
sions for Wars of  Succession, and the gradual rise 
of  standing  Armies  also  contributed  towards 
keeping the peace.  It was  one thing to impro- 
vise  a  campaign  with  a  few  hastily  assembled 
troops, but quite another to conduct a war with a 
standing Army and adequate finance. 
The Peace of  Westphalia was supposed to have 
established  the  status  quo  for  Europe.  It 
humbled  the  world  monarchy  of  Spain,  which 
reposed  upon  firmer  foundations  than  did  the 
mediaeval Empire, and which had been a danger- 
ous  menace  to  the  liberty  of  Europe.  The 
Peace of  the Pyrenees in 1659  had put an end to 
the long conflict with France and had destroyed 
the power of  Spain.  Its place was filled by France 
and the rising  sun of  Louis XIV. and his "  ex- 
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Powers  because  it  followed  a  wider  orbit  and 
pursued  unattainable  aims.  The  ambition  of 
Louis  was  to place  France  at the head  of  the 
Roman  States, and to win  back for his country 
its natural frontiers, so called.  Now  for the first 
time was witnessed the hitherto unheard-of spect- 
acle of  uninterested  Powers  being  dragged  into 
the contest between two States, in order to  uphold 
the status quo.  The intervention of  the neutrals 
and the Triple Alliance of  Holland, England, and 
Sweden forced Louis to make peace earlier than 
he had intended. 
The  international  relationships  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  were  unnatural  nevertheless,  in- 
asmuch that Germany, the heart of  Europe, lay 
in an impotence for which she had only herself 
to blame, and the Fatherland of  Luther was in no 
condition to stand as a compact Power in defence 
of  the Protestant Faith.  The whole disgrace of 
the situation was exemplified by the small part 
which the two deciding Powers, Brandenburg and 
Electoral Saxony, took in the Thirty Years' War. 
Neither  of  them took an active share for  more 
than four  years,  and they remained  neutral for 
the other twenty-six.  Two  States stepped  into 
the breach in our defences ;  they were Holland and 
Sweden, which were both too weak, by reason of 
their  scanty  population,  to  hold  permanently 
their unnatural position among the Great Powers 
of  Europe.  The Hague became a centre for diplo- 
macy,  and it is  significant that Hugo  Grotius, 
a  Dutchman,  was  the  father  of  the science  of 
international law.  We owe to Holland, not only 
the maintenance of  Protestantism,  but also the 
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breaking of the naval power of  Spain ;  hers is the 
honour  of  restoring the preponderance  at sea to 
the Protestant Germans, by wresting it from the 
hands  of  the  Catholic  Romans.  Towards  the 
end  of  the century the military policy  of  Louis 
XIV. was directed towards conquest of  the Rhine 
frontier,  and  the  great  coalition  was  formed 
against him which finally terminated in the War 
of  the  Spanish  Succession,  and  after  a  long 
struggle destroyed the undue weight which France 
had for a time possessed, and relegated her  once 
more  to the  rank  of  the  other  Powers.  The 
great drama of  the Scandinavian War was being 
played out at the same time  in the eastern half 
of  Europe, but the two contests had no connexion 
with  each  other,  and  are  therefore  not  to be 
described as European.  They were followed by 
the great treaties of  Utrecht and Nystadt, whose 
decisions  were  held  inviolable  through  many 
years to come, for men thought once more that 
they had  found  the status  quo for  Europe,  and 
began to dream again of  an eternal peace ; it was 
supposed that the world  hzid  been  brought  to a 
standstill by the latest peace Congresses.  When 
we  examine more closely how nearly the map of 
Europe at the time of  the Peace of  Utrecht ex- 
pressed  the  real  requirements  of  the  different 
countries  we  see  how  far it was  from  realizing 
the  hopes  which  were  entertained.  The  com- 
munity  of  States was  divided  into two  groups, 
whose  interests made them antagonistic to each 
other.  Southern and Western  Europe struggled 
over the remains of  the old Lotharingian Empire, 
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and  in  Switzerland,  while  the North  and  East 
fought  for  the  dominiurn  rnaris  Baltiei,  and 
whether  it  should  fall  into  German,  Polish, 
Russian, or Scandinavian hands.  To us it seems 
monstrous  that two great wars  could be  waged 
for so many years side by side, and yet remain 
entirely separate ;  it proves that as yet there was 
no  unity  in  international  politics.  As  before, 
the reason  lay in that lack  of  any concentrated 
will-power which prevented Protestant Germany 
from taking her  rank  among  European  States. 
While the political conditions of  Central Europe 
were  still thus immature, we  perceive how  the 
two Powers who had been raised unnaturally to 
the first rank  in the seventeenth  century with- 
draw  gradually  into  the  background.  Sweden 
ceased to be a really great Power, and her land- 
power was transferred to Prussia; while Holland 
experienced  the  stern truth of  the old  sic vos, 
non  vobis,  and was  smothered under  the tender 
embraces  of  her  friend  England.  From  the 
moment that one monarch reigned over the two 
countries Holland  was  exploited in all amity to 
serve  English  ends,  and  gradually  became  the 
second of  the Sea Powers,  after having so long 
been the first. 
The  cleavage  between  East  and  West  was 
never  fully  bridged,  until  a  genius  arose  in 
Prussia, and taught her to be conscious of  herself. 
On this Prussia's  greatness reposes, and she was 
called by Providence to span the gulf.  Since the 
days of  John Sigismund the geographical position 
of  the State had made it part of  both systems. 
Frederick I. had  failed to understand this,  and 
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had thrown the whole  of  his power in with the 
West;  his  hosts  had  fought  desperately  and 
victoriously  at Malplaquet  and  Turin,  and  ad- 
vanced to the Alban hills and the walls of  Rome, 
even while the forces of  the North were sweeping 
unhindered  through  Prussia,  and treating it as 
conquered territory.  The country was sacrificed 
to Austrian policy, for not in vain did a Guelph 
Princess sit on Prussia's  throne.  Frederick the 
Great was the first person to see in what direction 
the importance  of  Prussia really lay ; young as 
he  was  when  he  wrote  his  brilliant  Considka- 
tions  sur  E'btat  prbsent  du  corps  politique  de 
E'Europe,  he  expressed  in  it  his  consciousness 
that he had the power within him to break  the 
stagnation  which  he  depicts  so  strikingly  as 
settled upon Europe after the Peace of  Utrecht. 
The Seven Years' War was in fact the first Euro- 
pean War in the proper sense of  the word.  The 
whole  of  Europe took part in the struggle, and, 
as the victorious  outcome  showed,  Prussia  had 
at last  infused  Central  Europe  with  a  political 
will of its own, so that the comity of nations began 
to assume coherent shape, and it became apparent 
that Prussia's  fight for existence had at the same 
time been a fight for a reshaping of  international 
relationships.  Five great  Powers thenceforward 
become  arbiters  of  the  fate  of  Europe ; the 
importance of  the second and third rank States 
dwindles  more  and  more  relatively  as  well  as 
absolutely, and their participation in Congresses is 
only requested  when  their interests are directly 
concerned.  Only two of  these five great States 
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one schismatic.  The European world  had thus 
diverged  widely from its mediaeval  aspect,  and 
it is  not  hard  to understand  why  the Vatican 
hated Prussia who had been the foundress of  the 
new order of  things. 
The rapid development of  maritime law in the 
years  that  followed  is  a  proof  of  how  closely 
the interests of  this Pentarchy were intertwined. 
There was a connexion between the Seven Years' 
War  and  that  great  colonial  struggle  between 
France and England which finally decided whether 
the dominion  of  the seas  should  rest  with  the 
Latin or  the  Teutonic  race.  England's  victory 
was so complete that her maritime preponderance 
endures  to  this  day.  She  made  every  fresh 
triumph over France a new  occasion to trample 
upon international law, and monstrous injustices 
to neutrals were perpetrated at sea in the name 
of  justice and fair policy.  A feeling of  malicious 
pleasure  swept  over  every  country  when  the 
American Colonies, who had fought so valiantly 
on England's  side in the French war, at length 
shook  off  her  rule.  During  the  Seven  Years' 
War  England's  anxiety about her  own  material 
interests and the Russian timber trade had pre- 
vented  her  from  protecting  our  Baltic  coasts 
or  making  war  with  our  enemy,  Russia.  In 
1780, however,  Catherine  the Second concluded 
a  treaty  with  the  small  northern  Kingdoms, 
and afterwards with Prussia and Austria, which 
aimed at securing freedom for legitimate trade to 
neutrals  in time  of  war.  The  defection  of  the 
American  Colonies  had somewhat  shattered the 
preponderance  of  England  on  the sea,  even  as 
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the War  of  the Spanish Succession had lowered 
the position of  France.  The mere existence of  the 
young Power forced England to moderate, at all 
events outwardly, her claims to naval supremacy. 
A  fact  of  no  less  importance  was  that  a 
non-European  State was  now  for the first  time 
acknowledged as civilized, and recognized by inter- 
national law.  In this also Prussia  led  the van. 
It  was  owing  to Frederick  the  Great,  and  his 
commercial treaty with the United States, that a 
nation dwelling beyond the western horizon was 
now  admitted  as  having  equal  rights  with  the 
peoples  of  Europe.  Till  then,  the New  World 
had  been  regarded  as the  servant  of  the  Old. 
This  point  of  view  now  slowly  began  to alter, 
but in spite of  this the Law of  Nations was still 
confined to Europe.  The dreamers'  hopes were 
falsified, and it was proved that the other quarters 
of  the globe were  not  in a  position  to create  a 
civilization which could compete with the culture 
that was innate in Europe  and coeval with  her 
growth.  Colonial life is as a tree without roots, 
and  therefore  Europe  remains  the heart  of  the 
world, while we, who know that world, may safely 
prophesy that so it will always be. 
The Fre'nch Revolution caused a sudden inter- 
ruption,  and  a  reaction  for  the  worse,  in  the 
development of  international relationships.  The 
mad  attempt to found  a  universal  Empire  was 
once more seriously undertaken.  The Revolution 
was  from  the  beginning  cosmopolitan  in  char- 
acter.  The French imagined themselves as the 
Messiah among nations, and the supposition was 
inevitably accompanied by a policy of  conquest. 
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We know now how Napoleon, as heir of  the Revo- 
lution, tried to realize  the monstrous  plan  of  a 
world  monarchy,  which  he,  almost  cynically, 
dubbed a  Federative System.  His ideal was  of 
a France surrounded by her satellite States.  At 
first  Fortune  favoured  the  gigantic  adventure, 
but  it was  wrecked  at last  on  the rock  of  its 
own unreason.  Napoleon's universal Empire was 
shattered  by  the  War  of  Liberation,  and  the 
centrifugal  tendencies  regained  all  the  more 
strength  because  the  enterprise  of  this  human 
being  had  mocked  at history  and trampled  on 
the  development  of  centuries.  Thus  we  mark 
the rapid  return to pre-Revolutionary  paths in 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  which  was  to lay  the 
foundations  of  the  new  ordering  of  Europe. 
Thenceforward its fate was  decided by  the five 
great  Powers,  who  once  more  graciously  in- 
cluded  defeated  France  among  their  number. 
Their preponderance was heavy, sometimes even 
oppressive.  Alexander  I.  of  Russia  saw  the 
world as a great Christian brotherhood,  and the 
idea of  a unity among the States of  Europe was 
driven to death in the notion of  the Holy Alliance, 
merely  theoretic  though  this  was.  It  made 
demands  upon  the individual  States  which  no 
sovereign  State  could  grant.  Nevertheless  the 
long peace which  followed  did  bear fruit in the 
development of  international law ;  the far-reach- 
ing  trade  relationships  came  into being, which 
all such alterations must  of  necessity call forth. 
The  rights  of  aliens  and an international  civil 
law were  now  for the first  time established  and 
organized. 
The world believed, as it had done a hundred 
years  before, that the normal  and abiding con- 
ditions had been created by the decrees of  Vienna. 
These  were  quoted  and  appealed  to on  every 
hand,  and it seemed once  more as if  the wheel 
of  history  was  expected  to  stand  still.  Yet, 
when we  look at the map as it then was we  are 
as  much  amazed  by  the  shortsightedness  of 
statesmen in the Congress of Vienna as Frederick 
was by the lack of vision in the Utrecht decisions. 
The  weakness  of  Italy  and  Germany  was  the 
cause of  the unnatural predominance of  France, 
which  could  therefore  never  be  rectified  until 
these  countries  were  strengthened ; Gneisenau 
had stated as much before the Congress met, and 
his  conviction  was  shared  by  Stein.  Neverthe- 
less this problem of  Central Europe was the very 
one which the Congress left unsolved.  Germany 
still lay powerless  beneath the nominal  unity of 
a  Federation,  and  all  our  neighbours  took  a 
tacit  oath  in  Vienna  to  hold  Prussia  down. 
Italy too  was  left unstrengthened  by  any firm 
bond.  The system of  buffer-States  was  devised 
to  prevent  mutual  contact  between  the  great 
Powers,  by  interposing  those of  the third  rank, 
like Piedmont in the south, or the Dutch-Belgian 
State in the north, put together out of  two quite 
inharmonious  ingredients.  The  whole  concep- 
tion of  the life of  States and nations was mechani- 
cal  in  the  extreme,  and  the  great  dormant 
antagonisms  between  Prussia  and Austria,  and 
between the alien yoke of  the latter and Italian 
aspirations, were entirely disregarded. 
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Vienna  Treaties  were  not  the  ratio  scripta 
which  Metternich  and  the  partisans  of  the 
Hofburg  had  proclaimed  them  to  be.  They 
were  followed by revolutions  in Spain, in Italy, 
and in  Greece, and finally by the revolution  of 
July, which, in dethroning the Bourbons, struck 
down  one  of  the  pillars  of  Legitimacy.  After 
a  struggle  Belgium  once  more  regained  her 
independence,  separated from  Holland,  and be- 
came  at once  the Paradise  of  priests  and the 
home  of  the phrase-makers  of  Liberalism.  To 
all this we must add the new antagonisms which 
arose in Europe.  The States of  the liberal West 
took their stand upon the one side, those of  the 
reactionary  East,  with  the  Czar  Nicholas  at 
their head, upon the other.  Moreover, the period 
was dominated by the unreasonable notion that 
international  differences  must  follow  the  same 
lines  as  internal  politics.  It  is  always  a  sign 
of  political  doctrinairism  when  the party cleav- 
ages  within  the  various  States  determine  the 
antagonisms of  foreign policy.  Palmerston, well 
knowing  the folly of  continental Liberals,  mas- 
queraded before them as the champion of  liberty, 
whereas he was really thinking only of  his bales 
of  cotton ; the Czar  Nicholas  was  in the same 
way a doctrinaire on the subject of  Legitimacy. 
These differences were brought into prominence 
in the follies of  the celebrated disputes over inter- 
vention  or non-intervention.  The States in the 
Holy Alliance had driven the idea of  interference 
with the party quarrels of  their neighbours much 
too  far.  They  had  declared  that the interests 
of  public  order  required  that the Great  Powers 
should be entitled to intervene if  the peace of  a 
State were  disturbed  from  beneath,  by  popular 
risings.  What  could  be  more  unjust  than this 
principle, which  allowed interference in the case 
of  a  national  upheaval,  but  withheld  it  if  a 
Government  was  attacked from without ?  The 
Quadruple  Alliance  came  to  be  looked  upon, 
justly,  in the light  of  a  police force, oppressive 
to the liberty of  nations.  The opposite  Liberal 
doctrine  of  non - intervention  was,  however, 
equally  untenable.  No  sovereign  State  can 
engage  itself  beforehand  never  to interfere  in 
the internal dissensions of  a neighbouring State, 
for  these  might  at any time become  a  menace 
to its own  existence.  The character  of  certain 
parties,  socialistic  or  ecclesiastical, will  always 
be  cosmopolitan  and  international,  and  no 
sovereign  Power  can  ever  undertake  to abstain 
from interfering  with  them.  We  can  only  say 
that any State which mixes itself in the internal 
affairs of  its neighbours does so at its peril, and 
that experience has proved how highly dangerous 
such intervention may be. 
In those  years  the contests  between  States 
were  fought  round  this disputed  point.  Mean- 
while the structure of  the Vienna Congress began 
to crumble stone by stone.  It was an irony  of 
history which forced Metternich  in 1846 to pull 
down the Republic of  Cracow, a State which he 
had himself set up.  It was at  the same time the 
suicide of  the old system, for it was an admission 
of  the  coming  shadow  of  great  events.  With 
the  year  1848 they  came.  France  once  again 
witnessed  the  collapse  of  authority ; slumber- 582  THE COMITY  OF NATIONS  MARITIME LAW  583 
ing  forces  of  nationality  were  roused  in  Italy 
and  in  Germany,  and  in  both  countries  the 
movement  towards  unity began.  The  Prussian 
Zollverein had paved the way  for it in Germany, 
but  in  Italy  nothing  had  yet  been  done. 
With  us,  as  with  them,  the  first  attempt  to 
erect  a  national  State  was  frustrated.  The 
conservative  Powers  were  able  once  more  to 
suppress  national  sentiment  in  Italy,  and  to 
prevent  the  antagonism  between  Prussia  and 
Austria from coming to a head.  To all appear- 
ance the old balance of  power,  which had rested 
upon the weakness of  Central Europe, was again 
restored.  Italy smarted under  a visible foreign 
dominion, and the same yoke pressed on Germany 
in  a  concealed  form.  The  misfortune  which 
hindered  our  development  lay in  the fact  that 
part  of  our  nation  looked  upon  Austria  as 
primarily a German State. 
The  problem  of  how  Central  Europe  should 
be  organized as a  national  Power  continued  to 
be the real great crux for the European  system 
of  States.  A new turn was given to the question 
by  France,  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  by 
Napoleon III., a man whom posterity will judge 
more fairly, for the French still know him only 
as a scapegoat.  When we  remember how  little 
influence France had had upon European history 
since the fall of  Napoleon I., and how Napoleon 
111.  raised her again to the rank of  a  first-class 
Power,  even  although  she  lacked  the  physical 
and intellectual force to maintain  that position, 
we  shall not be able to dismiss this man with a 
couple  of  phrases.  It  was  he  who  devised the 
entanglement of  the Crimean War whereby Russie 
was  deposed  from  her  leading  position  among 
the Great  Powers,  and her  place  was  filled  by 
France.  Another  important  result  of  this  war 
was  the  total  dislocation  of  the  European 
alliances.  Austria and Russia had been so closely 
bound together that their friendship had become 
a  dogma  of  reactionary  faith,  but Austria  now 
adopted  a  half  hostile  attitude towards  Russia, 
although her interests did not compel her to do so. 
In other ways as well, the Paris Peace Congress 
of  1856  had an important bearing on international 
relationships.  The liberal predilection for Turkey, 
a  confusion  of  thought  arising  from  hatred  of 
Russia,  led  to the unreasonable  attempt to in- 
clude  the  Porte  among  the  European  States, 
although  a  Power  which  was  neither  European 
nor  Christian  could  not  possibly  take its place 
in  a  system  which  was  based  upon  those  two 
attributes.  Therefore  the  equal  status  which 
was  accorded  to Turkey  by  the Paris Congress 
remained one  of  name  only,  and in actual fact 
she continued as heretofore, under the guardian- 
ship of  other Powers.  Finally,  an attempt was 
made in Paris to modify maritime law.  England 
granted  certain  concessions,  and recognized the 
principle  which  was  demanded  by the navies of 
the second-class  Powers  that  the  flag  should 
cover the cargo.  Her own demand for the aboli- 
tion  of  privateering was,  fortunately, frustrated 
by  the objection  raised  by  America.  Humane 
in  appearance,  it was  fundamentally selfish, for, 
since England is stronger  than any other Navy 
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doing anything against her superiority ; England 
can  only be  seriously injured  in a naval war  by 
the infliction of  as much damage as possible  to 
her mercantile marine. 
The  great  Civil  War  which  soon  afterwards 
arose  in  America,  and  its  resultant  Mexican 
complications, had  an important  influence upon 
the  law  of  nations.  The  Monroe  doctrine, 
"America  for  the  Americans,"  stood  its  test, 
and  Napoleon's  attempt  at  intervention  in 
Mexico failed. 
Finally  the  great  national  movements  in 
Central  Europe  came  also  to their  fulfilment : 
in  1859 the Italian rising, which  led  in a  short 
two  years  to a  United  Italy,  and  from  1866 
onwards,  the decisive events in Germany.  The 
victory  over  France was  the death-blow  of  the 
old  system.  After  the battle of  Sedan  France 
showed  herself  as  incapable  thenceforward  of 
ruling  the  world  as  Spain  had  been  after  the 
Peace of  the Pyrenees.  From then onwards the 
map of  our  Continent  has  been  much  more  in 
accordance  with  nature.  The  middle  was 
strengthened,  and  the  brilliant  idea  which  put 
Europe's  centre  of  gravity  in  its  right  place, 
was made a reality.  The founding of  the German 
Empire works automatically for the calm of  the 
system of  States, inasmuch that the ambition of 
Russia may now be soothed, for, in all essentials 
she has attained the power  which  she requires. 
The menace to the peace of  Europe to-day is a 
reaction on the part of  those surrounding States 
which have been gradually driven into the back- 
ground, and which cannot console themselves for 
the  loss  of  their  former  power.  This  rise  of 
Germany to the rank of  a real Power is the one 
great change in the political conditions of  Europe 
which  began  with  the  year  1866;  the  other, 
whose  results are not  yet  fully  matured,  is the 
entrance  of  Italy,  as  a  sixth ,Power,  into  the 
European Pentarchy.  Spain's pretensions to the 
title  are merely formal,  and based  purely  upon 
vanity.  We may say of Italy, on the other hand, 
that she is beginning to figure as a  Great  Power, 
without actually as yet being one.  If she wishes 
to assert her  position  in  reality  she  must  fight 
for it ; the day must  come when  she will  once 
more  remember  her  destiny  as a  Mediterranean 
State.  Her  first  victories  will  raise  her  to the 
rank  to which  her  brilliant  talents undoubtedly 
give her a claim. 
Such,  then,  is  the  position  of  Europe  itself. 
Beyond its borders conditions have been astonish- 
ingly  altered, and changes have  taken  place  in 
the  course  of  little  more  than  half  a  century 
greater  than  the  world  has  ever  seen  before. 
China and Japan, countries hitherto hermetically 
sealed to Europeans, began  to open their ports. 
Australia, too, may be said only to have been dis- 
covered fifty years ago, for up till then it had been 
nothing more than a  penal  Colo~y. The proud 
prophecy  of  1860, "the  Pacific  is  awake,"  has 
been  fulfilled  to-day.  England,  in  her  r61e  of 
advocate  for Liberalism,  set  all  Europe by  the 
ears, and under  cover of  the latent discontents 
which she herself had fostered, she conquered half 
the world.  If she continues to succeed in keeping 
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territories will be thrust into her capacious pocket. 
It  almost  seems  as  if  our  nineteenth  century 
were the executor to the Will and Testament of 
the  sixteenth,  for  only  within  it has  the New 
World  which  Columbus  discovered  become  a 
practical  reality.  The  world  beyond  Europe is 
bulking larger and larger upon Europe's horizon, 
and there is no doubt that the European nations 
must  go out to it and subdue it directly or  in- 
directly to themselves.  We see the great process 
of  expansive  civilization going forward with  all 
the resistless might of  a natural force, nor can we 
yet  discern  the faintest trace  of  a  balance  of 
power.  No  one  but a  fool  could  imagine  that 
such a development would  ever come to a stop, 
and yet believers in an eternal peace must believe 
in this doctrine also.  No partitioning of  the map 
could  be  devised  which  would  guarantee  it. 
Moreover, the nations themselves  are alive  and 
changing, and no one can say absolutely whether 
a  small  nationality  will  shrivel  and  perish,  or 
whether  it  will  blossom  with  an  unexpected 
vigour.  Upon  this the  course  of  events  must 
depend,  but  it is  obvious  that  the  reshaping 
process can never cease.  Moreover it is precisely 
in the changeful course of  its history that man- 
kind has shown its own greatness, and the fairest 
fruits  of  human  civilization  and  culture  have 
ripened. 
XXVIII 
INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  INTER- 
NATIONAL  INTERCOURSE 
WHEN we  ask,  does  an  international law  exist 
at all ?  we  are  met  by  two  extreme  and  con- 
tradictory  conceptions,  both  alike  untenable, 
of  the  international  life  of  States.  The  first, 
the naturalistic, whose chief champion we already 
know to be Machiavelli, starts from the principle 
that the State is  absolute  power,  and may  do 
anything which  serves its ends,  consequently  it 
can  bind  itself  by no law  in its relations  with 
other  States,  which  are  determined  by  purely 
mechanical  considerations  of  proportionate 
strength.  This  is  an idea  which  can  only  be 
disproved  by  its  own  arguments.  We  must 
admit that the State is absolute physical power, 
but  if  it insists  upon  being  that, and  nothing 
else, unrestrained by conscience or reason, it will 
"0  longer be able to maintain itself in a position 
of  security.  Even  the  naturalistic  school  will 
allow  that the  State aims  at  producing  order 
within its own boundaries, but how can it do so 
if it will be pledged to no law beyond those bound- 
aries ?  A State which  went  upon the principle 
Of  despising  faith  and  loyalty  would  be  con- 
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stantly threatened by enemies, and would conse- 
quently be  unable to fulfil its purpose  of  being 
physical power.  This is borne out by the experi- 
ence of  history,  and we  see how  Cesare Borgia, 
Machiavelli's  own  ideal  of  a  Prince,  fell finally 
into the pit which he had digged for others.  The 
State does not identify itself with physical power 
for its own sake ; it is Power, in order to protect 
and to further the highest welfare of  the human 
race.  Taken without qualification,  the doctrine 
of  Power,  as  such,  is quite empty of  meaning, 
and unmoral as well, because it can find no justi- 
fication within itself. 
It is opposed by another, as false as itself, the 
moralizing  doctrine  of  Liberal  theorists.  Here 
we  find the State regarded  as if  it were  a  good 
little boy,  who should be washed, and brushed, 
and  sent  to school,  who  should  have  his  ears 
pulled to keep him obedient ; he, on his side, is 
expected to be grateful and good, and God knows 
how much else.  All this is German doctrinairism 
once  again,  working  mischief  in  this  direction 
also.  All  our political transgressions  have been 
caused by the idea which comes so naturally to a 
highly  educated  people,  that a  scientifically in- 
controvertible  principle  is  in  itself  sufficient  to 
give  a  new  direction  to the world  of  historical 
fact.  To this belief the Germans owe, not merely 
their spirit of  scientific research,  but also their 
manifold  errors  of  practice.  Our  doctrinaire 
professors of  international  law  think they have 
only to formulate a few axioms, and the nations, 
as reasonable beings, will  be  bound  to agree to 
them;  it  is  again  and  again  forgotten  that 
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stupidity and passion have been among the great 
powers in history.  Yet who can fail to see what 
a  real  force  the  passions  of  nationality  have 
once  more  become  in  the  nineteenth  century ? 
By  what  authority do individual  men,  such  as 
Rotteck, Bluntschli, or Heffter, arrogate to them- 
selves  to utter  such  a  "  Thou  shalt ! " to the 
State ?  No  human  being  stands  in  a  position 
to  place  positive  binding  commands  upon  all 
governments  alike ;  he  must  realize  that  the 
reasons on which his precepts are based are liable 
to be modified and overcome by life as it is lived. 
This deals the death-blow to the false conception 
of some imaginary law.  Only a positive law, then, 
remains,  and  no  amount  of  theorizing  can  lay 
down principles for it, unconditionally and with- 
out  more  ado.  All  the  labour  of  science  can 
only prepare the way, until the truth and reason 
in  certain  principles  of  law  become  a  living 
conviction in the nation.  The abstract concep- 
tion  of  the State,  if  it  is  to be  carried  to its 
logical conclusion, requires the existence.of some 
supreme power  on earth, endowed with  external 
authority.  Thus  we  are  inevitably  led  to St. 
Peter's  Chair, for this supreme authority cannot 
be  vested  in any earthly body,  but only in the 
Representative  of  Christ,  who  claims  to speak 
in the name of  God.  No  such power, however, 
ought to exist here below, for our world of  beauty 
ought  to be  a  world  of  liberty  as  well.  It is 
evident that this effeminate sentimental concep- 
tion of  the law of  nations has only been logically 
formularized  by  ultramontane  thinkers.  The 
great  Code  of  the Jesuits  has  carried  it to its INTERNATIONAL LAW  ITS DEVELOPMENT 
correct conclusion ; the world is there seen as an 
Ethnarchy  and the nations  therein  as an ideal 
community,  presided  over  by  an  Ethnarch, 
the  Pope,  who,  by  his  spiritual  exhortations 
and influence,  can coerce the individual States, 
and set limits to the sphere  of  each,  and thus 
uphold the law among them all.  There can be 
no other logical practical conclusion to an argu- 
ment  which  regards  the State as a  personality 
acting  under  orders.  There  can  never  be  an 
international law  which  will  impose itself  upon 
the Great Powers as a practical restraint, by the 
mere fact of its theoretic scientific existence. 
We  must recognize, then, that these  extreme 
views are both of  them untenable,  but we  need 
not  despair  of  establishing  a  doctrine of  inter- 
national  law  which  is  workable,  because  based 
upon  the  facts of  history.  In doing  so  it  is 
above all important not to make greater demands 
upon human nature than its frailty can satisfy. 
The idealist who loses sight of  this principle may 
all too easily become  a disappointed enthusiast. 
One may be sure that  -any  one who declaims that 
brute force is the only arbiter in the rivalries of 
nations is one  of  the sentimentalists undeceived 
who once smoked the Pipe of  Peace, and who now, 
having seen that his dreams cannot be  realized 
in this world, has rushed  to the other extreme, 
and sees  a  crude cynicism  in  everything.  It is 
true that  all  the really  great  political  thinkers 
do cherish a  cynical  contempt  for  mankind  in 
general,  and  with  justice,  provided  it  is  not 
carried too far.  Those who do not ask too much 
of  human nature are the most successful in calling 
forth  the  really  great  gifts  which  it possesses 
amidst  all  its  bestiality  and  liability  to  err. 
Therefore  we  must  start  from  the  historical 
standpoint,  and take the State as it really  is; 
physical  power  indeed,  but  also  an institution 
designed  to co-operate in  the education  of  the 
human  race.  As  physical  power,  its  natural 
inclination will be to seize as many of  the neces- 
saries of  life as it thinks  useful to itself;  it is 
acquisitive  by  nature.  Every  State,  however, 
will of  its own accord pay a certain respect to the 
neighbouring  Powers.  A  more  definite  feeling 
of  law will be evolved by time out of  the dictates 
of  reason and a  mutual recognition  of  personal 
advantage.  Every  State will  realize  that it is 
an  integral  part  of  the  community  of  other 
States in which it finds itself  placed, and that it 
must live with them on some kind of  terms, bad 
or good, as the case may be.  These reflections will 
arise from very real considerations of  reciprocity, 
and not from love to mankind. 
The formal side of  international law,  dealing 
with  such  matters  as  the  inviolability  of  the 
person of  Ambassadors, and the ceremonial there- 
with  connected,  was  fixed  comparatively  early, 
and  in  modern  Europe  diplomatic  rights  are 
absolutely  settled.  It  is  safe  to say that  this 
department of  the law  of  nations is  much less 
often infringed than the internal legal ordinances 
of the average State.  Nevertheless the existence 
of  international law must  always be  precarious, 
and  it  cannot  cease  to  be  a  lea!  imperfects, 
because no power  higher than the States them- 
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thing  has  to depend  upon  a  mutual  give-and- 
take, and, since the supreme compelling authority 
is lacking, the co-operation of  science, and above 
all,  the  force  of  public  opinion,  will  have  an 
important  influence.  Savigny  declared  that 
international  law  was  no  stricturn  jus,  but 
continually in process of  development.  But this 
is  a  long  way  from asserting  the impotence of 
the  law  of  nations,  for  changeful  as  it is,  its 
influence is palpable, and we  can follow its con- 
sequences  step  by  step  at  the  present  day. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  development  of 
modern international law has been quite particu- 
larly  modified  by  Christianity,  and the  cosmo- 
politanism,  in  the  noble  sense  of  the  word, 
which  Christianity  has  introduced,  and  which 
goes beyond and above the State.  It was there- 
fore quite reasonable and logical to exclude the 
Porte,  for  many  hundreds  of  years,  from  the 
scope of European international law.  The govern- 
ment of  the Sultan had no claim to a full share 
in its benefits so long as the Porte was dominated 
by  a  Mohammedan  civilization.  Only  in  later 
times,  when  Christianity  had  gained  strength 
enough in the Balkan Peninsula to drive Moham- 
medanism  somewhat  into  the background,  was 
Turkey included in the international negotiations 
of  Europe. 
History shows us  how  great States spring to 
life  from  the  ashes  of  their  smaller  brethren. 
These  great  States finally  attain to a  measure 
of  strength which  enables  them  to stand upon 
their own feet and to become sufficient  for them- 
selves.  When they have reached this point they 
are  anxious  to secure  peace,  for  the  safety  of 
their own existence and the civilization of  which 
they  are  the  guardians.  Thus  an  organized 
comity of  nations, or so-called system of  States, 
arises out of the mutual guarantee of  law.  This 
necessarily presupposes the existence of  at least 
an  approximate balance  of  power  between  the 
States.  We  have seen how very mechanical this 
idea  became  at one  time  in  its  application  to 
European polities, but nevertheless it contains a 
kernel  of  truth.  We  cannot  think  of  it  as a 
trutina  gentium  with  its  scales  exactly  sus- 
pended,  but  any  organized  system  of  States 
must  assume  that no  one  State is  so  powerful 
as to be able to permit itself any license without 
danger to itself.  Here the superiority of  Europe 
to the unripe political world of  America at once 
becomes  apparent.  Nothing  obliges  the  Union 
to place any restraint  upon its actions, and  the 
small South American Republics have only been 
spared  a  direct  interference  with  their  affairs 
because the connexion  between  them and their 
greater neighbour is still slight. 
Gortschakoff was perfectly right when he said 
that the last International  Congress  would  pro- 
mote the interests neither  of  the nations  which 
always fear attack, nor of  those unduly powerful 
countries which believe themselves strong enough 
to take the  offensive  The  observation  hit  the 
mark, as may be  proved  by an actual example. 
Countries like  Belgium  and Holland,  which,  to 
the  great  detriment  of  that  science,  have  un- 
fortunately so long been the home of international 
jurisprudence,  adopted a sentimental view  of  it, 
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because they lived in constant fear of  aggression. 
In the name  of  humanity,  demands were made 
upon  the victor  which were unnatural, and un- 
reasonable, and irreconcilable with the power of 
the State.  The Peace Treaties of  Nymegen  and 
Ryswyk  both  show  how  Holland  was  regarded 
in  the  seventeenth century  as  the  arena  of  la 
haute  politique.  Switzerland  held  the  same 
position  later, and few persons nowadays reflect 
how ludicrous it is for Belgium to look upon her- 
self  as the chosen centre for the science of  inter- 
national law.  As  it is certain that all such law 
must be grounded upon practice,  so it is equally 
certain that a  State whose position is abnormal 
will also be the occasion for an abnormal miscon- 
struction  of  the principles which  should govern 
it.  Belgium is a neutral State, therefore incom- 
plete  by its very nature ; how  is  it possible to 
expect  a  sound  and healthy  law  of  nations  to 
proceed  from  such  a  source ?  I must  ask you 
all to keep this in mind  when  in time to come 
you are confronted with the voluminous Belgian 
literature on this subject.  Theye is, on the other 
hand, a State in our midst to-day which believes 
itself to be always in the position of  the assailant, 
and which is consequently the fountain-head of 
barbarism  in international law.  It is the fault 
of  England, and of  England  only, that in time 
of  war the maritime law of  nations continues on 
the level of  privileged piracy.  Thus we  see that, 
between nations, all law is grounded upon mutual 
give-and-take, and that it is useless  to hold  up 
the phrases  and doctrines  of  a  vaguely  general 
humanity  for  the  edification  of  the  countries 
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concerned.  In this matter theory must be rooted 
in practice, and practice presupposes a real reci- 
procity, or, in other words, a real balance of  Dower.  -  I  In order  to make  no  mistake  as to the real 
meaning  of  international  law,  we  must  always 
remember  that it must  not  run  counter to the 
nature  of  the  State.  No  State can  reasonably 
be  asked to adopt a course which would lead it 
to  destroy  itself.  Likewise  every  State in  the 
comity  of  nations  must  retain the attributes of 
sovereignty  whose  defence  is  its  highest  duty 
even in its international relations.  We  find the 
principles  of  international  law  most  secure  in 
that department of  it which does not trench upon 
questions of  sovereignty;  that is in the domain 
of  etiquette and of  international civil law. 
In times of  peace these agreements are seldom 
encroached upon,  or  if  they  are,  the offence is 
expiated  at once.  Any  insult  offered,  even  if 
only outwardly, to the honour  of  a  State, casts 
doubt upon the nature of  the State.  We mistake 
the  moral  laws  of  politics  if  we  reproach  any 
State  with  having  an  over-sensitive  sense  of 
honour, for this instinct must be highly developed 
in each one of  them if  it is to be true to its own 
essence.  The  State is  no  violet,  to bloom  un- 
Seen;  its  power  should  stand  proudly,  for  all 
the world  to see,  and it cannot allow even the 
symbols  of  it to be  contested.  If  the  flag  is 
insulted, the State must claim reparation ;  should 
this not  be  forthcoming,  war must follow, how- 
ever small the occasion may seem ; for the State 
has never any choice but to maintain the respect 
in which it is held among its fellows. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From this it follows that all the restraints to 
which  States  bind  themselves  by  treaty  are 
voluntary, and that all treaties are concluded on 
the tacit understanding  rebus  sic stantibus.  No 
State ever has, or ever will exist, which is willing 
to hold to all eternity to the agreements  which 
it signs.  No  State will  ever be in a  position to 
pledge  its  whole  hereafter  to a  treaty,  which 
cannot fail to be a limitation of  its sovereignty ; 
it  always intends that the contract shall eventually 
be annulled, and shall only apply so long as the 
present  circumstances  are  not  totally  altered. 
This  principle  is  often  called inhumane, but its 
logical  conclusion shows it to be  the contrary. 
Only if  the State is aware that all its treaties only 
apply conditionally will it go to work prudently 
in the making of them.  History is not meant to 
be looked at from the point  of  view  of  a judge 
hearing a civil suit.  According to that standard, 
Prussia, having signed the Treaty of  Tilsit, would 
have been wrong in attacking Napoleon in 1813. 
But this treaty, like others, had been concluded 
rebus  sic  stantibus,  and, thank  God,  those  res 
had  been  radically  altered  some  years  before. 
A noble nation was given the chance of  shaking 
off an intolerable yoke, and as soon as a people 
is aware  that their time is come, they have the 
right to make the attempt. 
Politics  must  never  discount  the free  moral 
forces  in  the  national  life.  No  State  in  the 
world may renounce the "  I " in its sovereignty. 
If conditions are imposed upon it which impinge 
upon this, and which it is unable to prevent, then 
"the breach is more honoured than the observ- 
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ante."  It is one of  the fine things about history 
that we  see nations more easily consoled for their 
material losses than for injuries to their honour. 
The loss of  a province can always be accepted 
as an inward necessity, but a brave people  feels 
continually  insulted  when  it  has  to endure  a 
servitude, so called.  By keeping his troops per- 
petually  upon  Prussian  soil,  Napoleon  I.  filled 
the  most  patient  hearts  with  burning  hatred. 
When  a  State has  been  hurt in its honour,  the 
breaking of  its treaties is only a question of  time, 
as England and France discovered in 1870, when 
in  their  Crimean  arrogance  they  closed  the 
Black Sea to the war-ships of  exhausted Russia. 
Russia was fully justified  in using the favourable 
opportunity  of  the Franco-Prussian  War to set 
aside  this  agreement  with  the tacit  consent  of 
Germany. 
When a State recognizes that existing treaties 
no longer express the actual political conditions, 
and when it cannot persuade the other Powers to 
give way by peaceful negotiation, the moment has 
come when the nations proceed to the ordeal by 
battle.  A State thus situated is conscious when 
it declares war that it is performing an inevitable 
duty.  The combatant countries are moved by no 
incentives of  personal greed, but they feel that the 
real position of  power is not expressed by existing 
treaties and that they must be determined afresh 
by the judgment  of  the nations, since no peaceful 
agreement  can  be  reached.  The  righteousness 
of  war depends simply and solely upon the con- 
sciousness of  a moral necessity.  War is justified 
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no compelling force superior to themselves, and 
because history must always be in constant flux ; 
war  therefore  must  be  taken  as  part  of  the 
divinely appointed order.  Of  course it is possible 
for  a  Government  to be  mistaken  about  the 
necessity which drives them to declare it; "War 
creates no right which was not already existing," 
as Niebuhr truly said, and, for this very reason, 
isolated  deeds of  violence are justified  by  their 
successful accomplishment,  witness the achieve- 
ment  of  German  and  Italian  unity.  On  the 
other hand, since not every war is caused by an 
inward  necessity,  the  historian  must  keep  his 
vision clear, and remember that the life of  States 
is  counted  in  centuries.  The  proud  saying  of 
the  defeated  Piedmontese, "  We  are  beginning 
again," will always have its place in the chronicles 
of noble nations. 
No  Courts of  Arbitration will  ever succeed in 
banishing  war from the world.  It is absolutely 
impossible for the other members  of  the group 
of  nations  to take  an  impartial  view  of  any 
question  vitally  affecting one  of  their  number. 
Parties there must be, if  only because the nations 
are bound  together,  or  driven  apart by  living 
interests of  the most various kinds.  What Euro- 
pean  country  could  have  taken  a  totally  un- 
biassed  attitude towards the question of  Alsace 
and Lorraine, supposing that Germany had been 
foolish  enough  to submit  it to an  Arbitration 
Court ?  The wildest imagination cannot picture 
a detached  Tribunal in this instance.  Here we 
have  the explanation  of  the well -known fact, 
that international  Congresses  are quite capable 
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of finding legal formulae for the results of  a war, 
but that they can never avert the outbreak of  it. 
A  foreign  State  can  only  pronounce  impartial 
judgment  on matters of third-rate importance. 
We  have already seen that war is  both justi- 
fiable and moral, and that the ideal of  perpetual 
peace is not only impossible but immoral as well. 
It  is  unworthy  of  man's  reason  to regard  the 
impracticable as feasible, but a life of pure intellect 
is all too often enervating to the reasoning faculty. 
War  cannot  vanish  from  the  earth  as  long as 
human sins and passions remain what they are. 
It  is  delightful  to  observe  how  the  feeling 
of  patriotism  breaks  involuntarily  through  the 
cosmopolitan phrases even of  the apostles of  per- 
petual  peace.  The  prophet  Joel  prayed  that 
before its day should dawn Israel might call all 
the heathen to a bloody reckoning in the valley 
of  Jehoshaphat,  and  Victor  Hugo  likewise de- 
manded  that  the  Germans  should  get  their 
drubbing first.  Yet again we  must repeat-the 
arbitrament of  force is the logical outcome of  the 
nature of  the State.  The mere fact of  the exist- 
ence  of  many  States involves  the necessity  of 
war.  The dream of  eternal peace-said  Frederick 
the Great-is  a phantom, which each man rejects 
when  the call of  war rings in his own ears.  It 
is  impossible  to imagine-he  went  on  to say- 
any balance of power which can last. 
War,  however,  is  the  very  sphere  in  which 
we  can most clearly trace the triumph of  human 
reason.  All  noble  nations  have  felt  that  the 
physical  forces  which  war  unchains  require  to 
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law  has  been  developed,  based  upon  mutual 
interests.  This  department  of  international 
jurisprudence,  which  fools  dismiss  as unworthy 
of  a  civilized  people,  is  where  the  science  has 
achieved the most ; in modern days we rarely see 
crude  violations  of  the laws  of  war.  There  is 
nothing  in international law  more  beautiful,  or 
showing more  unmistakably  the  continual  pro- 
gress of mankind, than a whole series of  principles, 
grounded  only  upon  universalis  consensus  and 
yet as firmly established as those of  the Common 
Law  of  any given  country.  It is  evident  that 
the law of  nations must always lag a few  steps 
behind the law of the individual States, for certain 
principles  of  civilization  and law  must  first  be 
developed  at home  before  they  can  be  put  in 
practice in intercourse abroad.  Thus it was im- 
possible to have international legislation against 
slavery until respect for the individual had become 
as universal as our century has made it.  In the 
course of  centuries the instinct for justice between 
countries has become so strong, that at any rate 
the  formal  side  of  international  law  may  be 
looked upon as quite secured.  The publicity  of 
modern  public life has  done much towards this 
end.  The  days of  the  English  Blue-books  are 
indeed at an end ;  Blue, Green, or Yellow, they are 
all  alike intended  to befog  the  Philistine  in  a 
cloud of  incense;  nor  is it ever difficult for an 
adroit diplomat thus to throw dust in the eyes of 
Parliament.  Still,  the  whole  trend  of  political 
life has come into the open to such a degree that 
any gross breach of  international law immediately 
causes great irritation in every civilized country. 
We  will  now  examine  a  few  of  the  funda- 
mental principles which have been legally defined 
primarily by the peaceful intercourse of  nations. 
Every people without exception must nowadays 
be  allowed  to pursue  uninterruptedly  the trade 
and commerce, the arts and sciences, which are 
such  a  bond  between  different  countries.  The 
races of antiquity sometimes forbade other nations 
to  practise  some  particular  industry,  whose 
secrets  they  looked  upon  as their  own  private 
possession.  Even in the time of  the later Roman 
Empire it was forbidden to instruct the barbarians 
in the art of  shipbuilding, and similar monopolies 
were still practically enforced at the date of  the 
Hanseatic  League.  In modern  days this  could 
no longer happen.  No State may deny free com- 
petition in trade to its fellows, and this principle 
is guarded by a system of  treaties. 
In  ancient  times,  moreover,  almost  every 
nation laid claim to some sort of  monopoly with 
regard to the navigation of  a sea.  In later days 
it was still held that particular seas, which were 
not exactly the ocean itself, belonged to certain 
States, as the Adriatic to the Venetian Republic, 
the Ligurian Sea to Venice, the Gulf  of  Bothnia 
to Sweden, and so forth.  Now the sea is only the 
property of the countries upon its shores as far as 
their  military  domination of  it extends, that is, 
within  cannon  range  from  the  shore,  and  this 
limit  has  been  altered  again  quite recently  by 
the advance of  technical science.  All such ques- 
tions are finally decided, however, by the realities 
of power ; if  a State is in a position to dominate 
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will make that sea free.  The Caspian is nomin- 
ally  controlled  by  two  States which  border  it, 
Russia and Persia, but the power of  the former is 
such that we  may call the Caspian a Russian Sea. 
If  a  Government were  established  in Constanti- 
nople which was really able to shut the Bosphorus 
against  every  Navy,  it could  mock  at all  the 
declamations  which  might  be  hurled  against  it. 
For the rest, the ocean is free to every ship sailing 
under  legitimate  colours.  The  policing  of  the 
high  seas  is  provided  by  the  Navies  of  every 
country, for every ship of  war  has the right to 
stop a  merchant vessel  and inspect  her  papers. 
This is the result of  an endlessly long and difficult 
process  of  development,  but all the Powers are 
now  agreed that an occasional inconvenience to 
their  merchantmen  is  a  lesser  evil  than  sea- 
piracy. 
All  international  rights  are  guaranteed  by 
treaties  between  States.  It  is  clear  that these 
must differ in many ways from the contracts of 
civil law. 
The first  distinction is that they can only be 
concluded upon  a basis of  faith and loyalty, as 
there  is no judge  who can enforce their observ- 
ance.  The  Athenians  were  guided  by  a  true 
instinct  when  they  contracted their  agreements 
only for a limited time.  Christian nations think 
otherwise, and make  their treaties  for  eternity, 
but, as we have seen, they are made on the under- 
standing that they are only to endure while the 
conditions  of  power  between  the  contracting 
parties  are not  totally  altered.  The  more  this 
is  insisted  upon,  and  the  more  soberly  each 
State reflects upon it, the more secure will  their 
treaties be. 
There  are, furthermore,  such  things  as com- 
pulsory  treaties.  No  agreement  made  by 
sovereign  States in  time  of  peace  can  ever  be 
so  described-little  Switzerland,  for  instance, 
is  perfectly  at liberty  to make  or  to refuse  a 
peaceful treaty with ourselvcs-but,  on the other 
hand, every peace imposed by the victor on the 
vanquished  must  be  compulsory.  Here  again 
we are confronted  with the question of  who  can 
be  arbiter  endowed  with  legal  authority  to 
pronounce  whether  a  treaty  is  freely  made. 
Neither  does the law  of  nations admit of  lapse 
by  superannuation,  for  this is  in  the nature of 
a  juridical  make-shift.  For instance,  when  the 
law decrees twenty years to be  the prescriptive 
period for theft, the legislator is acting a pretence 
for the practical reason that it does not pay to 
go  on  inquiring  into  trivial  matters  after  so 
great a lapse of  time.  The life of  nations, how- 
ever,  is  counted  by  centuries,  so  that  a  pre- 
scriptive period can only enter into it after long 
ages  have  gone  by.  Frederick  the  Great  was 
absolutely  within  his  rights  when  he  claimed 
the four Silesian Duchies for his State, although 
the treaties which secured them to his House had 
been made more than two hundred years before. 
In international  treaties  great  stress  should 
be  laid upon  the cautious use  of  terms,  and in 
this respect also we  can trace a great progress in, 
the course of  history.  In former times it some- 
times happened that a treaty which was apparently 
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potentiaries had ostensibly exceeded their powers. 
Ancient States got out of  the difficulty by deliver- 
ing  up the  plenipotentiaries,  but  to-day  this is 
no longer  possible.  The  contracting States are 
now not only obliged to bind themselves specific- 
allv.  but a  definite period is also laid down for  -  - 
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the  ratification  of  all  treaties  by  the  supreme 
authorities concerned, and until this ratification 
is  accomplished the contract  is  not completed. 
As  a secondary point,  States are now  bound  by 
their  treaties,  no  matter in whom  the supreme 
authority  is  vested.  The  French  Republic  is 
pledged  to  the  treaties  made  by  the  French 
Empire.  It is therefore important that contracts 
should be worded as clearly as possible, and, as 
a general rule,  should contain no secret clauses, 
for these confuse the legal issue by leading the 
nations,  which  are  ignorant  of  their  contents, 
to form  a  false  estimate of  the obligatims  for 
which they are mutually responsible ; and they 
may  in  consequence  become  a  danger  to their 
own Government. 
Old-fashioned  Cabinets  thought  that  secret 
clauses  gave  them  an opportunity  of  tripping 
up a  rival  State, but the weapon  was  double- 
edged.  Exceptions, of  course, there are.  When 
Prussia made terms of  peace with the conquered 
States of  South Germany  in  1866, an offensive 
and  defensive alliance  was  secretly  contracted, 
which  was  kept  dark  for  a  time.  There  were 
good  reasons  for  this,  for  when  France,  in the 
following year, made her desire for war evident it 
was  publicly  announced  that North  and  South 
Germany would stand together. 
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There is one subject above all others in which 
international law may be set upon a firm footing, 
namely,  international  civil  law,  the  treatment 
which a State metes out to aliens.  An immeasur- 
able step in advance was made when the foreigner 
was  made  absolutely  secure  of  the  protection 
of  the law in every  civilized  country.  It is an 
insult to the human race to say that the law of 
nations  still  rests  upon  mere  force.  This  is 
untrue,  but  still  men  must  not  demand  the 
impossible of  one another.  The difficulties spring 
to light the moment the subject of  international 
civil law is closely studied, for we are faced again 
with  the reservation  which  all these obligations 
contain, and we  see them subject to each nation's 
care for its own security.  Let us make as many 
treaties as we  like about international civil law, 
but  they  must  all presuppose  that the alien  is 
not  troublesome  to  ourselves.  Should  he  be- 
come so, the State must have power to expel him 
without  giving reasons,  even  if  it has  signed a 
treaty which, as a rule, ensures security of  resid- 
ence  to  the  subjects  of  another  Government. 
It  is  thus that persons  are got  rid  of  who  are 
suspected of  being spies or unauthorized agents ; 
discussions of  such cases would  usually  be very 
unpleasant and injurious to the friendly relations 
between the countries.  It is therefore a perfectly 
reasonable principle that every foreigner may be 
immediately  driven  out  with  no  explanation 
beyond that his  presence is not desired.  There 
must be no tampering with this right, for other- 
wise  honest  dwellers  in  a  foreign land will  not 
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what seems harsh  at first  sight turns out to be 
the  truest  kindness.  It  is  impossible,  on  the 
other hand, for the State to be legally empowered 
to banish its own subjects.  If we  were to expel 
the Jesuits, we  might at least be sure that they 
would  find  an asylum  everywhere;  but  if  the 
State tried to do the same by ordinary criminals, 
it would simply have to blow them into the air, 
for no other country would receive them.  Strictly 
speaking, the right of  banishment is inconsistent 
with an organized political society. 
The process of  time has connected a reciprocal 
support in the prosecution of  criminals with the 
mutual defence of  civil law, and with it a whole 
series of  the most  difficult problems have come 
into being.  It is easy enough to state the theory 
that the whole human race is concerned in pro- 
secuting  crime, and  among  noble  nations  this 
principle presents no difficulties until we  come to 
the definition of  what crime is.  The distinction 
between ordinary and political crime at once be- 
comes of  primary importance.  Every State must 
make the prosecution of  persons accused of  high 
treason by another Government dependant upon 
its own interests.  A state of  war may be  latent 
between two countries who are outwardly friendly, 
as is  the case with France and Germany at the 
present  time.  Again,  it may often happen that 
a man whom the law of  his own country regards 
as a political traitor may be the welcome guest of 
another nation, and it would be unreasonable to 
require that they should deliver him up.  Agree- 
ments can be made in respect of  the extradition 
of  common offenders, thongh no State will engage 
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itself to  refuse its protection to political criminals, 
but will always reserve the right of  judgment for 
each  case.  This  applies to political  offences  in 
general, although there are certain bomb-throwing 
Anarchists pure and simple about whom a mutual 
arrangement might be possible. 
The  exact  degree  of  ordinary  crime  which 
involves  extradition  can,  of  course,  only  be 
settled  by  positive  treaties;  but  it should  in 
any  case  be  limited  to really  serious  offences. 
The  great  differences  of  legal  procedure  in  the 
various countries make it imperatively necessary 
to try offenders as much as possible by their own 
laws, and experience has shown that this expan- 
sion of  the powers  of  courts,  as  far as can  be 
managed, has had good results. 
Out of  the joint maintenance of  law has sprung 
an ordered comity of  nations, or system of  States, 
which  has  also  received  its  settled  outward 
forms.  The disputes over etiquette in the seven- 
teenth  century  which  seem  so  ludicrous  to us 
now  had the right idea at the back  of  them in 
spite of  their  lack  of  good  taste.  Even to-day 
a  difference  exists  between  royal  majesty  and 
petty princes, and none the less because unwritten, 
between the Great Powers and second- or third- 
rate States.  A State may be defined as a Great 
Power  if  its total destruction  would  require  a 
coalition  of  other  States  to  accomplish.  The 
preponderance  of  Great  Powers  is  felt  on  all 
hands to-day, yet it has been the very means of 
ensuring a certain security in international traffic. 
The  Congress  of  Aix-la-  Chapelle  in  1818  set 
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all  civilized  countries  now  differentiate  exactly 
between the various classes of diplomats.  Another 
result of  the undue preponderance of  the leading 
European Powers in modern history has been to 
exclude the smaller States from taking a part in 
Congresses unless they are directly concerned in a 
disputed  point.  If, however, one of  these small 
countries is consulted, its opinion is given the same 
weight as that of  one of  the Great Powers.  More- 
over, a Congress is not ruled by a majority, but by 
the liberum veto of  natural Law.  I have spoken 
already about  the unreasonableness  of  deciding 
by the vote of a majority when the question at 
issue is not one of  power in which physical strength 
supports the decision by  the many against  the 
few.  It is not logical to proceed on this basis in 
a Congress which is not waging war, but is formu- 
lating the results of  war, and of  whom unanimity 
must consequently be demanded. 
It  is  not  possible  to  lay  down  any  fixed 
principles  for  international  policy,  for,  as  we 
have  seen, the  unconditional  doctrine  of  inter- 
vention  is  as  false  as  its  antithesis.  Every 
State may  be  placed  in  a  position  where  the 
party  strifes  of  another  country  are  a  menace 
to its own  freedom.  Thus we  may  find that a 
cosmopolitan party at the helm of  a neighbour- 
ing State may lead to consequences so important 
for ourselves that we  are bound for our own sake 
to interfere.  Such intervention is always fraught 
with  danger,  for  the  worship  of  national  in- 
dependence  has  waxed  so  strong  in  our  own 
day that any meddling with  it  will  produce  a 
strong  reaction  in  other  countries  beyond  the 
IN TIME  OF WAR  609 
one  directly  concerned.  Stern  experience  has 
taught modern  States to hold  themselves  aloof 
as much  as possible from the private affairs of 
their  neighbours.  No  dogmas can  decide these 
problems, but when its own safety is at stake a 
State should, and will, take action. 
When a war is actually in progress its guiding 
political idea is to bring about new conditions of 
international  law  which  will  express  the  real 
relative  strength of  the contending parties  and 
be recognized by both of  them.  It is, therefore, 
perfectly  equitable  to wage  war  in  the  most 
effective  manner possible, so that its goal of  peace 
may  be  reached  as  quickly  as  may  be.  For 
this reason the blow must be aimed at  the enemy's 
heart, and the use of  the most formidable weapons 
is  absolutely justifiable,  provided  that they do 
not  inflict  needless  suffering  on  the  wounded. 
Philanthropists  may  declaim  as much  as they 
like against explosive shells fired into the powder 
magazines of  wooden battle-ships, but still facts 
remain  unchanged.  States  in  conclave  have 
dectded what weapons are to be forbidden;  the 
use  of  cxplosive bullets for small arms was pro- 
hibited  at the  instance  of  Russia.  It  is  per- 
missible  to take  advantage  of  all the  enemy's 
weak  points,  and a  State may turn treason  and 
mutiny  within  its enemy's  borders  to serve  its 
own  ends.  Nothing  but  the  rapid  march  of 
events  prevented  us  in  Prussia  from  making  a 
compact with Hungary in 1866. 
It is equally impossible to deny to a belligerent 
State the right of  employing all its troops in the 
field, whether they be  savages or civilized men. 
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It  is  important  to take  an unbiassed  view  of 
ourselves  in  this  question,  in  order  to guard 
against  prejudice  in  respect  of  other  nations. 
The Germans raised a fearful outcry against the 
French  for  letting  loose  the  Turcos  against  a 
civilized nation in the last war.  It was a natural 
accusation  in  the passion  of  the  moment,  but 
our  calmer  judgment  can  find  no  violation 
of  international  law  in  what  was  done.  The 
principle  stands  that a  belligerent  State  may, 
and must, throw all its troops and all its physical 
resources into the struggle.  Where is it possible 
to draw the line ?  Which of  the charming races 
which make up its Empire is Russia to withhold 
from the field ?  A State is obliged to make the 
fullest use of all its material strength, but it must 
do so in accordance with the honourable  usages 
which have been  settled by the long experience 
of  war.  Yet  with  all  this,  the employment  of 
the Turcos places the claim of  France to be the 
leader  of  civilization  in  a  peculiar  light.  Thus 
a  whole  series  of  complaints  arise  because  de- 
mands  are made  upon  a  State which  it cannot 
possibly  satisfy.  In the  national  wars  of  the 
present  day every honest  subject  is a  spy, and 
therefore the banishment of  80,000 Germans from 
France in 1870 was not in itself a violation of the 
law.  but  was  only  indefensible because  it was 
carried out with a certain brutality. 
There is one rule of  humanity in war which is 
theoretically  of  universal  application,  although 
it  is  only  practically  recognized  in  land  cam- 
paigns ; namely, that it is States who are fighting, 
and not their individual citizens.  Certain definite 
signs  there  must  be,  therefore,  to distinguish 
those persons who are entitled to fight by author- 
ity of  the State, and who  are to be  treated as 
soldiers.  It  is an ugly gap in international law 
that  no  universal  agreement  has  as  yet  been 
reached on this point, although it is the founda- 
tion of  all humanity in war.  A soldier must feel 
that he has no foe but the soldiers of  the enemy, 
and that he need not fear that the peasant who 
has met him in peaceful fashion will be shooting 
at him  half  an hour  later from  behind  a  bush. 
The behaviour of  soldiery in an enemy's country 
is sure to be  unfeeling and cruel if  they do not 
know who they should treat as soldiers like them- 
selves,  and  who  as  highway  robbers.  No  one 
can be recognized as a soldier unless he has taken 
the oath of  allegiance, stands under the Articles 
of  War,  and wears  some kind  of  badge  which 
need  not  be  exactly  a  full  uniform.  It  goes 
without  saying  that  the  irregular  levies  who 
hover round the enemy, and do not stand under 
the Articles of  War, should be  treated with un- 
relenting severity.  It is urgently necessary that 
an  international  agreement  should  be  come  to 
over the forms which  make an armed person a 
real  member  of  a  lawful  army.  The  question 
was  discussed  in  Brussels  in  1874,  when  the 
difference of  interests at once became apparent. 
Small States like  Switzerland  had  no  desire  to 
bind themselves by any obligations. 
For  the time  being  every  State continues to 
decide for itself  alone which  of  its opponents it 
will  consider as belonging to the enemy's army, 
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Many of the francs-tireurs of  1870-71  deserve our 
moral respect by their despairing efforts to save 
their  country,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of 
international law they were highway thieves.  As 
such,  Napoleon  justly  treated  Schill  and  his 
companions.  Schill was  a  Prussian  staff-officer 
who  deserted,  who  tempted  his  men  to do the 
same, and who then began a war against France 
as chief of a band of  robbers in the eye of  the law. 
The  King's  anger  against  his  action  knew  no 
bounds, for it was the end of  all political cohesion 
if  every  staff-officer  were  at liberty  to collect 
a  little  army and fight  upon  his  own  account. 
Nevertheless when Napoleon held to the letter of 
international law he perpetrated an unexampled 
piece of  cruelty, and did a very imprudent thing 
into the bargain.  Every noble feeling was nat- 
urally on Schill's side, even as Schenkendorf made 
him prophesy : 
Und mein K6nig selbst wird sagen : 
Ruh in Frieden, treuer Schill ! 
(For my king himself  will tell me, 
cc Sleep in peace, true-hearted Schill.") 
Yet with  all this the action  of  the enemy  was 
absolutely in accordance with the law of  nations. 
When it is quite clearly defined who is part of 
the army, and who may claim honourable treat- 
ment as a prisoner of  war, it becomes possible to 
spare the private  property  of  a  hostile  country 
to a very great extent.  But here again it is im- 
portant to understand that national pride must 
not  be  insulted  in the name  of  humanity.  At 
that same Congress in Brussels, Prussia proposed 
that  a  conquered  hostile  province  should  be 
administered ipso jure  by the military authorities 
of  the  enemy.  This would  in  many  ways  be 
an  advantage  for material  existence.  When  a 
general  knows  that  he  will  have  the  support 
of  international  law  in  requiring  the obedience 
of  the  enemy's  officials  he  will  impose  stricter 
discipline upon his own troops, and altogether he 
will be able to act more humanely.  Nevertheless 
there are more important things to be considered 
than  trade  and  commerce.  The  German  pro- 
posal expressed the confidence of  a nation accus- 
tomed to conquer, but could we  seriously desire 
that Prussian officials should be legally compelled 
to obey the orders of  a Russian general ?  Such 
an excess  of  humanity  would  not  only  lead  to 
dishonour  but  would  also  be  inhumane.  We 
expect  our  countrymen  to resist  the enemy  by 
every means  allowed.  Let us  call to mind  our 
experiences in the past.  No East Prussian sub- 
ject  can  forget  how  President  Dohna  wrought 
against the enemy, and during the Russian occupa- 
tion,  collected  the taxes  for  the rightful  king. 
Are  such  acts to be  forbidden in  the name  of 
philanthropy, and does not patriotism count for 
more ?  It  matters  more  that a  nation  should 
keep  its honour  unsullied  than that a  Russian, 
incensed  by  such  opposition  from  the  sturdy 
men of  Prussia, should burn a couple of  villages 
which he had meant to rule over with his knout. 
International law must  not  meddle in  kindness' 
name with the moral possessions of  a people. 
Private property may be respected to  the widest 
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purely  military possession, so long as the limits 
of  the hostile army are clearly defined.  Requisi- 
tions are permitted, and it is a universal practice 
to give bons in exchange ;  the business of  getting 
these repaid is naturally the concern of  the con- 
quered party.  The wanton  burning  of  villages, 
and  attack upon  private  property  as  such,  of 
which the devastation of  the Palatinate by Melac 
is such a terrible example, is looked upon by all 
modern civilized States as a breach of  international 
law.  Private property may  only  be  injured  to 
the extent rendered  inevitable by the exigencies 
of  war.  It  is mere mockery, however, to apply 
these  principles  to warfare  against  savages.  A 
negro tribe must be  punished by the burning of 
their villages, for it is the only kind of  example 
which  will  avail.  If  the  German  Empire  has 
abandoned  this principle to-day it has done  so 
out of  disgraceful weakness,  and for no reasons 
of  humanity or high respect for 1aw.l 
The standard of  forbearance expected even of 
civilized  nations  should  not  be  higher  than the 
feeling for law which is common to all nations, 
and the State should not be used for experiments 
in philanthropy.  We had a striking example of 
this  truth  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  when, 
in  an access of  false kindness, we  undertook  to 
respect the private property  of  France upon the 
seas.  The impulse was  noble and humane,  but 
we  forgot  that  among  the  other  States  stood 
England,  turning  a  deaf  ear  on  principle  to 
generous ideas, and moreover we  never reckoned 
that France would  not pay us back in our own 
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coin.  Our  unreciprocated  generosity  relieved 
France  of  the necessity  of  protecting  her  com- 
merce against our ships of  war, and enabled her 
to keep  her  whole  fleet free  for  the war.  Her 
marines,  and her  first-class naval artillery were 
a11  brought  ashore,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
winter  we  constantly had to fight against these 
naval troops.  Thus our action only put weapons 
into  the  enemy's  hands.  Every  forward  step 
in international humanity must be founded upon 
reciprocity. 
We  must now  consider a  number  of  cases in 
which doubt arises whether the property in ques- 
tion belongs to the State or to private  owners. 
It goes  without  saying that all the property of 
the State is the spoil of  the victor, and this applies 
first and foremost to military stores in the widest 
sense,  as State railways,  etc.  A  more  difficult 
question arises with regard to the dep8ts of  the 
railways owned by private companies, but never- 
theless  accorded  a  practical  monopoly by  the 
State.  There is no doubt that the enemy may 
make use of  the rolling stock during the war, but 
may he keep the waggons besides ?  The nature 
of  the French railways fully justified  our decision 
in the last war: they were  State-owned, and we 
kept the waggons we  had taken, in order, when 
the settlement came, to return them in part pay- 
ment.  The problem  of  Banks is still harder  to 
decide.  There  are  Banks,  such  as  our  own 
Reichsbank,  in which  a Board  of  bankers have 
an interest as well  as the State.  Commercially 
this  is  an  advantage,  for  it  brings  the Bank 
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it in the front rank of  contemporary commercial 
life.  It is, however, an illusion to suppose that 
it is thus secured from confiscation at the hands 
of  a  foreign  conqueror.  An  enemy  must  un- 
doubtedly treat it as a State Bank, and will  not 
consider the smaller share in it held by private 
persons.  Modern  international  law  lays  down 
that those great treasures of  a State which serve 
the ends of  Science and Art are to be regarded as 
the common property of  all mankind and immune 
from the hand of  the spoiler.  Formerly this prin- 
ciple was systematically trampled upon. 
As  regards  treatment  of  the  standing  army, 
and of  all persons connected with national defence, 
each individual can claim honourable treatment 
as a prisoner  of  war,  and all attempts to place 
such persons in the ranks of  their enemy's army 
is contrary to international law.  It is doubtful, 
however, whether  this principle applied to past 
centuries,  for  it is  one  which  depends  entirely 
upon  the sense of  justice  of  a  given age.  The 
mercenary  system  showed  so  total a  disregard 
of  the  finer  feelings  at the  beginning  of  the 
eighteenth century that one French Regiment, of 
German nationality, was  taken from the French 
by  the  Saxons  at Hochstadt,  and  again  later 
from the  Saxons  by  the  Swedes;  from  the 
Swedes it passed  over to the Prussians at Stral- 
sund,  and  finally  remained  with  them  as  the 
"  Young Anhalt "  Regiment.  Nevertheless, when 
Frederick the Great put the captive  Saxons in 
the Prussian  ranks at Pirna,  it was felt that a 
proceeding  which  had  once  been  undisputed 
was  now  no  longer  possible.  The  Saxons  de- 
serted in herds,  and a  repetition of  the experi- 
ment in modern days would palpably be madness, 
as well as a breach of  law. 
No  one  contests the right of  every State not 
only to make war, but to declare itself neutral in 
the wars of  others, in so far as material conditions 
allow.  It is mere boasting when a State declares 
a neutrality which it is not in a position to  uphold, 
for  neutrality  needs  defence  as  much  as  does 
participation  with  one  of  the belligerents.  The 
neutral  State  must  disarm  every  soldier  who 
crosses its frontier, and should it fail to do so the 
belligerents are justified under some circumstances 
in refusing to recognize its neutrality,  even if  it 
has only permitted the armed enemy to enter a 
single one of  its villages. 
Unhappily the laws of  war are still very differ- 
ently interpreted on land and on the seas, and it 
is here that the mischievous influence of  English 
power over civilization and universal law cannot 
fail to strike any one who chooses to see it.  The 
melancholy saying of  Schiller still holds good : 
Auf  den Wellen ist alles Welle, 
Auf  dem Meer ist kein Eigentum. 
(There is nothing stable among the waves, 
Where no man calls anything his own.) 
Deeply  mortifying as  this is to our pride,  it is 
true, because even to-day there is no balance  of 
power at  sea, and for this we have no one to blame 
but  England.  Her  superiority is  so immeasur- 
able that she can  do whatever  she  pleases.  A 
balance of  naval power must be brought to pass 
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law can hope to be realized upon the seas.  The 
modern  infatuation  of  public  opinion  is  often 
astonishing;  again  and  again  countries  are 
belauded which are following false paths ; again 
and again the sentimentalities of  Belgian teachers 
of  international  law  and the barbarisms of  the 
English maritime code are held up to admiration. 
Every other State would be ready, under certain 
conditions, to respect merchant shipping in time 
of  war, but England alone holds by the principle 
that at sea there is no  distinction to be  made 
between the property  of  the State and the pro- 
perty  of  the individual.  So long  as one  State 
takes  its stand upon  this  all  the  others  must 
imitate its barbarism.  Of  course maritime con- 
ditions  cannot be  quite  the  same  as those  on 
land, because there are many commodities which 
serve  the purposes  of  war.  Therefore  freedom 
for private property cannot be so widely extended 
at sea, but this is no reason why  ocean warfare 
should  to all  eternity  remain  ocean  piracy,  or 
why belligerents should be authorized to despoil 
one another of  all merchandise without distinc- 
tions made. 
Up till now  all progress in maritime law has 
been brought about by the second-class navies. 
Again  and  again  we  see  how  the  Powers  are 
driven for their own sakes to make humane regu- 
lations,  and in this we  have the explanation  of 
the efforts made by the smaller countries to  soften 
the maritime  law.  We  must  not  suppose  that 
the English  are worse individually than anybody 
else,  and if  we  were  in their position  we  might 
perhaps act as they do.  In the League of  armed 
neutrality  in  1780  the second-class navies  laid 
down, firstly, that the flag should cover the goods, 
and the enemy's non-military merchandise should 
pass free in neutral bottoms ;  and secondly, that 
all blockades must be effective, and no Power be 
given the right to declare a blockade of  a whole 
coast which was not actually closed by hostile war- 
ships.  Treaty  after  treaty tried  to give  effect 
to these principles.  England  has  now  at last 
acknowledged that the flag covers the goods,  a 
concession forced from her by the rise of  American 
sea-power.  If  it had  depended  upon  Germany, 
the  question  of  freedom  for  private  property 
at sea  would  have  been  settled  long  ago  by 
international  discussion;  but theory has  no  in- 
fluence over the law of  nations, unless it expresses 
to some extent the actual relative power of  the 
different States. 
From whatever angle we  view political science 
we  find that its proper  function  lies  in  dealing 
with that only true humanity which is rooted in 
the actual facts of  history, and that the dreams 
of  fancy are beyond its scope.  The destinies of 
States are accomplished by processes  of  attrac- 
tion and repulsion whose  final consummation  is 
hidden  from mortal eyes, and whose  tendencies 
can only be dimly guessed at.  There is no need 
for us  to become  critics of  history,  for the real 
point  is to understand how the Divine plan  has 
unfolded itself  little  by little in all the variety 
of  actual  existence.  A  practical  politician  is 
great if  he can read  the signs of  the times, and 
foresee more or less the trend of  history at a given 
moment.  No  quality beseems  him  better than 620  INTERNATIONAL LAW 
modesty.  He  must  not  stray  with  blind  un- 
certainty among the many complex circumstances 
which he has to handle, but he must concentrate 
upon  the attainable  and keep  his  goal  clearly 
before  him.  It is my hope that you may have 
learned from these lectures how many factors go 
to the making of  history and how carefully con- 
sidered all our political judgments should therefore 
be.  If  what I have  said  has  taught  you  this 
modesty of  true science, I shall be well content. 
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right of resistance to, ii. 90 
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i.  257-8 ;  stock  exchange, 
i. 405 ; taxation  in,  ii.  287, 
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ii.  288,  294 ; bailiwicks,  ii. 
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ment  in,  ii.  274,  321,  342 ; 
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Brabant, ii. 342, 411 
Brahmins, i. 308, ii. 25, 27 
Brandenburg, i. 114, ii. 127, 556 ; 
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254, ii. 140 ; attitude towards 
the  Jesuits,  ii.  132 ; corre- 
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Relations with the State :  i. 108, 
328-61, ii. 24 ; conflicts with 
the State, i. 25-8,54, 93-4,98, 
332-3 ; right  of  freedom  of 
conscience,  i.  178 ; right  of 
resistance to the State, i. 185- 
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under the Directory, ii. 303 ; 
ecclesiastical  states dissolved 
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the  necessity  of  money  for 
war,  ii.  444 ; administration 
of  justice  under,  ii.  450, 
rated in public opinion, ii. 67 ; 
illness  of,  ii.  167 ; adminis- 
trative failures,  ii.  133, 191 ; 
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Freemasons, I. 180, 291, 349 
Free Trade, i. 46,  175, 402-3 
Reiburg, ii. 62 
French,  character,  i.  66 ; cyni- 
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George William,  Elector  of  Bav- 
aria, ii.  98 
German  Confederation, i.  127, ii. 
246-7,  345-9 ;  diet  of,  ii. 
337, 338, 345 
German  Emperor,  ii.  370,  373-5, 
377, 380 INDEX  INDEX 
370-3 ;  political  parties,  i. 
150 ; code of  rights of  1848, 
i.  160 ;  Civil Service, ii.  154, 
179, 299, 371-2, 434-5, 525-9, 
535 ;  ministerial  impeach- 
ments, ii.  172-5 ; Reichstag, 
ii. 178, 182-4 ; Imperial Diet, 
ii.  178 ; Federal  Council, i. 
31,  ii.  178-9,  370,  377-8 ; 
royal  rjght  of  assent  and 
veto,  11.  182 -3  ; Imperial 
Chancellor, ii. 339-40, 375-7 ; 
Council of Princes, ii.  378-9 
Culture in, i. 39, 381-2, 386-7 
Education,  elementary,  i.  365- 
71 ;  training  colleges  for 
teachers, i. 370-71 ;  secondary, 
i. 371-8 ; universities,  i. 376- 
880 :  a~~ointment  of teachers, 
German language, i. 111, 270-71 
Germans :  national  characteris- 
tics,  i.  19-20, 273-5, ii.  258, 
434,  521 ;  North  Germans 
more  civilized  than  South 
Germans, i. 67-8 ; conception 
of  freedom,  i.  152 ; absence 
of  national  prejudices,  i. 
178-9 ; racial  origins, i. 280- 
90 ; resistance  to Rome,  11. 
256-7 ;  compared  with  the 
English,  ii. 395 
Germany : subordination to Eng- 
land, i. 24 ; evolution of  the 
State, i. 25, 78-80, 97-8, 110- 
111, 124-5, ii.  358-83 ;  must 
become  a  power beyond  the 
seas,  i. 33-4 ; and the Con- 
gress of  Vienna,  i.  69 ; rail- 
way  system,  i.  75.;  emigra- 
tion from, to Amenca, i. 106, 
118, ii. 295, 297 ; revolution 
of,  1866,  i.  131 ; universal 
suffrage, i. 155, ii. 195-9, 311 ; 
relations with Poland, i. 212, 
ii.  109 ;  growth  of  popula- 
tion, i. 231, 232-3 ; Jews in, 
i. 301-2 ;  Polish provinces of, 
i.  367 ; Teutonic  Order,  ii. 
53-4 ; medieval  cities  of, ii. 
i. 37'9-ib.. 
Finance,  11.  287,  489-511 ; 
Crown  revenues,  11.  184-8, 
490-2 :  national  debt,  11. 
I 
--- - 
512-li, 515, 520-2 
Jurisdiction,  i.  17,  ii.  450-52 ; 
punishment of political crimes, 
i.  152-3 ; criminal  jurisdic- 
tion, ii. 459, 482-3 ; trial by 
jury,  ii.  474-5,  477-8 ; civil 
law, ii. 483-5 
Local  government,  ii.  531-3, 
542, 546, 549-58 
Police, discretionary powers of, 
i. 173 
Press, restrictions on, i. 169-73 ; 
Jewish influence in, ii. 31 
Social conditions,  i.  51 ; home 
life, i. 234 ; marriage,  i. 238, 
265 ; position  of  women,  1. 
245-8 ;  middle class, i. 321-2 ; 
working classes, i. 326 ;  evo- 
lution  of  the  homestead,  i. 
391-2 ;  importance of peasant 
class,  i.  403-4 ;  observance 
of  Sunday, ii. 295 ;  drinking, 
108 ;  and  the  Baltic  Pro-  / 
vinces,  ii.  141 ;  democracy 
in, ii. 324 ; and international 
relations,  ii.  565  - 6,  572-6, 
579-85 ; latent state of  war  / 
with  France,  ii.  606 ; and 
international law,  ii.  588-90, 
604, 612-14 
Aristocracy,  i.  304,  312-7,  ii. 
191-2, 379-81 
Army :  universal  service,  i. 
138 ; admjnistration, ii. 201 ; 
officers,  11.  382 ;  organlza- 
tion, ii. 390, 393-4, 401, 406, 
410-48 ;  Landsknechts,  11. 
412-15; Landswehr, ii. 436-41 ; 
three years'  service restored, 
ii. 438-9 ; one-year volunteer 
system,  ii.  441 ;  provincial 
army corps, ii. 441-2 
Church, i. 79,  82, 334-5, 344-8, 
361, ii. 54-7, 362-3 
Climate  and  geographical  con- 
ditions, i. 206,  209,  213-18 ; 
forests, ii. 493 
Colonization, i. 116-22 
Constitution, i. 159, 184-5, 191- 
193, ii. 59, 82-3, 88-105, 149- 
50,  155-6, 162-3, 178,  182-7, 
ii. 296. 
See also Prussia 
Gervinus, i, 98, 401, ii. 65,  211 
Ghent, ii. 411 
Ghibellines, i. 341 
Gibbon, i. 14 
Glarus, ii. 322 
Gneisenau, ii. 432, 436-7, 579 
Goethe, i. 39,  43, 67-8, 323, 374 ; 
ii.  283,  427 ; opinion  of  the 
press,  i.  176 ; visit  to  the 
Rhineland, i. 220 ;  mother of, 
i.  247 ; Tasso, i.  40, ii.  a1, 
486 
Golden Bull, ii. 169 
Gortschakoff, ii. 593 
Goslar, ii. 359 
Gotha,  compulsory  education  in, 
i. 368 
Gottingen Seven, the, i.  171, 190 
Granada, ii. 37 
Great Britain,  i. 24,  33-4, 53, 75, 
162,  288,  394 ; perpetually 
at  war, i. 65, ii. 394 ; rule in 
India, i.  100, 307 ; evolution 
of,  i.  110,  123-4,  280-81 ; 
relations  with  Holland,  i. 
112, ii.  574 ; and the aboli- 
tion of  slavery, i.  162 ; free- 
dom of  the Press in, i.  168 ; 
under the Commonwealth, ii. 
10 ;  union  with  Hanover, 
ii. 18,330-32 ;  commercialism, 
ii. 19-20 ; Norman Conquest, 
ii. 87 ; and the Seven Years' 
War,  ii.  132,  576 ; Regency 
conflicts,  11.  167 ;  acquisi- 
tion  of .the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  n.  520 ;  maritime 
supremacy,  ii.  576-7 ;  and 
international  law,  ii.  583-4, 
594, 597, 614, 617-19 
Aristocracy,  i.  311-13, 317,  ii. 
122, 150-51,  160, 239,  258 
Army, ii.  201,  391-4, 404-6 
Church, i. 344 
Climate  and geographical  con- 
ditions, i. 207-8, 211,  220-3 
Colonies,  i.  116-17,  331-2,  ii. 
585-6 ;  magnificent  adrnini- 
stration of, i. 78 
Constitution,  i.  146-7,  184-5, 
ii.  90,  100-102, 120,  145-50, 
241 ;  Montesquieu's  appre- 
ciation  of,  ii.  4 ; based  on 
theory  of  contract,  i.  188 ; 
Parliament, i.102,137,312-13, 
ii.  150-60,  183,  188-9,  201, 
258,  541-2 ; illegitimacy  of 
the  Crown,  i.  129 ; party 
government, i. 145-8 ;  minis- 
terial impeachments, ii.  173- 
174 ;  secret balloting, ii. 199 ; 
Civil  Service, iii.  152-4, 524 ; 
Cabinet, ii.  153-4 ;  Board  of 
Public  Health,  ii.  159,  540 ; 
poor  law  administration,  ii. 
ii.  185-7,  490;  taxation,  ii:  1  ~usta&s  Adolphus,  i.  28,  ii. 
498, 500, 508,;  national debt, 
ii. 511-15, 519 
Jurisdiction, i. 125, ii. 450, 456 ; 
criminal  law,  i.  152, ii.  463, 
469 ; law  of  entail,  i.  268 ; 
law of high  treason,  ii.  101,; 
criminal  prosecutions,  11. 
472-3 ;  trial by jury, ii. 475-7; 
status  of  judges,  ii.  476 ; 
civil law, ii. 483 
Literature, i. 37, 323 
Local government, ii. 298,  532, 
535-42 ;  Justices of the Peace, 
i. 313, ii. 152, 159, 532, 535, 
538-41 ;  County  Councils,  ii. 
159, 540-42 
Navy, ii. 405-6 
Police,  restrictions  of  discre- 
tionary powers of, i. 157, 164, 
173 ; institution of, ii. 539 
Population,  growth  of,  i.  227, 
231-2 
Press, freedom of, i. 168 
Royal family, ii. 64,  68 
So~ial  conditions : family life, 
1.  248 ; lack  of  a  peasant 
class,  i.  404 t.  rise  of  the 
middle classes, 11.157; country 
life, ii. 536-8 ; observance of 
Sunday, ii. 295 
Greece (ancient), colonization  of, 
i.  114, 116 ; class system, i. 
308 ; education, i. 363, 373 ; 
theatres, i.  382 ; tyrants of, 
jj. 77, 209-11 ; monarchy in, 
11.  79-83 ; compared  with 
SpaGa, ii. 240-41 ;  democracy 
ln,  11.  304 ;  confederations 
of,  ii.  334-5 ;  army, ii. 408 ; 
international  relations,  ii. 
562-3 ;  national  character, 
i. 273, 289-90 
Greece (modern), i.  144, 155 
Gregory VII.,  ii. 44 
Grillparzer, i. 141 
Grimm, the brothers, ii. 210 
Grimm, Hermann, i. 58, 251 
Grimm,  Jacob,  i.  171,  286,  370, 
379 
Grimm, William, i. 379 
Grote, ii. 247 
Grotius, Hugo, i. xiii, 202,  ii. 269, 
572 
159,  540 ; powerlessness  of 
the Crown, i.  254,  ii.  177-8, 
302 ; right of  royal veto,  ii. 
181-2 
Finance,  ii.  489 ;  Crown lands. 
Guelderland, ii. 339 
Guelphs, the, i. 147, 188, ii. 68,70, 
169, 186 
Gunpowder,  introduction  of,  ii. 
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96-7 ; and the Thirty Years' 
War, ii. 49 ;  military reforms, 
ii. 415-16, 418 
Hague, the, ii. 572 
Halberstadt, ii. 363 
Halle, ii. 326 
Haller, Ludwig von, ii. 93, 96 
Hamilcar, ii. 251 
Hamilton,  Alexander,  ii.  283-4, 
348 
Hannibal, ii. 14-15, 251, 252 
Hanover,  association  \nth  Eng- 
land, ii. 18, 330-32 
Hanover,  House  of,  ii.  64,  146, 
147, 149 
Hanseatic League, i. 279, ii. 335 
Hansemann,  David,  ii.  547 ; 
Prussia  and  France, i.  138, 
ii. 490 
Hapsburg,  House  of:  ii.  359; 
matrimonial  treaties  of,  i. 
108-9 ; inland policy, i:  213 ; 
family  resemblance,  11.  64 ; 
efforts to form a single state, 
ii. 569 
Hardenberg,  Carl  August  von, i. 
103,  162,  ii.  99,  489,  528, 
553:~ 
Harmodius. ii. 210 
- 
~assen~fl;~,  ii. 172-3 
Hastings, Warren, trial of, ii. 174 
Hat-i-Sheruf of  Gulhane, ii. 41 
Haupt, i. 99 
Haussmann, Baron, ii. 536 
Heffter, ii. 589 
Hegel, i. 22, 53, 121, ii. 362, 461 
Heidelberg, i. 223, ii. 366 
Heine, i. 299 
Heinze trial, ii. 484 
Helmholtz, i. 18 
Henneberg, Berthold von, ii. 377 
Henrv  VI.,  Roman  Emperor,  ii. 
i05 
Henry VIII., of England, ii. 165 
Henry III., of France, i. 187 
Henry IV., of  France, i. 126,187, 
264, ii. 124 
Henry V., of  France, i. 132 
Henry,  Prince  (of  Prussia),  ii. 
423, 424, 425 
Henry of  Plauen, ii. 26 
Herder, i. xi, 39, 114 
Herodotus,  historical  method,  i. 
55 ; on democracies, ii. 276 
Herwegh, i. 143 
Hesse, Electorate of, ii. 172-3 
High Treason, i. 53, ii. 101, 467 
Hildesheim, ii. 382 
Hill, Rowland, ii. 524 
Hindus,  caste  system  of,  i.  305, 
307-8 
History:  must be primarily politi- 
cal, i. 55-9 ; qualifications for 
writing of, i. 139-40 
Hobbes, Thomas, i. 5 
Hoche, ii. 428 
Hochstadt, ii. 616 
Hodel, i. 96, ii. 467 
Hofer, Andreas, i. 287 
Hohenfriedberg, Battle of, ii. 422 
Hohenlohe, ii. 365 
Hohenstaufen, ii. 49,105 
Hohenzollerns : followers of  Cal- 
vln,  I.  346 ; institution  of 
compulsory  education  by,  i. 
369 1  patronage of art, i. 386 ; 
legitimacy of,ii. 11; character, 
ii. 63, 65 ;  glorious history of, 
ii. 150 ; elevation of  Prussia 
by,  ii.  362.;  organization  of 
labour by, 11.  419.;  accessions 
to territories of, 11.  526 
Holland :  i. 33, 113 ;  rivalry with 
England,  i.  112 ; rise  of,  i. 
122-3 ; entrance into German 
Customs Union indispensable, 
i.  216 ; elementary  educa- 
tion in, i. 365 ;  constitution, 
ii.  15 ; under  the  House  of 
Orange,  ii.  67 ;  aristocracy 
of,  ii.  229 ;  political  union 
with  Belgium,  ii.  333 ; pre- 
ponderance of, in the Nether- 
lands  Republic,  11.  338-41 ; 
decline of, ii. 347, 574 ;  inter- 
national relations,  ii.  572-3.; 
and  international  law,  11. 
593-4.  See  also Netherlands 
Holst, ii. 328 
Holstein, i. 292-3, ii. 103 
Holtzendorff, ii. 460, 466 
Holy Alliance, the, ii. 578, 580 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  i.  68,  75, 
ii. 110 
Homer, ii. 63, 79-80, 210 
Horace, i. 57, 310, ii. 220 
Hosius. Stanislas, ii. 112 
Hugo, victor, ii. 599 
Huguenots, i. 12, 105-6, 118, 345, 
ii. 126 
~uiboldt,  Alexander von, i. 92 
Humboldt, William, i. 7,  112, ii. 
283-4 ; on the limits of  the 
State's  activity, i.  71-2 ; on 
the  establishment  of  Berlin 
University, i. 362 
ism, i. 51 ;  racial origin, i. 121 
Italy: culture of, i. 38, 384; and 
the Congress of Vienna, i. 69 ; 
and the Rising of  1859, i. 96-7, 
ii. 584 ; prevalence of assassi- 
nation in, i. 103; origin and 
development of  the State,  i. 
110-11, 125 ; revolution in, i. 
130 ;  disappearance of forests 
of, i. 206 ; geographical con- 
ditions,  i.  214 ; position  of 
women in,  i. 244-5 ; distress 
Hundred Years'  War, ii. 121 
Hungary :  acquisition  by  the 
Hapsburgs,  i.  89,  109 ; har- 
bour  of  Fiume  restored  to, 
i.  212 ; rule  by  the  Turks, 
i.  294,  ii.  37 ;  racial  diffi- 
culties  in,  i.  295-8 ;  aris- 
tocracy,  i.  319;  elective 
kingship in, ii.  106 ; lack of 
towns in, ii.  108 ; suggested 
compact with Prussia in 1866, 
ii. 609 
Hunsriick, forest, i. 206, ii. 493 
Hussite Wars, ii. 411 
Ibsen, ii. 333 
Ihering, i. 45 ; Struggle for  Justice, 
ii.  455 ; on  the  nature  of 
punishment, ii. 462 
India, i.  277,  ii.  143 ;  castes  of, 
i.  307-8 ; monarchies  of,  ii. 
25 ; East India Company, ii. 
240 
Indian Civil Service, ii. 524 
Indian Mutiny, i. 100 
Individualism  and  the  State,  i. 
71, 104-6 
Inheritance, Law of, i. 268, 308 
Inte~national Law,  i.  28-9,  96, 
11.  576,  587-620.  See  also 
Treaties 
International relations,  ii.  561-86 
Inventions, influence of, i. 56-7 
Ireland :  conquest  of,  i.  110 ; 
rebellion in, i. 164 ;  growth of 
population, i. 227 ; payment 
of  tithe  by  Catholics  of,  i. 
344-5, 358 
Irish, i. 278 ; members of  Parlia- 
ment, ii. 158 
Isle de France, i. 110 
Israelites,  hereditary  priesthood 
of, ii. 25 
Istria, i. 288 
Italian language, origin of, i. 111 
Italian Renaissance, i. 56 
Italians, i.  27,  287-8 ; dilettant-  .. -.. 
Jezidi  (Kurdish tribe), ii.  22 
Joachim  Frederick,  Elector,  ii. 
526 
caused by free trade in, i, 403 ; 
tyrants  of,  ii.  77,  119,  208, 
209,  211-14 ; city  states of, 
ii. 260 ; democratic republics 
of,  ii.  260 ; medieval  army 
of, ii. 411 ; and the War of 
the  Polish  Succession,  11. 
422 ; local  government,  ii. 
547-9 ;  movement  towards 
unity  in,  ii.  582 ; entrance 
into the European pentarchy, 
ii. 585 
Aristocracy, i. 312, 318 
Church, i. 345, ii. 48-53 
Constitution,  ii.  14,  102 ;  re- 
forms  in,  ii.  130 ; govern- 
ment based on party major!- 
ties,  ii.  183 ; monarchy,  I. 
129, ii. 162 
Jack the Ripper, ii. 465 
Jackson, General, ii. 285 
Jagellons,  ii. 110, 112 
Jahdebusen,  i. 213 
James II., of  England, ii. 146 
Janissaries, ii. 36,  40 
Japan : transfo~mation of  con- 
stitution,  11.  33 ;  develop- 
ment, ii. 585 
Jena, Battle of, ii. 432 
Jena, High Court of, ii. 372 
Jesuits :  ii.  606 ;  attack  on 
Machiavelli,  i.  87 ; incom- 
patible with a modern State, 
i.  181,  356 ; doctrine  of,  i. 
187 ;  seventeenth - century 
missionaries,  ii.  29 ;  toler- 
ance  of  Frederick  the  Great 
and  Catherine 11.  of  Russia 
towards, ii. 132;  code of, ii. 
589-90 
Jesus  Christ,  religious genius  of, 
i. 323 
Jews : i. 81-2,  278,  ii.  29-31 ; in 
Europe,  i. 298-302 ; in Ger- 
many, i. 334, ii. 31 ; Polish, 
ii. 109 
Joel, the prophet, ii. 599 
John  II., ~f France, ii. 69 
John  Caslmir,  of  Poland,  ii. 
115 
John  Sigismund, Elector of  Bran- 
denburg, i.  346, ii. 574 
Johnson,  R.  M.,  President  of 
U.S.A.,  ii. 179-80 
Joseph II., Emperor,  i. 352 INDEX  INDEX 
i. 331;  compared with  Mel- 
anchthon, i. 331 ;  work for the 
liberation of  the State, i. xii, 
83,  341,  343 ; on  national 
education, i. 364 
Lutheran  Church,  cleavage  of, 
from  Reformed  Church,  i. 
331 
Lynch, Judge, i. 110, ii. 293 
Journalists, i. 172-3 
Julius Caesar, i. 300, 311, ii. 256, 
257 
Julius II., Pope, ii. 49 
July Revolution, ii. 580 
Justices of  the Peace.  See Great 
Britain, Local government 
Kaisersberg, Geiler von, i. 14 
Kalkstein, General, i. 155 
Kalksteins, the, ii. 99 
Kamin, ii. 363 
Kant,  i.  15,  39,  40,  114,  158 ; 
The Foundations  of  the  Meta- 
physics  of  Ethics, i. 61 ; cate- 
gorical  imperative,  i.  93 ; 
Natural  Law, i.  189 ; defini- 
tion of religion, i. 329 
Keller, Gottfried, i. 223 
Kleist, Heinrich von, i. 103 
Kollin, Battle of, ii. 423, 425 
Koniggratz, Battle of, i. lW, 368, 
ii. 396, 443 
Konigsberg, ii. 99 
Konigstein  (Saxony), fortress  of, 
ii. 447 
Koran, the, ii. 34, 35, 37 
Kotzebue, i. 102 
Krause, i. 73 
Kreuz-Zeilung, i. 321 
Kshatryas, i. 308 
Kurland, i. 121, 122 
Lachmann, i. 99 
Lafayette, Marquis de, i. 159 
Lamprecht, i. 238 
Landon, ii. 422 
Language, i. 286-7 
Languedoc, Provincial  Assembly, 
ii. 122 
Languet, i. 188 
Lasker,  Deputy,  i.  137,  ii.  194, 
459, 482 
Lassalle,  Frederick : conception 
of  property, i. 391,  393 ; on 
wages  and  labour,  I.  399, 
400 
Latin Confederation, the, ii. 334 
Latin Council of  1215, ii. 476 
Lausanne, ii. 323 
Law : administration  of,  ii.  449- 
485 ;  principle  of. equality 
before  the  law,  11.  451-2 ; 
judges,  11.  454-6 ;  public 
trials,  ii.  452-4 ;  civil  law, 
i.  63-4,  ii.  456-8,  483-5 ; 
criminal law.  See  that title 
Leibnitz, i. 154, ii. 15 
Leipzig :  transference  of  the 
Mazarin, Cardinal, ii. 124 
Mecca, ii. 38 
Mecklenburg:  weakness  of  royal 
authority in, ii. 91 ; Law of 
Succession of  1755, ii. 91-2 ; 
administration, ii. 92 ;  Treas- 
ury system, ii. 96 ; nobility, 
ii. 99 ; blind duke of, ii. 170 
Medici, the, ii. 214 
Supreme  Court  to,  ii.  383 ; 
socialist trial of  1870, ii. 478-9 
Leo XIII., Pope, ii. 52 
Leo : treatise  on  the physiology 
of the State, ii. 19 
Leonardo da Vinci, i. 383, ii. 208 
Leopold  I.,  of  Anhalt-Dessau : 
army reforms of, ii. 425 
Leopold  of  Coburg,  King  of  the 
Belgians, ii. 162 
Leopold, Prince of  Bavaria, ii. 168 
Lesczinski, ii. 111 
Lessing, i. 40 
Leuthen, Battle  of, ii., 424,  425 
Leyden,  University,  1.  279,  ii. 
267 
Liberals : view of  the  Army,  ii. 
391, 393 
Liberum veto, ii. 115 
Lichtenstein Dragoons, ii. 123 
Lieber, Franz, i. 89.. 
Lincoln, Abraham, 11.70, 179,285, 
351, 352 
Literature,  produced  by  the 
middle classes, i. 321 
Livonia, Germans in, i. 122,284 
Livy, ii. 409 
Local  government,  i.  156,  ii. 
530-58 ; value of, i. 52, 139 
Locke :  doctrine of  the division of 
powers, ii. 3 
Lombard City League, ii. 336 
London, i. 70, 164 ;  police organi- 
zation, ii. 159 
Lords-Lieutenants, i. 313, ii. 541 
Lorenz, of Jena, i. 240 
Lorraine, ii. 422 
Louis I.,  Emperor, i. 300 
Louis II., King of  Bavaria, ii. 379 
Louis  XIV.,  of  France, i.  12, ii. 
124-7, 129, 286, 416-17, 571-3 
Louis XVI., of  France, ii. 68 
Louis Napoleon, ii. 301, 479 
Louis Philippe,  i.  244,  322,  325, 
ii. 190, 479 
Louis the Bavarian, Emperor,  i. 
341 
Louvois, ii. 125 
Louvre,  opening of  Art  Galleries 
in, i. 3841. 
Lowenbund, 11.  335 
Lucerne, ii. 357 
Liineburg, monarchy of, ii. 90 
Lusiads, the, i. 38 
Luther, Martin,  i. xv, 5, 187,359, 
366 ; catechism  of,  i.  93 ; 
home  life  of,  i.  246-7,  262 ; 
religious  genius  of,  I.  823 ; 
intolerance  towards  ~wingli, 
Meiningen, i. 201 
Macaulay, i. 55, 73, 144-5, ii. 393,  1  Meissen, ii. 556 
401 
Macedon, monarchy of, ii. 304 
Macedonia, ii. 563 
Machiavelli :  admiration ,of  the 
Ottoman  tyranny,  11.  35 ; 
theory  of  the State,  ii.  570, 
.587-8 ; The Prince,. .  i.  83-8 ; 
Tyrants  Codez,  11.  211 ; 
Dell'  arte della guerra, ii. 417 
MacMahon, Madame, i.  244 
Magdeburg, ii. 363 
Magna Charta, i. 164 
Mago, Dissertation  on Agriculture, 
ii. 249 
Magyars :  i. 293,295-7 ;  incapacity 
for founding towns, ii. 108 
Mahmud II., Sultan, ii. 40 
Mahommed, lack  of  appreciation 
of, i. 332 
Maine, ii. 356 
~al~laquet,  ii. 575 
Malthus,  Doctrine  of  Population, 
i. 228-9 
Manchester  School, i.  65,  ii. 494, 
536 
Manin,  Daniel,  ii.  266 ; Letters 
from Paris, i. 103 
Manhheim, i. 102 
Manteuffel, General, ii. 444 
Manure, discovery of use of, i. 57 
Margaret of  Denmark, i. 253 
Maria  Theresa,  i.  240,  253,  254, 
295, ii.  129 
Maritime Law, ii. 576, 583-4, 594, 
617-19 
Markgrave, office of, i. 121 
Marks, i.  120 
Marriage,  I.  193,  235 ;  group 
marriage,  i.  238 -40 ; mar- 
riage law, i. 261-9 
Mars-la-Tour, ii. 443 
Marwitz, Baron von der, ii. 99 
Marx, on wages and labour, i. 400 
Mathy, Karl, ii. 520 
Matriarchy, i. 238-40 
Maurice  of  Nassau,  Prince  of 
Orange, ii. 269 
Maurice of  Saxony, ii. 361-2 
1  Melac, ii. 614 
Melanchthon :  compared  with 
Luther, i. 331 ; on the rela- 
tions  of  Church  and  State, 
i.  344 ; promotion  of  com- 
pulsory education by, i. 368 
Mendelssohn, Moses, i. 278 
Mennonites, i. 334 
Mercenary armies.  See Armies 
Merovingians, i. 237 
Metternich, ii. 48, 123, 580, 581 
Metz, fortress of, ii. 448 
Mexico, i. 109, ii. 356, 584 
Middle Ages : social conditions of, 
i.  53 ; arts and crafts of,  i. 
383 
Middle classes :  power of, i. 177-8 ; 
counterpart of,  in the castes 
of  India, i. 308 ; social well- 
being of  a  natiou  dependent 
on,  i.  320-21 ;  the producers 
of  national literature and art, 
i. 321 ; economic activity of, 
ibid. ; attempt  to  educate 
lower classes, i. 324-5 
German,, i.  321-2;  French, i. 
322 
Milan, ii. 212,  213 
Mill, John Stuart, i. 255 
Milton,  i.  37,  257 ; Areopagitica, 
i. 168 ;  absence of  fanaticism 
in, i. 331 
Minghetti, ii. 548 
Minos, i. 108 
Mint, the, ii. 494 
~irabeau;  ii. 182 
Mississippi, i. 206 
Mitylene, ii. 562 
Mockern, Battle of, ii. 436 
Mohl, ii. 176 
Moltke, ii. 172, 398, 445 ; popular 
conception of,  i.  324 ; view 
of,  regarding  the  future  of 
Turkey, ii. 41 
Monarchomachen, i. 187 
Monarchy : nature  and  advant- 
ages of, i. 151, ii. 8-20, 58-77 ; 
possibility  of  political  free- INDEX  INDEX 
dom  under,  i.  154 ;  theo- 
cratic  formulae  and  cere- 
monies  retained  in,  ii.  32; 
right  of  resistance to, ii. 89- 
90 ; hereditary  principle,  ii. 
163-4 ;  royal  marriages,  ii. 
164-5 ; insane  monarchs,  ii. 
165-8 ; regencies,  ii.  165-7 ; 
blindness  an  incapacity  for 
rule,  ii.  168-70 ; ministerial 
responsibility for acts of  the 
monarch,  ii.  170-77 ; royal 
power of  assent and veto, ii. 
181-3 ;  royal  revenue,  ii. 
184-8 ;  jurisdiction  under, 
ii. 450-511 
Types of: 11.  76-7 ; early types, 
ii.  78-143 ; absolute,  ii.  76, 
77,  117-43 ;  legendary,  ii. 
76 ;  feudal,  ii.  76,  87 ; 
elective, ii. 76, 571 ; tyranny 
and Caesarism, ii. 77, 207-25 ; 
constitutional,  ii. 144-206 
Mongols, i. 275 
Monogamy, i. 235-7, 240 
Monroe doctrine, ii. 584 
Montana, ii. 51 
Montecucoli, ii. 444. 
Montesquieu,  i.  x111,  ii.  84,  148, 
160-62, 238 ; three  separate 
authorities in the State dis- 
tinguished by,  ii. 3-4 ;  differ- 
entiation  of,  constitutional 
forms, ii. 7 ; on the English 
constitution, ii. 145 
Montfort, Simon de, ii. 188 
Montmorencys, i. 314 
Moral Law,  relation  of  the State 
to, i. 92 
Morgan,  L.  H.,  researches  on 
marriage, i. 238, 239 
Mormons, i. 334 
Moro, Ludovico, ii. 21 4 
Moser, John Jacob, ii. 369 
Moser, Justus, i. 7 
Motley, J. L., ii. 340 
Mulhausen, ii. 343 
Muller, Adam, i. 61 
Muller, Johannes, ii. 343 
Munich, ii. 361 
Munster, ii. 119 
Munychia, ii. 307 
Museums,  establishment  of,  i. 
384-5 
Mutiny Act, ii. 392-3 
209,  266,  349,  359,  365 ; 
army of,  i.  97,  ii.  398,  402, 
419-20, 428-34 ; and Prussia, 
i. 105, ii. 597 ; condemnation 
of  the  hig~ds  ;  Catholic 
processions  forbidden  by,  i. 
354 ; art treasures stolen by, 
i.  385 ; senate  of,  ii.  190 ; 
policy  and  administration, 
ii.  222-4,  529 ;  survival  of 
monarchic  bureaucracy  of, 
ii. 299 ;! Act of  Mediation of 
1803, ii.  319 ; tactics  of,  ii. 
431-2 ; war-chest of, ii. 444 ; 
taxation  of,  ii.  505 ; dream 
of  a world-monarchy, ii. 578 ; 
treatment  of  Schill, ii.  612 
Napoleon III., i. 141 ; coup d'dtat, 
i. 86, 91 ; France raised to a 
first-class power  by, i.  142 ; 
"  saviour of society,"  ii. 402 ; 
and the  Pranco-Prussian War, 
ii.  445 ; misjudgment  of, ii. 
582-3 
Nassau, Duke of, i. 201 
National debts, ii. 511-22 
Nationality, i. 270-302 
Natural  Law,  theory  of,  i.  xii 
et  seqq, 5,  71,  104, 157, 390, 
402, ii. 226 
Navies,  increased  importance  of, 
ii. 448  ...  --- 
Negroes, i.1275-6 
Nelson, i. 37 
Neo-Guelphs, ii. 50 
Netherlands :  revolt of, i. 127,193 ; 
marriage  law  in,  1.  263 ; 
nationalities in, i. 279 ;  middle 
classes of, i. 322 ;  compulsory 
education in, i. 368 ;  brilliant 
history of, ii. 19 ; seven pro- 
vinces of, ii. 230, 351 ; army 
of,  ii.  251 ; constitution  of, 
ii.  266-71,  319, 336-42, 347 ; 
and the House of  Orange, ii. 
284 ; development  of  mili- 
tary science in, ii. 416 
NeufchAtel,  ii.  323 ; association 
with Prussia, ii. 331 
Neuss, ii. 46 
Nevada, ii. 326 
New  York,  ii.  357 ; population 
of,  ii.  296-7 ; and the Con- 
gress of  Philadelphia, ii. 348, 
349 ;  reactionaries  In,  11. 
289-90 ; State of, ii. 326 
Nantes,  Edict  of,  revocation  of,  Newspapers.  See  Press 
i. 264, ii. 126  Nice, i. 204 
Napoleon I., i. xvi, 70, ii. 28, 161,  Nicholas I., of Russia, ii. 140, 580 
Niebuhr, i. xii, 4, 67,  190, 357, ii. 
247, 253, 598 
Nihilists, i. 180 
Nimwegen,  Peace of, ii.  594 
Nobiling, ii. 467 
Nobility.  See  Aristocracy 
Noisseville. Battle of.  ii.  444 
N6rdlingen, Battle of; ii. 416 
Norfolk, Duke of, ii. 147 
Norman Conquest, i. 124, ii. 87 
Normandy,  Provincial  Assembly 
of, ii. 122 
North American Confederation, ii. 
345-7 
North  German  Confederation.  ii. 
352 
Norway :  constitution,  i.  190 ; 
association  with  Sweden,  ii. 
18, 332-4 
Nowawes, ii. 420 
Nuremberg,  ii.  382 ;  council 
house,  ii.  235 ; geniessende 
Familien of,  ii. 259 
Nystadt, Treaty of, ii. 573 
Oates, Titus, ii. 473 
Oath, the, i. 194, 334 
Odoacer, ii. 85-6 
Odysseus, ii. 80 
Oettingen, i. 89 
Ofen, i. 297 
Oldenburg, House of, ii. 64 
Oligarchy, ii. 7 
Olmutz, ii. 422, 438 
Olympia, monuments of, ii. 306 
Ommayades,  ii. 37 
"  Optimates,"  origin of, i. 311 
Orange,  House of, ii. 15, 67, 268- 
70, 284, 340 
Original Sin, doctrine of, i. xviii 
Odeans, House of, ii. 71-2 
Ostracism, ii. 313-14 
Otho IV., Emperor, ii. 46 
Otto, King of Bavaria, ii.  168 
Ottoman Empire.  See  Turkey 
Padua, ii. 260 ;  university of, ii. 265 
Palmerston, Lord, ii. 580 
Pambasileus, ii. 31 
Papacy.  See  Roman  Catholic 
Church 
Papal  States, the.  See States of 
the Church 
Paraguay, Jesuit State in, i. 62-3 
Paris, ii. 427 ; foundation of  Art 
Academy in, i. 384 
Paris Peace Congress of  1856, ii. 
583 
Party, i. 142-51 
Patriotism, i.  14-15 
Paul I., of Russia, ii. 140 
Pauline  of  Lippe - Detmold,  i. 
253 
Peace, idea of eternal peace a sign 
of degeneracy, i. 68-9 
Peel, Sir Robert, ii. 539 
Peloponnesian  War, ii.  246,  309, 
316, 562 
Periander of Corinth, ii. 210 
Pericles, i. 204.380-81. ii. 282.284.  ,  , 
313;  315 . 
Persia, theocratic government  of, 
ii.  31-2 ; and the control  of 
the Caspian Sea, ii. 602 
Peru, States of, i. 276 
Peter  the Great,  i.  284,  338,  ii. 
137 
Petersburg, i. 320 
Pfizer, Paul, i. 25 
Phidias.  i. xix 
~hiladel~hia,  Congress of, ii. 348, 
350,  353-4 
Philidae, ii. 312 
Philip of  Macedon, i. 154, ii. 209 
Philip 11. of  Spain, i.  92, 355, ii. 
68, 122, 131 
Philip the Pair, of  France, i. 341, 
ii. 120 
Phoenicia, ii. 28 ;  colonization of, 
i. 116, ii. 304 
Piacenza, ii. 214 
Piedmont,  i.  33,  .281 ; and  the 
war  of  1859, I.  96-7,  143, ii. 
598 ; division  into  depart- 
ments,  ii.  548 ;  territorial 
aristocracy of, i. 318 ; statute 
enacted  by  in  1848,  ii.  14; 
kings of, ii. 67 
Pindar, i. 18 
Pirna, ii. 616 
Pisa, ii. 214 
Pisistratus of  Athens, ii. 210 
Pitt,  William,  Earl of  Chatharn. 
See Chatham 
Pitt, William, the younger, ii. 155, 
157, 186, 515 
Pius IX., Pope, ii. 26,  45, 50 
Platea, ii. 562 
Platen, ii. 261 
Plato,  i.  xix ;  on  education,  i. 
363 ;  definition of ideal king- 
ship,  ii.  70 ;  admiration  of 
Sparta, ii. 241-2 
Plauen, Heinrich von, ii. 232 
Poland, i. 132-3, ii. 163 ; enmity 
with  Germany, i. 212;  aris- 
tocracy of, i. 319 ; lack of  a 
middle  class,  i.  319 ; pro- INDEX  INDEX 
tection of  Teutonism in Po- 
lish  provinces  of  Germany, 
i.  367 ; monarchy in, ii. 76, 
106-17  ; Parliament, ii.  114- 
116 ;  War of  the Polish Suc- 
cession, ii. 422 ; partitions of, 
ii. 571 
Poles, annihilation of, i. 12 ;  con- 
ception  of  liberty,  1.  152 ; 
Riparian,  i.  226 ; of  Posen, 
1.  290 ;  in  the  Austrian 
Imperial  Parliament, i.  297 
Police,  discretionary  powers  of, 
i. 157,  165, 173 
Polignac, ii. 172 
Political assassinations, i. 102-3 
Political  economy and the State : 
i. 388-406  ; taxation, i. 389 ; 
property, i. 390 et  seqq. ;  the 
working  classes,  i.  397  ef 
seqq. ; wages  and  labour,  i. 
399-400  ;  co-operative  indus- 
trial associations, i. 400-401  ; 
health insurance, i. 400-401  ; 
freetradeandprotectivetariffs, 
i.  402-3  ; capitalism, i. 404 ; 
company legislation, i. 404-5  ; 
stock exchange, i. 405-6 
Political idealism, i. 50 ; fostered 
by war, i. 67 
Politics,  general  definition  of,  i. 
ix et  Feqq. 
Polybius, ii. 16, 252, 256 
Polvcrates of  Samos. ii. 210 
polj.gamY, i. 236,  237,  240 
Pomerania, i. 112, ii. 556 
Pope.  See  Roman  Catholic 
Church 
Population, growth of, i. 226-33 
Portsmouth, ii, 155 
Portugal, i. 38,  ii. 130 ; coloniza- 
tion  of,  i.  116 ; political 
freedom in, i. 155 
Posen, i. 283,  290 
Post Office, administration by the 
State, ii. 494-5 
Press, freedom of, i.  166-78,  352 ; 
and advertisements, i. 171-2  ; 
effect  of,  upon  individual 
culture, i. 176 
Price, Dr., ii. 514 
Priesthood, the, i. 308 
Prittwitz, ii. 397 
Privateering, ii. 583-4 
Professional  classes,  rise  of,  i. 
305-7 
Protestantism :  defects of, i. 247 ; 
ministry of, i. 308 ; compared 
with Catholicism, i. 352, 361 
Prussia, i. xv-xvi, 39,  129, ii. 338, 
582, 609 ; sovereignty of,  i. 
30-31, 49 ; 11.  373-9  ; ex- 
aminations  in,  i.  34-5  ; en- 
franchisement  of  serfs  of, 
1.  49 ;  after  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht,  1.  68;  and  the 
treaty of Tilsit, i. 96, ii. 596- 
597 ; and  Napoleon,  i.  105 ; 
evolution  of  the  State,  i. 
112-13,  127, ii.  366-9,  574-7, 
584 ; in the Middle  Ages,  i. 
114 ;  German  invasion  of, 
i.  121-3  ;  Roman  Catholics 
of,  i.  350-51, ii.  48,  56-7  ; 
agrarian  laws,  i.  389, 393 ; 
free trade  party  in,  i.  402 ; 
unjustly  accused  of  militar- 
ism,  ii.  20 ; the  Teutonic 
Order, ii. 26, 54 ; Provincial 
Diets, ii. 118 ;  class divisions 
in,  ii.  130 ; under  Frederick 
William IV., ii. 167 ; associa- 
tion with Neufchhtel, ii. 331- 
332 ;  and the North American 
Confederation, ii.  346 ; and 
the  second  Silesian  War,  ii. 
364 ; province-system in, ii. 
556 ;  and the war of  1866,  ii. 
604 
Aristocracy, i.  315,  ii.  192 
Army, ii. 36, 418-26,  433-44 
Church:  i.  247, 346, 350-51, 
357-9  ; Church lands, ii.  363 
Constitution : ii.  14, 175 ;  par- 
liamentary system, ii.  191-2,  -  - 
195 
Education, i. 367-8 
Finance, i. 138 
Geographical conditions, i. 218, 
219,  222 
Monarchy in : i. 136-7,  ii. 4, 62, 
67,  76,  118, 126-35,  178,  402 ; 
royal revenue, ii. 185-7 
Prussia,  Western : under the do- 
mination  of  Poland,  ii.  103 ; 
disaffection  of  the  Polish 
aristocracy in, ii. 119 
Prussian  Customs  Law  of  1818, 
ii. 489 
Prussian League, ii. 103 
Prussian Poland, ii. 116-17 
Prussian Town Edict, ii. 551 
Public opinion, i.  141-2,  151 
Pufendorf, i. 154 
Pyrenees, Peace of, ii. 571, 584 
Pyrrhus, ii. 4439 
Quadruple Alliance, ii. 581 
Querfurt, Meinhard von, ii. 232  education in, i. 963-4;  art in, 
Quetelet, i. xvii-xviii  /  i. 382-4  :  monarchy in, ii. 80- 
Racial antagonisms, i. 275-8 
Radicals, i. 106, 143, 158, ii. 276 
Radziwill, the,  ii.  111 ; Elise,  ii. 
164 
Railways :  control of  by the State, 
ii. 494 ; strategic, ii. 445-6 
Ranke, i. 139-40,  ii. 263,  393 
Rauch, i. 383,  386, ii. 249 
Red Indians, i. 132,  276,  281 
Reform, definition of, i. 126 
Reform  Bill  of  1832, i.  147, ii. 
540-42 
Reformation, the, i. 75, ii. 568 
Regensburg,  ii.  367 ; ~eichstag, 
ii. 361 
Reichsbank, ii. 383,  615 
Reinach, Baron de, i. 314 
Religion.  See Church 
Republics, i.  151, 154, ii.  11-20, 
60 ;  aristocratic, ii. 7-8,  226- 
272, 281 ; democratic.  See 
Democracy 
Reuss, ii. 365 ; army of Prince of, 
ii. 374 
Revolutions, i. 126-31 
Rhenish League, ii. 335 
Rhine, right of  Germany to entire 
possession of, i. 215-16 
Rhode Island, ii. 326 
Ricardo, i. 399 
Richard Cmur de Lion, ii. 411 
Richelieu, Cardinal, ii. 121, 124 
phi, i. 303,  398 
Rights  of  man,"  theory  of,  i. 
158-9  ; right to work, i.  166 
Riot Act, the, i. 157 
Ritter, Karl, i. 204 
Ritual.  See Dogma and Ritual 
Robespierre, ii. 290 
Robin Hood, ii. 537 
Rohmer, Friedrich, i. 145 
Roland, Madame, i. 244 
Roman Catholic Church :  monastic 
orders, i.  163 ; influence  on 
nationalities,  i.  291 ;  the 
Papacy,  ii.  13,  24-6,  42-57, 
566, 567 ; invention  of  the 
censorship, i.  170 
Roman Law, i. 16, 17,  ii. 473 
Romans, characteristics  of, i.  57, 
285-90  ; colonization  of,  i. 
116 ; mixed  nationality,  i. 
281 
Rome  (ancient) :  i..  111, ii.  334 ; 
marnage  in,  1.  242 ;  ans- 
tocracy  of,  i.  311,  318 ; 
82 ;  German conquest of, ii. 
86 ; aristocratic  government 
in, ii. 232-3,  236, 238-9,  252- 
260 ; army of, ii. 394,  407-10, 
430 ;  Empire of, i. 132, ii. 71, 
208-9,  215,  222,  563-6 
Roon, ii. 368,376,  427 
Rossbach, Battle of, ii. 331,  424 
Rothe, Richard, i. 54, 88 
Rothenburg, ii. 235 
Rother, ii. 513 
Rothschilds, i.  131, 404, ii.  184, 
308 
~ottiEk,  ii. 90, 103,  176, 589 
Rottweil, ii. 343 
Roumania, i. 190 
Rousseau, i. 5-6,  17,  68, 135,  189, 
ii. 113-14,  116,  160-62,  276 
Riimelin, i. 75,  231 ; Essays  and 
Addresses, i. 89 
Rurik, Kingdom of, i. 110 
Russia, i. 33-4,  89, 105, 110,  221, 
402, ii.  39, 397, 597, 602, 
609-10,  613 ; ethnographical 
conditions,  i:  273 ; German 
pppulatiqn  in  Baltic  pro- 
vlnces,  1.  284-5, ii.  141 ; 
relations with Finland, ii. 18 ; 
enmity with  Turkey,  ii.  39 ; 
trial by jury in, ii. 139 ; and 
the  Seven  Years'  War,  ii. 
576 ; and  the Crimean War, 
ii. 583 
Church, i. 27, 338-9,  ii. 136-7 
Constitution, ii. 105,  136-43 
So~ial  conditions : aristocracy, 
1.  319-20  ; middle  class, j. 
320-21  ;  peasant  class,  11. 
137-9,  141-2 
Ryswyk, Peace of, ii. 594 
Sadowa, ii. 443 
St. Pierre, 1'AbbC Caste1 de, i. 68 
Saladin, ii. 567 
Salic Law, i. 255 
Sallust, i. 18 
San Germano, Countess of, i. 245 
Sand, memorial to at Mannheim, 
i. 102 
Sanudo, i. 128 
Sarrazins. ii. 288 
Savigny, 'i.  xii,  xiii,  4, 190, 266, 
379,  ii. 485, 592 
Savoy, i. 33, 204 
Savoy, House of, ii.  52, 162 
Saxon-Altenburg, ii. 365 
Saxons, the, i. 227, 318 INDEX  INDEX 
Saxony, i. 111, 399, ii. 424-5, 444, 
556,  572 ; aristocracy  of, i. 
315 ; officers  corps,  ii.  382 ; 
Parliament  of,  ii.  102,  191 ; 
kings of, i. 31, ii. 374, 380 
Scandinavian War, the, ii. 573 
Schaffle, Herr, i. 400 
Scharnhorst,  army  organization 
of, i.  309, ii.  432-6 
Schelling, Caroline, i. 247 
Schenkendorf, ii. 612 
Schill, ii. 612 
Schiller, i. 11, 39, 40, ii. 212, 277, 
283, 617 
Schimmelmann, Count, i. 292 
Schinkel i. 385, 386, ii. 249 
Schleiermacher,  i.  93,  178,  194, 
329, 332 
Schleissheim,  Art  Galleries  at, i. 
384 
Schleswig, ii. 103 
Schleswig-Holstein, i. 149 
Schlosser, i. 98, ii. 176 
Schliiter, i. 386, ii. 249 
Schmalkald, League of, ii. 361 
Schwarzenberg,  Felix, i. 89 
Schwarzenberg,  Karl  Philippe, 
Prince of, ii. 432 
Schwyz (canton), prison in, ii. 292 
Scotland, i. 110 
Scott, Sir Walter, i. 37 
Scottish philosophy,  i. 46 
Secret societies, i. 180-81 
Sedan, Battle of, ii. 584 
Self- government.  See  Local 
government 
Seneca, i. 242 
Servius Tullius, ii. 81 
Seven Years'  War, i. 101, ii.  132, 
331, 421-6, 511, 575-6 
Sforza, Francesco, ii. 212 
Sforzas, thc, ii. 212, 213 
Shakespeare, William, i. 37 
Sherman, ii. 353 
Sicily,  administration  of,  under 
Verres, ii. 219 
Siebenbiirgen, i. 227, 318 
Siegen, Duke of, i. 201 
Sieyks, AbbC, ii. 161, 544 
Sigismund 111. of Poland, ii.  113 
Silesia, ii.  119, 556 ; Protestants 
and Catholics in, i. 225-6, 358 
Silesian War, Second, ii. 364 
Simonides, ii. 210 
Slavery, i. 158, 162, ii. 239,280-82, 
285, 600 
Slovaks, i. 226 
Social democrats, i. 41, 239 
Solon, Constitution of, ii. 310 
Sonderbund, ii. 74, 289, 320 
Spain :  i. 20,50,102,110,, 12f, 127, 
155, ii.  130 ; colon~zation,  i. 
116 ; geography  of, i. 215 ; 
under the Ommayades, ii. 37 ; 
and Carthage, ii. 248, 250-51; 
decline of, ii. 571, 573, 585 
Army, ii. 399 
Church, ii. 45 
Constitution :  ii.  102 ;  mon- 
archy, ii. 68 ;  independence of 
the Crown due to Luther,  i. 
341 ;  disappearance of Crown 
lands, ii. 490 
Railways, ii. 183-4 
Spanish, frivolity of, i. 128 
Sparta: i. 212,213, ii. 20,79, 262, 
306 ;  state  education  in,  i. 
363 ; aristocratic republic of, 
ii. 223, 237, 239, 241-8, 253.; 
compared  with  Athens,  11. 
306, 308-9 
Spies, i.  101, ii. 610 
Spinoza, ii.  270, 338, 417-18 
Stade, i. 261 
Stagl, Madame de, i. 244 
Stahl, i.  126 
State,  the :  the State idea, i. 3-59 ; 
aims of, i.  60-80 ;  in relation 
to the moral law,  i.  81-106 ; 
rise and fall of states, i. 107- 
133 ;  government of, i. 134-95, 
ii.  387-8 ;  finance  of,  i.  138, 
ii.  202-6,  486-522 ; and in- 
dustry, i. 165, ii. 494-5 ;  land 
and people,  i.  199-233 ; and 
the family, i.  234-69 ; races, 
tribes,  and  nationalities,  i. 
270-302 ; castes, estates, and 
classes,  i.. 303-27 ; and  the 
Church,  1.  328 - 67 ;  and 
education,  i.  362-87 ;  and 
political  economy,  i.  388- 
406 ; forms  of  Constitution, 
ii.  3-383 ; administration, ii. 
387-8 ; constitution  of  the 
army,  ii.  389 - 448 ; admini- 
stration of  justice, ii. 449-85 ; 
Civil Service, ii. 523-30 ;  local 
government,  ii.  530-58 ; in- 
tercational  politics,  ii.  561- 
586 ;  international  law,  ii. 
587-619 
States,  confederations  of.  See 
Confederations 
States, Federal.  See Federal States 
States of the Church, i. 130, ii. 11, 
Society and the State; i. 44-59  '  45-6,  55-6 
Statesmanship,  qualifications  for, 
i.  58, 98 
Statistics, i. xvii-xviii 
Stein, Freiherr vom, i. 162, ii. 137, 
230, 528, 551-2, 556, 579 
Stein-Hardenberg Agrarian Legis- 
lation, i. 389 
Stock Exchange, i. 4.05-406,  ii. 303 
Stockholm, ii. 235 
Stolbergs, ii. 191, 365 
Strafford, Earl of, ii. 171-2 
Stralsund, ii. 616 
Strassburg :  cathedral, i. 182 ;  for- 
tress, ii. 448 
Stuarts, i. 131, ii. 68, 146, 171 
Sudras. i. 3n8 
suffrage, i.-183 ;  universal, i. 352, 
ii. 195-9, 311-12 
Sulciman I., Sultan, i. 83 
Sweden,  i.  112, ii.  98,  326,  601 ; 
liberation  of,  by  Gustavus 
Vasa.  i.  120 : illedtimacv of  -  - 
royai  house,  i.  129,  i31 ; 
association  with  Norway,  ii. 
18, 332-4 ; under the Vasas, 
ii.  67 ;  under  Gustavus 
Adolphus  and his  successors, 
ii.  96-7 ;  and  the  Thirty 
Years'  War, ii. 572 ; decline 
of, ii. 574 
Swiss :  racial origin, i. 278-9 ;  ideal 
of  freedom  and  equality,  ii. 
275-6 :  thriftiness,  ii.  288 ; 
c.onse&ativeness, if. 289 ;  in: 
stinct for law, ii. 365 
Switzerland : existence of  neces- 
sary  to  the  international 
situation, i. 32-3, 113 ; luris- 
prudence in, i. 35 ;  origins of, 
i.  122-3, ii.  358 ; geography 
of, i. 214, 223 ;  lack of  a true 
aristocracy, i. 317-18; Church, 
i.  351 ;  class distinctions,  ii. 
229-30 ;  plutocracy  in,  ii. 
240,  291 ;  low  standard  of 
culture,  ii.  286 ; experiment 
with progressive  income-tax, 
ii.  499 ;  and  international 
law, ii. 594, 603, 611 
Constitution,  i.  200,  291-2,  ii. 
74, 280, 288, 292, 303, 317-24, 
335-7, 341 el seqq. 
Sybel, ii. 85 
Synesius, ii. 86 
Syria, ii. 563 
Tacitus, i. 4, ii. 16, 219-20 
Talleyrand, i.  129 
Tallien, Madame, i. 244 
Tammany-ring, ii. 290 
Tannenberg,  Battle  of,  ii.  54,  - 
411 
Taparelli, Luigi, i. 5 
Tariffs, protective, i. 403 
Taxation, i. 389 ; German dislike 
of,  ii.  94-8 ; direct  and in- 
direct,.. ii.  495-506 ;  income 
tax,  11.  506-7 ;  communal 
imposts,  ii.  507-10 ;  rent 
duty, ii. 510 
Temple, Sir William, i. 36 
Teutonic  Order.  the, i.  121, 127, 
ii. 26,  53, i12, 231, 232- 
Texas, ii. 285, 326 
Themistocles, ii. 307, 311, 312 
Theocracies, i. 62, ii. 9, 11 et seqq., 
21 -57 
~heodohc  the Ostrogoth, i. 300 
Thiers, ii. 113, 163 
Thirtv Years'  War, i. 104, 149, ii. 
.  . 
~homasius,  .i. 154 
Thorn, massacre of, ii. 112 
Thorwaldsen, i. 38-9 
Thucydides,  i.  56,  108,  204,  ii. 
284, 562 
Thurgau, canton of, ii. 344 
Thuringia, i. 201 
Tibet, theocracy in, ii. 29 
Ticino, the, ii. 343 
Tilsit, Treaty of, i. 96, ii. 596 
Transylvania, i. 296 
Travelling, stupidity of, i. 224 
Treaties : conditional validity of, 
i.  28,  96,  ii.  596-7 ; com- 
mercial, ii. 601 ;  duration of, 
ii.  602-603 ; compulsory,  ii. 
603 ;  wording  of, ii. 603-604 ; 
secret clauses, ii. 604 
Treitschke,  Heinrich  von,  youth- 
ful  radicalism  of,  i.  190 ; 
Historical and Political Essays, 
ii. 53 n. ; IIislory of  Germany, 
ii. 48 n., 66 n., 90 n. 
Trent, i. 287 
Treves, ii. 56 
Trial  by jury,  ii.  474-82 ; intro- 
duced into Russia, ii. 139 
Trieste, ii. 262 
Troubadours, i. 243, 246 
Tudors, the, ii. 120, 171 
Turcos,  employment  of,  in  the 
Pranco-Prussian  War, ii.  610 
Turin, ii. 575 
Turkey : i. 293-4, 319 ; theocratic 
government  of,  ii.  33-42 ; 
and  Russia,  ii.  39,  142 ; 
alliance with France, ii. 569 ; INDEX 
and the Paris Peace Congress, 
11.  583 ;  and  international 
law, ii. 592 
Tuscany, i. f?l, ii. 422 
Tyrannies,  n.  207-25 ;  ancient, 
ii.  208-211 ;  mediaeval,  ii. 
211-14 : Caesarism, ii. 214-22 ; 
~ona~artism,  ii. 222-5. 
Ultramontane party, i.  144 
United  States of  America,  i. 75, 
402,  ii.  11,  75-6,  276,  305, 
365 ; intellectual  mediocrity, 
i. 78, ii. 294 ; evolution of the 
Union, i. 110, ii. 358 ;  growth 
of  population,  i.  116 ; rela- 
tions  with  England, i.  117 ; 
immigration  of  Germans  to, 
i.  118 ; and the abolition of 
slavery,  1.  162 ;  claim  to 
possess  all  North  America, 
i.  222 ; Irish  population,  i. 
227 ;  chivalry  towards 
women  in,  1.  248-9 ;  trade 
opened  with  Japan,  ii.  33 ; 
aristocratic  character  of  the 
Southern  States,  4j.  271-2 ; 
hero-worship  in,  n.  284-5 ; 
reactionaries  in,  ii.  289-90 ; 
social conditions, ii. 291, 295- 
8 ;  moral  dogmatism  in, 
ii.  295 1.  temperance  legisla- 
tion,  11.  296-7 ;  political 
parties,  ii.  303 ; stock  ex- 
change, ii. 303 ; materialism, 
ii.  317 ; commercial  treaty 
with Frederick  the Great, jj. 
577 ;  and  privateering,  11. 
583 : rise of  sea-power of, ii. 
619 ' 
Church,  ii.  295 ; ''  voluntary 
system,"  i.  346-8 ;  admini- 
stration of  Church property, 
i.  357 ; Roman Catholics,  ii. 
325 
Constitution, i.  135, ii.  179-80, 
283-305,  324-9,  336-7,  347 
et  seqq.,  381 ;  conservatism 
of, i.  125 ;  presidency, ii. 70- 
71,  283-4, 301-2 ; expensive- 
ness  of,  ii.  286-8 ; govern- 
ment officials, ii. 298-9,  371, 
533 
Jurisdiction, ii. 292-4 
Universal service.  See Armies 
Universal  suffrage.  See  Suffrage 
Ud, ii. 280, 321 
Utrecht, Peace  of,  i.  68,  ii.  573, 
579 
Vaisyas,  i. 308 
Valmy, ii. 427 
Vasa, Gustavus, i. 120 
Vasas, the, ii. 67 
Vauban, ii. 418 
Vaud, Pays de, ii. 344 
Venice  (ancient) : i.  38,  319,  ii. 
73,  319,  601 ;  government, 
i.  135,  ii.  232,  238,  262-6 ; 
blind doge of, ii. 169 ;  ]uns- 
diction, ii.  233,  294 ; archi- 
tecture,  ii.  234 ; diplomacy, 
ii.  235-6,  569 ;  checking 
system,  ii.  236 ; fall  of,  ii. 
237 ;  development  of,  ii. 
260-62  -..  - 
Ventura, ii. 51 
Verdun, Treaty of, ii. 359 
Vermont, ii. 356 
Verona, ii. 212, 260 
Verres,.ii. 219 
Victoria.  Queen,  i.  254,  ii.  148,  -. 
178' 
Vienna,  mediaeval  culture  of,  i. 
298 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  i.  69,  129, 
219, ii. 237, 556-7, 578-81 
Vincke, Freiherr von, i. 134 
Virgil, i. 57, ii. 220 
Virginia, ii. 356 
Visconti, the, ii. 213 
Vizille, ii. 122 
Vlaks, i. 226, 227, 296 
Volapuk, i. 178 
Voltaire, i. 87 
Wachsmuth,  E.  W.,  Histosg  of 
Party, i. 148 
Waldeck,  Benedict,  i.  136,  350 ; 
trial of, ii. 473 
Wallenstein, i. 13, 213, ii. 50 
Walpole, Sir Robert, ii. 156 
Walter von der Vogelweide, i. 223 
Waluieff, Count, ii,  137 
War :  necessity of, i. 14-15, ii. 597- 
600 ;  sacredness  of,  i.  29 ; 
powerto reinvigorate anation, 
i.  51,  et  seqq. ; conduct  of  a 
function of  the State, i. 65- 
70 ;  nature  of,  1.  66-9 ; 
economic  effects  of,  i.  70 ; 
a factor in State construction, 
i.  108-9 ;  majesty,.  of,  11. 
395-6 ; and politics, 11.  397-8 ; 
foreign  policy  expressed  in 
terms  of  force,  n.  9.04 ; 
finance of, ii. 444,  512,518-9 ; 
weapons,  ii.  609 ;.  and inter- 
national  law,  n.  599-600, 
INDEX 
609-617 ;  respect  for  private 
property, ii. 613-16 ;  prisoners 
of  war,  ii.  616 ; obligations 
of neutral states, ii. 617 
War  of the Polish  Succession, ii. 
422 
War  of  the  Spanish  Succession, 
ii. 573, 577 
Wars of  the Roses, ii. 120 
Warsaw : ii. 113, 142 ; church of 
St. John,  ii. 108 
Washington,  George,  i.  115 ; ii. 
62,  73,  283-5,  305,  327-8, 
345-6, 434 
Weimar, i. 40, 201 ; Grand Duke 
of, ii. 379 
Weimar, Bernhard von, ii. 417 
Welcker, i. 190 
Wellesley,  Richard  C.,  Marquis 
Wellesley, i. 100 
Wellington, Duke of, i. 146, ii. 405 
Wends, i. 290 
Werder,  General, ii. 446 
Wessex, i. 110 
West  Point,  U.S.A.,  Military 
College, ii. 271 
Westphalia, i. 112, 122, ii. 556 
Westphalia, Treaty of, i. 125, 346, 
ii. 360, 363,  569-72 
Wiesbaden, Church of, i. 354 
William  I.,  King  of  Prussia, 
German  Emperor,  i.  25,  31, 
102;  ii. 65, 68, 69, 164, 167, 
367.  375. 427 
Women :  and marriage, i. 239-42 ; 
influence  on  the  spread  qf 
Christianity,  i.  242-3 ; posl- 
tion of : in Prance, i. 243-4 ; 
in Italy, i. 244-5 ;  in Germany, 
i. 245-8 ;  in England, i. 248 ;  in 
America,  i.  249-50 ;  female 
emancipation, i. 248-50 ; pro- 
fessions  open  to,  i.  250-60 ; 
entry  into  universities,  i. 
251-2 ; as sovereigns, i. 253-5; 
as  authors,  i.  256-7 ;  as 
doctors,  i.  257 ;  more  in- 
clined  to piety  than men,  i, 
329 
Working classes, the :  i. 308,322-7 ; 
education, i. 324-5 ;  necessity 
for considerate treatment of, i. 
325 ; emigration to the cities, 
i.  326-7 ; wages and labour, 
i.  399-400 ; co-operative  as- 
sociations,  i. 400-401 ;  health 
insurance, i. 401 
Wrangel, ii. 397 
Writing, influence of  discovery of, 
i. 57 
Wurtemberg, i.  129, ii.  338,  382 ; 
Estates  of,  ii.  91 ; nepotism 
in, ii. 99 
Wurtemberg,  King of, i. 31 
Yorck, i. 105 
York's  Corps, ii. 436 
~illiarn.~.,  of Orange, i. 86, ii. 269 
William III., of England, i. 123-4, 
ii. 146, 147, 270, 392 
William the Conqueror, i. 200. ii. 87 
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zamoiski, ii. 113 
Zohnenuhr,"  i. 178 
Zollverein,  i.  140,  141, ii.  366-7, 
371-2. 582 
Winckelmann, i< 220 
Wines,  a  factor in civilization, i. 
222 
Zurich, ii.'  323, 342, 344, 357 
Zwingli,  i.  186, 331,  ii.  74,  317, 
322, 344 